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Author SHA1 Message Date
Greg Kroah-Hartman c58091a3ea Linux 5.7.2 2020-06-10 20:21:45 +02:00
Oleg Nesterov 516c0cb6a5 uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned
commit 013b2deba9 upstream.

uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe()
relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but
some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this.

We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the
offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches
the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures,
so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE.

Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very
beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is
aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:45 +02:00
Josh Poimboeuf 8af4d77272 x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list
commit 3798cc4d10 upstream

Make the docs match the code.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:45 +02:00
Mark Gross 73c5cad3af x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation
commit 7222a1b5b8 upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

 [ bp: Massage.
   jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:45 +02:00
Mark Gross cdf4110fb3 x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation
commit 7e5b3c267d upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:45 +02:00
Mark Gross 468e86c304 x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()
commit 93920f61c2 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Mark Gross dc7919a5a3 x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id
commit e9d7144597 upstream

Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.

On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.

 [ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Srinivas Kandagatla 7885998deb nvmem: qfprom: remove incorrect write support
commit 8d9eb0d6d5 upstream.

qfprom has different address spaces for read and write. Reads are
always done from corrected address space, where as writes are done
on raw address space.
Writing to corrected address space is invalid and ignored, so it
does not make sense to have this support in the driver which only
supports corrected address space regions at the moment.

Fixes: 4ab11996b4 ("nvmem: qfprom: Add Qualcomm QFPROM support.")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522113341.7728-1-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Oliver Neukum d08cc4db8f CDC-ACM: heed quirk also in error handling
commit 97fe809934 upstream.

If buffers are iterated over in the error case, the lower limits
for quirky devices must be heeded.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Reported-by: Jean Rene Dawin <jdawin@math.uni-bielefeld.de>
Fixes: a4e7279cd1 ("cdc-acm: introduce a cool down")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526124420.22160-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Pascal Terjan 9a07c5a296 staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK
commit 15ea976a1f upstream.

The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e46
("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and
while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants
I noticed this driver uses the old value.

The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the
second definition.

Signed-off-by: Pascal Terjan <pterjan@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200523211247.23262-1-pterjan@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Jiri Slaby 4d18b3f94e tty: hvc_console, fix crashes on parallel open/close
commit 24eb2377f9 upstream.

hvc_open sets tty->driver_data to NULL when open fails at some point.
Typically, the failure happens in hp->ops->notifier_add(). If there is
a racing process which tries to open such mangled tty, which was not
closed yet, the process will crash in hvc_open as tty->driver_data is
NULL.

All this happens because close wants to know whether open failed or not.
But ->open should not NULL this and other tty fields for ->close to be
happy. ->open should call tty_port_set_initialized(true) and close
should check by tty_port_initialized() instead. So do this properly in
this driver.

So this patch removes these from ->open:
* tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL). This happens on last close.
* tty->driver_data = NULL. Dtto.
* tty_port_put(&hp->port). This happens in shutdown and until now, this
  must have been causing a reference underflow, if I am not missing
  something.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: Raghavendra <rananta@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526145632.13879-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Dmitry Torokhov 7ca8cd811d vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii
commit b86dab0540 upstream.

When k_ascii is invoked several times in a row there is a potential for
signed integer overflow:

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888:19 signed integer overflow:
10 * 1111111111 cannot be represented in type 'int'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:154
 handle_overflow+0xdc/0xf0 lib/ubsan.c:184
 __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x2a/0x40 lib/ubsan.c:205
 k_ascii+0xbf/0xd0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888
 kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1477 [inline]
 kbd_event+0x888/0x3be0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495

While it can be worked around by using check_mul_overflow()/
check_add_overflow(), it is better to introduce a separate flag to
signal that number pad is being used to compose a symbol, and
change type of the accumulator from signed to unsigned, thus
avoiding undefined behavior when it overflows.

Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525232740.GA262061@dtor-ws
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Josh Triplett 740049da81 serial: 8250: Enable 16550A variants by default on non-x86
commit 15a3f03d5e upstream.

Some embedded devices still use these serial ports; make sure they're
still enabled by default on architectures more likely to have them, to
avoid rendering someone's console unavailable.

Reported-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reported-by: Maxim Kochetkov <fido_max@inbox.ru>
Fixes: dc56ecb81a ("serial: 8250: Support disabling mdelay-filled probes of 16550A variants")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a20b5fb7dd295cfb48160eecf4bdebd76332d67d.1590509426.git.josh@joshtriplett.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:44 +02:00
Paul Cercueil 665cc6af90 usb: musb: jz4740: Prevent lockup when CONFIG_SMP is set
commit 685f5f2410 upstream.

The function dma_controller_irq() locks up the exact same spinlock we
locked before calling it, which obviously resulted in a deadlock when
CONFIG_SMP was enabled. This flew under the radar as none of the boards
supported by this driver needs SMP.

Fixes: 57aadb46bd ("usb: musb: jz4740: Add support for DMA")

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525025049.3400-6-b-liu@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:43 +02:00
Dinghao Liu b23a5312fc usb: musb: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error
commit e4befc121d upstream.

When copy_from_user() returns an error code, there
is a runtime PM usage counter imbalance.

Fix this by moving copy_from_user() to the beginning
of this function.

Fixes: 7b6c1b4c0e ("usb: musb: fix runtime PM in debugfs")

Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525025049.3400-7-b-liu@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:43 +02:00
Bin Liu 788481763e usb: musb: start session in resume for host port
commit 7f88a5ac39 upstream.

Commit 17539f2f4f ("usb: musb: fix enumeration after resume") replaced
musb_start() in musb_resume() to not override softconnect bit, but it
doesn't restart the session for host port which was done in musb_start().
The session could be disabled in musb_suspend(), which leads the host
port doesn't stay in host mode.

So let's start the session specifically for host port in musb_resume().

Fixes: 17539f2f4f ("usb: musb: fix enumeration after resume")

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525025049.3400-3-b-liu@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:43 +02:00
Fabrice Gasnier 538dbbb320 iio: adc: stm32-adc: fix a wrong error message when probing interrupts
commit 10134ec3f8 upstream.

A wrong error message is printed out currently, like on STM32MP15:
- stm32-adc-core 48003000.adc: IRQ index 2 not found.

This is seen since commit 7723f4c5ec ("driver core: platform: Add an
error message to platform_get_irq*()").
The STM32 ADC core driver wrongly requests up to 3 interrupt lines. It
should request only the necessary IRQs, based on the compatible:
- stm32f4/h7 ADCs share a common interrupt
- stm32mp1, has one interrupt line per ADC.
So add the number of required interrupts to the compatible data.

Fixes: d58c67d1d8 ("iio: adc: stm32-adc: add support for STM32MP1")
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Gasnier <fabrice.gasnier@st.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:43 +02:00
Jonathan Cameron baccc99716 iio:chemical:pms7003: Fix timestamp alignment and prevent data leak.
commit 13e945631c upstream.

One of a class of bugs pointed out by Lars in a recent review.
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp assumes the buffer used is aligned
to the size of the timestamp (8 bytes).  This is not guaranteed in
this driver which uses an array of smaller elements on the stack.
As Lars also noted this anti pattern can involve a leak of data to
userspace and that indeed can happen here.  We close both issues by
moving to a suitable structure in the iio_priv() data with alignment
explicitly requested.  This data is allocated with kzalloc so no
data can leak appart from previous readings.

Fixes: a1d642266c ("iio: chemical: add support for Plantower PMS7003 sensor")
Reported-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tomasz Duszynski <tomasz.duszynski@octakon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:43 +02:00
Mathieu Othacehe b2f5864534 iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.
commit 18dfb53263 upstream.

The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped
unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be
returned.

Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while
and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up.

Fixes: 62a1efb9f8 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe@gmail.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:43 +02:00
Jonathan Cameron 15c5184ff1 iio:chemical:sps30: Fix timestamp alignment
commit a5bf6fdd19 upstream.

One of a class of bugs pointed out by Lars in a recent review.
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp assumes the buffer used is aligned
to the size of the timestamp (8 bytes).  This is not guaranteed in
this driver which uses an array of smaller elements on the stack.

Fixes: 232e0f6dde ("iio: chemical: add support for Sensirion SPS30 sensor")
Reported-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tomasz Duszynski <tomasz.duszynski@octakon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:43 +02:00
Johan Hovold 4c88f55316 USB: serial: ch341: fix lockup of devices with limited prescaler
commit c432df1559 upstream.

Michael Hanselmann reports that

	[a] subset of all CH341 devices stop responding to bulk
	transfers, usually after the third byte, when the highest
	prescaler bit (0b100) is set. There is one exception, namely a
	prescaler of exactly 0b111 (fact=1, ps=3).

Fix this by forcing a lower base clock (fact = 0) whenever needed.

This specifically makes the standard rates 110, 134 and 200 bps work
again with these devices.

Fixes: 3571456508 ("USB: serial: ch341: reimplement line-speed handling")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>	# 5.5
Reported-by: Michael Hanselmann <public@hansmi.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200514141743.GE25962@localhost
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:42 +02:00
Michael Hanselmann 43e424a2d8 USB: serial: ch341: add basis for quirk detection
commit c404bf4aa9 upstream.

A subset of CH341 devices does not support all features, namely the
prescaler is limited to a reduced precision and there is no support for
sending a RS232 break condition. This patch adds a detection function
which will be extended to set quirk flags as they're implemented.

The author's affected device has an imprint of "340" on the
turquoise-colored plug, but not all such devices appear to be affected.

Signed-off-by: Michael Hanselmann <public@hansmi.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1e1ae0da6082bb528a44ef323d4e1d3733d38858.1585697281.git.public@hansmi.ch
[ johan: use long type for quirks; rephrase and use port device for
	 messages; handle short reads; set quirk flags directly in
	 helper function ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>	# 5.5
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:42 +02:00
Daniele Palmas 2aa7a88fea USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions
commit 399ad9477c upstream.

Add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions:

	0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet
	0x1033: tty, tty, tty, ecm

Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525211106.27338-1-dnlplm@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:42 +02:00
Bin Liu e55b113a0b USB: serial: usb_wwan: do not resubmit rx urb on fatal errors
commit 986c1748c8 upstream.

usb_wwan_indat_callback() shouldn't resubmit rx urb if the previous urb
status is a fatal error. Or the usb controller would keep processing the
new urbs then run into interrupt storm, and has no chance to recover.

Fixes: 6c1ee66a0b ("USB-Serial: Fix error handling of usb_wwan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:42 +02:00
Matt Jolly 42cf5f017f USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support
commit 3429444abd upstream.

Add support for Dell Wireless 5816e Download Mode (AKA boot & hold mode /
QDL download mode) to drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c

This is required to update device firmware.

Signed-off-by: Matt Jolly <Kangie@footclan.ninja>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-10 20:21:42 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman dbd736c811 Linux 5.7.1 2020-06-07 11:33:02 +02:00
Dan Carpenter b37adef3d0 airo: Fix read overflows sending packets
commit 11e7a91994 upstream.

The problem is that we always copy a minimum of ETH_ZLEN (60) bytes from
skb->data even when skb->len is less than ETH_ZLEN so it leads to a read
overflow.

The fix is to pad skb->data to at least ETH_ZLEN bytes.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Hu Jiahui <kirin.say@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527184830.GA1164846@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:33:02 +02:00
DENG Qingfang bb91074415 net: dsa: mt7530: set CPU port to fallback mode
commit 38152ea37d upstream.

Currently, setting a bridge's self PVID to other value and deleting
the default VID 1 renders untagged ports of that VLAN unable to talk to
the CPU port:

	bridge vlan add dev br0 vid 2 pvid untagged self
	bridge vlan del dev br0 vid 1 self
	bridge vlan add dev sw0p0 vid 2 pvid untagged
	bridge vlan del dev sw0p0 vid 1
	# br0 cannot send untagged frames out of sw0p0 anymore

That is because the CPU port is set to security mode and its PVID is
still 1, and untagged frames are dropped due to VLAN member violation.

Set the CPU port to fallback mode so untagged frames can pass through.

Fixes: 83163f7dca ("net: dsa: mediatek: add VLAN support for MT7530")
Signed-off-by: DENG Qingfang <dqfext@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:33:01 +02:00
Sakari Ailus b6a8a6ef7e media: staging: ipu3-imgu: Move alignment attribute to field
commit 8c038effd8 upstream.

Move the alignment attribute of struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s to the
field in struct ipu3_uapi_4a_config, the other location where the struct
is used.

Fixes: commit c9d52c114a ("media: staging: imgu: Address a compiler warning on alignment")
Reported-by: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Bingbu Cao <bingbu.cao@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v5.3 and up
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:33:01 +02:00
Sakari Ailus a57840a6e0 media: Revert "staging: imgu: Address a compiler warning on alignment"
commit 81d1adeb52 upstream.

This reverts commit c9d52c114a.

The patch being reverted changed the memory layout of struct
ipu3_uapi_acc_param. Revert it, and address the compiler warning issues in
further patches.

Fixes: commit c9d52c114a ("media: staging: imgu: Address a compiler warning on alignment")
Reported-by: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Bingbu Cao <bingbu.cao@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v5.3 and up
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:33:01 +02:00
Jérôme Pouiller ccb290b274 mmc: fix compilation of user API
commit 83fc5dd57f upstream.

The definitions of MMC_IOC_CMD  and of MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD rely on
MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR:

    #define MMC_IOC_CMD       _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 0, struct mmc_ioc_cmd)
    #define MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 1, struct mmc_ioc_multi_cmd)

However, MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR is defined in linux/major.h and
linux/mmc/ioctl.h did not include it.

Signed-off-by: Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200511161902.191405-1-Jerome.Pouiller@silabs.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:33:00 +02:00
Daniel Axtens 8c20f4355a kernel/relay.c: handle alloc_percpu returning NULL in relay_open
commit 54e200ab40 upstream.

alloc_percpu() may return NULL, which means chan->buf may be set to NULL.
In that case, when we do *per_cpu_ptr(chan->buf, ...), we dereference an
invalid pointer:

  BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0x7dae0000
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000003f3fec
  ...
  NIP relay_open+0x29c/0x600
  LR relay_open+0x270/0x600
  Call Trace:
     relay_open+0x264/0x600 (unreliable)
     __blk_trace_setup+0x254/0x600
     blk_trace_setup+0x68/0xa0
     sg_ioctl+0x7bc/0x2e80
     do_vfs_ioctl+0x13c/0x1300
     ksys_ioctl+0x94/0x130
     sys_ioctl+0x48/0xb0
     system_call+0x5c/0x68

Check if alloc_percpu returns NULL.

This was found by syzkaller both on x86 and powerpc, and the reproducer
it found on powerpc is capable of hitting the issue as an unprivileged
user.

Fixes: 017c59c042 ("relay: Use per CPU constructs for the relay channel buffer pointers")
Reported-by: syzbot+1e925b4b836afe85a1c6@syzkaller-ppc64.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+587b2421926808309d21@syzkaller-ppc64.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+58320b7171734bf79d26@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d6074fb08bdb2e010520@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Akash Goel <akash.goel@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.10+]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191219121256.26480-1-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:33:00 +02:00
Herbert Xu 3927c3cd9a crypto: api - Fix use-after-free and race in crypto_spawn_alg
commit 6603523bf5 upstream.

There are two problems in crypto_spawn_alg.  First of all it may
return spawn->alg even if spawn->dead is set.  This results in a
double-free as detected by syzbot.

Secondly the setting of the DYING flag is racy because we hold
the read-lock instead of the write-lock.  We should instead call
crypto_shoot_alg in a safe manner by gaining a refcount, dropping
the lock, and then releasing the refcount.

This patch fixes both problems.

Reported-by: syzbot+fc0674cde00b66844470@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 4f87ee118d ("crypto: api - Do not zap spawn->alg")
Fixes: 73669cc556 ("crypto: api - Fix race condition in...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:59 +02:00
Matthew Garrett e7b57188a5 mt76: mt76x02u: Add support for newer versions of the XBox One wifi adapter
commit b2934279c3 upstream.

The current version has a new USB ID and reports as an 0x7632 device.
Adding the IDs results in it working out of the box.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:59 +02:00
Giuseppe Marco Randazzo d62c14fe06 p54usb: add AirVasT USB stick device-id
commit 63e49a9fda upstream.

This patch adds the AirVasT USB wireless devices 124a:4026
to the list of supported devices. It's using the ISL3886
usb firmware. Without this modification, the wiki adapter
is not recognized.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Marco Randazzo <gmrandazzo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com> [formatted, reworded]
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200405220659.45621-1-chunkeey@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:58 +02:00
Julian Sax c9d47d53ce HID: i2c-hid: add Schneider SCL142ALM to descriptor override
commit 6507ef1066 upstream.

This device uses the SIPODEV SP1064 touchpad, which does not
supply descriptors, so it has to be added to the override list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Julian Sax <jsbc@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:58 +02:00
Benjamin Tissoires 469ab273c8 HID: multitouch: enable multi-input as a quirk for some devices
commit 40d5bb8737 upstream.

Two touchpad/trackstick combos are currently not behaving properly.
They define a mouse emulation collection, as per Win8 requirements,
but also define a separate mouse collection for the trackstick.

The way the kernel currently treat the collections is that it
merges both in one device. However, given that the first mouse
collection already defines X,Y and left, right buttons, when
mapping the events from the second mouse collection, hid-multitouch
sees that these events are already mapped, and simply ignores them.

To be able to report events from the tracktick, add a new quirked
class for it, and manually add the 2 devices we know about.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207235
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:58 +02:00
Scott Shumate 764a088c07 HID: sony: Fix for broken buttons on DS3 USB dongles
commit e72455b898 upstream.

Fix for non-working buttons on knock-off USB dongles for Sony
controllers. These USB dongles are used to connect older Sony DA/DS1/DS2
controllers via USB and are common on Amazon, AliExpress, etc.  Without
the patch, the square, X, and circle buttons do not function.  These
dongles used to work prior to kernel 4.10 but removing the global DS3
report fixup in commit e19a267b99 ("HID: sony: DS3 comply to Linux gamepad
spec") exposed the problem.

Many people reported the problem on the Ubuntu forums and are working
around the problem by falling back to the 4.9 hid-sony driver.

The problem stems from these dongles incorrectly reporting their button
count as 13 instead of 16.  This patch fixes up the report descriptor by
changing the button report count to 16 and removing 3 padding bits.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e19a267b99 ("HID: sony: DS3 comply to Linux gamepad spec")
Signed-off-by: Scott Shumate <scott.shumate@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:57 +02:00
Fan Yang e98a6a24ba mm: Fix mremap not considering huge pmd devmap
commit 5bfea2d9b1 upstream.

The original code in mm/mremap.c checks huge pmd by:

		if (is_swap_pmd(*old_pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd)) {

However, a DAX mapped nvdimm is mapped as huge page (by default) but it
is not transparent huge page (_PAGE_PSE | PAGE_DEVMAP).  This commit
changes the condition to include the case.

This addresses CVE-2020-10757.

Fixes: 5c7fb56e5e ("mm, dax: dax-pmd vs thp-pmd vs hugetlbfs-pmd")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:57 +02:00
Brad Love fadfe0e17d media: dvbdev: Fix tuner->demod media controller link
commit 9f984cacf4 upstream.

Fixes bug exposed by:

[a3fbc2e6bb: media: mc-entity.c: use WARN_ON, validate link pads]

The dvbdev incorrectly requests a tuner sink pad to connect to a demux
sink pad. The media controller failure percolates back and the dvb device
creation fails. Fix this by requesting a tuner source pad. Instead of
forcing that pad to be index zero, check if a negative integer error
is returned. A note is added that first source pad found is chosen.

Affected bridges cx231xx and em28xx printed the below warning[s]
when a variety of media controller dvb enabled devices were connected.
The warning returns an error causing all affected devices to fail DVB
device creation.

[  253.138332] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  253.138339] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1550 at drivers/media/mc/mc-entity.c:669 media_create_pad_link+0x1e0/0x200 [mc]
[  253.138339] Modules linked in: si2168 em28xx_dvb(+) em28xx si2157 lgdt3306a cx231xx_dvb dvb_core cx231xx_alsa cx25840 cx231xx tveeprom cx2341x i2c_mux videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videodev mc ir_rc5_decoder rc_hauppauge mceusb rc_core eda
c_mce_amd kvm nls_iso8859_1 crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper efi_pstore wmi_bmof k10temp asix usbnet mii nouveau snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic input_leds ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi mxm_wmi snd_hda_in
tel video snd_intel_dspcfg ttm snd_hda_codec drm_kms_helper snd_hda_core drm snd_hwdep snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event i2c_algo_bit snd_pcm snd_rawmidi fb_sys_fops snd_seq syscopyarea sysfillrect snd_seq_device sysimgblt snd_timer snd soundcore ccp mac_hid sch_fq_codel parport_p
c ppdev lp parport ip_tables x_tables autofs4 vfio_pci irqbypass vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio hid_generic usbhid hid i2c_piix4 ahci libahci wmi gpio_amdpt
[  253.138370]  gpio_generic
[  253.138372] CPU: 0 PID: 1550 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W         5.7.0-rc2+ #181
[  253.138373] Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/B350M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 2.G0 04/27/2018
[  253.138376] RIP: 0010:media_create_pad_link+0x1e0/0x200 [mc]
[  253.138378] Code: 26 fd ff ff 44 8b 4d d0 eb d9 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff 44 89 c8 c3 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb f2 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb e8 <0f> 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb af 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb a5 66 90
[  253.138379] RSP: 0018:ffffb9ecc0ee7a78 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  253.138380] RAX: ffff943f706c99d8 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  253.138381] RDX: ffff943f613e0180 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff943f706c9958
[  253.138381] RBP: ffffb9ecc0ee7ab0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff943f613e0180
[  253.138382] R10: ffff943f613e0180 R11: ffff943f706c9400 R12: 0000000000000000
[  253.138383] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff943f706c9958 R15: 0000000000000001
[  253.138384] FS:  00007f3cd29ba540(0000) GS:ffff943f8ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  253.138385] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  253.138385] CR2: 000055f7de0ca830 CR3: 00000003dd208000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[  253.138386] Call Trace:
[  253.138392]  media_create_pad_links+0x104/0x1b0 [mc]
[  253.138397]  dvb_create_media_graph+0x350/0x5f0 [dvb_core]
[  253.138402]  em28xx_dvb_init+0x5ea/0x2600 [em28xx_dvb]
[  253.138408]  em28xx_register_extension+0x63/0xc0 [em28xx]
[  253.138410]  ? 0xffffffffc039c000
[  253.138412]  em28xx_dvb_register+0x15/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[  253.138416]  do_one_initcall+0x71/0x250
[  253.138418]  ? do_init_module+0x27/0x22e
[  253.138421]  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[  253.138423]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1ec/0x270
[  253.138425]  ? __vunmap+0x1e3/0x240
[  253.138427]  do_init_module+0x5f/0x22e
[  253.138430]  load_module+0x2525/0x2d40
[  253.138436]  __do_sys_finit_module+0xe5/0x120
[  253.138438]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xe5/0x120
[  253.138442]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20
[  253.138443]  do_syscall_64+0x57/0x1b0
[  253.138445]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  253.138446] RIP: 0033:0x7f3cd24dc839
[  253.138448] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1f f6 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  253.138449] RSP: 002b:00007ffe4fc514d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[  253.138450] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a9237f63f0 RCX: 00007f3cd24dc839
[  253.138451] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055a922c3ad2e RDI: 0000000000000000
[  253.138451] RBP: 000055a922c3ad2e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  253.138452] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[  253.138453] R13: 000055a9237f5550 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 000055a9237f63f0
[  253.138456] ---[ end trace a60f19c54aa96ec4 ]---

[  234.915628] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  234.915640] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1502 at drivers/media/mc/mc-entity.c:669 media_create_pad_link+0x1e0/0x200 [mc]
[  234.915641] Modules linked in: si2157 lgdt3306a cx231xx_dvb(+) dvb_core cx231xx_alsa cx25840 cx231xx tveeprom cx2341x i2c_mux videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videodev mc ir_rc5_decoder rc_hauppauge mceusb rc_core edac_mce_amd kvm nls_iso8859
_1 crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper efi_pstore wmi_bmof k10temp asix usbnet mii nouveau snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic input_leds ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi mxm_wmi snd_hda_intel video snd_intel_dspcf
g ttm snd_hda_codec drm_kms_helper snd_hda_core drm snd_hwdep snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event i2c_algo_bit snd_pcm snd_rawmidi fb_sys_fops snd_seq syscopyarea sysfillrect snd_seq_device sysimgblt snd_timer snd soundcore ccp mac_hid sch_fq_codel parport_pc ppdev lp parport ip_tab
les x_tables autofs4 vfio_pci irqbypass vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio hid_generic usbhid hid i2c_piix4 ahci libahci wmi gpio_amdpt gpio_generic
[  234.915700] CPU: 0 PID: 1502 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.7.0-rc2+ #181
[  234.915702] Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/B350M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 2.G0 04/27/2018
[  234.915709] RIP: 0010:media_create_pad_link+0x1e0/0x200 [mc]
[  234.915712] Code: 26 fd ff ff 44 8b 4d d0 eb d9 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff 44 89 c8 c3 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb f2 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb e8 <0f> 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb af 0f 0b 41 b9 ea ff ff ff eb a5 66 90
[  234.915714] RSP: 0018:ffffb9ecc1b6fa50 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  234.915717] RAX: ffff943f8c94a9d8 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  234.915719] RDX: ffff943f613e0900 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff943f8c94a958
[  234.915721] RBP: ffffb9ecc1b6fa88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff943f613e0900
[  234.915723] R10: ffff943f613e0900 R11: ffff943f6b590c00 R12: 0000000000000000
[  234.915724] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff943f8c94a958 R15: 0000000000000001
[  234.915727] FS:  00007f4ca3646540(0000) GS:ffff943f8ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  234.915729] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  234.915731] CR2: 00007fff7a53ba18 CR3: 00000003da614000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[  234.915733] Call Trace:
[  234.915745]  media_create_pad_links+0x104/0x1b0 [mc]
[  234.915756]  dvb_create_media_graph+0x350/0x5f0 [dvb_core]
[  234.915766]  dvb_init.part.4+0x691/0x1360 [cx231xx_dvb]
[  234.915780]  dvb_init+0x1a/0x20 [cx231xx_dvb]
[  234.915787]  cx231xx_register_extension+0x71/0xa0 [cx231xx]
[  234.915791]  ? 0xffffffffc042f000
[  234.915796]  cx231xx_dvb_register+0x15/0x1000 [cx231xx_dvb]
[  234.915802]  do_one_initcall+0x71/0x250
[  234.915807]  ? do_init_module+0x27/0x22e
[  234.915811]  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[  234.915816]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1ec/0x270
[  234.915820]  ? __vunmap+0x1e3/0x240
[  234.915826]  do_init_module+0x5f/0x22e
[  234.915831]  load_module+0x2525/0x2d40
[  234.915848]  __do_sys_finit_module+0xe5/0x120
[  234.915850]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xe5/0x120
[  234.915862]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20
[  234.915865]  do_syscall_64+0x57/0x1b0
[  234.915870]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  234.915872] RIP: 0033:0x7f4ca3168839
[  234.915876] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1f f6 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  234.915878] RSP: 002b:00007ffcea3db3b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[  234.915881] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055af22c29340 RCX: 00007f4ca3168839
[  234.915882] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055af22c38390 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  234.915884] RBP: 000055af22c38390 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  234.915885] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[  234.915887] R13: 000055af22c29060 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  234.915896] ---[ end trace a60f19c54aa96ec3 ]---

Signed-off-by: Brad Love <brad@nextdimension.cc>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-07 11:32:56 +02:00
50 changed files with 645 additions and 126 deletions
@@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
Date: January 2018
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
mds
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst
special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
=============================================
SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
infer values returned from special register accesses. Special register
accesses are accesses to off core registers. According to Intel's evaluation,
the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
to MDS attacks.
Affected processors
--------------------
Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
be affected.
A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
============= ============ ========
common name Family_Model Stepping
============= ============ ========
IvyBridge 06_3AH All
Haswell 06_3CH All
Haswell_L 06_45H All
Haswell_G 06_46H All
Broadwell_G 06_47H All
Broadwell 06_3DH All
Skylake_L 06_4EH All
Skylake 06_5EH All
Kabylake_L 06_8EH <= 0xC
Kabylake 06_9EH <= 0xD
============= ============ ========
Related CVEs
------------
The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
============== ===== =====================================
CVE-2020-0543 SRBDS Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
============== ===== =====================================
Attack scenarios
----------------
An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
Mitigation mechanism
-------------------
Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
processor.
During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
overwritten.
This has three effects on performance:
#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
bandwidth.
#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
as EGETKEY execution).
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
--------------------------------
Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
for other logical processors.
Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
with the option "srbds=". The option for this is:
============= =============================================================
off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
affected platforms.
============= =============================================================
SRBDS System Information
-----------------------
The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
The possible values contained in this file are:
============================== =============================================
Not affected Processor not vulnerable
Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
mitigation
Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
effect.
Mitigation: TSX disabled Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
enabled while this system was booted with TSX
disabled.
Unknown: Dependent on
hypervisor status Running on virtual guest processor that is
affected but with no way to know if host
processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
============================== =============================================
SRBDS Default mitigation
------------------------
This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
reuse. Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
RDRAND and RDSEED.
@@ -4757,6 +4757,26 @@
the kernel will oops in either "warn" or "fatal"
mode.
srbds= [X86,INTEL]
Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
(SRBDS) mitigation.
Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
exploit which can leak bits from the random
number generator.
By default, this issue is mitigated by
microcode. However, the microcode fix can cause
the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
much slower. Among other effects, this will
result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
the following option:
off: Disable mitigation and remove
performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
Specifies how frequently to check for
grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 7
SUBLEVEL = 0
SUBLEVEL = 2
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
+24 -3
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@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@
#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_D 0xd
#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_NANO 0xf
#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins)
/**
* X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
* X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
* @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
* The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
* @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
* @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
* @_steppings: Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
* @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
* @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
* format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
@@ -37,15 +39,34 @@
* into another macro at the usage site for good reasons, then please
* start this local macro with X86_MATCH to allow easy grepping.
*/
#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
_feature, _data) { \
#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
_steppings, _feature, _data) { \
.vendor = X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, \
.family = _family, \
.model = _model, \
.steppings = _steppings, \
.feature = _feature, \
.driver_data = (unsigned long) _data \
}
/**
* X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Macro for CPU matching
* @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
* The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
* @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
* @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
* @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
* @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
* format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
* etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
*
* The steppings arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE() is
* set to wildcards.
*/
#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, feature, data) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, \
X86_STEPPING_ANY, feature, data)
/**
* X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor, family and CPU feature
* @vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+2
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@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSRM (18*32+ 4) /* Fast Short Rep Mov */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT (18*32+ 8) /* AVX-512 Intersect for D/Q */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL (18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT (18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
#define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
@@ -407,5 +408,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
+4
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@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@
#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */
#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */
/* SRBDS support */
#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0)
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
+1
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@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ static inline int pmd_large(pmd_t pte)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
/* NOTE: when predicate huge page, consider also pmd_devmap, or use pmd_large */
static inline int pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd)
{
return (pmd_val(pmd) & (_PAGE_PSE|_PAGE_DEVMAP)) == _PAGE_PSE;
+106
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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
l1tf_select_mitigation();
mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
/*
* As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
@@ -397,6 +399,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
enum srbds_mitigations {
SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
};
static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
};
static bool srbds_off;
void update_srbds_msr(void)
{
u64 mcu_ctrl;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
return;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
return;
if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
return;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
switch (srbds_mitigation) {
case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
break;
case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
break;
default:
break;
}
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
}
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
{
u64 ia32_cap;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
return;
/*
* Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
* TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
*/
ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
update_srbds_msr();
pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}
static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
return -EINVAL;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
return 0;
srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
return 0;
}
early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
@@ -1528,6 +1621,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@@ -1572,6 +1670,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
return srbds_show_state(buf);
default:
break;
}
@@ -1618,4 +1719,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
}
#endif
+45 -11
View File
@@ -1075,9 +1075,30 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
{}
};
static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
{}
};
static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@@ -1097,31 +1118,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
/*
@@ -1139,7 +1163,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1148,7 +1181,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
@@ -1591,6 +1624,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
mtrr_ap_init();
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
update_srbds_msr();
}
static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
+1
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@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
+6 -1
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@@ -39,13 +39,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
for (m = match;
m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
m++) {
if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
continue;
if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
continue;
if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
continue;
if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
!(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
continue;
if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
continue;
return m;
+16 -6
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@@ -716,17 +716,27 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_drop_spawn);
static struct crypto_alg *crypto_spawn_alg(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct crypto_alg *alg = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
struct crypto_alg *target;
bool shoot = false;
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
alg = spawn->alg;
if (!spawn->dead && !crypto_mod_get(alg)) {
alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_DYING;
alg = NULL;
if (!spawn->dead) {
alg = spawn->alg;
if (!crypto_mod_get(alg)) {
target = crypto_alg_get(alg);
shoot = true;
alg = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
}
up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
return alg ?: ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
if (shoot) {
crypto_shoot_alg(target);
crypto_alg_put(target);
}
return alg;
}
struct crypto_tfm *crypto_spawn_tfm(struct crypto_spawn *spawn, u32 type,
+2 -1
View File
@@ -333,12 +333,13 @@ static unsigned int crypto_ctxsize(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
return len;
}
static void crypto_shoot_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
void crypto_shoot_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_DYING;
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_shoot_alg);
struct crypto_tfm *__crypto_alloc_tfm(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
u32 mask)
+1
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@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ void crypto_alg_tested(const char *name, int err);
void crypto_remove_spawns(struct crypto_alg *alg, struct list_head *list,
struct crypto_alg *nalg);
void crypto_remove_final(struct list_head *list);
void crypto_shoot_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg);
struct crypto_tfm *__crypto_alloc_tfm(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
u32 mask);
void *crypto_create_tfm(struct crypto_alg *alg,
+8
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@@ -562,6 +562,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -570,6 +576,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -580,6 +587,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_mds.attr,
&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
NULL
};
+26
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
#define MT_QUIRK_ASUS_CUSTOM_UP BIT(17)
#define MT_QUIRK_WIN8_PTP_BUTTONS BIT(18)
#define MT_QUIRK_SEPARATE_APP_REPORT BIT(19)
#define MT_QUIRK_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT BIT(20)
#define MT_INPUTMODE_TOUCHSCREEN 0x02
#define MT_INPUTMODE_TOUCHPAD 0x03
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ static void mt_post_parse(struct mt_device *td, struct mt_application *app);
#define MT_CLS_WIN_8 0x0012
#define MT_CLS_EXPORT_ALL_INPUTS 0x0013
#define MT_CLS_WIN_8_DUAL 0x0014
#define MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT 0x0015
/* vendor specific classes */
#define MT_CLS_3M 0x0101
@@ -279,6 +281,15 @@ static const struct mt_class mt_classes[] = {
MT_QUIRK_CONTACT_CNT_ACCURATE |
MT_QUIRK_WIN8_PTP_BUTTONS,
.export_all_inputs = true },
{ .name = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
.quirks = MT_QUIRK_ALWAYS_VALID |
MT_QUIRK_IGNORE_DUPLICATES |
MT_QUIRK_HOVERING |
MT_QUIRK_CONTACT_CNT_ACCURATE |
MT_QUIRK_STICKY_FINGERS |
MT_QUIRK_WIN8_PTP_BUTTONS |
MT_QUIRK_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
.export_all_inputs = true },
/*
* vendor specific classes
@@ -1714,6 +1725,11 @@ static int mt_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id)
if (id->group != HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8)
hdev->quirks |= HID_QUIRK_MULTI_INPUT;
if (mtclass->quirks & MT_QUIRK_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT) {
hdev->quirks &= ~HID_QUIRK_INPUT_PER_APP;
hdev->quirks |= HID_QUIRK_MULTI_INPUT;
}
timer_setup(&td->release_timer, mt_expired_timeout, 0);
ret = hid_parse(hdev);
@@ -1926,6 +1942,11 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {
MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_DWAV,
USB_DEVICE_ID_DWAV_EGALAX_MULTITOUCH_C002) },
/* Elan devices */
{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
HID_DEVICE(BUS_I2C, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
USB_VENDOR_ID_ELAN, 0x313a) },
/* Elitegroup panel */
{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_SERIAL,
MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ELITEGROUP,
@@ -2056,6 +2077,11 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {
MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_STANTUM_STM,
USB_DEVICE_ID_MTP_STM)},
/* Synaptics devices */
{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
HID_DEVICE(BUS_I2C, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
USB_VENDOR_ID_SYNAPTICS, 0xce08) },
/* TopSeed panels */
{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_TOPSEED,
MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_TOPSEED2,
+17
View File
@@ -867,6 +867,23 @@ static u8 *sony_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, u8 *rdesc,
if (sc->quirks & PS3REMOTE)
return ps3remote_fixup(hdev, rdesc, rsize);
/*
* Some knock-off USB dongles incorrectly report their button count
* as 13 instead of 16 causing three non-functional buttons.
*/
if ((sc->quirks & SIXAXIS_CONTROLLER_USB) && *rsize >= 45 &&
/* Report Count (13) */
rdesc[23] == 0x95 && rdesc[24] == 0x0D &&
/* Usage Maximum (13) */
rdesc[37] == 0x29 && rdesc[38] == 0x0D &&
/* Report Count (3) */
rdesc[43] == 0x95 && rdesc[44] == 0x03) {
hid_info(hdev, "Fixing up USB dongle report descriptor\n");
rdesc[24] = 0x10;
rdesc[38] = 0x10;
rdesc[44] = 0x00;
}
return rdesc;
}
+8
View File
@@ -389,6 +389,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id i2c_hid_dmi_desc_override_table[] = {
},
.driver_data = (void *)&sipodev_desc
},
{
.ident = "Schneider SCL142ALM",
.matches = {
DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SCHNEIDER"),
DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "SCL142ALM"),
},
.driver_data = (void *)&sipodev_desc
},
{ } /* Terminate list */
};
+14 -20
View File
@@ -65,12 +65,14 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv;
* @clk_sel: clock selection routine
* @max_clk_rate_hz: maximum analog clock rate (Hz, from datasheet)
* @has_syscfg: SYSCFG capability flags
* @num_irqs: number of interrupt lines
*/
struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg {
const struct stm32_adc_common_regs *regs;
int (*clk_sel)(struct platform_device *, struct stm32_adc_priv *);
u32 max_clk_rate_hz;
unsigned int has_syscfg;
unsigned int num_irqs;
};
/**
@@ -375,21 +377,15 @@ static int stm32_adc_irq_probe(struct platform_device *pdev,
struct device_node *np = pdev->dev.of_node;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS; i++) {
/*
* Interrupt(s) must be provided, depending on the compatible:
* - stm32f4/h7 shares a common interrupt line.
* - stm32mp1, has one line per ADC
*/
for (i = 0; i < priv->cfg->num_irqs; i++) {
priv->irq[i] = platform_get_irq(pdev, i);
if (priv->irq[i] < 0) {
/*
* At least one interrupt must be provided, make others
* optional:
* - stm32f4/h7 shares a common interrupt.
* - stm32mp1, has one line per ADC (either for ADC1,
* ADC2 or both).
*/
if (i && priv->irq[i] == -ENXIO)
continue;
if (priv->irq[i] < 0)
return priv->irq[i];
}
}
priv->domain = irq_domain_add_simple(np, STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS, 0,
@@ -400,9 +396,7 @@ static int stm32_adc_irq_probe(struct platform_device *pdev,
return -ENOMEM;
}
for (i = 0; i < STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS; i++) {
if (priv->irq[i] < 0)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < priv->cfg->num_irqs; i++) {
irq_set_chained_handler(priv->irq[i], stm32_adc_irq_handler);
irq_set_handler_data(priv->irq[i], priv);
}
@@ -420,11 +414,8 @@ static void stm32_adc_irq_remove(struct platform_device *pdev,
irq_dispose_mapping(irq_find_mapping(priv->domain, hwirq));
irq_domain_remove(priv->domain);
for (i = 0; i < STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS; i++) {
if (priv->irq[i] < 0)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < priv->cfg->num_irqs; i++)
irq_set_chained_handler(priv->irq[i], NULL);
}
}
static int stm32_adc_core_switches_supply_en(struct stm32_adc_priv *priv,
@@ -817,6 +808,7 @@ static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32f4_adc_priv_cfg = {
.regs = &stm32f4_adc_common_regs,
.clk_sel = stm32f4_adc_clk_sel,
.max_clk_rate_hz = 36000000,
.num_irqs = 1,
};
static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32h7_adc_priv_cfg = {
@@ -824,6 +816,7 @@ static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32h7_adc_priv_cfg = {
.clk_sel = stm32h7_adc_clk_sel,
.max_clk_rate_hz = 36000000,
.has_syscfg = HAS_VBOOSTER,
.num_irqs = 1,
};
static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32mp1_adc_priv_cfg = {
@@ -831,6 +824,7 @@ static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32mp1_adc_priv_cfg = {
.clk_sel = stm32h7_adc_clk_sel,
.max_clk_rate_hz = 40000000,
.has_syscfg = HAS_VBOOSTER | HAS_ANASWVDD,
.num_irqs = 2,
};
static const struct of_device_id stm32_adc_of_match[] = {
+12 -5
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ struct pms7003_state {
struct pms7003_frame frame;
struct completion frame_ready;
struct mutex lock; /* must be held whenever state gets touched */
/* Used to construct scan to push to the IIO buffer */
struct {
u16 data[3]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM10 */
s64 ts;
} scan;
};
static int pms7003_do_cmd(struct pms7003_state *state, enum pms7003_cmd cmd)
@@ -104,7 +109,6 @@ static irqreturn_t pms7003_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p)
struct iio_dev *indio_dev = pf->indio_dev;
struct pms7003_state *state = iio_priv(indio_dev);
struct pms7003_frame *frame = &state->frame;
u16 data[3 + 1 + 4]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM10, padding, timestamp */
int ret;
mutex_lock(&state->lock);
@@ -114,12 +118,15 @@ static irqreturn_t pms7003_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p)
goto err;
}
data[PM1] = pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM1_OFFSET);
data[PM2P5] = pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM2P5_OFFSET);
data[PM10] = pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM10_OFFSET);
state->scan.data[PM1] =
pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM1_OFFSET);
state->scan.data[PM2P5] =
pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM2P5_OFFSET);
state->scan.data[PM10] =
pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM10_OFFSET);
mutex_unlock(&state->lock);
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, data,
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, &state->scan,
iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
err:
iio_trigger_notify_done(indio_dev->trig);
+6 -3
View File
@@ -230,15 +230,18 @@ static irqreturn_t sps30_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p)
struct iio_dev *indio_dev = pf->indio_dev;
struct sps30_state *state = iio_priv(indio_dev);
int ret;
s32 data[4 + 2]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM4, PM10, timestamp */
struct {
s32 data[4]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM4, PM10 */
s64 ts;
} scan;
mutex_lock(&state->lock);
ret = sps30_do_meas(state, data, 4);
ret = sps30_do_meas(state, scan.data, ARRAY_SIZE(scan.data));
mutex_unlock(&state->lock);
if (ret)
goto err;
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, data,
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, &scan,
iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
err:
iio_trigger_notify_done(indio_dev->trig);
+2 -4
View File
@@ -219,7 +219,6 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask,
u8 rdy_mask, u8 data_reg, int *val)
{
int tries = 20;
__be16 buf;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&data->vcnl4000_lock);
@@ -246,13 +245,12 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask,
goto fail;
}
ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client,
data_reg, sizeof(buf), (u8 *) &buf);
ret = i2c_smbus_read_word_swapped(data->client, data_reg);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
mutex_unlock(&data->vcnl4000_lock);
*val = be16_to_cpu(buf);
*val = ret;
return 0;
+3 -2
View File
@@ -707,9 +707,10 @@ int dvb_create_media_graph(struct dvb_adapter *adap,
}
if (ntuner && ndemod) {
pad_source = media_get_pad_index(tuner, true,
/* NOTE: first found tuner source pad presumed correct */
pad_source = media_get_pad_index(tuner, false,
PAD_SIGNAL_ANALOG);
if (pad_source)
if (pad_source < 0)
return -EINVAL;
ret = media_create_pad_links(mdev,
MEDIA_ENT_F_TUNER,
+8 -3
View File
@@ -807,10 +807,15 @@ mt7530_port_set_vlan_aware(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port)
PCR_MATRIX_MASK, PCR_MATRIX(MT7530_ALL_MEMBERS));
/* Trapped into security mode allows packet forwarding through VLAN
* table lookup.
* table lookup. CPU port is set to fallback mode to let untagged
* frames pass through.
*/
mt7530_rmw(priv, MT7530_PCR_P(port), PCR_PORT_VLAN_MASK,
MT7530_PORT_SECURITY_MODE);
if (dsa_is_cpu_port(ds, port))
mt7530_rmw(priv, MT7530_PCR_P(port), PCR_PORT_VLAN_MASK,
MT7530_PORT_FALLBACK_MODE);
else
mt7530_rmw(priv, MT7530_PCR_P(port), PCR_PORT_VLAN_MASK,
MT7530_PORT_SECURITY_MODE);
/* Set the port as a user port which is to be able to recognize VID
* from incoming packets before fetching entry within the VLAN table.
+6
View File
@@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ enum mt7530_port_mode {
/* Port Matrix Mode: Frames are forwarded by the PCR_MATRIX members. */
MT7530_PORT_MATRIX_MODE = PORT_VLAN(0),
/* Fallback Mode: Forward received frames with ingress ports that do
* not belong to the VLAN member. Frames whose VID is not listed on
* the VLAN table are forwarded by the PCR_MATRIX members.
*/
MT7530_PORT_FALLBACK_MODE = PORT_VLAN(1),
/* Security Mode: Discard any frame due to ingress membership
* violation or VID missed on the VLAN table.
*/
+12
View File
@@ -1925,6 +1925,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t mpi_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!",__func__);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) {
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
npacks = skb_queue_len (&ai->txq);
if (npacks >= MAXTXQ - 1) {
@@ -2127,6 +2131,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t airo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!", __func__);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) {
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
/* Find a vacant FID */
for( i = 0; i < MAX_FIDS / 2 && (fids[i] & 0xffff0000); i++ );
@@ -2201,6 +2209,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t airo_start_xmit11(struct sk_buff *skb,
airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!", __func__);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) {
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
/* Find a vacant FID */
for( i = MAX_FIDS / 2; i < MAX_FIDS && (fids[i] & 0xffff0000); i++ );
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id p54u_table[] = {
{USB_DEVICE(0x0db0, 0x6826)}, /* MSI UB54G (MS-6826) */
{USB_DEVICE(0x107b, 0x55f2)}, /* Gateway WGU-210 (Gemtek) */
{USB_DEVICE(0x124a, 0x4023)}, /* Shuttle PN15, Airvast WM168g, IOGear GWU513 */
{USB_DEVICE(0x124a, 0x4026)}, /* AirVasT USB wireless device */
{USB_DEVICE(0x1435, 0x0210)}, /* Inventel UR054G */
{USB_DEVICE(0x15a9, 0x0002)}, /* Gemtek WUBI-100GW 802.11g */
{USB_DEVICE(0x1630, 0x0005)}, /* 2Wire 802.11g USB (v1) / Z-Com */
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ static inline bool is_mt76x0(struct mt76x02_dev *dev)
static inline bool is_mt76x2(struct mt76x02_dev *dev)
{
return mt76_chip(&dev->mt76) == 0x7612 ||
mt76_chip(&dev->mt76) == 0x7632 ||
mt76_chip(&dev->mt76) == 0x7662 ||
mt76_chip(&dev->mt76) == 0x7602;
}
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id mt76x2u_device_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x7392, 0xb711) }, /* Edimax EW 7722 UAC */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0846, 0x9053) }, /* Netgear A6210 */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x045e, 0x02e6) }, /* XBox One Wireless Adapter */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x045e, 0x02fe) }, /* XBox One Wireless Adapter */
{ },
};
-14
View File
@@ -27,25 +27,11 @@ static int qfprom_reg_read(void *context,
return 0;
}
static int qfprom_reg_write(void *context,
unsigned int reg, void *_val, size_t bytes)
{
struct qfprom_priv *priv = context;
u8 *val = _val;
int i = 0, words = bytes;
while (words--)
writeb(*val++, priv->base + reg + i++);
return 0;
}
static struct nvmem_config econfig = {
.name = "qfprom",
.stride = 1,
.word_size = 1,
.reg_read = qfprom_reg_read,
.reg_write = qfprom_reg_write,
};
static int qfprom_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s {
__u32 bayer_sign;
__u8 bayer_nf;
__u8 reserved2[7];
} __attribute__((aligned(32))) __packed;
} __packed;
/**
* struct ipu3_uapi_4a_config - 4A config
@@ -466,7 +466,8 @@ struct ipu3_uapi_4a_config {
struct ipu3_uapi_ae_grid_config ae_grd_config;
__u8 padding[20];
struct ipu3_uapi_af_config_s af_config;
struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s awb_fr_config;
struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s awb_fr_config
__attribute__((aligned(32)));
} __packed;
/**
@@ -2477,7 +2478,7 @@ struct ipu3_uapi_acc_param {
struct ipu3_uapi_yuvp1_yds_config yds2 __attribute__((aligned(32)));
struct ipu3_uapi_yuvp2_tcc_static_config tcc __attribute__((aligned(32)));
struct ipu3_uapi_anr_config anr;
struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s awb_fr __attribute__((aligned(32)));
struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s awb_fr;
struct ipu3_uapi_ae_config ae;
struct ipu3_uapi_af_config_s af;
struct ipu3_uapi_awb_config awb;
+1 -8
View File
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static inline unsigned char *get_hdr_bssid(unsigned char *pframe)
/* block-ack parameters */
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFC0
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
@@ -532,13 +532,6 @@ struct ieee80211_ht_addt_info {
#define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_GF_STA_PRSNT 0x0004
#define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_HT_STA_PRSNT 0x0010
/* block-ack parameters */
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
/*
* A-PMDU buffer sizes
* According to IEEE802.11n spec size varies from 8K to 64K (in powers of 2)
+8 -15
View File
@@ -371,15 +371,14 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
* tty fields and return the kref reference.
*/
if (rc) {
tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
tty->driver_data = NULL;
tty_port_put(&hp->port);
printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_open: request_irq failed with rc %d.\n", rc);
} else
} else {
/* We are ready... raise DTR/RTS */
if (C_BAUD(tty))
if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 1);
tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, true);
}
/* Force wakeup of the polling thread */
hvc_kick();
@@ -389,22 +388,12 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
{
struct hvc_struct *hp;
struct hvc_struct *hp = tty->driver_data;
unsigned long flags;
if (tty_hung_up_p(filp))
return;
/*
* No driver_data means that this close was issued after a failed
* hvc_open by the tty layer's release_dev() function and we can just
* exit cleanly because the kref reference wasn't made.
*/
if (!tty->driver_data)
return;
hp = tty->driver_data;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hp->port.lock, flags);
if (--hp->port.count == 0) {
@@ -412,6 +401,9 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
/* We are done with the tty pointer now. */
tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
if (!tty_port_initialized(&hp->port))
return;
if (C_HUPCL(tty))
if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 0);
@@ -428,6 +420,7 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
* waking periodically to check chars_in_buffer().
*/
tty_wait_until_sent(tty, HVC_CLOSE_WAIT);
tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, false);
} else {
if (hp->port.count < 0)
printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_close %X: oops, count is %d\n",
+1
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ config SERIAL_8250_PNP
config SERIAL_8250_16550A_VARIANTS
bool "Support for variants of the 16550A serial port"
depends on SERIAL_8250
default !X86
help
The 8250 driver can probe for many variants of the venerable 16550A
serial port. Doing so takes additional time at boot.
+16 -10
View File
@@ -127,7 +127,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(func_buf_lock); /* guard 'func_buf' and friends */
static unsigned long key_down[BITS_TO_LONGS(KEY_CNT)]; /* keyboard key bitmap */
static unsigned char shift_down[NR_SHIFT]; /* shift state counters.. */
static bool dead_key_next;
static int npadch = -1; /* -1 or number assembled on pad */
/* Handles a number being assembled on the number pad */
static bool npadch_active;
static unsigned int npadch_value;
static unsigned int diacr;
static char rep; /* flag telling character repeat */
@@ -845,12 +849,12 @@ static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
shift_state &= ~(1 << value);
/* kludge */
if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch != -1) {
if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch_active) {
if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE)
to_utf8(vc, npadch);
to_utf8(vc, npadch_value);
else
put_queue(vc, npadch & 0xff);
npadch = -1;
put_queue(vc, npadch_value & 0xff);
npadch_active = false;
}
}
@@ -868,7 +872,7 @@ static void k_meta(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
{
int base;
unsigned int base;
if (up_flag)
return;
@@ -882,10 +886,12 @@ static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
base = 16;
}
if (npadch == -1)
npadch = value;
else
npadch = npadch * base + value;
if (!npadch_active) {
npadch_value = 0;
npadch_active = true;
}
npadch_value = npadch_value * base + value;
}
static void k_lock(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static void acm_softint(struct work_struct *work)
}
if (test_and_clear_bit(ACM_ERROR_DELAY, &acm->flags)) {
for (i = 0; i < ACM_NR; i++)
for (i = 0; i < acm->rx_buflimit; i++)
if (test_and_clear_bit(i, &acm->urbs_in_error_delay))
acm_submit_read_urb(acm, i, GFP_NOIO);
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ static irqreturn_t jz4740_musb_interrupt(int irq, void *__hci)
irqreturn_t retval = IRQ_NONE, retval_dma = IRQ_NONE;
struct musb *musb = __hci;
spin_lock_irqsave(&musb->lock, flags);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_INVENTRA_DMA) && musb->dma_controller)
retval_dma = dma_controller_irq(irq, musb->dma_controller);
spin_lock_irqsave(&musb->lock, flags);
musb->int_usb = musb_readb(musb->mregs, MUSB_INTRUSB);
musb->int_tx = musb_readw(musb->mregs, MUSB_INTRTX);
musb->int_rx = musb_readw(musb->mregs, MUSB_INTRRX);
+7
View File
@@ -2877,6 +2877,13 @@ static int musb_resume(struct device *dev)
musb_enable_interrupts(musb);
musb_platform_enable(musb);
/* session might be disabled in suspend */
if (musb->port_mode == MUSB_HOST &&
!(musb->ops->quirks & MUSB_PRESERVE_SESSION)) {
devctl |= MUSB_DEVCTL_SESSION;
musb_writeb(musb->mregs, MUSB_DEVCTL, devctl);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&musb->lock, flags);
error = musb_run_resume_work(musb);
if (error)
+5 -5
View File
@@ -168,6 +168,11 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file,
u8 test;
char buf[24];
memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
return -EFAULT;
pm_runtime_get_sync(musb->controller);
test = musb_readb(musb->mregs, MUSB_TESTMODE);
if (test) {
@@ -176,11 +181,6 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file,
goto ret;
}
memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
return -EFAULT;
if (strstarts(buf, "force host full-speed"))
test = MUSB_TEST_FORCE_HOST | MUSB_TEST_FORCE_FS;
+65 -3
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
#define CH341_LCR_CS6 0x01
#define CH341_LCR_CS5 0x00
#define CH341_QUIRK_LIMITED_PRESCALER BIT(0)
static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x4348, 0x5523) },
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1a86, 0x7523) },
@@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ struct ch341_private {
u8 mcr;
u8 msr;
u8 lcr;
unsigned long quirks;
};
static void ch341_set_termios(struct tty_struct *tty,
@@ -159,9 +162,11 @@ static const speed_t ch341_min_rates[] = {
* 2 <= div <= 256 if fact = 0, or
* 9 <= div <= 256 if fact = 1
*/
static int ch341_get_divisor(speed_t speed)
static int ch341_get_divisor(struct ch341_private *priv)
{
unsigned int fact, div, clk_div;
speed_t speed = priv->baud_rate;
bool force_fact0 = false;
int ps;
/*
@@ -187,8 +192,12 @@ static int ch341_get_divisor(speed_t speed)
clk_div = CH341_CLK_DIV(ps, fact);
div = CH341_CLKRATE / (clk_div * speed);
/* Some devices require a lower base clock if ps < 3. */
if (ps < 3 && (priv->quirks & CH341_QUIRK_LIMITED_PRESCALER))
force_fact0 = true;
/* Halve base clock (fact = 0) if required. */
if (div < 9 || div > 255) {
if (div < 9 || div > 255 || force_fact0) {
div /= 2;
clk_div *= 2;
fact = 0;
@@ -227,7 +236,7 @@ static int ch341_set_baudrate_lcr(struct usb_device *dev,
if (!priv->baud_rate)
return -EINVAL;
val = ch341_get_divisor(priv->baud_rate);
val = ch341_get_divisor(priv);
if (val < 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -308,6 +317,54 @@ out: kfree(buffer);
return r;
}
static int ch341_detect_quirks(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct ch341_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct usb_device *udev = port->serial->dev;
const unsigned int size = 2;
unsigned long quirks = 0;
char *buffer;
int r;
buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* A subset of CH34x devices does not support all features. The
* prescaler is limited and there is no support for sending a RS232
* break condition. A read failure when trying to set up the latter is
* used to detect these devices.
*/
r = usb_control_msg(udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0), CH341_REQ_READ_REG,
USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_IN,
CH341_REG_BREAK, 0, buffer, size, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT);
if (r == -EPIPE) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "break control not supported\n");
quirks = CH341_QUIRK_LIMITED_PRESCALER;
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (r != size) {
if (r >= 0)
r = -EIO;
dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to read break control: %d\n", r);
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
kfree(buffer);
if (quirks) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "enabling quirk flags: 0x%02lx\n", quirks);
priv->quirks |= quirks;
}
return r;
}
static int ch341_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct ch341_private *priv;
@@ -330,6 +387,11 @@ static int ch341_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
goto error;
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);
r = ch341_detect_quirks(port);
if (r < 0)
goto error;
return 0;
error: kfree(priv);
+4
View File
@@ -1157,6 +1157,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_CC864_SINGLE) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_DE910_DUAL) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_UE910_V2) },
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1031, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */
.driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(3) },
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1033, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX (ECM) */
.driver_info = NCTRL(0) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG0),
.driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG1),
+1
View File
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)}, /* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81d0)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
+4
View File
@@ -270,6 +270,10 @@ static void usb_wwan_indat_callback(struct urb *urb)
if (status) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s: nonzero status: %d on endpoint %02x.\n",
__func__, status, endpoint);
/* don't resubmit on fatal errors */
if (status == -ESHUTDOWN || status == -ENOENT)
return;
} else {
if (urb->actual_length) {
tty_insert_flip_string(&port->port, data,
+2
View File
@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
__u16 vendor;
__u16 family;
__u16 model;
__u16 steppings;
__u16 feature; /* bit index */
kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
};
@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
#define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
#define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
#define X86_MODEL_ANY 0
#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
#define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0 /* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */
/*
+1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#define LINUX_MMC_IOCTL_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
struct mmc_ioc_cmd {
/*
+12 -4
View File
@@ -867,10 +867,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct file *file,
if (ret)
goto out;
/* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
@@ -1166,6 +1162,15 @@ static int __uprobe_register(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* This ensures that copy_from_page(), copy_to_page() and
* __update_ref_ctr() can't cross page boundary.
*/
if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
return -EINVAL;
retry:
uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset, ref_ctr_offset);
if (!uprobe)
@@ -2014,6 +2019,9 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr)
uprobe_opcode_t opcode;
int result;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE)))
return -EINVAL;
pagefault_disable();
result = __get_user(opcode, (uprobe_opcode_t __user *)vaddr);
pagefault_enable();
+5
View File
@@ -581,6 +581,11 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *base_filename,
return NULL;
chan->buf = alloc_percpu(struct rchan_buf *);
if (!chan->buf) {
kfree(chan);
return NULL;
}
chan->version = RELAYFS_CHANNEL_VERSION;
chan->n_subbufs = n_subbufs;
chan->subbuf_size = subbuf_size;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ unsigned long move_page_tables(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
new_pmd = alloc_new_pmd(vma->vm_mm, vma, new_addr);
if (!new_pmd)
break;
if (is_swap_pmd(*old_pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd)) {
if (is_swap_pmd(*old_pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd) || pmd_devmap(*old_pmd)) {
if (extent == HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
bool moved;
/* See comment in move_ptes() */