Linux 5.1.2

commit 95310e348a upstream

Fix a minor typo in the MDS documentation: "eanbled" -> "enabled".

Reported-by: Jeff Bastian <jbastian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -496,8 +497,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
 
-		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
-		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+		See also: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+========================
+Hardware vulnerabilities
+========================
+
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   l1tf
+   mds

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst

@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
 line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
 module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
 
+.. _mitigation_selection:
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+   CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+  all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+  but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+  abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+
+         The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+         enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+    ========================  ============================================
+    'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
+    'SMT mitigated'           SMT is enabled and mitigated
+    'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
+    'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+    ========================  ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+  mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+  effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+  without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+  This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+  microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+  the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+  takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+  The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+  space and when entering a guest.
+
+  If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+  is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+  other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+  For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+  transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+  vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+  - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+    available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+    guest transition.
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+    invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+    For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+    :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+  - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+    CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+    mitigation is enabled.
+
+  The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+   L1TF         MDS   VMX-L1FLUSH   Host MDS     MDS-State
+
+   Don't care   No    Don't care    N/A          Not affected
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Off          Vulnerable
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Full         Mitigated
+
+   Yes          Yes   Enabled       Don't care   Mitigated
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Off          Vulnerable
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Full         Mitigated
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+  This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+  host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+  have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+  cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+  to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+  for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+  command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+  XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+  before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+  either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+  means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+  disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+  exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+  Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+  depends on the type of workloads.
+
+  See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+  :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+		for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+		userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+		protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+		It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+  full,nosmt	The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable
+		CPUs.  This is the complete mitigation.
+
+  off		Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+   execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+   can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+   See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+   If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+   guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+  for L1TF applies.
+  See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.

Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst

@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
-This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
-possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
-are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations.
 
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
-   l1tf
+   hw-vuln/index
 
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
-			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
 
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
@@ -2387,6 +2387,32 @@
 			Format: <first>,<last>
 			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
 
+	mds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+			Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+			internal buffers which can forward information to a
+			disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+			forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+			attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+			not have direct access.
+
+			This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+			full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
+				     SMT on vulnerable CPUs
+			off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mds=full.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
 	mem=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
 			Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
 			to see the whole system memory or for test.
@@ -2544,6 +2570,40 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
+					       mds=off [X86]
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
+					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for

Documentation/index.rst

@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ implementation.
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    sh/index
+   x86/index
 
 Filesystem Documentation
 ------------------------

Documentation/x86/conf.py

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
+
+project = "X86 architecture specific documentation"
+
+tags.add("subproject")
+
+latex_documents = [
+    ('index', 'x86.tex', project,
+     'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
+]

Documentation/x86/index.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+==========================
+x86 architecture specifics
+==========================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   mds

Documentation/x86/mds.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
+=================================================
+
+.. _mds:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
+on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
+
+ - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
+ - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
+ - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
+ - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) (CVE-2019-11091)
+
+MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
+dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
+can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
+memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
+buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
+not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
+buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
+
+MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
+L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
+to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
+operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
+deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
+can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
+be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
+Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
+
+MLPDS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
+from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
+file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
+contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
+faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
+exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
+thread leakage is possible.
+
+MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
+memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
+structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
+MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS.
+
+Exposure assumptions
+--------------------
+
+It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
+exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
+needed for exploiting MDS requires:
+
+ - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
+
+ - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
+   data for consumption through a side channel.
+
+ - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
+   data
+
+The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+
+There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
+untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
+whether it can be used to create such a construct.
+
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
+thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
+instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
+the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
+clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
+command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
+VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
+be issued.
+
+If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
+executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
+other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
+
+This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
+which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
+enters a C-state.
+
+The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
+(idle) transitions.
+
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected
+accordingly.
+
+According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
+itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
+data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
+user space or VM guests.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ======= ============================================================
+ off      Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+          mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line
+
+ full     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+          advertised in CPUID.
+
+ vmwerv	  Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+	  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+	  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+	  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+	  effort approach without guarantee.
+ ======= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command
+line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
+the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+
+1. Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
+   on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
+   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
+   mds_user_clear.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
+   most of the kernel to user space transitions. There are a few exceptions
+   which are not invoking prepare_exit_to_usermode() on return to user
+   space. These exceptions use the paranoid exit code.
+
+   - Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI):
+
+     Access to sensible data like keys, credentials in the NMI context is
+     mostly theoretical: The CPU can do prefetching or execute a
+     misspeculated code path and thereby fetching data which might end up
+     leaking through a buffer.
+
+     But for mounting other attacks the kernel stack address of the task is
+     already valuable information. So in full mitigation mode, the NMI is
+     mitigated on the return from do_nmi() to provide almost complete
+     coverage.
+
+   - Double fault (#DF):
+
+     A double fault is usually fatal, but the ESPFIX workaround, which can
+     be triggered from user space through modify_ldt(2) is a recoverable
+     double fault. #DF uses the paranoid exit path, so explicit mitigation
+     in the double fault handler is required.
+
+   - Machine Check Exception (#MC):
+
+     Another corner case is a #MC which hits between the CPU buffer clear
+     invocation and the actual return to user. As this still is in kernel
+     space it takes the paranoid exit path which does not clear the CPU
+     buffers. So the #MC handler repopulates the buffers to some
+     extent. Machine checks are not reliably controllable and the window is
+     extremly small so mitigation would just tick a checkbox that this
+     theoretical corner case is covered. To keep the amount of special
+     cases small, ignore #MC.
+
+   - Debug Exception (#DB):
+
+     This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
+     kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
+     so no extra mitigation required.
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+   cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+   repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+   a C-State.
+
+   When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+   sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+   The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+   and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+   protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+   the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+   idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+   activated.
+
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+   the system.
+
+   The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+   that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+   sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+   available to the non idle sibling.
+
+   When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+   sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+   speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+   flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+   in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+   The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+   not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+   has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+   preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+   functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+   legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+   not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 1
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 2
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Shy Crocodile
 

arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h

@@ -23,26 +23,34 @@
 
 #include <asm/errno.h>
 
+#define FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS	128 /* What's the largest number you can think of? */
+
 #define __futex_atomic_op(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg)		\
 do {									\
+	unsigned int loops = FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS;				\
+									\
 	uaccess_enable();						\
 	asm volatile(							\
 "	prfm	pstl1strm, %2\n"					\
 "1:	ldxr	%w1, %2\n"						\
 	insn "\n"							\
 "2:	stlxr	%w0, %w3, %2\n"						\
-"	cbnz	%w0, 1b\n"						\
-"	dmb	ish\n"							\
+"	cbz	%w0, 3f\n"						\
+"	sub	%w4, %w4, %w0\n"					\
+"	cbnz	%w4, 1b\n"						\
+"	mov	%w0, %w7\n"						\
 "3:\n"									\
+"	dmb	ish\n"							\
 "	.pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n"					\
 "	.align	2\n"							\
-"4:	mov	%w0, %w5\n"						\
+"4:	mov	%w0, %w6\n"						\
 "	b	3b\n"							\
 "	.popsection\n"							\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)						\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b)						\
-	: "=&r" (ret), "=&r" (oldval), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp)	\
-	: "r" (oparg), "Ir" (-EFAULT)					\
+	: "=&r" (ret), "=&r" (oldval), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp),	\
+	  "+r" (loops)							\
+	: "r" (oparg), "Ir" (-EFAULT), "Ir" (-EAGAIN)			\
 	: "memory");							\
 	uaccess_disable();						\
 } while (0)
@@ -57,23 +65,23 @@ arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, int oparg, int *oval, u32 __user *_uaddr)
 
 	switch (op) {
 	case FUTEX_OP_SET:
-		__futex_atomic_op("mov	%w3, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("mov	%w3, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_ADD:
-		__futex_atomic_op("add	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("add	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_OR:
-		__futex_atomic_op("orr	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("orr	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_ANDN:
-		__futex_atomic_op("and	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("and	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, ~oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_XOR:
-		__futex_atomic_op("eor	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("eor	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -93,6 +101,7 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *_uaddr,
 			      u32 oldval, u32 newval)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned int loops = FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS;
 	u32 val, tmp;
 	u32 __user *uaddr;
 
@@ -104,20 +113,24 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *_uaddr,
 	asm volatile("// futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic\n"
 "	prfm	pstl1strm, %2\n"
 "1:	ldxr	%w1, %2\n"
-"	sub	%w3, %w1, %w4\n"
-"	cbnz	%w3, 3f\n"
-"2:	stlxr	%w3, %w5, %2\n"
-"	cbnz	%w3, 1b\n"
-"	dmb	ish\n"
+"	sub	%w3, %w1, %w5\n"
+"	cbnz	%w3, 4f\n"
+"2:	stlxr	%w3, %w6, %2\n"
+"	cbz	%w3, 3f\n"
+"	sub	%w4, %w4, %w3\n"
+"	cbnz	%w4, 1b\n"
+"	mov	%w0, %w8\n"
 "3:\n"
+"	dmb	ish\n"
+"4:\n"
 "	.pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
-"4:	mov	%w0, %w6\n"
-"	b	3b\n"
+"5:	mov	%w0, %w7\n"
+"	b	4b\n"
 "	.popsection\n"
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b)
-	: "+r" (ret), "=&r" (val), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp)
-	: "r" (oldval), "r" (newval), "Ir" (-EFAULT)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 5b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 5b)
+	: "+r" (ret), "=&r" (val), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp), "+r" (loops)
+	: "r" (oldval), "r" (newval), "Ir" (-EFAULT), "Ir" (-EAGAIN)
 	: "memory");
 	uaccess_disable();
 

arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 

arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c

@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 

arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.

arch/x86/entry/common.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/vdso.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
@@ -212,6 +213,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
 #endif
 
 	user_enter_irqoff();
+
+	mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #define SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS				\

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
@@ -382,5 +383,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
 #define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+#define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
 /* Provide __cpuidle; we can't safely include <linux/cpu.h> */
 #define __cpuidle __attribute__((__section__(".cpuidle.text")))
 
@@ -54,11 +56,13 @@ static inline void native_irq_enable(void)
 
 static inline __cpuidle void native_safe_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
 static inline __cpuidle void native_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 

arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
 
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+
 /*
  * CPU model specific register (MSR) numbers.
  *
@@ -40,14 +42,14 @@
 /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT		1	   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
-#define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 
 #define MSR_PPIN_CTL			0x0000004e
 #define MSR_PPIN			0x0000004f
@@ -69,20 +71,25 @@
 #define MSR_MTRRcap			0x000000fe
 
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
-#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	(1 << 3)   /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
-						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * control required.
-						    */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
+#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
+						 * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+						 * control required.
+						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO			BIT(5)   /*
+						  * Not susceptible to
+						  * Microarchitectural Data
+						  * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
+						  */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
-#define L1D_FLUSH			(1 << 0)   /*
-						    * Writeback and invalidate the
-						    * L1 data cache.
-						    */
+#define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
+						 * Writeback and invalidate the
+						 * L1 data cache.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e

arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/idle.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define MWAIT_SUBSTATE_MASK		0xf
 #define MWAIT_CSTATE_MASK		0xf
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ static inline void __monitorx(const void *eax, unsigned long ecx,
 
 static inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
@@ -74,6 +77,8 @@ static inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
 			    unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	/* No MDS buffer clear as this is AMD/HYGON only */
+
 	/* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "b" (ebx), "c" (ecx));
@@ -81,6 +86,8 @@ static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
 
 static inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	trace_hardirqs_on();
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"

arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

@@ -318,6 +318,56 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+
+/**
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
+ * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
+ * instruction is executed.
+ */
+static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
+
+	/*
+	 * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
+	 * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
+	 * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
+	 * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
+	 * data segment is the fastest variant.
+	 *
+	 * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
+}
+
+/**
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
+/**
+ * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 /*

arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

@@ -991,4 +991,10 @@ enum l1tf_mitigations {
 
 extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
 
+enum mds_mitigations {
+	MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -63,6 +64,13 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -101,6 +109,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 
+	mds_select_mitigation();
+
+	arch_smt_update();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -206,6 +218,61 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
+		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+			cpu_smt_disable(false);
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		mds_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
@@ -440,7 +507,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -574,9 +642,6 @@ specv2_set_mode:
 
 	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
 	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
-
-	/* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
-	arch_smt_update();
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
@@ -610,6 +675,31 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
 		static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
+	 * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
+	 *
+	 * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
+	 * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
+	 * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+		return;
+
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+}
+
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
 	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -631,6 +721,17 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (mds_mitigation) {
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
+		update_mds_branch_idle();
+		break;
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -672,7 +773,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -1008,6 +1110,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
@@ -1036,7 +1143,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 		pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
 				half_pa);
 		pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
-		pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
+		pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1069,6 +1176,7 @@ static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
 early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
@@ -1107,6 +1215,23 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 }
 #endif
 
+static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+			       (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
+			        sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1173,6 +1298,10 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
 			return l1tf_show_state(buf);
 		break;
+
+	case X86_BUG_MDS:
+		return mds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1204,4 +1333,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *b
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
+}
 #endif

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c

@@ -948,61 +948,77 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #endif
 }
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_NSC,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY,	4 },
+#define NO_SPECULATION	BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN	BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB		BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF		BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS		BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY	BIT(5)
+
+#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
+	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
+
+#define VULNWL_INTEL(model, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_HYGON(family, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
+	VULNWL(ANY,	4, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(CENTAUR,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(INTEL,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(NSC,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+
+	/* Intel Family 6 */
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+
+	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+
+	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
 	{}
 };
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_HYGON },
-	{}
-};
+static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+{
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
 
-/* Only list CPUs which speculate but are non susceptible to SSB */
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x12,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x11,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x10,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0xf,					},
-	{}
-};
-
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_l1tf[] = {
-	/* in addition to cpu_no_speculation */
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
-	{}
-};
+	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
+}
 
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
@@ -1011,15 +1027,20 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
-	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
+		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1028,7 +1049,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_l1tf))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);

arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 #include <asm/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/cache.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/nmi.h>
@@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ nmi_restart:
 		write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
 	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
 		goto nmi_restart;
+
+	if (user_mode(regs))
+		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_nmi);
 

arch/x86/kernel/traps.c

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/trace/mpx.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/mpx.h>
 #include <asm/vm86.h>
 #include <asm/umip.h>
@@ -367,6 +368,13 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 		regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
 		regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax;
 
+		/*
+		 * This situation can be triggered by userspace via
+		 * modify_ldt(2) and the return does not take the regular
+		 * user space exit, so a CPU buffer clear is required when
+		 * MDS mitigation is enabled.
+		 */
+		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 		return;
 	}
 #endif

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c

@@ -410,7 +410,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
 		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
-		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP);
+		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
+		F(MD_CLEAR);
 
 	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
 	get_cpu();

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c

@@ -6431,8 +6431,11 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 */
 	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
 
+	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 
 	if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != read_cr2())
 		write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
@@ -6668,8 +6671,8 @@ free_partial_vcpu:
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
-#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 
 static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {

arch/x86/mm/pti.c

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;

drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c

@@ -1142,8 +1142,8 @@ static struct dev_pm_domain acpi_lpss_pm_domain = {
 		.thaw_noirq = acpi_subsys_thaw_noirq,
 		.poweroff = acpi_subsys_suspend,
 		.poweroff_late = acpi_lpss_suspend_late,
-		.poweroff_noirq = acpi_subsys_suspend_noirq,
-		.restore_noirq = acpi_subsys_resume_noirq,
+		.poweroff_noirq = acpi_lpss_suspend_noirq,
+		.restore_noirq = acpi_lpss_resume_noirq,
 		.restore_early = acpi_lpss_resume_early,
 #endif
 		.runtime_suspend = acpi_lpss_runtime_suspend,

drivers/base/cpu.c

@@ -548,11 +548,18 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -560,6 +567,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
+	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 

drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c

@@ -228,9 +228,15 @@ static int bcm_gpio_set_power(struct bcm_device *dev, bool powered)
 	int err;
 
 	if (powered && !dev->res_enabled) {
-		err = regulator_bulk_enable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES, dev->supplies);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
+		/* Intel Macs use bcm_apple_get_resources() and don't
+		 * have regulator supplies configured.
+		 */
+		if (dev->supplies[0].supply) {
+			err = regulator_bulk_enable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES,
+						    dev->supplies);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
 
 		/* LPO clock needs to be 32.768 kHz */
 		err = clk_set_rate(dev->lpo_clk, 32768);
@@ -259,7 +265,13 @@ static int bcm_gpio_set_power(struct bcm_device *dev, bool powered)
 	if (!powered && dev->res_enabled) {
 		clk_disable_unprepare(dev->txco_clk);
 		clk_disable_unprepare(dev->lpo_clk);
-		regulator_bulk_disable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES, dev->supplies);
+
+		/* Intel Macs use bcm_apple_get_resources() and don't
+		 * have regulator supplies configured.
+		 */
+		if (dev->supplies[0].supply)
+			regulator_bulk_disable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES,
+					       dev->supplies);
 	}
 
 	/* wait for device to power on and come out of reset */

drivers/cpufreq/armada-37xx-cpufreq.c

@@ -359,11 +359,11 @@ static int __init armada37xx_cpufreq_driver_init(void)
 	struct armada_37xx_dvfs *dvfs;
 	struct platform_device *pdev;
 	unsigned long freq;
-	unsigned int cur_frequency;
+	unsigned int cur_frequency, base_frequency;
 	struct regmap *nb_pm_base, *avs_base;
 	struct device *cpu_dev;
 	int load_lvl, ret;
-	struct clk *clk;
+	struct clk *clk, *parent;
 
 	nb_pm_base =
 		syscon_regmap_lookup_by_compatible("marvell,armada-3700-nb-pm");
@@ -399,6 +399,22 @@ static int __init armada37xx_cpufreq_driver_init(void)
 		return PTR_ERR(clk);
 	}
 
+	parent = clk_get_parent(clk);
+	if (IS_ERR(parent)) {
+		dev_err(cpu_dev, "Cannot get parent clock for CPU0\n");
+		clk_put(clk);
+		return PTR_ERR(parent);
+	}
+
+	/* Get parent CPU frequency */
+	base_frequency =  clk_get_rate(parent);
+
+	if (!base_frequency) {
+		dev_err(cpu_dev, "Failed to get parent clock rate for CPU\n");
+		clk_put(clk);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/* Get nominal (current) CPU frequency */
 	cur_frequency = clk_get_rate(clk);
 	if (!cur_frequency) {
@@ -431,7 +447,7 @@ static int __init armada37xx_cpufreq_driver_init(void)
 	for (load_lvl = ARMADA_37XX_DVFS_LOAD_0; load_lvl < LOAD_LEVEL_NR;
 	     load_lvl++) {
 		unsigned long u_volt = avs_map[dvfs->avs[load_lvl]] * 1000;
-		freq = cur_frequency / dvfs->divider[load_lvl];
+		freq = base_frequency / dvfs->divider[load_lvl];
 		ret = dev_pm_opp_add(cpu_dev, freq, u_volt);
 		if (ret)
 			goto remove_opp;

drivers/hv/hv.c

@@ -408,7 +408,6 @@ int hv_synic_cleanup(unsigned int cpu)
 
 		clockevents_unbind_device(hv_cpu->clk_evt, cpu);
 		hv_ce_shutdown(hv_cpu->clk_evt);
-		put_cpu_ptr(hv_cpu);
 	}
 
 	hv_get_synint_state(VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT, shared_sint.as_uint64);

drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c

@@ -165,6 +165,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_th_pci_id_table[] = {
 		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x34a6),
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
 	},
+	{
+		/* Comet Lake */
+		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x02a6),
+		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
+	},
 	{ 0 },
 };
 

drivers/i3c/master.c

@@ -385,8 +385,9 @@ static void i3c_bus_set_addr_slot_status(struct i3c_bus *bus, u16 addr,
 		return;
 
 	ptr = bus->addrslots + (bitpos / BITS_PER_LONG);
-	*ptr &= ~(I3C_ADDR_SLOT_STATUS_MASK << (bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG));
-	*ptr |= status << (bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG);
+	*ptr &= ~((unsigned long)I3C_ADDR_SLOT_STATUS_MASK <<
+						(bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG));
+	*ptr |= (unsigned long)status << (bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG);
 }
 
 static bool i3c_bus_dev_addr_is_avail(struct i3c_bus *bus, u8 addr)

drivers/iio/adc/qcom-spmi-adc5.c

@@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id adc5_match_table[] = {
 	},
 	{ }
 };
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, adc5_match_table);
 
 static int adc5_get_dt_data(struct adc5_chip *adc, struct device_node *node)
 {

drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static ssize_t
 lpfc_drvr_version_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		       char *buf)
 {
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, LPFC_MODULE_DESC "\n");
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, LPFC_MODULE_DESC "\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ lpfc_enable_fip_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
 	if (phba->hba_flag & HBA_FIP_SUPPORT)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "1\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "1\n");
 	else
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0\n");
 }
 
 static ssize_t
@@ -564,14 +564,15 @@ lpfc_bg_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	if (phba->cfg_enable_bg)
+	if (phba->cfg_enable_bg) {
 		if (phba->sli3_options & LPFC_SLI3_BG_ENABLED)
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "BlockGuard Enabled\n");
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+					"BlockGuard Enabled\n");
 		else
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
 					"BlockGuard Not Supported\n");
-	else
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	} else
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
 					"BlockGuard Disabled\n");
 }
 
@@ -583,7 +584,7 @@ lpfc_bg_guard_err_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->bg_guard_err_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -595,7 +596,7 @@ lpfc_bg_apptag_err_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->bg_apptag_err_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -607,7 +608,7 @@ lpfc_bg_reftag_err_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->bg_reftag_err_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -625,7 +626,7 @@ lpfc_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 {
 	struct Scsi_Host *host = class_to_shost(dev);
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",lpfc_info(host));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", lpfc_info(host));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -644,7 +645,7 @@ lpfc_serialnum_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->SerialNumber);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->SerialNumber);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -666,7 +667,7 @@ lpfc_temp_sensor_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",phba->temp_sensor_support);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->temp_sensor_support);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -685,7 +686,7 @@ lpfc_modeldesc_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->ModelDesc);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->ModelDesc);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -704,7 +705,7 @@ lpfc_modelname_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->ModelName);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->ModelName);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -723,7 +724,7 @@ lpfc_programtype_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->ProgramType);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->ProgramType);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -741,7 +742,7 @@ lpfc_mlomgmt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 		(phba->sli.sli_flag & LPFC_MENLO_MAINT));
 }
 
@@ -761,7 +762,7 @@ lpfc_vportnum_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->Port);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->Port);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -789,10 +790,10 @@ lpfc_fwrev_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	sli_family = phba->sli4_hba.pc_sli4_params.sli_family;
 
 	if (phba->sli_rev < LPFC_SLI_REV4)
-		len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d\n",
+		len = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d\n",
 			       fwrev, phba->sli_rev);
 	else
-		len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d:%d:%x\n",
+		len = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d:%d:%x\n",
 			       fwrev, phba->sli_rev, if_type, sli_family);
 
 	return len;
@@ -816,7 +817,7 @@ lpfc_hdw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	lpfc_vpd_t *vp = &phba->vpd;
 
 	lpfc_jedec_to_ascii(vp->rev.biuRev, hdw);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", hdw);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", hdw);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -837,10 +838,11 @@ lpfc_option_rom_version_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	char fwrev[FW_REV_STR_SIZE];
 
 	if (phba->sli_rev < LPFC_SLI_REV4)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->OptionROMVersion);
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",
+				phba->OptionROMVersion);
 
 	lpfc_decode_firmware_rev(phba, fwrev, 1);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", fwrev);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", fwrev);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -871,20 +873,20 @@ lpfc_link_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	case LPFC_LINK_DOWN:
 	case LPFC_HBA_ERROR:
 		if (phba->hba_flag & LINK_DISABLED)
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"Link Down - User disabled\n");
 		else
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"Link Down\n");
 		break;
 	case LPFC_LINK_UP:
 	case LPFC_CLEAR_LA:
 	case LPFC_HBA_READY:
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "Link Up - ");
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "Link Up - ");
 
 		switch (vport->port_state) {
 		case LPFC_LOCAL_CFG_LINK:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 					"Configuring Link\n");
 			break;
 		case LPFC_FDISC:
@@ -894,38 +896,40 @@ lpfc_link_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		case LPFC_NS_QRY:
 		case LPFC_BUILD_DISC_LIST:
 		case LPFC_DISC_AUTH:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"Discovery\n");
 			break;
 		case LPFC_VPORT_READY:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "Ready\n");
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+					"Ready\n");
 			break;
 
 		case LPFC_VPORT_FAILED:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "Failed\n");
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+					"Failed\n");
 			break;
 
 		case LPFC_VPORT_UNKNOWN:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"Unknown\n");
 			break;
 		}
 		if (phba->sli.sli_flag & LPFC_MENLO_MAINT)
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 					"   Menlo Maint Mode\n");
 		else if (phba->fc_topology == LPFC_TOPOLOGY_LOOP) {
 			if (vport->fc_flag & FC_PUBLIC_LOOP)
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Public Loop\n");
 			else
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Private Loop\n");
 		} else {
 			if (vport->fc_flag & FC_FABRIC)
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Fabric\n");
 			else
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Point-2-Point\n");
 		}
 	}
@@ -937,28 +941,28 @@ lpfc_link_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		struct lpfc_trunk_link link = phba->trunk_link;
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port0, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 0: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link0.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
 				trunk_errmsg[link.link0.fault]);
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port1, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 1: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link1.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
 				trunk_errmsg[link.link1.fault]);
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port2, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 2: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link2.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
 				trunk_errmsg[link.link2.fault]);
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port3, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 3: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link3.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
@@ -986,15 +990,15 @@ lpfc_sli4_protocol_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = vport->phba;
 
 	if (phba->sli_rev < LPFC_SLI_REV4)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
 
 	if (phba->sli4_hba.lnk_info.lnk_dv == LPFC_LNK_DAT_VAL) {
 		if (phba->sli4_hba.lnk_info.lnk_tp == LPFC_LNK_TYPE_GE)
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fcoe\n");
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fcoe\n");
 		if (phba->sli4_hba.lnk_info.lnk_tp == LPFC_LNK_TYPE_FC)
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
 	}
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "unknown\n");
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1014,7 +1018,7 @@ lpfc_oas_supported_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			phba->sli4_hba.pc_sli4_params.oas_supported);
 }
 
@@ -1072,7 +1076,7 @@ lpfc_num_discovered_ports_show(struct device *dev,
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			vport->fc_map_cnt + vport->fc_unmap_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -1586,7 +1590,7 @@ lpfc_nport_evt_cnt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->nport_event_cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->nport_event_cnt);
 }
 
 int
@@ -1675,7 +1679,7 @@ lpfc_board_mode_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	else
 		state = "online";
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", state);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", state);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1901,8 +1905,8 @@ lpfc_max_rpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, &cnt, NULL, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1929,8 +1933,8 @@ lpfc_used_rpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt, acnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, &cnt, &acnt, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1957,8 +1961,8 @@ lpfc_max_xri_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, &cnt, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1985,8 +1989,8 @@ lpfc_used_xri_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt, acnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, &cnt, &acnt, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2013,8 +2017,8 @@ lpfc_max_vpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cnt, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2041,8 +2045,8 @@ lpfc_used_vpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt, acnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cnt, &acnt))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2067,10 +2071,10 @@ lpfc_npiv_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
 	if (!(phba->max_vpi))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Not Supported\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Not Supported\n");
 	if (vport->port_type == LPFC_PHYSICAL_PORT)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Physical\n");
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Virtual (VPI %d)\n", vport->vpi);
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Physical\n");
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Virtual (VPI %d)\n", vport->vpi);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2092,7 +2096,7 @@ lpfc_poll_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", phba->cfg_poll);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", phba->cfg_poll);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2196,7 +2200,7 @@ lpfc_fips_level_show(struct device *dev,  struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_level);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_level);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2215,7 +2219,7 @@ lpfc_fips_rev_show(struct device *dev,  struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_spec_rev);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_spec_rev);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2234,7 +2238,7 @@ lpfc_dss_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s - %sOperational\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s - %sOperational\n",
 			(phba->cfg_enable_dss) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
 			(phba->sli3_options & LPFC_SLI3_DSS_ENABLED) ?
 				"" : "Not ");
@@ -2263,7 +2267,7 @@ lpfc_sriov_hw_max_virtfn_show(struct device *dev,
 	uint16_t max_nr_virtfn;
 
 	max_nr_virtfn = lpfc_sli_sriov_nr_virtfn_get(phba);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", max_nr_virtfn);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", max_nr_virtfn);
 }
 
 static inline bool lpfc_rangecheck(uint val, uint min, uint max)
@@ -2323,7 +2327,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);\
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;\
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",\
 			phba->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
@@ -2351,7 +2355,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;\
 	uint val = 0;\
 	val = phba->cfg_##attr;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n",\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n",\
 			phba->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
@@ -2487,7 +2491,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 { \
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);\
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2512,7 +2516,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 { \
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);\
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2784,7 +2788,7 @@ lpfc_soft_wwpn_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->cfg_soft_wwpn);
 }
 
@@ -2881,7 +2885,7 @@ lpfc_soft_wwnn_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 {
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->cfg_soft_wwnn);
 }
 
@@ -2947,7 +2951,7 @@ lpfc_oas_tgt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			wwn_to_u64(phba->cfg_oas_tgt_wwpn));
 }
 
@@ -3015,7 +3019,7 @@ lpfc_oas_priority_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_priority);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_priority);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3078,7 +3082,7 @@ lpfc_oas_vpt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			wwn_to_u64(phba->cfg_oas_vpt_wwpn));
 }
 
@@ -3149,7 +3153,7 @@ lpfc_oas_lun_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_state);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_state);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3213,7 +3217,7 @@ lpfc_oas_lun_status_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	if (!(phba->cfg_oas_flags & OAS_LUN_VALID))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_status);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_status);
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR(lpfc_xlane_lun_status, S_IRUGO,
 		   lpfc_oas_lun_status_show, NULL);
@@ -3365,7 +3369,7 @@ lpfc_oas_lun_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	if (oas_lun != NOT_OAS_ENABLED_LUN)
 		phba->cfg_oas_flags |= OAS_LUN_VALID;
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "0x%llx", oas_lun);
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "0x%llx", oas_lun);
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -3499,7 +3503,7 @@ lpfc_iocb_hw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->iocb_max);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->iocb_max);
 }
 
 static DEVICE_ATTR(iocb_hw, S_IRUGO,
@@ -3511,7 +3515,7 @@ lpfc_txq_hw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata)->phba;
 	struct lpfc_sli_ring *pring = lpfc_phba_elsring(phba);
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			pring ? pring->txq_max : 0);
 }
 
@@ -3525,7 +3529,7 @@ lpfc_txcmplq_hw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata)->phba;
 	struct lpfc_sli_ring *pring = lpfc_phba_elsring(phba);
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			pring ? pring->txcmplq_max : 0);
 }
 
@@ -3561,7 +3565,7 @@ lpfc_nodev_tmo_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",	vport->cfg_devloss_tmo);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",	vport->cfg_devloss_tmo);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5169,12 +5173,12 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 
 	switch (phba->cfg_fcp_cpu_map) {
 	case 0:
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"fcp_cpu_map: No mapping (%d)\n",
 				phba->cfg_fcp_cpu_map);
 		return len;
 	case 1:
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"fcp_cpu_map: HBA centric mapping (%d): "
 				"%d of %d CPUs online from %d possible CPUs\n",
 				phba->cfg_fcp_cpu_map, num_online_cpus(),
@@ -5188,12 +5192,12 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		cpup = &phba->sli4_hba.cpu_map[phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu];
 
 		if (!cpu_present(phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d not present\n",
 					phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu);
 		else if (cpup->irq == LPFC_VECTOR_MAP_EMPTY) {
 			if (cpup->hdwq == LPFC_VECTOR_MAP_EMPTY)
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d hdwq None "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d\n",
@@ -5201,7 +5205,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 					cpup->phys_id,
 					cpup->core_id, cpup->hyper);
 			else
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d EQ %04d hdwq %04d "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d\n",
@@ -5210,7 +5214,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 					cpup->core_id, cpup->hyper);
 		} else {
 			if (cpup->hdwq == LPFC_VECTOR_MAP_EMPTY)
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d hdwq None "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d IRQ %d\n",
@@ -5218,7 +5222,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 					cpup->phys_id,
 					cpup->core_id, cpup->hyper, cpup->irq);
 			else
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d EQ %04d hdwq %04d "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d IRQ %d\n",
@@ -5233,7 +5237,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		if (phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu <
 				phba->sli4_hba.num_possible_cpu &&
 				(len >= (PAGE_SIZE - 64))) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len,
 					PAGE_SIZE - len, "more...\n");
 			break;
 		}
@@ -5753,10 +5757,10 @@ lpfc_sg_seg_cnt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 	int len;
 
-	len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SGL sz: %d  total SGEs: %d\n",
+	len = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SGL sz: %d  total SGEs: %d\n",
 		       phba->cfg_sg_dma_buf_size, phba->cfg_total_seg_cnt);
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE, "Cfg: %d  SCSI: %d  NVME: %d\n",
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE, "Cfg: %d  SCSI: %d  NVME: %d\n",
 			phba->cfg_sg_seg_cnt, phba->cfg_scsi_seg_cnt,
 			phba->cfg_nvme_seg_cnt);
 	return len;
@@ -6755,7 +6759,7 @@ lpfc_show_rport_##field (struct device *dev,				\
 {									\
 	struct fc_rport *rport = transport_class_to_rport(dev);		\
 	struct lpfc_rport_data *rdata = rport->hostdata;		\
-	return snprintf(buf, sz, format_string,				\
+	return scnprintf(buf, sz, format_string,			\
 		(rdata->target) ? cast rdata->target->field : 0);	\
 }
 

drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_ct.c

@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ lpfc_vport_symbolic_port_name(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *symbol,
 	 * Name object.  NPIV is not in play so this integer
 	 * value is sufficient and unique per FC-ID.
 	 */
-	n = snprintf(symbol, size, "%d", vport->phba->brd_no);
+	n = scnprintf(symbol, size, "%d", vport->phba->brd_no);
 	return n;
 }
 
@@ -1444,26 +1444,26 @@ lpfc_vport_symbolic_node_name(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *symbol,
 
 	lpfc_decode_firmware_rev(vport->phba, fwrev, 0);
 
-	n = snprintf(symbol, size, "Emulex %s", vport->phba->ModelName);
+	n = scnprintf(symbol, size, "Emulex %s", vport->phba->ModelName);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " FV%s", fwrev);
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " FV%s", fwrev);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " DV%s.",
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " DV%s.",
 		      lpfc_release_version);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " HN:%s.",
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " HN:%s.",
 		      init_utsname()->nodename);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
 	/* Note :- OS name is "Linux" */
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " OS:%s\n",
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " OS:%s\n",
 		      init_utsname()->sysname);
 	return n;
 }

drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.h

@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ lpfc_debug_dump_qe(struct lpfc_queue *q, uint32_t idx)
 	pword = q->qe[idx].address;
 
 	len = 0;
-	len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "QE[%04d]: ", idx);
+	len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "QE[%04d]: ", idx);
 	if (qe_word_cnt > 8)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s\n", line_buf);
 
@@ -359,11 +359,11 @@ lpfc_debug_dump_qe(struct lpfc_queue *q, uint32_t idx)
 			if (qe_word_cnt > 8) {
 				len = 0;
 				memset(line_buf, 0, LPFC_LBUF_SZ);
-				len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len,
+				len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 						"%03d: ", i);
 			}
 		}
-		len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "%08x ",
+		len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "%08x ",
 				((uint32_t)*pword) & 0xffffffff);
 		pword++;
 	}

drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_attr.c

@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ qla2x00_sysfs_write_optrom_ctl(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 		}
 
 		ha->optrom_region_start = start;
-		ha->optrom_region_size = start + size;
+		ha->optrom_region_size = size;
 
 		ha->optrom_state = QLA_SREADING;
 		ha->optrom_buffer = vmalloc(ha->optrom_region_size);
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ qla2x00_sysfs_write_optrom_ctl(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 		}
 
 		ha->optrom_region_start = start;
-		ha->optrom_region_size = start + size;
+		ha->optrom_region_size = size;
 
 		ha->optrom_state = QLA_SWRITING;
 		ha->optrom_buffer = vmalloc(ha->optrom_region_size);

drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nvme.c

@@ -615,7 +615,6 @@ static void qla_nvme_unregister_remote_port(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct fc_port *fcport = container_of(work, struct fc_port,
 	    nvme_del_work);
 	struct qla_nvme_rport *qla_rport, *trport;
-	scsi_qla_host_t *base_vha;
 
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_FC))
 		return;
@@ -623,23 +622,19 @@ static void qla_nvme_unregister_remote_port(struct work_struct *work)
 	ql_log(ql_log_warn, NULL, 0x2112,
 	    "%s: unregister remoteport on %p\n",__func__, fcport);
 
-	base_vha = pci_get_drvdata(fcport->vha->hw->pdev);
-	if (test_bit(PFLG_DRIVER_REMOVING, &base_vha->pci_flags)) {
-		ql_dbg(ql_dbg_disc, fcport->vha, 0x2114,
-		    "%s: Notify FC-NVMe transport, set devloss=0\n",
-		    __func__);
-
-		nvme_fc_set_remoteport_devloss(fcport->nvme_remote_port, 0);
-	}
-
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(qla_rport, trport,
 	    &fcport->vha->nvme_rport_list, list) {
 		if (qla_rport->fcport == fcport) {
 			ql_log(ql_log_info, fcport->vha, 0x2113,
 			    "%s: fcport=%p\n", __func__, fcport);
+			nvme_fc_set_remoteport_devloss
+				(fcport->nvme_remote_port, 0);
 			init_completion(&fcport->nvme_del_done);
-			nvme_fc_unregister_remoteport(
-			    fcport->nvme_remote_port);
+			if (nvme_fc_unregister_remoteport
+			    (fcport->nvme_remote_port))
+				ql_log(ql_log_info, fcport->vha, 0x2114,
+				    "%s: Failed to unregister nvme_remote_port\n",
+				    __func__);
 			wait_for_completion(&fcport->nvme_del_done);
 			break;
 		}

drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c

@@ -980,6 +980,8 @@ void qlt_free_session_done(struct work_struct *work)
 		sess->send_els_logo);
 
 	if (!IS_SW_RESV_ADDR(sess->d_id)) {
+		qla2x00_mark_device_lost(vha, sess, 0, 0);
+
 		if (sess->send_els_logo) {
 			qlt_port_logo_t logo;
 
@@ -1160,8 +1162,6 @@ void qlt_unreg_sess(struct fc_port *sess)
 	if (sess->se_sess)
 		vha->hw->tgt.tgt_ops->clear_nacl_from_fcport_map(sess);
 
-	qla2x00_mark_device_lost(vha, sess, 0, 0);
-
 	sess->deleted = QLA_SESS_DELETION_IN_PROGRESS;
 	sess->disc_state = DSC_DELETE_PEND;
 	sess->last_rscn_gen = sess->rscn_gen;

drivers/soc/sunxi/Kconfig

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 config SUNXI_SRAM
 	bool
 	default ARCH_SUNXI
+	select REGMAP_MMIO
 	help
 	  Say y here to enable the SRAM controller support. This
 	  device is responsible on mapping the SRAM in the sunXi SoCs

drivers/staging/greybus/power_supply.c

@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static int gb_power_supply_prop_descriptors_get(struct gb_power_supply *gbpsy)
 
 	op = gb_operation_create(connection,
 				 GB_POWER_SUPPLY_TYPE_GET_PROP_DESCRIPTORS,
-				 sizeof(req), sizeof(*resp) + props_count *
+				 sizeof(*req), sizeof(*resp) + props_count *
 				 sizeof(struct gb_power_supply_props_desc),
 				 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!op)

drivers/staging/most/cdev/cdev.c

@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static void __exit mod_exit(void)
 		destroy_cdev(c);
 		destroy_channel(c);
 	}
-	unregister_chrdev_region(comp.devno, 1);
+	unregister_chrdev_region(comp.devno, CHRDEV_REGION_SIZE);
 	ida_destroy(&comp.minor_id);
 	class_destroy(comp.class);
 }

drivers/staging/most/sound/sound.c

@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static int audio_probe_channel(struct most_interface *iface, int channel_id,
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&adpt->dev_list);
 	iface->priv = adpt;
 	list_add_tail(&adpt->list, &adpt_list);
-	ret = snd_card_new(&iface->dev, -1, "INIC", THIS_MODULE,
+	ret = snd_card_new(iface->driver_dev, -1, "INIC", THIS_MODULE,
 			   sizeof(*channel), &adpt->card);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err_free_adpt;

drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c

@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ static void wilc_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	mc_list = kmalloc_array(dev->mc.count, ETH_ALEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	mc_list = kmalloc_array(dev->mc.count, ETH_ALEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!mc_list)
 		return;
 

drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c

@@ -470,12 +470,12 @@ static void acm_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 	struct acm *acm = rb->instance;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int status = urb->status;
+	bool stopped = false;
+	bool stalled = false;
 
 	dev_vdbg(&acm->data->dev, "got urb %d, len %d, status %d\n",
 		rb->index, urb->actual_length, status);
 
-	set_bit(rb->index, &acm->read_urbs_free);
-
 	if (!acm->dev) {
 		dev_dbg(&acm->data->dev, "%s - disconnected\n", __func__);
 		return;
@@ -488,15 +488,16 @@ static void acm_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 		break;
 	case -EPIPE:
 		set_bit(EVENT_RX_STALL, &acm->flags);
-		schedule_work(&acm->work);
-		return;
+		stalled = true;
+		break;
 	case -ENOENT:
 	case -ECONNRESET:
 	case -ESHUTDOWN:
 		dev_dbg(&acm->data->dev,
 			"%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
 			__func__, status);
-		return;
+		stopped = true;
+		break;
 	default:
 		dev_dbg(&acm->data->dev,
 			"%s - nonzero urb status received: %d\n",
@@ -505,10 +506,24 @@ static void acm_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Unthrottle may run on another CPU which needs to see events
-	 * in the same order. Submission has an implict barrier
+	 * Make sure URB processing is done before marking as free to avoid
+	 * racing with unthrottle() on another CPU. Matches the barriers
+	 * implied by the test_and_clear_bit() in acm_submit_read_urb().
 	 */
 	smp_mb__before_atomic();
+	set_bit(rb->index, &acm->read_urbs_free);
+	/*
+	 * Make sure URB is marked as free before checking the throttled flag
+	 * to avoid racing with unthrottle() on another CPU. Matches the
+	 * smp_mb() in unthrottle().
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+	if (stopped || stalled) {
+		if (stalled)
+			schedule_work(&acm->work);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	/* throttle device if requested by tty */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&acm->read_lock, flags);
@@ -842,6 +857,9 @@ static void acm_tty_unthrottle(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	acm->throttle_req = 0;
 	spin_unlock_irq(&acm->read_lock);
 
+	/* Matches the smp_mb__after_atomic() in acm_read_bulk_callback(). */
+	smp_mb();
+
 	if (was_throttled)
 		acm_submit_read_urbs(acm, GFP_KERNEL);
 }

drivers/usb/dwc3/Kconfig

@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ comment "Platform Glue Driver Support"
 
 config USB_DWC3_OMAP
 	tristate "Texas Instruments OMAP5 and similar Platforms"
-	depends on EXTCON && (ARCH_OMAP2PLUS || COMPILE_TEST)
+	depends on ARCH_OMAP2PLUS || COMPILE_TEST
+	depends on EXTCON || !EXTCON
 	depends on OF
 	default USB_DWC3
 	help
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ config USB_DWC3_ST
 
 config USB_DWC3_QCOM
 	tristate "Qualcomm Platform"
-	depends on EXTCON && (ARCH_QCOM || COMPILE_TEST)
+	depends on ARCH_QCOM || COMPILE_TEST
+	depends on EXTCON || !EXTCON
 	depends on OF
 	default USB_DWC3
 	help

drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c

@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ static void dwc3_get_properties(struct dwc3 *dwc)
 	u8			tx_max_burst_prd;
 
 	/* default to highest possible threshold */
-	lpm_nyet_threshold = 0xff;
+	lpm_nyet_threshold = 0xf;
 
 	/* default to -3.5dB de-emphasis */
 	tx_de_emphasis = 1;

drivers/usb/musb/Kconfig

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ config USB_MUSB_SUNXI
 	depends on NOP_USB_XCEIV
 	depends on PHY_SUN4I_USB
 	depends on EXTCON
-	depends on GENERIC_PHY
+	select GENERIC_PHY
 	select SUNXI_SRAM
 
 config USB_MUSB_DAVINCI

drivers/usb/serial/f81232.c

@@ -556,9 +556,12 @@ static int f81232_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
 
 static void f81232_close(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 {
+	struct f81232_private *port_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+
 	f81232_port_disable(port);
 	usb_serial_generic_close(port);
 	usb_kill_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb);
+	flush_work(&port_priv->interrupt_work);
 }
 
 static void f81232_dtr_rts(struct usb_serial_port *port, int on)
@@ -632,6 +635,40 @@ static int f81232_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int f81232_suspend(struct usb_serial *serial, pm_message_t message)
+{
+	struct usb_serial_port *port = serial->port[0];
+	struct f81232_private *port_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(port->read_urbs); ++i)
+		usb_kill_urb(port->read_urbs[i]);
+
+	usb_kill_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb);
+
+	if (port_priv)
+		flush_work(&port_priv->interrupt_work);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int f81232_resume(struct usb_serial *serial)
+{
+	struct usb_serial_port *port = serial->port[0];
+	int result;
+
+	if (tty_port_initialized(&port->port)) {
+		result = usb_submit_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb, GFP_NOIO);
+		if (result) {
+			dev_err(&port->dev, "submit interrupt urb failed: %d\n",
+					result);
+			return result;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return usb_serial_generic_resume(serial);
+}
+
 static struct usb_serial_driver f81232_device = {
 	.driver = {
 		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
@@ -655,6 +692,8 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver f81232_device = {
 	.read_int_callback =	f81232_read_int_callback,
 	.port_probe =		f81232_port_probe,
 	.port_remove =		f81232_port_remove,
+	.suspend =		f81232_suspend,
+	.resume =		f81232_resume,
 };
 
 static struct usb_serial_driver * const serial_drivers[] = {

drivers/usb/storage/scsiglue.c

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static const char* host_info(struct Scsi_Host *host)
 static int slave_alloc (struct scsi_device *sdev)
 {
 	struct us_data *us = host_to_us(sdev->host);
+	int maxp;
 
 	/*
 	 * Set the INQUIRY transfer length to 36.  We don't use any of
@@ -74,20 +75,17 @@ static int slave_alloc (struct scsi_device *sdev)
 	sdev->inquiry_len = 36;
 
 	/*
-	 * USB has unusual DMA-alignment requirements: Although the
-	 * starting address of each scatter-gather element doesn't matter,
-	 * the length of each element except the last must be divisible
-	 * by the Bulk maxpacket value.  There's currently no way to
-	 * express this by block-layer constraints, so we'll cop out
-	 * and simply require addresses to be aligned at 512-byte
-	 * boundaries.  This is okay since most block I/O involves
-	 * hardware sectors that are multiples of 512 bytes in length,
-	 * and since host controllers up through USB 2.0 have maxpacket
-	 * values no larger than 512.
-	 *
-	 * But it doesn't suffice for Wireless USB, where Bulk maxpacket
-	 * values can be as large as 2048.  To make that work properly
-	 * will require changes to the block layer.
+	 * USB has unusual scatter-gather requirements: the length of each
+	 * scatterlist element except the last must be divisible by the
+	 * Bulk maxpacket value.  Fortunately this value is always a
+	 * power of 2.  Inform the block layer about this requirement.
+	 */
+	maxp = usb_maxpacket(us->pusb_dev, us->recv_bulk_pipe, 0);
+	blk_queue_virt_boundary(sdev->request_queue, maxp - 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some host controllers may have alignment requirements.
+	 * We'll play it safe by requiring 512-byte alignment always.
 	 */
 	blk_queue_update_dma_alignment(sdev->request_queue, (512 - 1));
 

drivers/usb/storage/uas.c

@@ -789,24 +789,33 @@ static int uas_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev)
 {
 	struct uas_dev_info *devinfo =
 		(struct uas_dev_info *)sdev->host->hostdata;
+	int maxp;
 
 	sdev->hostdata = devinfo;
 
 	/*
-	 * USB has unusual DMA-alignment requirements: Although the
-	 * starting address of each scatter-gather element doesn't matter,
-	 * the length of each element except the last must be divisible
-	 * by the Bulk maxpacket value.  There's currently no way to
-	 * express this by block-layer constraints, so we'll cop out
-	 * and simply require addresses to be aligned at 512-byte
-	 * boundaries.  This is okay since most block I/O involves
-	 * hardware sectors that are multiples of 512 bytes in length,
-	 * and since host controllers up through USB 2.0 have maxpacket
-	 * values no larger than 512.
+	 * We have two requirements here. We must satisfy the requirements
+	 * of the physical HC and the demands of the protocol, as we
+	 * definitely want no additional memory allocation in this path
+	 * ruling out using bounce buffers.
 	 *
-	 * But it doesn't suffice for Wireless USB, where Bulk maxpacket
-	 * values can be as large as 2048.  To make that work properly
-	 * will require changes to the block layer.
+	 * For a transmission on USB to continue we must never send
+	 * a package that is smaller than maxpacket. Hence the length of each
+         * scatterlist element except the last must be divisible by the
+         * Bulk maxpacket value.
+	 * If the HC does not ensure that through SG,
+	 * the upper layer must do that. We must assume nothing
+	 * about the capabilities off the HC, so we use the most
+	 * pessimistic requirement.
+	 */
+
+	maxp = usb_maxpacket(devinfo->udev, devinfo->data_in_pipe, 0);
+	blk_queue_virt_boundary(sdev->request_queue, maxp - 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * The protocol has no requirements on alignment in the strict sense.
+	 * Controllers may or may not have alignment restrictions.
+	 * As this is not exported, we use an extremely conservative guess.
 	 */
 	blk_queue_update_dma_alignment(sdev->request_queue, (512 - 1));
 

include/linux/cpu.h

@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
 					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
 			     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
@@ -187,4 +189,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */

include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h

@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ struct adv_info {
 
 #define HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH	10
 
+/* Min encryption key size to match with SMP */
+#define HCI_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE		7
+
 /* Default LE RPA expiry time, 15 minutes */
 #define HCI_DEFAULT_RPA_TIMEOUT		(15 * 60)
 

kernel/cpu.c

@@ -2304,3 +2304,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);

kernel/futex.c

@@ -1311,13 +1311,15 @@ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
 
 static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
 {
+	int err;
 	u32 uninitialized_var(curval);
 
 	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (unlikely(cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)))
-		return -EFAULT;
+	err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
 
 	/* If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
 	return curval != uval ? -EAGAIN : 0;
@@ -1502,10 +1504,8 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_pi_state *pi_
 	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
-	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-
-	} else if (curval != uval) {
+	ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+	if (!ret && (curval != uval)) {
 		/*
 		 * If a unconditional UNLOCK_PI operation (user space did not
 		 * try the TID->0 transition) raced with a waiter setting the
@@ -1700,32 +1700,32 @@ retry_private:
 	double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 	op_ret = futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, uaddr2);
 	if (unlikely(op_ret < 0)) {
-
 		double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
-		/*
-		 * we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have an MMU,
-		 * but we might get them from range checking
-		 */
-		ret = op_ret;
-		goto out_put_keys;
-#endif
-
-		if (unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT)) {
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) ||
+		    unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT && op_ret != -EAGAIN)) {
+			/*
+			 * we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have
+			 * an MMU, but we might get them from range checking
+			 */
 			ret = op_ret;
 			goto out_put_keys;
 		}
 
-		ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out_put_keys;
+		if (op_ret == -EFAULT) {
+			ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
+			if (ret)
+				goto out_put_keys;
+		}
 
-		if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
+		if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED)) {
+			cond_resched();
 			goto retry_private;
+		}
 
 		put_futex_key(&key2);
 		put_futex_key(&key1);
+		cond_resched();
 		goto retry;
 	}
 
@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static int fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q,
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(curval), newval;
 	struct task_struct *oldowner, *newowner;
 	u32 newtid;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, err = 0;
 
 	lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
 
@@ -2421,14 +2421,17 @@ retry:
 	if (!pi_state->owner)
 		newtid |= FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
 
-	if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr))
-		goto handle_fault;
+	err = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
+	if (err)
+		goto handle_err;
 
 	for (;;) {
 		newval = (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) | newtid;
 
-		if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval))
-			goto handle_fault;
+		err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+		if (err)
+			goto handle_err;
+
 		if (curval == uval)
 			break;
 		uval = curval;
@@ -2456,23 +2459,37 @@ retry:
 	return 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * To handle the page fault we need to drop the locks here. That gives
-	 * the other task (either the highest priority waiter itself or the
-	 * task which stole the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the
-	 * pi_state. So once we are back from handling the fault we need to
-	 * check the pi_state after reacquiring the locks and before trying to
-	 * do another fixup. When the fixup has been done already we simply
-	 * return.
+	 * In order to reschedule or handle a page fault, we need to drop the
+	 * locks here. In the case of a fault, this gives the other task
+	 * (either the highest priority waiter itself or the task which stole
+	 * the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the pi_state. So once we
+	 * are back from handling the fault we need to check the pi_state after
+	 * reacquiring the locks and before trying to do another fixup. When
+	 * the fixup has been done already we simply return.
 	 *
 	 * Note: we hold both hb->lock and pi_mutex->wait_lock. We can safely
 	 * drop hb->lock since the caller owns the hb -> futex_q relation.
 	 * Dropping the pi_mutex->wait_lock requires the state revalidate.
 	 */
-handle_fault:
+handle_err:
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 	spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr);
 
-	ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
+	switch (err) {
+	case -EFAULT:
+		ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
+		break;
+
+	case -EAGAIN:
+		cond_resched();
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		ret = err;
+		break;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(q->lock_ptr);
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
@@ -3041,10 +3058,8 @@ retry:
 		 * A unconditional UNLOCK_PI op raced against a waiter
 		 * setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit. Try again.
 		 */
-		if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
-			put_futex_key(&key);
-			goto retry;
-		}
+		if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+			goto pi_retry;
 		/*
 		 * wake_futex_pi has detected invalid state. Tell user
 		 * space.
@@ -3059,9 +3074,19 @@ retry:
 	 * preserve the WAITERS bit not the OWNER_DIED one. We are the
 	 * owner.
 	 */
-	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0)) {
+	if ((ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0))) {
 		spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
-		goto pi_faulted;
+		switch (ret) {
+		case -EFAULT:
+			goto pi_faulted;
+
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			goto pi_retry;
+
+		default:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+			goto out_putkey;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -3075,6 +3100,11 @@ out_putkey:
 	put_futex_key(&key);
 	return ret;
 
+pi_retry:
+	put_futex_key(&key);
+	cond_resched();
+	goto retry;
+
 pi_faulted:
 	put_futex_key(&key);
 
@@ -3435,6 +3465,7 @@ err_unlock:
 static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr, int pi)
 {
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
+	int err;
 
 	/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
 	if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
@@ -3444,42 +3475,57 @@ retry:
 	if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
 		return -1;
 
-	if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) == task_pid_vnr(curr)) {
-		/*
-		 * Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
-		 * of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
-		 * via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
-		 * set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
-		 * futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
-		 * to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
-		 * thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
-		 * userspace.
-		 */
-		mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
-		/*
-		 * We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
-		 * the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
-		 * we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
-		 * access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
-		 * verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
-		 * does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
-		 * give up and leave the futex locked.
-		 */
-		if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval)) {
+	if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
+	 * of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
+	 * via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
+	 * set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
+	 * futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
+	 * to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
+	 * thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
+	 * userspace.
+	 */
+	mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
+
+	/*
+	 * We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
+	 * the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
+	 * we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
+	 * access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
+	 * verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
+	 * does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
+	 * give up and leave the futex locked.
+	 */
+	if ((err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval))) {
+		switch (err) {
+		case -EFAULT:
 			if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
 				return -1;
 			goto retry;
-		}
-		if (nval != uval)
+
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			cond_resched();
 			goto retry;
 
-		/*
-		 * Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
-		 * PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
-		 */
-		if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
-			futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
+		default:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+			return err;
+		}
 	}
+
+	if (nval != uval)
+		goto retry;
+
+	/*
+	 * Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
+	 * PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
+	 */
+	if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
+		futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

kernel/irq/manage.c

@@ -357,8 +357,10 @@ irq_set_affinity_notifier(unsigned int irq, struct irq_affinity_notify *notify)
 	desc->affinity_notify = notify;
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
 
-	if (old_notify)
+	if (old_notify) {
+		cancel_work_sync(&old_notify->work);
 		kref_put(&old_notify->kref, old_notify->release);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }

lib/ubsan.c

@@ -86,11 +86,13 @@ static bool is_inline_int(struct type_descriptor *type)
 	return bits <= inline_bits;
 }
 
-static s_max get_signed_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
+static s_max get_signed_val(struct type_descriptor *type, void *val)
 {
 	if (is_inline_int(type)) {
 		unsigned extra_bits = sizeof(s_max)*8 - type_bit_width(type);
-		return ((s_max)val) << extra_bits >> extra_bits;
+		unsigned long ulong_val = (unsigned long)val;
+
+		return ((s_max)ulong_val) << extra_bits >> extra_bits;
 	}
 
 	if (type_bit_width(type) == 64)
@@ -99,15 +101,15 @@ static s_max get_signed_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
 	return *(s_max *)val;
 }
 
-static bool val_is_negative(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
+static bool val_is_negative(struct type_descriptor *type, void *val)
 {
 	return type_is_signed(type) && get_signed_val(type, val) < 0;
 }
 
-static u_max get_unsigned_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
+static u_max get_unsigned_val(struct type_descriptor *type, void *val)
 {
 	if (is_inline_int(type))
-		return val;
+		return (unsigned long)val;
 
 	if (type_bit_width(type) == 64)
 		return *(u64 *)val;
@@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ static u_max get_unsigned_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
 }
 
 static void val_to_string(char *str, size_t size, struct type_descriptor *type,
-	unsigned long value)
+			void *value)
 {
 	if (type_is_int(type)) {
 		if (type_bit_width(type) == 128) {
@@ -163,8 +165,8 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(unsigned long *flags)
 	current->in_ubsan--;
 }
 
-static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, unsigned long lhs,
-			unsigned long rhs, char op)
+static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
+			void *rhs, char op)
 {
 
 	struct type_descriptor *type = data->type;
@@ -191,8 +193,7 @@ static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, unsigned long lhs,
 }
 
 void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 
 	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '+');
@@ -200,23 +201,21 @@ void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_add_overflow);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '-');
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_sub_overflow);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '*');
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_mul_overflow);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long old_val)
+				void *old_val)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char old_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -237,8 +236,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow);
 
 
 void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char rhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -323,7 +321,7 @@ static void ubsan_type_mismatch_common(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data,
 }
 
 void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data,
-				unsigned long ptr)
+				void *ptr)
 {
 	struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = {
 		.location = &data->location,
@@ -332,12 +330,12 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data,
 		.type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind
 	};
 
-	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr);
+	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, (unsigned long)ptr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data,
-				unsigned long ptr)
+				void *ptr)
 {
 
 	struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = {
@@ -347,12 +345,12 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data,
 		.type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind
 	};
 
-	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr);
+	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, (unsigned long)ptr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive(struct vla_bound_data *data,
-					unsigned long bound)
+					void *bound)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char bound_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -369,8 +367,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive(struct vla_bound_data *data,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive);
 
-void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data,
-				unsigned long index)
+void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data, void *index)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char index_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -388,7 +385,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds(struct shift_out_of_bounds_data *data,
-					unsigned long lhs, unsigned long rhs)
+					void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct type_descriptor *rhs_type = data->rhs_type;
@@ -439,7 +436,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value(struct invalid_value_data *data,
-				unsigned long val)
+				void *val)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];

net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c

@@ -1276,6 +1276,14 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
 	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
 		return 0;
 
+	/* The minimum encryption key size needs to be enforced by the
+	 * host stack before establishing any L2CAP connections. The
+	 * specification in theory allows a minimum of 1, but to align
+	 * BR/EDR and LE transports, a minimum of 7 is chosen.
+	 */
+	if (conn->enc_key_size < HCI_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
+		return 0;
+
 	return 1;
 }
 

net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static int do_hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, void __user
 			sockfd_put(csock);
 			return err;
 		}
+		ca.name[sizeof(ca.name)-1] = 0;
 
 		err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
 		if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))

net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c

@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2cap_chan_set_defaults);
 
-static void l2cap_le_flowctl_init(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+static void l2cap_le_flowctl_init(struct l2cap_chan *chan, u16 tx_credits)
 {
 	chan->sdu = NULL;
 	chan->sdu_last_frag = NULL;
 	chan->sdu_len = 0;
-	chan->tx_credits = 0;
+	chan->tx_credits = tx_credits;
 	/* Derive MPS from connection MTU to stop HCI fragmentation */
 	chan->mps = min_t(u16, chan->imtu, chan->conn->mtu - L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
 	/* Give enough credits for a full packet */
@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static void l2cap_le_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	if (test_and_set_bit(FLAG_LE_CONN_REQ_SENT, &chan->flags))
 		return;
 
-	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan);
+	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan, 0);
 
 	req.psm     = chan->psm;
 	req.scid    = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid);
@@ -5532,11 +5532,10 @@ static int l2cap_le_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	chan->dcid = scid;
 	chan->omtu = mtu;
 	chan->remote_mps = mps;
-	chan->tx_credits = __le16_to_cpu(req->credits);
 
 	__l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan);
 
-	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan);
+	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan, __le16_to_cpu(req->credits));
 
 	dcid = chan->scid;
 	credits = chan->rx_credits;

sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c

@@ -1251,11 +1251,15 @@ struct sst_dsp *sst_dsp_new(struct device *dev,
 		goto irq_err;
 
 	err = sst_dma_new(sst);
-	if (err)
-		dev_warn(dev, "sst_dma_new failed %d\n", err);
+	if (err)  {
+		dev_err(dev, "sst_dma_new failed %d\n", err);
+		goto dma_err;
+	}
 
 	return sst;
 
+dma_err:
+	free_irq(sst->irq, sst);
 irq_err:
 	if (sst->ops->free)
 		sst->ops->free(sst);

tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
 endif
 
 turbostat : turbostat.c
-override CFLAGS +=	-Wall
+override CFLAGS +=	-Wall -I../../../include
 override CFLAGS +=	-DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
 override CFLAGS +=	-DINTEL_FAMILY_HEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h"'
 

tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
 endif
 
 x86_energy_perf_policy : x86_energy_perf_policy.c
-override CFLAGS +=	-Wall
+override CFLAGS +=	-Wall -I../../../include
 override CFLAGS +=	-DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
 
 %: %.c