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Author SHA1 Message Date
Greg Kroah-Hartman 5f8bc2bb0e Linux 5.4.2 2019-12-04 22:31:09 +01:00
Hans de Goede e64cd7a033 platform/x86: hp-wmi: Fix ACPI errors caused by passing 0 as input size
commit f3e4f3fc8e upstream.

The AML code implementing the WMI methods creates a variable length
field to hold the input data we pass like this:

        CreateDWordField (Arg1, 0x0C, DSZI)
        Local5 = DSZI /* \HWMC.DSZI */
        CreateField (Arg1, 0x80, (Local5 * 0x08), DAIN)

If we pass 0 as bios_args.datasize argument then (Local5 * 0x08)
is 0 which results in these errors:

[   71.973305] ACPI BIOS Error (bug): Attempt to CreateField of length zero (20190816/dsopcode-133)
[   71.973332] ACPI Error: Aborting method \HWMC due to previous error (AE_AML_OPERAND_VALUE) (20190816/psparse-529)
[   71.973413] ACPI Error: Aborting method \_SB.WMID.WMAA due to previous error (AE_AML_OPERAND_VALUE) (20190816/psparse-529)

And in our HPWMI_WIRELESS2_QUERY calls always failing. for read commands
like HPWMI_WIRELESS2_QUERY the DSZI value is not used / checked, except for
read commands where extra input is needed to specify exactly what to read.

So for HPWMI_WIRELESS2_QUERY we can safely pass the size of the expected
output as insize to hp_wmi_perform_query(), as we are already doing for all
other HPWMI_READ commands we send. Doing so fixes these errors.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197007
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201981
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1520703
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:08 +01:00
Hans de Goede 5227ac4dda platform/x86: hp-wmi: Fix ACPI errors caused by too small buffer
commit 16245db148 upstream.

The HP WMI calls may take up to 128 bytes of data as input, and
the AML methods implementing the WMI calls, declare a couple of fields for
accessing input in different sizes, specifycally the HWMC method contains:

        CreateField (Arg1, 0x80, 0x0400, D128)

Even though we do not use any of the WMI command-types which need a buffer
of this size, the APCI interpreter still tries to create it as it is
declared in generoc code at the top of the HWMC method which runs before
the code looks at which command-type is requested.

This results in many of these errors on many different HP laptop models:

[   14.459261] ACPI Error: Field [D128] at 1152 exceeds Buffer [NULL] size 160 (bits) (20170303/dsopcode-236)
[   14.459268] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\HWMC] (Node ffff8edcc61507f8), AE_AML_BUFFER_LIMIT (20170303/psparse-543)
[   14.459279] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB.WMID.WMAA] (Node ffff8edcc61523c0), AE_AML_BUFFER_LIMIT (20170303/psparse-543)

This commit increases the size of the data element of the bios_args struct
to 128 bytes fixing these errors.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197007
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201981
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1520703
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:08 +01:00
Candle Sun 41dc53ab98 HID: core: check whether Usage Page item is after Usage ID items
commit 1cb0d2aee2 upstream.

Upstream commit 58e7515500 ("HID: core: move Usage Page concatenation
to Main item") adds support for Usage Page item after Usage ID items
(such as keyboards manufactured by Primax).

Usage Page concatenation in Main item works well for following report
descriptor patterns:

    USAGE_PAGE (Keyboard)                   05 07
    USAGE_MINIMUM (Keyboard LeftControl)    19 E0
    USAGE_MAXIMUM (Keyboard Right GUI)      29 E7
    LOGICAL_MINIMUM (0)                     15 00
    LOGICAL_MAXIMUM (1)                     25 01
    REPORT_SIZE (1)                         75 01
    REPORT_COUNT (8)                        95 08
    INPUT (Data,Var,Abs)                    81 02

-------------

    USAGE_MINIMUM (Keyboard LeftControl)    19 E0
    USAGE_MAXIMUM (Keyboard Right GUI)      29 E7
    LOGICAL_MINIMUM (0)                     15 00
    LOGICAL_MAXIMUM (1)                     25 01
    REPORT_SIZE (1)                         75 01
    REPORT_COUNT (8)                        95 08
    USAGE_PAGE (Keyboard)                   05 07
    INPUT (Data,Var,Abs)                    81 02

But it makes the parser act wrong for the following report
descriptor pattern(such as some Gamepads):

    USAGE_PAGE (Button)                     05 09
    USAGE (Button 1)                        09 01
    USAGE (Button 2)                        09 02
    USAGE (Button 4)                        09 04
    USAGE (Button 5)                        09 05
    USAGE (Button 7)                        09 07
    USAGE (Button 8)                        09 08
    USAGE (Button 14)                       09 0E
    USAGE (Button 15)                       09 0F
    USAGE (Button 13)                       09 0D
    USAGE_PAGE (Consumer Devices)           05 0C
    USAGE (Back)                            0a 24 02
    USAGE (HomePage)                        0a 23 02
    LOGICAL_MINIMUM (0)                     15 00
    LOGICAL_MAXIMUM (1)                     25 01
    REPORT_SIZE (1)                         75 01
    REPORT_COUNT (11)                       95 0B
    INPUT (Data,Var,Abs)                    81 02

With Usage Page concatenation in Main item, parser recognizes all the
11 Usages as consumer keys, it is not the HID device's real intention.

This patch checks whether Usage Page is really defined after Usage ID
items by comparing usage page using status.

Usage Page concatenation on currently defined Usage Page will always
do in local parsing when Usage ID items encountered.

When Main item is parsing, concatenation will do again with last
defined Usage Page if this page has not been used in the previous
usages concatenation.

Signed-off-by: Candle Sun <candle.sun@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nianfu Bai <nianfu.bai@unisoc.com>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Siarhei Vishniakou <svv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:07 +01:00
Herbert Xu f98a928d6e crypto: talitos - Fix build error by selecting LIB_DES
commit dbc2e87bd8 upstream.

The talitos driver needs to select LIB_DES as it needs calls
des_expand_key.

Fixes: 9d574ae8eb ("crypto: talitos/des - switch to new...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:07 +01:00
Joel Stanley 88e373c047 Revert "jffs2: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in jffs2_add_frag_to_fragtree()"
commit 6e78c01fde upstream.

This reverts commit f2538f9993. The patch
stopped JFFS2 from being able to mount an existing filesystem with the
following errors:

 jffs2: error: (77) jffs2_build_inode_fragtree: Add node to tree failed -22
 jffs2: error: (77) jffs2_do_read_inode_internal: Failed to build final fragtree for inode #5377: error -22

Fixes: f2538f9993 ("jffs2: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences...")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:06 +01:00
Theodore Ts'o 69412e8ac6 ext4: add more paranoia checking in ext4_expand_extra_isize handling
commit 4ea99936a1 upstream.

It's possible to specify a non-zero s_want_extra_isize via debugging
option, and this can cause bad things(tm) to happen when using a file
system with an inode size of 128 bytes.

Add better checking when the file system is mounted, as well as when
we are actually doing the trying to do the inode expansion.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191110121510.GH23325@mit.edu
Reported-by: syzbot+f8d6f8386ceacdbfff57@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+33d7ea72e47de3bdf4e1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+44b6763edfc17144296f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:05 +01:00
Heiner Kallweit 2840e52f67 r8169: fix resume on cable plug-in
[ Upstream commit 398fd408cc ]

It was reported [0] that network doesn't wake up on cable plug-in with
certain chip versions. Reason is that on these chip versions the PHY
doesn't detect cable plug-in when being in power-down mode. So prevent
the PHY from powering down if WoL is enabled.

[0] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202103

Fixes: 95fb8bb318 ("net: phy: force phy suspend when calling phy_stop")
Reported-by: jhdskag3 <jhdskag3@tutanota.com>
Tested-by: jhdskag3 <jhdskag3@tutanota.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:05 +01:00
Heiner Kallweit c07fd3caad r8169: fix jumbo configuration for RTL8168evl
[ Upstream commit 14012c9f3b ]

Alan reported [0] that network is broken since the referenced commit
when using jumbo frames. This commit isn't wrong, it just revealed
another issue that has been existing before. According to the vendor
driver the RTL8168e-specific jumbo config doesn't apply for RTL8168evl.

[0] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/11/30/119

Fixes: 4ebcb113ed ("r8169: fix jumbo packet handling on resume from suspend")
Reported-by: Alan J. Wylie <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: Alan J. Wylie <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:04 +01:00
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo cb2008b4de selftests: pmtu: use -oneline for ip route list cache
[ Upstream commit 2745aea675 ]

Some versions of iproute2 will output more than one line per entry, which
will cause the test to fail, like:

TEST: ipv6: list and flush cached exceptions                        [FAIL]
  can't list cached exceptions

That happens, for example, with iproute2 4.15.0. When using the -oneline
option, this will work just fine:

TEST: ipv6: list and flush cached exceptions                        [ OK ]

This also works just fine with a more recent version of iproute2, like
5.4.0.

For some reason, two lines are printed for the IPv4 test no matter what
version of iproute2 is used. Use the same -oneline parameter there instead
of counting the lines twice.

Fixes: b964641e99 ("selftests: pmtu: Make list_flush_ipv6_exception test more demanding")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:04 +01:00
John Rutherford b5c36e7734 tipc: fix link name length check
[ Upstream commit fd567ac20c ]

In commit 4f07b80c97 ("tipc: check msg->req data len in
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable") the same patch code was copied into
routines: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable(),
tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() and tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats().
The two link routine occurrences should have been modified to check
the maximum link name length and not bearer name length.

Fixes: 4f07b80c97 ("tipc: check msg->reg data len in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable")
Signed-off-by: John Rutherford <john.rutherford@dektech.com.au>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:03 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski 7b7a6e872d selftests: bpf: correct perror strings
[ Upstream commit e5dc9dd325 ]

perror(str) is basically equivalent to
print("%s: %s\n", str, strerror(errno)).
New line or colon at the end of str is
a mistake/breaks formatting.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:03 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski 987daa48f8 selftests: bpf: test_sockmap: handle file creation failures gracefully
[ Upstream commit 4b67c51503 ]

test_sockmap creates a temporary file to use for sendpage.
this may fail for various reasons. Handle the error rather
than segfault.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:03 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski 569cac5a50 net/tls: use sg_next() to walk sg entries
[ Upstream commit c5daa6cccd ]

Partially sent record cleanup path increments an SG entry
directly instead of using sg_next(). This should not be a
problem today, as encrypted messages should be always
allocated as arrays. But given this is a cleanup path it's
easy to miss was this ever to change. Use sg_next(), and
simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:02 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski a58365a79a net/tls: remove the dead inplace_crypto code
[ Upstream commit 9e5ffed37d ]

Looks like when BPF support was added by commit d3b18ad31f
("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") and
commit d829e9c411 ("tls: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
it broke/removed the support for in-place crypto as added by
commit 4e6d47206c ("tls: Add support for inplace records
encryption").

The inplace_crypto member of struct tls_rec is dead, inited
to zero, and sometimes set to zero again. It used to be
set to 1 when record was allocated, but the skmsg code doesn't
seem to have been written with the idea of in-place crypto
in mind.

Since non trivial effort is required to bring the feature back
and we don't really have the HW to measure the benefit just
remove the left over support for now to avoid confusing readers.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:02 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski 0e663d88f9 selftests/tls: add a test for fragmented messages
[ Upstream commit 65190f7742 ]

Add a sendmsg test with very fragmented messages. This should
fill up sk_msg and test the boundary conditions.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:01 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski 3cef7ef9c4 net: skmsg: fix TLS 1.3 crash with full sk_msg
[ Upstream commit 031097d9e0 ]

TLS 1.3 started using the entry at the end of the SG array
for chaining-in the single byte content type entry. This mostly
works:

[ E E E E E E . . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

                 E < content type
               /
[ E E E E E E C . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

(Where E denotes a populated SG entry; C denotes a chaining entry.)

If the array is full, however, the end will point to the start:

[ E E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

And we end up overwriting the start:

    E < content type
   /
[ C E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

The sg array is supposed to be a circular buffer with start and
end markers pointing anywhere. In case where start > end
(i.e. the circular buffer has "wrapped") there is an extra entry
reserved at the end to chain the two halves together.

[ E E E E E E . . l ]

(Where l is the reserved entry for "looping" back to front.

As suggested by John, let's reserve another entry for chaining
SG entries after the main circular buffer. Note that this entry
has to be pointed to by the end entry so its position is not fixed.

Examples of full messages:

[ E E E E E E E E . l ]
  ^               ^
   start           end

   <---------------.
[ E E . E E E E E E l ]
      ^ ^
   end   start

Now the end will always point to an unused entry, so TLS 1.3
can always use it.

Fixes: 130b392c6c ("net: tls: Add tls 1.3 support")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:31:01 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski 795c687eac net/tls: free the record on encryption error
[ Upstream commit d10523d0b3 ]

When tls_do_encryption() fails the SG lists are left with the
SG_END and SG_CHAIN marks in place. One could hope that once
encryption fails we will never see the record again, but that
is in fact not true. Commit d3b18ad31f ("tls: add bpf support
to sk_msg handling") added special handling to ENOMEM and ENOSPC
errors which mean we may see the same record re-submitted.

As suggested by John free the record, the BPF code is already
doing just that.

Reported-by: syzbot+df0d4ec12332661dd1f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d3b18ad31f ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:59 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski a85ca00279 net/tls: take into account that bpf_exec_tx_verdict() may free the record
[ Upstream commit c329ef9684 ]

bpf_exec_tx_verdict() may free the record if tls_push_record()
fails, or if the entire record got consumed by BPF. Re-check
ctx->open_rec before touching the data.

Fixes: d3b18ad31f ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:59 +01:00
Paolo Abeni ab46fb3ef6 openvswitch: remove another BUG_ON()
[ Upstream commit 8a574f8665 ]

If we can't build the flow del notification, we can simply delete
the flow, no need to crash the kernel. Still keep a WARN_ON to
preserve debuggability.

Note: the BUG_ON() predates the Fixes tag, but this change
can be applied only after the mentioned commit.

v1 -> v2:
 - do not leak an skb on error

Fixes: aed067783e ("openvswitch: Minimize ovs_flow_cmd_del critical section.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:58 +01:00
Paolo Abeni 910d9e8839 openvswitch: drop unneeded BUG_ON() in ovs_flow_cmd_build_info()
[ Upstream commit 8ffeb03fbb ]

All the callers of ovs_flow_cmd_build_info() already deal with
error return code correctly, so we can handle the error condition
in a more gracefull way. Still dump a warning to preserve
debuggability.

v1 -> v2:
 - clarify the commit message
 - clean the skb and report the error (DaveM)

Fixes: ccb1352e76 ("net: Add Open vSwitch kernel components.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:58 +01:00
Xin Long 0111438d7c sctp: cache netns in sctp_ep_common
[ Upstream commit 312434617c ]

This patch is to fix a data-race reported by syzbot:

  BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sctp_assoc_migrate / sctp_hash_obj

  write to 0xffff8880b67c0020 of 8 bytes by task 18908 on cpu 1:
    sctp_assoc_migrate+0x1a6/0x290 net/sctp/associola.c:1091
    sctp_sock_migrate+0x8aa/0x9b0 net/sctp/socket.c:9465
    sctp_accept+0x3c8/0x470 net/sctp/socket.c:4916
    inet_accept+0x7f/0x360 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:734
    __sys_accept4+0x224/0x430 net/socket.c:1754
    __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1795 [inline]
    __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1792 [inline]
    __x64_sys_accept+0x4e/0x60 net/socket.c:1792
    do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  read to 0xffff8880b67c0020 of 8 bytes by task 12003 on cpu 0:
    sctp_hash_obj+0x4f/0x2d0 net/sctp/input.c:894
    rht_key_get_hash include/linux/rhashtable.h:133 [inline]
    rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline]
    rht_head_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:174 [inline]
    head_hashfn lib/rhashtable.c:41 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_one lib/rhashtable.c:245 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_chain lib/rhashtable.c:276 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_table lib/rhashtable.c:316 [inline]
    rht_deferred_worker+0x468/0xab0 lib/rhashtable.c:420
    process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
    worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
    kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

It was caused by rhashtable access asoc->base.sk when sctp_assoc_migrate
is changing its value. However, what rhashtable wants is netns from asoc
base.sk, and for an asoc, its netns won't change once set. So we can
simply fix it by caching netns since created.

Fixes: d6c0256a60 ("sctp: add the rhashtable apis for sctp global transport hashtable")
Reported-by: syzbot+e3b35fe7918ff0ee474e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:57 +01:00
Jouni Hogander 97d92f0763 slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open
[ Upstream commit e58c191241 ]

Slip_open doesn't clean-up device which registration failed from the
slip_devs device list. On next open after failure this list is iterated
and freed device is accessed. Fix this by calling sl_free_netdev in error
path.

Here is the trace from the Syzbot:

__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:634
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132
sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:725 [inline]
slip_open+0xecd/0x11b7 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:801
tty_ldisc_open.isra.0+0xa3/0x110 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:469
tty_set_ldisc+0x30e/0x6b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:596
tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2334 [inline]
tty_ioctl+0xe8d/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2594
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xdb6/0x13e0 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: 3b5a39979d ("slip: Fix memory leak in slip_open error path")
Reported-by: syzbot+4d5170758f3762109542@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:56 +01:00
Navid Emamdoost d6a456237d sctp: Fix memory leak in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook
[ Upstream commit b6631c6031 ]

In the implementation of sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() the allocated
new_asoc is leaked if security_sctp_assoc_request() fails. Release it
via sctp_association_free().

Fixes: 2277c7cd75 ("sctp: Add LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:55 +01:00
Paolo Abeni 8109f5b67a openvswitch: fix flow command message size
[ Upstream commit 4e81c0b3fa ]

When user-space sets the OVS_UFID_F_OMIT_* flags, and the relevant
flow has no UFID, we can exceed the computed size, as
ovs_nla_put_identifier() will always dump an OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY
attribute.
Take the above in account when computing the flow command message
size.

Fixes: 74ed7ab926 ("openvswitch: Add support for unique flow IDs.")
Reported-by: Qi Jun Ding <qding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:55 +01:00
Dust Li dbb5cc35b9 net: sched: fix tc -s class show no bstats on class with nolock subqueues
[ Upstream commit 14e54ab914 ]

When a classful qdisc's child qdisc has set the flag
TCQ_F_CPUSTATS (pfifo_fast for example), the child qdisc's
cpu_bstats should be passed to gnet_stats_copy_basic(),
but many classful qdisc didn't do that. As a result,
`tc -s class show dev DEV` always return 0 for bytes and
packets in this case.

Pass the child qdisc's cpu_bstats to gnet_stats_copy_basic()
to fix this issue.

The qstats also has this problem, but it has been fixed
in 5dd431b6b9 ("net: sched: introduce and use qstats read...")
and bstats still remains buggy.

Fixes: 22e0f8b932 ("net: sched: make bstats per cpu and estimator RCU safe")
Signed-off-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:54 +01:00
Nikolay Aleksandrov 63c197a192 net: psample: fix skb_over_panic
[ Upstream commit 7eb9d7675c ]

We need to calculate the skb size correctly otherwise we risk triggering
skb_over_panic[1]. The issue is that data_len is added to the skb in a
nl attribute, but we don't account for its header size (nlattr 4 bytes)
and alignment. We account for it when calculating the total size in
the > PSAMPLE_MAX_PACKET_SIZE comparison correctly, but not when
allocating after that. The fix is simple - use nla_total_size() for
data_len when allocating.

To reproduce:
 $ tc qdisc add dev eth1 clsact
 $ tc filter add dev eth1 egress matchall action sample rate 1 group 1 trunc 129
 $ mausezahn eth1 -b bcast -a rand -c 1 -p 129
 < skb_over_panic BUG(), tail is 4 bytes past skb->end >

[1] Trace:
 [   50.459526][ T3480] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:(____ptrval____) len:196 put:136 head:(____ptrval____) data:(____ptrval____) tail:0xc4 end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
 [   50.474339][ T3480] ------------[ cut here ]------------
 [   50.481132][ T3480] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:108!
 [   50.486059][ T3480] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 [   50.489463][ T3480] CPU: 3 PID: 3480 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 5.4.0-rc7 #108
 [   50.492844][ T3480] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014
 [   50.496551][ T3480] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x79/0x7b
 [   50.498261][ T3480] Code: bc 00 00 00 41 57 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 90 29 9a 83 4c 8b 8b c0 00 00 00 50 8b 83 b8 00 00 00 50 ff b3 c8 00 00 00 e8 ae ef c0 fe <0f> 0b e8 2f df c8 fe 48 8b 55 08 44 89 f6 4c 89 e7 48 c7 c1 a0 22
 [   50.504111][ T3480] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000447a10 EFLAGS: 00010282
 [   50.505835][ T3480] RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: ffff888039317d00 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [   50.507900][ T3480] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff812716e1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
 [   50.509820][ T3480] RBP: ffffc90000447a60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
 [   50.511735][ T3480] R10: ffffffff81d4f940 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff834a22b0
 [   50.513494][ T3480] R13: ffffffff82c10433 R14: 0000000000000088 R15: ffffffff838a8084
 [   50.515222][ T3480] FS:  00007f3536462700(0000) GS:ffff88803eac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [   50.517135][ T3480] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [   50.518583][ T3480] CR2: 0000000000442008 CR3: 000000003b222000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 [   50.520723][ T3480] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 [   50.522709][ T3480] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 [   50.524450][ T3480] Call Trace:
 [   50.525214][ T3480]  skb_put.cold+0x1b/0x1b
 [   50.526171][ T3480]  psample_sample_packet+0x1d3/0x340
 [   50.527307][ T3480]  tcf_sample_act+0x178/0x250
 [   50.528339][ T3480]  tcf_action_exec+0xb1/0x190
 [   50.529354][ T3480]  mall_classify+0x67/0x90
 [   50.530332][ T3480]  tcf_classify+0x72/0x160
 [   50.531286][ T3480]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x3db/0xd50
 [   50.532327][ T3480]  dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20
 [   50.533299][ T3480]  packet_sendmsg+0xee7/0x2090
 [   50.534331][ T3480]  sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x70
 [   50.535271][ T3480]  __sys_sendto+0x148/0x1f0
 [   50.536252][ T3480]  ? tomoyo_file_ioctl+0x23/0x30
 [   50.537334][ T3480]  ? ksys_ioctl+0x5e/0xb0
 [   50.540068][ T3480]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x2a/0x30
 [   50.542810][ T3480]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x1f0
 [   50.545383][ T3480]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 [   50.548477][ T3480] RIP: 0033:0x7f35357d6fb3
 [   50.551020][ T3480] Code: 48 8b 0d 18 90 20 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 d3 20 00 00 75 13 49 89 ca b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 34 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 eb f6 ff ff 48 89 04 24
 [   50.558547][ T3480] RSP: 002b:00007ffe0c7212c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 [   50.561870][ T3480] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001dac010 RCX: 00007f35357d6fb3
 [   50.565142][ T3480] RDX: 0000000000000082 RSI: 0000000001dac2a2 RDI: 0000000000000003
 [   50.568469][ T3480] RBP: 00007ffe0c7212f0 R08: 00007ffe0c7212d0 R09: 0000000000000014
 [   50.571731][ T3480] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000082
 [   50.574961][ T3480] R13: 0000000001dac2a2 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003
 [   50.578170][ T3480] Modules linked in: sch_ingress virtio_net
 [   50.580976][ T3480] ---[ end trace 61a515626a595af6 ]---

CC: Yotam Gigi <yotamg@mellanox.com>
CC: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CC: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
CC: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
CC: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Fixes: 6ae0a62861 ("net: Introduce psample, a new genetlink channel for packet sampling")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:54 +01:00
Chuhong Yuan 40c1eee566 net: macb: add missed tasklet_kill
[ Upstream commit 61183b056b ]

This driver forgets to kill tasklet in remove.
Add the call to fix it.

Fixes: 032dc41ba6 ("net: macb: Handle HRESP error")
Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:53 +01:00
Oleksij Rempel 45b03799ad net: dsa: sja1105: fix sja1105_parse_rgmii_delays()
[ Upstream commit 9bca3a0a92 ]

This function was using configuration of port 0 in devicetree for all ports.
In case CPU port was not 0, the delay settings was ignored. This resulted not
working communication between CPU and the switch.

Fixes: f5b8631c29 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Error out if RGMII delays are requested in DT")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:53 +01:00
David Bauer 72e08c098e mdio_bus: don't use managed reset-controller
[ Upstream commit 32085f25d7 ]

Geert Uytterhoeven reported that using devm_reset_controller_get leads
to a WARNING when probing a reset-controlled PHY. This is because the
device devm_reset_controller_get gets supplied is not actually the
one being probed.

Acquire an unmanaged reset-control as well as free the reset_control on
unregister to fix this.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
CC: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:52 +01:00
Menglong Dong 1189227da8 macvlan: schedule bc_work even if error
[ Upstream commit 1d7ea55668 ]

While enqueueing a broadcast skb to port->bc_queue, schedule_work()
is called to add port->bc_work, which processes the skbs in
bc_queue, to "events" work queue. If port->bc_queue is full, the
skb will be discarded and schedule_work(&port->bc_work) won't be
called. However, if port->bc_queue is full and port->bc_work is not
running or pending, port->bc_queue will keep full and schedule_work()
won't be called any more, and all broadcast skbs to macvlan will be
discarded. This case can happen:

macvlan_process_broadcast() is the pending function of port->bc_work,
it moves all the skbs in port->bc_queue to the queue "list", and
processes the skbs in "list". During this, new skbs will keep being
added to port->bc_queue in macvlan_broadcast_enqueue(), and
port->bc_queue may already full when macvlan_process_broadcast()
return. This may happen, especially when there are a lot of real-time
threads and the process is preempted.

Fix this by calling schedule_work(&port->bc_work) even if
port->bc_work is full in macvlan_broadcast_enqueue().

Fixes: 412ca1550c ("macvlan: Move broadcasts into a work queue")
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dong.menglong@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:52 +01:00
Jeroen de Borst 1c57e9361e gve: Fix the queue page list allocated pages count
[ Upstream commit a95069ecb7 ]

In gve_alloc_queue_page_list(), when a page allocation fails,
qpl->num_entries will be wrong.  In this case priv->num_registered_pages
can underflow in gve_free_queue_page_list(), causing subsequent calls
to gve_alloc_queue_page_list() to fail.

Fixes: f5cedc84a3 ("gve: Add transmit and receive support")
Signed-off-by: Jeroen de Borst <jeroendb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Catherine Sullivan <csully@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:51 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 4c1bb6bbc5 x86/fpu: Don't cache access to fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx
commit 59c4bd853a upstream.

The state/owner of the FPU is saved to fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx by pointing
to the context that is currently loaded. It never changed during the
lifetime of a task - it remained stable/constant.

After deferred FPU registers loading until return to userland was
implemented, the content of fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx may change during
preemption and must not be cached.

This went unnoticed for some time and was now noticed, in particular
since gcc 9 is caching that load in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() and
reusing it in the retry loop:

  copy_fpstate_to_sigframe()
    load fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx and save on stack
    fpregs_lock()
    copy_fpregs_to_sigframe() /* failed */
    fpregs_unlock()
         *** PREEMPTION, another uses FPU, changes fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx ***

    fault_in_pages_writeable() /* succeed, retry */

    fpregs_lock()
	__fpregs_load_activate()
	  fpregs_state_valid() /* uses fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx from stack */
    copy_fpregs_to_sigframe() /* succeeds, random FPU content */

This is a comparison of the assembly produced by gcc 9, without vs with this
patch:

| # arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:173:      if (!access_ok(buf, size))
|        cmpq    %rdx, %rax      # tmp183, _4
|        jb      .L190   #,
|-# arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:512:       return fpu == this_cpu_read_stable(fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx) && cpu == fpu->last_cpu;
|-#APP
|-# 512 "arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h" 1
|-       movq %gs:fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx,%rax      #, pfo_ret__
|-# 0 "" 2
|-#NO_APP
|-       movq    %rax, -88(%rbp) # pfo_ret__, %sfp
…
|-# arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:512:       return fpu == this_cpu_read_stable(fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx) && cpu == fpu->last_cpu;
|-       movq    -88(%rbp), %rcx # %sfp, pfo_ret__
|-       cmpq    %rcx, -64(%rbp) # pfo_ret__, %sfp
|+# arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:512:       return fpu == this_cpu_read(fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx) && cpu == fpu->last_cpu;
|+#APP
|+# 512 "arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h" 1
|+       movq %gs:fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx(%rip),%rax        # fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx, pfo_ret__
|+# 0 "" 2
|+# arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:512:       return fpu == this_cpu_read(fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx) && cpu == fpu->last_cpu;
|+#NO_APP
|+       cmpq    %rax, -64(%rbp) # pfo_ret__, %sfp

Use this_cpu_read() instead this_cpu_read_stable() to avoid caching of
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx during preemption points.

The Fixes: tag points to the commit where deferred FPU loading was
added. Since this commit, the compiler is no longer allowed to move the
load of fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx somewhere else / outside of the locked
section. A task preemption will change its value and stale content will
be observed.

 [ bp: Massage. ]

Debugged-by: Austin Clements <austin@google.com>
Debugged-by: David Chase <drchase@golang.org>
Debugged-by: Ian Lance Taylor <ian@airs.com>
Fixes: 5f409e20b7 ("x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@intel.com>
Cc: Austin Clements <austin@google.com>
Cc: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Chase <drchase@golang.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: ian@airs.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josharian@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191128085306.hxfa2o3knqtu4wfn@linutronix.de
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205663
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:50 +01:00
Mika Westerberg 5148c89f99 thunderbolt: Power cycle the router if NVM authentication fails
commit 7a7ebfa85f upstream.

On zang's Dell XPS 13 9370 after Thunderbolt NVM firmware upgrade the
Thunderbolt controller did not come back as expected. Only after the
system was rebooted it became available again. It is not entirely clear
what happened but I suspect the new NVM firmware image authentication
failed for some reason. Regardless of this the router needs to be power
cycled if NVM authentication fails in order to get it fully functional
again.

This modifies the driver to issue a power cycle in case the NVM
authentication fails immediately when dma_port_flash_update_auth()
returns. We also need to call tb_switch_set_uuid() earlier to be able to
fetch possible NVM authentication failure when DMA port is added.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205457
Reported-by: zang <dump@tzib.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:50 +01:00
Alexander Usyskin 570c0ee0b9 mei: me: add comet point V device id
commit 82b29b9f72 upstream.

Comet Point (Comet Lake) V device id.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105150514.14010-2-tomas.winkler@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:49 +01:00
Alexander Usyskin 57916ffb5d mei: bus: prefix device names on bus with the bus name
commit 7a2b9e6ec8 upstream.

Add parent device name to the name of devices on bus to avoid
device names collisions for same client UUID available
from different MEI heads. Namely this prevents sysfs collision under
/sys/bus/mei/device/

In the device part leave just UUID other parameters that are
required for device matching are not required here and are
just bloating the name.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105150514.14010-1-tomas.winkler@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:49 +01:00
Fabio D'Urso 5029226bb6 USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add device IDs for U-Blox C099-F9P
commit c1a1f273d0 upstream.

This device presents itself as a USB hub with three attached devices:
 - An ACM serial port connected to the GPS module (not affected by this
   commit)
 - An FTDI serial port connected to the GPS module (1546:0502)
 - Another FTDI serial port connected to the ODIN-W2 radio module
   (1546:0503)

This commit registers U-Blox's VID and the PIDs of the second and third
devices.

Datasheet: https://www.u-blox.com/sites/default/files/C099-F9P-AppBoard-Mbed-OS3-FW_UserGuide_%28UBX-18063024%29.pdf

Signed-off-by: Fabio D'Urso <fabiodurso@hotmail.it>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:48 +01:00
Hans de Goede 244d577e28 staging: rtl8723bs: Add 024c:0525 to the list of SDIO device-ids
commit 3d5f1eedbf upstream.

Add 024c:0525 to the list of SDIO device-ids, based on a patch found
in the Android X86 kernels. According to that patch this device id is
used on the Alcatel Plus 10 device.

Reported-and-tested-by: youling257 <youling257@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191111113846.24940-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:47 +01:00
Hans de Goede 928353f4e1 staging: rtl8723bs: Drop ACPI device ids
commit 2d9d249153 upstream.

The driver only binds by SDIO device-ids, all the ACPI device-id does
is causing the driver to load unnecessarily on devices where the DSDT
contains a bogus OBDA8723 device.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191111113846.24940-2-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:47 +01:00
Pan Bian ab1908cbe2 staging: rtl8192e: fix potential use after free
commit b7aa39a2ed upstream.

The variable skb is released via kfree_skb() when the return value of
_rtl92e_tx is not zero. However, after that, skb is accessed again to
read its length, which may result in a use after free bug. This patch
fixes the bug by moving the release operation to where skb is never
used later.

Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572965351-6745-1-git-send-email-bianpan2016@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:47 +01:00
Ajay Singh bb2135c6a5 staging: wilc1000: fix illegal memory access in wilc_parse_join_bss_param()
commit c7e621bb98 upstream.

Do not copy the extended supported rates in 'param->supp_rates' if the
array is already full with basic rates values. The array size check
helped to avoid possible illegal memory access [1] while copying to
'param->supp_rates' array.

1. https://marc.info/?l=linux-next&m=157301720517456&w=2

Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1487400 ("Memory - illegal accesses")
Fixes: 4e0b0f42c9 ("staging: wilc1000: use struct to pack join parameters for FW")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ajay Singh <ajay.kathat@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191106062127.3165-1-ajay.kathat@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:46 +01:00
Mathias Kresin eea8956c96 usb: dwc2: use a longer core rest timeout in dwc2_core_reset()
commit 6689f0f4bb upstream.

Testing on different generations of Lantiq MIPS SoC based boards, showed
that it takes up to 1500 us until the core reset bit is cleared.

The driver from the vendor SDK (ifxhcd) uses a 1 second timeout. Use the
same timeout to fix wrong hang detections and make the driver work for
Lantiq MIPS SoCs.

At least till kernel 4.14 the hanging reset only caused a warning but
the driver was probed successful. With kernel 4.19 errors out with
EBUSY.

Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.me>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:45 +01:00
Sami Tolvanen 88d945a0b0 driver core: platform: use the correct callback type for bus_find_device
commit 492c88720d upstream.

platform_find_device_by_driver calls bus_find_device and passes
platform_match as the callback function. Casting the function to a
mismatching type trips indirect call Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking.

This change adds a callback function with the correct type and instead
of casting the function, explicitly casts the second parameter to struct
device_driver* as expected by platform_match.

Fixes: 36f3313d6b ("platform: Add platform_find_device_by_driver() helper")
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112214156.3430-1-samitolvanen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:45 +01:00
Pascal van Leeuwen f3cda1dea7 crypto: inside-secure - Fix stability issue with Macchiatobin
commit b8c5d882c8 upstream.

This patch corrects an error in the Transform Record Cache initialization
code that was causing intermittent stability problems on the Macchiatobin
board.

Unfortunately, due to HW platform specifics, the problem could not happen
on the main development platform, being the VCU118 Xilinx development
board. And since it was a problem with hash table access, it was very
dependent on the actual physical context record DMA buffers being used,
i.e. with some (bad) luck it could seemingly work quit stable for a while.

Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:44 +01:00
Jens Axboe d624594445 net: disallow ancillary data for __sys_{send,recv}msg_file()
[ Upstream commit d69e07793f ]

Only io_uring uses (and added) these, and we want to disallow the
use of sendmsg/recvmsg for anything but regular data transfers.
Use the newly added prep helper to split the msghdr copy out from
the core function, to check for msg_control and msg_controllen
settings. If either is set, we return -EINVAL.

Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:44 +01:00
Jens Axboe 78df03e4c8 net: separate out the msghdr copy from ___sys_{send,recv}msg()
[ Upstream commit 4257c8ca13 ]

This is in preparation for enabling the io_uring helpers for sendmsg
and recvmsg to first copy the header for validation before continuing
with the operation.

There should be no functional changes in this patch.

Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:43 +01:00
Jens Axboe 8387e3688a io_uring: async workers should inherit the user creds
[ Upstream commit 181e448d87 ]

If we don't inherit the original task creds, then we can confuse users
like fuse that pass creds in the request header. See link below on
identical aio issue.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/26f0d78e-99ca-2f1b-78b9-433088053a61@scylladb.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-12-04 22:30:42 +01:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 79438f37a6 Linux 5.4.1 2019-11-29 10:10:32 +01:00
Michael Ellerman fcddcfa746 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
commit af2e8c68b9 upstream.

On some systems that are vulnerable to Spectre v2, it is up to
software to flush the link stack (return address stack), in order to
protect against Spectre-RSB.

When exiting from a guest we do some house keeping and then
potentially exit to C code which is several stack frames deep in the
host kernel. We will then execute a series of returns without
preceeding calls, opening up the possiblity that the guest could have
poisoned the link stack, and direct speculative execution of the host
to a gadget of some sort.

To prevent this we add a flush of the link stack on exit from a guest.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:32 +01:00
Michael Ellerman 79f6bca3bc powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch
commit 39e72bf96f upstream.

In commit ee13cb249f ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count
cache flush"), I added support for software to flush the count
cache (indirect branch cache) on context switch if firmware told us
that was the required mitigation for Spectre v2.

As part of that code we also added a software flush of the link
stack (return address stack), which protects against Spectre-RSB
between user processes.

That is all correct for CPUs that activate that mitigation, which is
currently Power9 Nimbus DD2.3.

What I got wrong is that on older CPUs, where firmware has disabled
the count cache, we also need to flush the link stack on context
switch.

To fix it we create a new feature bit which is not set by firmware,
which tells us we need to flush the link stack. We set that when
firmware tells us that either of the existing Spectre v2 mitigations
are enabled.

Then we adjust the patching code so that if we see that feature bit we
enable the link stack flush. If we're also told to flush the count
cache in software then we fall through and do that also.

On the older CPUs we don't need to do do the software count cache
flush, firmware has disabled it, so in that case we patch in an early
return after the link stack flush.

The naming of some of the functions is awkward after this patch,
because they're called "count cache" but they also do link stack. But
we'll fix that up in a later commit to ease backporting.

This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660.

Reported-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Fixes: ee13cb249f ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:31 +01:00
Bernd Porr 14c274e717 staging: comedi: usbduxfast: usbduxfast_ai_cmdtest rounding error
commit 5618332e5b upstream.

The userspace comedilib function 'get_cmd_generic_timed' fills
the cmd structure with an informed guess and then calls the
function 'usbduxfast_ai_cmdtest' in this driver repeatedly while
'usbduxfast_ai_cmdtest' is modifying the cmd struct until it
no longer changes. However, because of rounding errors this never
converged because 'steps = (cmd->convert_arg * 30) / 1000' and then
back to 'cmd->convert_arg = (steps * 1000) / 30' won't be the same
because of rounding errors. 'Steps' should only be converted back to
the 'convert_arg' if 'steps' has actually been modified. In addition
the case of steps being 0 wasn't checked which is also now done.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Porr <mail@berndporr.me.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191118230759.1727-1-mail@berndporr.me.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:29 +01:00
Aleksander Morgado 6618825699 USB: serial: option: add support for Foxconn T77W968 LTE modules
commit f079709542 upstream.

These are the Foxconn-branded variants of the Dell DW5821e modules,
same USB layout as those. The device exposes AT, NMEA and DIAG ports
in both USB configurations.

P:  Vendor=0489 ProdID=e0b4 Rev=03.18
S:  Manufacturer=FII
S:  Product=T77W968 LTE
S:  SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C:  #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I:  If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=03(HID  ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=usbhid
I:  If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option

P:  Vendor=0489 ProdID=e0b4 Rev=03.18
S:  Manufacturer=FII
S:  Product=T77W968 LTE
S:  SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C:  #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 2 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:  If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:  If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I:  If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none)

Signed-off-by: Aleksander Morgado <aleksander@aleksander.es>
[ johan: drop id defines ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:29 +01:00
Aleksander Morgado 191243c650 USB: serial: option: add support for DW5821e with eSIM support
commit 957c31ea08 upstream.

The device exposes AT, NMEA and DIAG ports in both USB configurations.
Exactly same layout as the default DW5821e module, just a different
vid/pid.

P:  Vendor=413c ProdID=81e0 Rev=03.18
S:  Manufacturer=Dell Inc.
S:  Product=DW5821e-eSIM Snapdragon X20 LTE
S:  SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C:  #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I:  If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=03(HID  ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=usbhid
I:  If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option

P:  Vendor=413c ProdID=81e0 Rev=03.18
S:  Manufacturer=Dell Inc.
S:  Product=DW5821e-eSIM Snapdragon X20 LTE
S:  SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C:  #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 2 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:  If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:  If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I:  If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none)

Signed-off-by: Aleksander Morgado <aleksander@aleksander.es>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:28 +01:00
Johan Hovold ef50d287de USB: serial: mos7840: fix remote wakeup
commit 92fe35fb9c upstream.

The driver was setting the device remote-wakeup feature during probe in
violation of the USB specification (which says it should only be set
just prior to suspending the device). This could potentially waste
power during suspend as well as lead to spurious wakeups.

Note that USB core would clear the remote-wakeup feature at first
resume.

Fixes: 3f5429746d ("USB: Moschip 7840 USB-Serial Driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>     # 2.6.19
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:27 +01:00
Johan Hovold c380833817 USB: serial: mos7720: fix remote wakeup
commit ea422312a4 upstream.

The driver was setting the device remote-wakeup feature during probe in
violation of the USB specification (which says it should only be set
just prior to suspending the device). This could potentially waste
power during suspend as well as lead to spurious wakeups.

Note that USB core would clear the remote-wakeup feature at first
resume.

Fixes: 0f64478cbc ("USB: add USB serial mos7720 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>     # 2.6.19
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:26 +01:00
Pavel Löbl 076b084d68 USB: serial: mos7840: add USB ID to support Moxa UPort 2210
commit e696d00e65 upstream.

Add USB ID for MOXA UPort 2210. This device contains mos7820 but
it passes GPIO0 check implemented by driver and it's detected as
mos7840. Hence product id check is added to force mos7820 mode.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Löbl <pavel@loebl.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[ johan: rename id defines and add vendor-id check ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:25 +01:00
Oliver Neukum 04484bed9f appledisplay: fix error handling in the scheduled work
commit 91feb01596 upstream.

The work item can operate on

1. stale memory left over from the last transfer
the actual length of the data transfered needs to be checked
2. memory already freed
the error handling in appledisplay_probe() needs
to cancel the work in that case

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+495dab1f175edc9c2f13@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191106124902.7765-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:25 +01:00
Oliver Neukum 878389a536 USB: chaoskey: fix error case of a timeout
commit 92aa5986f4 upstream.

In case of a timeout or if a signal aborts a read
communication with the device needs to be ended
lest we overwrite an active URB the next time we
do IO to the device, as the URB may still be active.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191107142856.16774-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:24 +01:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 0e8311ef18 usb-serial: cp201x: support Mark-10 digital force gauge
commit 347bc8cb26 upstream.

Add support for the Mark-10 digital force gauge device to the cp201x
driver.

Based on a report and a larger patch from Joel Jennings

Reported-by: Joel Jennings <joel.jennings@makeitlabs.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191118092119.GA153852@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:23 +01:00
Suwan Kim 274e0f1aee usbip: Fix uninitialized symbol 'nents' in stub_recv_cmd_submit()
commit 2a9125317b upstream.

Smatch reported that nents is not initialized and used in
stub_recv_cmd_submit(). nents is currently initialized by sgl_alloc()
and used to allocate multiple URBs when host controller doesn't
support scatter-gather DMA. The use of uninitialized nents means that
buf_len is zero and use_sg is true. But buffer length should not be
zero when an URB uses scatter-gather DMA.

To prevent this situation, add the conditional that checks buf_len
and use_sg. And move the use of nents right after the sgl_alloc() to
avoid the use of uninitialized nents.

If the error occurs, it adds SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC and stub_priv
will be released by stub event handler and connection will be shut
down.

Fixes: ea44d19076 ("usbip: Implement SG support to vhci-hcd and stub driver")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Suwan Kim <suwan.kim027@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191111141035.27788-1-suwan.kim027@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:22 +01:00
Hewenliang 9b6ae97d23 usbip: tools: fix fd leakage in the function of read_attr_usbip_status
commit 26a4d4c00f upstream.

We should close the fd before the return of read_attr_usbip_status.

Fixes: 3391ba0e27 ("usbip: tools: Extract generic code to be shared with vudc backend")
Signed-off-by: Hewenliang <hewenliang4@huawei.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191025043515.20053-1-hewenliang4@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:21 +01:00
Oliver Neukum 8c22dc7584 USBIP: add config dependency for SGL_ALLOC
commit 1ec13abac5 upstream.

USBIP uses lib/scatterlist.h
Hence it needs to set CONFIG_SGL_ALLOC

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112154939.21217-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:20 +01:00
Takashi Iwai b730b2ceb2 ALSA: hda - Disable audio component for legacy Nvidia HDMI codecs
commit 5a858e79c9 upstream.

The old Nvidia chips have multiple HD-audio codecs on the same
HD-audio controller, and this doesn't work as expected with the current
audio component binding that is implemented under the one-codec-per-
controller assumption; at the probe time, the driver leads to several
kernel WARNING messages.

For the proper support, we may change the pin2port and port2pin to
traverse the codec list per the given pin number, but this needs more
development and testing.

As a quick workaround, instead, this patch drops the binding in the
audio side for these legacy chips since the audio component support in
nouveau graphics driver is still not merged (hence it's basically
unused).

[ Unlike the original commit, this patch actually disables the audio
  component binding for all Nvidia chips, not only for legacy chips.
  It doesn't matter much, though: nouveau gfx driver still doesn't
  provide the audio component binding on 5.4.y, so it's only a
  placeholder for now.  Also, another difference from the original
  commit is that this removes the nvhdmi_audio_ops and other
  definitions completely in order to avoid a compile warning due to
  unused stuff.  -- tiwai ]

BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205625
Fixes: ade49db337 ("ALSA: hda/hdmi - Allow audio component for AMD/ATI and Nvidia HDMI")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122132000.4460-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:19 +01:00
A Sun 5567384fec media: mceusb: fix out of bounds read in MCE receiver buffer
commit e43148645d upstream.

Fix multiple cases of out of bounds (OOB) read associated with
MCE device receive/input data handling.

In reference for the OOB cases below, the incoming/read (byte) data
format when the MCE device responds to a command is:
    { cmd_prefix, subcmd, data0, data1, ... }
where cmd_prefix are:
    MCE_CMD_PORT_SYS
    MCE_CMD_PORT_IR
and subcmd examples are:
    MCE_RSP_GETPORTSTATUS
    MCE_RSP_EQIRNUMPORTS
    ...
Response size dynamically depends on cmd_prefix and subcmd.
So data0, data1, ... may or may not be present on input.
Multiple responses may return in a single receiver buffer.

The trigger condition for OOB read is typically random or
corrupt input data that fills the mceusb receiver buffer.

Case 1:

mceusb_handle_command() reads data0 (var hi) and data1 (var lo)
regardless of whether the response includes such data.
If { cmd_prefix, subcmd } is at the end of the receiver buffer,
read past end of buffer occurs.

This case was reported by
KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in mceusb_dev_recv
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c7fdb6cb36e65f2fe8c9

Fix: In mceusb_handle_command(), change variable hi and lo to
pointers, and dereference only when required.

Case 2:

If response with data is truncated at end of buffer after
{ cmd_prefix, subcmd }, mceusb_handle_command() reads past
end of buffer for data0, data1, ...

Fix: In mceusb_process_ir_data(), check response size with
remaining buffer size before invoking mceusb_handle_command().
+    if (i + ir->rem < buf_len)
            mceusb_handle_command(ir, &ir->buf_in[i - 1]);

Case 3:

mceusb_handle_command() handles invalid/bad response such as
{ 0x??, MCE_RSP_GETPORTSTATUS } of length 2 as a response
{ MCE_CMD_PORT_SYS, MCE_RSP_GETPORTSTATUS, data0, ... }
of length 7. Read OOB occurs for non-existent data0, data1, ...
Cause is mceusb_handle_command() does not check cmd_prefix value.

Fix: mceusb_handle_command() must test both cmd_prefix and subcmd.

Case 4:

mceusb_process_ir_data() receiver parser state SUBCMD is
possible at start (i=0) of receiver buffer resulting in buffer
offset=-1 passed to mceusb_dev_printdata().
Bad offset results in OOB read before start of buffer.

[1214218.580308] mceusb 1-1.3:1.0: rx data[0]: 00 80 (length=2)
[1214218.580323] mceusb 1-1.3:1.0: Unknown command 0x00 0x80
...
[1214218.580406] mceusb 1-1.3:1.0: rx data[14]: 7f 7f (length=2)
[1214218.679311] mceusb 1-1.3:1.0: rx data[-1]: 80 90 (length=2)
[1214218.679325] mceusb 1-1.3:1.0: End of raw IR data
[1214218.679340] mceusb 1-1.3:1.0: rx data[1]: 7f 7f (length=2)

Fix: If parser_state is SUBCMD after processing receiver buffer,
reset parser_state to CMD_HEADER.
In effect, discard cmd_prefix at end of receiver buffer.
In mceusb_dev_printdata(), abort if buffer offset is out of bounds.

Case 5:

If response with data is truncated at end of buffer after
{ cmd_prefix, subcmd }, mceusb_dev_printdata() reads past
end of buffer for data0, data1, ...
while decoding the response to print out.

Fix: In mceusb_dev_printdata(), remove unneeded buffer offset
adjustments (var start and var skip) associated with MCE gen1 header.
Test for truncated MCE cmd response (compare offset+len with buf_len)
and skip decoding of incomplete response.
Move IR data tracing to execute before the truncation test.

Signed-off-by: A Sun <as1033x@comcast.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:18 +01:00
Sean Young eff2ccdfd2 media: imon: invalid dereference in imon_touch_event
commit f3f5ba42c5 upstream.

The touch timer is set up in intf1. If the second interface does not exist,
the timer and touch input device are not setup and we get the following
error, when touch events are reported via intf0.

kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:956!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:956 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:949 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mod_timer+0x5a2/0xb50 kernel/time/timer.c:1100
Code: 45 10 c7 44 24 14 ff ff ff ff 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 45 20 48 c7 44 24 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 04 24 e9 5a fc ff ff e8 ae ce 0e 00 <0f> 0b e8 a7 ce 0e 00 4c 89 74 24 20 e9 37 fe ff ff e8 98 ce 0e 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881db209930 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffffffff86c2b200 RBX: 00000000ffffa688 RCX: ffffffff83efc583
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff812f4d82 RDI: ffff8881d2356200
RBP: ffff8881d23561e8 R08: ffffffff86c2b200 R09: ffffed103a46abeb
R10: ffffed103a46abea R11: ffff8881d2355f53 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 1ffff1103b64132d R14: ffff8881d2355f50 R15: 0000000000000006
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f75e2799000 CR3: 00000001d3b07000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 imon_touch_event drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1348 [inline]
 imon_incoming_packet.isra.0+0x2546/0x2f10 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1603
 usb_rx_callback_intf0+0x151/0x1e0 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1734
 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x1f2/0x470 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1654
 usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1719
 dummy_timer+0x120f/0x2fa2 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1965
 call_timer_fn+0x179/0x650 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
 run_timer_softirq+0x5e3/0x1490 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
 __do_softirq+0x221/0x912 kernel/softirq.c:292
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
 irq_exit+0x178/0x1a0 kernel/softirq.c:413
 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12f/0x500 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:830
 </IRQ>
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x28/0x2e0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:581
Code: 90 90 41 56 41 55 65 44 8b 2d 44 3a 8f 7a 41 54 55 53 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 36 ee d0 fb e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d fa dd 4f 00 fb f4 <65> 44 8b 2d 20 3a 8f 7a 0f 1f 44 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3
RSP: 0018:ffffffff86c07da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffffffff86c2b200 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffffff86c2ba4c
RBP: fffffbfff0d85640 R08: ffffffff86c2b200 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
 do_idle+0x3b6/0x500 kernel/sched/idle.c:263
 cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:355
 start_kernel+0x82a/0x864 init/main.c:784
 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241
Modules linked in:

Reported-by: syzbot+f49d12d34f2321cf4df2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:17 +01:00
Vito Caputo b96f53c165 media: cxusb: detect cxusb_ctrl_msg error in query
commit ca8f245f28 upstream.

Don't use uninitialized ircode[] in cxusb_rc_query() when
cxusb_ctrl_msg() fails to populate its contents.

syzbot reported:

dvb-usb: bulk message failed: -22 (1/-30591)
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ir_lookup_by_scancode drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:494 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rc_g_keycode_from_table drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:582 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rc_keydown+0x1a6/0x6f0 drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:816
CPU: 1 PID: 11436 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events dvb_usb_read_remote_control
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x13a/0x2b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:108
 __msan_warning+0x73/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:250
 bsearch+0x1dd/0x250 lib/bsearch.c:41
 ir_lookup_by_scancode drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:494 [inline]
 rc_g_keycode_from_table drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:582 [inline]
 rc_keydown+0x1a6/0x6f0 drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:816
 cxusb_rc_query+0x2e1/0x360 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:548
 dvb_usb_read_remote_control+0xf9/0x290 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-remote.c:261
 process_one_work+0x1572/0x1ef0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0x111b/0x2460 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x4b5/0x4f0 kernel/kthread.c:256
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:355

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:150 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0xd2/0x170 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
 __msan_chain_origin+0x6b/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:184
 rc_g_keycode_from_table drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:583 [inline]
 rc_keydown+0x2c4/0x6f0 drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c:816
 cxusb_rc_query+0x2e1/0x360 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:548
 dvb_usb_read_remote_control+0xf9/0x290 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-remote.c:261
 process_one_work+0x1572/0x1ef0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0x111b/0x2460 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x4b5/0x4f0 kernel/kthread.c:256
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:355

Local variable description: ----ircode@cxusb_rc_query
Variable was created at:
 cxusb_rc_query+0x4d/0x360 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c:543
 dvb_usb_read_remote_control+0xf9/0x290 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-remote.c:261

Signed-off-by: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:16 +01:00
Oliver Neukum acfcb05fbd media: b2c2-flexcop-usb: add sanity checking
commit 1b976fc6d6 upstream.

The driver needs an isochronous endpoint to be present. It will
oops in its absence. Add checking for it.

Reported-by: syzbot+d93dff37e6a89431c158@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:16 +01:00
Laurent Pinchart fc12e3da6a media: uvcvideo: Fix error path in control parsing failure
commit 8c279e9394 upstream.

When parsing the UVC control descriptors fails, the error path tries to
cleanup a media device that hasn't been initialised, potentially
resulting in a crash. Fix this by initialising the media device before
the error handling path can be reached.

Fixes: 5a254d751e ("[media] uvcvideo: Register a v4l2_device")
Reported-by: syzbot+c86454eb3af9e8a4da20@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:15 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner fc3b55ef2c futex: Prevent exit livelock
commit 3ef240eaff upstream.

Oleg provided the following test case:

int main(void)
{
	struct sched_param sp = {};

	sp.sched_priority = 2;
	assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);

	int lock = vfork();
	if (!lock) {
		sp.sched_priority = 1;
		assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
		_exit(0);
	}

	syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
	return 0;
}

This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:

 parent	    	    			child

  set FIFO prio 2

  vfork()			->	set FIFO prio 1
   implies wait_for_child()	 	sched_setscheduler(...)
 			   		exit()
					do_exit()
 					....
					mm_release()
					  tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
					  exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
					  complete() --> wakes parent
  sys_futex()
    loop infinite because
    tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING

The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:

  task holds futex
  ...
  do_exit()
    tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;

  --> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)

  switch_to(other_task)

  return to user
  sys_futex()
	loop infinite as above

Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.

To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:

   - A refcount is held on the task

   - The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location

   - The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
     on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
     the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
     is consistent and can be reevaluated.

This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.

For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff86 .. ba31c1a485
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.

Fixes: 778e9a9c3e ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:14 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 56690612a9 futex: Provide distinct return value when owner is exiting
commit ac31c7ff86 upstream.

attach_to_pi_owner() returns -EAGAIN for various cases:

 - Owner task is exiting
 - Futex value has changed

The caller drops the held locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and retries the
operation. In case of the owner task exiting this can result in a live
lock.

As a preparatory step for seperating those cases, provide a distinct return
value (EBUSY) for the owner exiting case.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.935606117@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:14 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner d3ba1e8d5c futex: Add mutex around futex exit
commit 3f186d9748 upstream.

The mutex will be used in subsequent changes to replace the busy looping of
a waiter when the futex owner is currently executing the exit cleanup to
prevent a potential live lock.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.845798895@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:13 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 172b09ddc3 futex: Provide state handling for exec() as well
commit af8cbda2cf upstream.

exec() attempts to handle potentially held futexes gracefully by running
the futex exit handling code like exit() does.

The current implementation has no protection against concurrent incoming
waiters. The reason is that the futex state cannot be set to
FUTEX_STATE_DEAD after the cleanup because the task struct is still active
and just about to execute the new binary.

While its arguably buggy when a task holds a futex over exec(), for
consistency sake the state handling can at least cover the actual futex
exit cleanup section. This provides state consistency protection accross
the cleanup. As the futex state of the task becomes FUTEX_STATE_OK after the
cleanup has been finished, this cannot prevent subsequent attempts to
attach to the task in case that the cleanup was not successfull in mopping
up all leftovers.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.753355618@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:13 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 398902dbc8 futex: Sanitize exit state handling
commit 4a8e991b91 upstream.

Instead of having a smp_mb() and an empty lock/unlock of task::pi_lock move
the state setting into to the lock section.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.645603214@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:12 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner b2f4e10676 futex: Mark the begin of futex exit explicitly
commit 18f694385c upstream.

Instead of relying on PF_EXITING use an explicit state for the futex exit
and set it in the futex exit function. This moves the smp barrier and the
lock/unlock serialization into the futex code.

As with the DEAD state this is restricted to the exit path as exec
continues to use the same task struct.

This allows to simplify that logic in a next step.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.539409004@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:11 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 350a30ce84 futex: Set task::futex_state to DEAD right after handling futex exit
commit f24f22435d upstream.

Setting task::futex_state in do_exit() is rather arbitrarily placed for no
reason. Move it into the futex code.

Note, this is only done for the exit cleanup as the exec cleanup cannot set
the state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD because the task struct is still in active
use.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.439511191@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:10 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 1bcee23370 futex: Split futex_mm_release() for exit/exec
commit 150d71584b upstream.

To allow separate handling of the futex exit state in the futex exit code
for exit and exec, split futex_mm_release() into two functions and invoke
them from the corresponding exit/exec_mm_release() callsites.

Preparatory only, no functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.332094221@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:10 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 7d7e93588f exit/exec: Seperate mm_release()
commit 4610ba7ad8 upstream.

mm_release() contains the futex exit handling. mm_release() is called from
do_exit()->exit_mm() and from exec()->exec_mm().

In the exit_mm() case PF_EXITING and the futex state is updated. In the
exec_mm() case these states are not touched.

As the futex exit code needs further protections against exit races, this
needs to be split into two functions.

Preparatory only, no functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.240518241@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:10 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 52507cfaff futex: Replace PF_EXITPIDONE with a state
commit 3d4775df0a upstream.

The futex exit handling relies on PF_ flags. That's suboptimal as it
requires a smp_mb() and an ugly lock/unlock of the exiting tasks pi_lock in
the middle of do_exit() to enforce the observability of PF_EXITING in the
futex code.

Add a futex_state member to task_struct and convert the PF_EXITPIDONE logic
over to the new state. The PF_EXITING dependency will be cleaned up in a
later step.

This prepares for handling various futex exit issues later.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.149449274@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:09 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 8012f98f92 futex: Move futex exit handling into futex code
commit ba31c1a485 upstream.

The futex exit handling is #ifdeffed into mm_release() which is not pretty
to begin with. But upcoming changes to address futex exit races need to add
more functionality to this exit code.

Split it out into a function, move it into futex code and make the various
futex exit functions static.

Preparatory only and no functional change.

Folded build fix from Borislav.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.049705556@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:08 +01:00
Kai Shen ba386ec3d7 cpufreq: Add NULL checks to show() and store() methods of cpufreq
commit e6e8df0726 upstream.

Add NULL checks to show() and store() in cpufreq.c to avoid attempts
to invoke a NULL callback.

Though some interfaces of cpufreq are set as read-only, users can
still get write permission using chmod which can lead to a kernel
crash, as follows:

chmod +w /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_cur_freq
echo 1 >  /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_cur_freq

This bug was found in linux 4.19.

Signed-off-by: Kai Shen <shenkai8@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Feilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Feilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
[ rjw: Subject & changelog ]
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:07 +01:00
Alan Stern 3143cd5f00 media: usbvision: Fix races among open, close, and disconnect
commit 9e08117c9d upstream.

Visual inspection of the usbvision driver shows that it suffers from
three races between its open, close, and disconnect handlers.  In
particular, the driver is careful to update its usbvision->user and
usbvision->remove_pending flags while holding the private mutex, but:

	usbvision_v4l2_close() and usbvision_radio_close() don't hold
	the mutex while they check the value of
	usbvision->remove_pending;

	usbvision_disconnect() doesn't hold the mutex while checking
	the value of usbvision->user; and

	also, usbvision_v4l2_open() and usbvision_radio_open() don't
	check whether the device has been unplugged before allowing
	the user to open the device files.

Each of these can potentially lead to usbvision_release() being called
twice and use-after-free errors.

This patch fixes the races by reading the flags while the mutex is
still held and checking for pending removes before allowing an open to
succeed.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:06 +01:00
Alan Stern ddac4e3401 media: usbvision: Fix invalid accesses after device disconnect
commit c7a1914640 upstream.

The syzbot fuzzer found two invalid-access bugs in the usbvision
driver.  These bugs occur when userspace keeps the device file open
after the device has been disconnected and usbvision_disconnect() has
set usbvision->dev to NULL:

	When the device file is closed, usbvision_radio_close() tries
	to issue a usb_set_interface() call, passing the NULL pointer
	as its first argument.

	If userspace performs a querycap ioctl call, vidioc_querycap()
	calls usb_make_path() with the same NULL pointer.

This patch fixes the problems by making the appropriate tests
beforehand.  Note that vidioc_querycap() is protected by
usbvision->v4l2_lock, acquired in a higher layer of the V4L2
subsystem.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7fa38a608b1075dfd634@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:05 +01:00
Alexander Popov 5aa7ad7e99 media: vivid: Fix wrong locking that causes race conditions on streaming stop
commit 6dcd5d7a7a upstream.

There is the same incorrect approach to locking implemented in
vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap(), vivid_stop_generating_vid_out() and
sdr_cap_stop_streaming().

These functions are called during streaming stopping with vivid_dev.mutex
locked. And they all do the same mistake while stopping their kthreads,
which need to lock this mutex as well. See the example from
vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap():
  /* shutdown control thread */
  vivid_grab_controls(dev, false);
  mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
  kthread_stop(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
  dev->kthread_vid_cap = NULL;
  mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);

But when this mutex is unlocked, another vb2_fop_read() can lock it
instead of vivid_thread_vid_cap() and manipulate the buffer queue.
That causes a use-after-free access later.

To fix those issues let's:
  1. avoid unlocking the mutex in vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap(),
vivid_stop_generating_vid_out() and sdr_cap_stop_streaming();
  2. use mutex_trylock() with schedule_timeout_uninterruptible() in
the loops of the vivid kthread handlers.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>      # for v3.18 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:04 +01:00
Vandana BN 92edb64da9 media: vivid: Set vid_cap_streaming and vid_out_streaming to true
commit b4add02d22 upstream.

When vbi stream is started, followed by video streaming,
the vid_cap_streaming and vid_out_streaming were not being set to true,
which would cause the video stream to stop when vbi stream is stopped.
This patch allows to set vid_cap_streaming and vid_out_streaming to true.
According to Hans Verkuil it appears that these 'if (dev->kthread_vid_cap)'
checks are a left-over from the original vivid development and should never
have been there.

Signed-off-by: Vandana BN <bnvandana@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>      # for v3.18 and up
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:03 +01:00
Geoffrey D. Bennett 9756233a20 ALSA: usb-audio: Fix Scarlett 6i6 Gen 2 port data
commit ce3cba788a upstream.

The s6i6_gen2_info.ports[] array had the Mixer and PCM port type
entries in the wrong place. Use designators to explicitly specify the
array elements being set.

Fixes: 9e4d5c1be2 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface")
Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g@b4.vu>
Tested-by: Alex Fellows <alex.fellows@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Markus Schroetter <project.m.schroetter@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191110134356.GA31589@b4.vu
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:02 +01:00
Takashi Iwai 0d0dc91e84 ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference at parsing BADD
commit 9435f2bb66 upstream.

snd_usb_mixer_controls_badd() that parses UAC3 BADD profiles misses a
NULL check for the given interfaces.  When a malformed USB descriptor
is passed, this may lead to an Oops, as spotted by syzkaller.
Skip the iteration if the interface doesn't exist for avoiding the
crash.

Fixes: 17156f23e9 ("ALSA: usb: add UAC3 BADD profiles support")
Reported-by: syzbot+a36ab65c6653d7ccdd62@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122112840.24797-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:01 +01:00
Yang Tao 82ca3ab31b futex: Prevent robust futex exit race
commit ca16d5bee5 upstream.

Robust futexes utilize the robust_list mechanism to allow the kernel to
release futexes which are held when a task exits. The exit can be voluntary
or caused by a signal or fault. This prevents that waiters block forever.

The futex operations in user space store a pointer to the futex they are
either locking or unlocking in the op_pending member of the per task robust
list.

After a lock operation has succeeded the futex is queued in the robust list
linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.

After an unlock operation has succeeded the futex is removed from the
robust list linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.

The robust list exit code checks for the pending operation and any futex
which is queued in the linked list. It carefully checks whether the futex
value is the TID of the exiting task. If so, it sets the OWNER_DIED bit and
tries to wake up a potential waiter.

This is race free for the lock operation but unlock has two race scenarios
where waiters might not be woken up. These issues can be observed with
regular robust pthread mutexes. PI aware pthread mutexes are not affected.

(1) Unlocking task is killed after unlocking the futex value in user space
    before being able to wake a waiter.

        pthread_mutex_unlock()
                |
                V
        atomic_exchange_rel (&mutex->__data.__lock, 0)
                        <------------------------killed
            lll_futex_wake ()                   |
                                                |
                                                |(__lock = 0)
                                                |(enter kernel)
                                                |
                                                V
                                            do_exit()
                                            exit_mm()
                                          mm_release()
                                        exit_robust_list()
                                        handle_futex_death()
                                                |
                                                |(__lock = 0)
                                                |(uval = 0)
                                                |
                                                V
        if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
                return 0;

    The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned by
    the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters which in consequence
    block infinitely.

(2) Waiting task is killed after a wakeup and before it can acquire the
    futex in user space.

        OWNER                         WAITER
				futex_wait()
   pthread_mutex_unlock()               |
                |                       |
                |(__lock = 0)           |
                |                       |
                V                       |
         futex_wake() ------------>  wakeup()
                                        |
                                        |(return to userspace)
                                        |(__lock = 0)
                                        |
                                        V
                        oldval = mutex->__data.__lock
                                          <-----------------killed
    atomic_compare_and_exchange_val_acq (&mutex->__data.__lock,  |
                        id | assume_other_futex_waiters, 0)      |
                                                                 |
                                                                 |
                                                   (enter kernel)|
                                                                 |
                                                                 V
                                                         do_exit()
                                                        |
                                                        |
                                                        V
                                        handle_futex_death()
                                        |
                                        |(__lock = 0)
                                        |(uval = 0)
                                        |
                                        V
        if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
                return 0;

    The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned
    by the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters, which seems to
    be correct as the exiting task does not own the futex value, but
    the consequence is that other waiters wont be woken up and block
    infinitely.

In both scenarios the following conditions are true:

   - task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
   - user space futex value == 0
   - Regular futex (not PI)

If these conditions are met then it is reasonably safe to wake up a
potential waiter in order to prevent the above problems.

As this might be a false positive it can cause spurious wakeups, but the
waiter side has to handle other types of unrelated wakeups, e.g. signals
gracefully anyway. So such a spurious wakeup will not affect the
correctness of these operations.

This workaround must not touch the user space futex value and cannot set
the OWNER_DIED bit because the lock value is 0, i.e. uncontended. Setting
OWNER_DIED in this case would result in inconsistent state and subsequently
in malfunction of the owner died handling in user space.

The rest of the user space state is still consistent as no other task can
observe the list_op_pending entry in the exiting tasks robust list.

The eventually woken up waiter will observe the uncontended lock value and
take it over.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and comment. Made the return explicit and not
  	depend on the subsequent check and added constants to hand into
  	handle_futex_death() instead of plain numbers. Fixed a few coding
	style issues. ]

Fixes: 0771dfefc9 ("[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: core")
Signed-off-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573010582-35297-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224555.943191378@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:01 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 95443fc0d7 x86/entry/32: Fix FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK with user CR3
commit 4a13b0e3e1 upstream.

UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK needs to read the GDT, and the GDT mapping that
can be accessed via %fs is not mapped in the user pagetables.  Use
SGDT to find the cpu_entry_area mapping and read the espfix offset
from that instead.

Reported-and-tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:00 +01:00
Ingo Molnar cd923d2b57 x86/pti/32: Calculate the various PTI cpu_entry_area sizes correctly, make the CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES assert precise
commit 05b042a194 upstream.

When two recent commits that increased the size of the 'struct cpu_entry_area'
were merged in -tip, the 32-bit defconfig build started failing on the following
build time assert:

  ./include/linux/compiler.h:391:38: error: call to ‘__compiletime_assert_189’ declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE
  arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c:189:2: note: in expansion of macro ‘BUILD_BUG_ON’
  In function ‘setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes’,

Which corresponds to the following build time assert:

	BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);

The purpose of this assert is to sanity check the fixed-value definition of
CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h:

	#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES    (NR_CPUS * 41)

The '41' is supposed to match sizeof(struct cpu_entry_area)/PAGE_SIZE, which value
we didn't want to define in such a low level header, because it would cause
dependency hell.

Every time the size of cpu_entry_area is changed, we have to adjust CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES
accordingly - and this assert is checking that constraint.

But the assert is both imprecise and buggy, primarily because it doesn't
include the single readonly IDT page that is mapped at CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE
(which begins at a PMD boundary).

This bug was hidden by the fact that by accident CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES is defined
too large upstream (v5.4-rc8):

	#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES    (NR_CPUS * 40)

While 'struct cpu_entry_area' is 155648 bytes, or 38 pages. So we had two extra
pages, which hid the bug.

The following commit (not yet upstream) increased the size to 40 pages:

  x86/iopl: ("Restrict iopl() permission scope")

... but increased CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES only 41 - i.e. shortening the gap
to just 1 extra page.

Then another not-yet-upstream commit changed the size again:

  880a98c339: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit")

Which increased the cpu_entry_area size from 38 to 39 pages, but
didn't change CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (kept it at 40). This worked
fine, because we still had a page left from the accidental 'reserve'.

But when these two commits were merged into the same tree, the
combined size of cpu_entry_area grew from 38 to 40 pages, while
CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES finally caught up to 40 as well.

Which is fine in terms of functionality, but the assert broke:

	BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);

because CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE is the total size of the area,
which is 1 page larger due to the IDT page.

To fix all this, change the assert to two precise asserts:

	BUILD_BUG_ON((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES+1)*PAGE_SIZE != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);
	BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);

This takes the IDT page into account, and also connects the size-based
define of CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE with the address-subtraction based
define of CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE.

Also clean up some of the names which made it rather confusing:

 - 'CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOT_SIZE' wasn't actually the 'total' size of
   the cpu-entry-area, but the per-cpu array size, so rename this
   to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_ARRAY_SIZE.

 - Introduce CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE that _is_ the total mapping
   size, with the IDT included.

 - Add comments where '+1' denotes the IDT mapping - it wasn't
   obvious and took me about 3 hours to decode...

Finally, because this particular commit is actually applied after
this patch:

  880a98c339: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit")

Fix the CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES value from 40 pages to the correct 39 pages.

All future commits that change cpu_entry_area will have to adjust
this value precisely.

As a side note, we should probably attempt to remove CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES
and derive its value directly from the structure, without causing
header hell - but that is an adventure for another day! :-)

Fixes: 880a98c339: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit")
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:10:00 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 92f8c688b2 selftests/x86/sigreturn/32: Invalidate DS and ES when abusing the kernel
commit 4d2fa82d98 upstream.

If the kernel accidentally uses DS or ES while the user values are
loaded, it will work fine for sane userspace.  In the interest of
simulating maximally insane userspace, make sigreturn_32 zero out DS
and ES for the nasty parts so that inadvertent use of these segments
will crash.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:59 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 72e521b167 selftests/x86/mov_ss_trap: Fix the SYSENTER test
commit 8caa016bfc upstream.

For reasons that I haven't quite fully diagnosed, running
mov_ss_trap_32 on a 32-bit kernel results in an infinite loop in
userspace.  This appears to be because the hacky SYSENTER test
doesn't segfault as desired; instead it corrupts the program state
such that it infinite loops.

Fix it by explicitly clearing EBP before doing SYSENTER.  This will
give a more reliable segfault.

Fixes: 59c2a7226f ("x86/selftests: Add mov_to_ss test")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:58 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra e74c494a20 x86/entry/32: Fix NMI vs ESPFIX
commit 8954290765 upstream.

When the NMI lands on an ESPFIX_SS, we are on the entry stack and must
swizzle, otherwise we'll run do_nmi() on the entry stack, which is
BAD.

Also, similar to the normal exception path, we need to correct the
ESPFIX magic before leaving the entry stack, otherwise pt_regs will
present a non-flat stack pointer.

Tested by running sigreturn_32 concurrent with perf-record.

Fixes: e5862d0515 ("x86/entry/32: Leave the kernel via trampoline stack")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:58 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 778226c41e x86/entry/32: Unwind the ESPFIX stack earlier on exception entry
commit a1a338e5b6 upstream.

Right now, we do some fancy parts of the exception entry path while SS
might have a nonzero base: we fill in regs->ss and regs->sp, and we
consider switching to the kernel stack. This results in regs->ss and
regs->sp referring to a non-flat stack and it may result in
overflowing the entry stack. The former issue means that we can try to
call iret_exc on a non-flat stack, which doesn't work.

Tested with selftests/x86/sigreturn_32.

Fixes: 45d7b25574 ("x86/entry/32: Enter the kernel via trampoline stack")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:57 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 9352a3a1ee x86/entry/32: Move FIXUP_FRAME after pushing %fs in SAVE_ALL
commit 82cb8a0b1d upstream.

This will allow us to get percpu access working before FIXUP_FRAME,
which will allow us to unwind ESPFIX earlier.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:56 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 81a204f1b4 x86/entry/32: Use %ss segment where required
commit 4c4fd55d3d upstream.

When re-building the IRET frame we use %eax as an destination %esp,
make sure to then also match the segment for when there is a nonzero
SS base (ESPFIX).

[peterz: Changelog and minor edits]
Fixes: 3c88c692c2 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:55 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra 0fbd1f06b6 x86/entry/32: Fix IRET exception
commit 40ad219958 upstream.

As reported by Lai, the commit 3c88c692c2 ("x86/stackframe/32:
Provide consistent pt_regs") wrecked the IRET EXTABLE entry by making
.Lirq_return not point at IRET.

Fix this by placing IRET_FRAME in RESTORE_REGS, to mirror how
FIXUP_FRAME is part of SAVE_ALL.

Fixes: 3c88c692c2 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs")
Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:54 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 90964a3fb5 x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit
commit 880a98c339 upstream.

The entry stack in the cpu entry area is protected against overflow by the
readonly GDT on 64-bit, but on 32-bit the GDT needs to be writeable and
therefore does not trigger a fault on stack overflow.

Add a guard page.

Fixes: c482feefe1 ("x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:54 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 987e90450a x86/pti/32: Size initial_page_table correctly
commit f490e07c53 upstream.

Commit 945fd17ab6 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Sync cpu_entry_area to
initial_page_table") introduced the sync for the initial page table for
32bit.

sync_initial_page_table() uses clone_pgd_range() which does the update for
the kernel page table. If PTI is enabled it also updates the user space
page table counterpart, which is assumed to be in the next page after the
target PGD.

At this point in time 32-bit did not have PTI support, so the user space
page table update was not taking place.

The support for PTI on 32-bit which was introduced later on, did not take
that into account and missed to add the user space counter part for the
initial page table.

As a consequence sync_initial_page_table() overwrites any data which is
located in the page behing initial_page_table causing random failures,
e.g. by corrupting doublefault_tss and wreckaging the doublefault handler
on 32bit.

Fix it by adding a "user" page table right after initial_page_table.

Fixes: 7757d607c6 ("x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:52 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 2867004c1d x86/doublefault/32: Fix stack canaries in the double fault handler
commit 3580d0b29c upstream.

The double fault TSS was missing GS setup, which is needed for stack
canaries to work.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:51 +01:00
Jan Beulich 274ad46fb7 x86/xen/32: Simplify ring check in xen_iret_crit_fixup()
commit 922eea2ce5 upstream.

This can be had with two instead of six insns, by just checking the high
CS.RPL bit.

Also adjust the comment - there would be no #GP in the mentioned cases, as
there's no segment limit violation or alike. Instead there'd be #PF, but
that one reports the target EIP of said branch, not the address of the
branch insn itself.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a5986837-01eb-7bf8-bf42-4d3084d6a1f5@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:50 +01:00
Jan Beulich 5f74e73ec3 x86/xen/32: Make xen_iret_crit_fixup() independent of frame layout
commit 29b810f5a5 upstream.

Now that SS:ESP always get saved by SAVE_ALL, this also needs to be
accounted for in xen_iret_crit_fixup(). Otherwise the old_ax value gets
interpreted as EFLAGS, and hence VM86 mode appears to be active all the
time, leading to random "vm86_32: no user_vm86: BAD" log messages alongside
processes randomly crashing.

Since following the previous model (sitting after SAVE_ALL) would further
complicate the code _and_ retain the dependency of xen_iret_crit_fixup() on
frame manipulations done by entry_32.S, switch things around and do the
adjustment ahead of SAVE_ALL.

Fixes: 3c88c692c2 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/32d8713d-25a7-84ab-b74b-aa3e88abce6b@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:49 +01:00
Jan Beulich 4614bc9655 x86/stackframe/32: Repair 32-bit Xen PV
commit 81ff2c37f9 upstream.

Once again RPL checks have been introduced which don't account for a 32-bit
kernel living in ring 1 when running in a PV Xen domain. The case in
FIXUP_FRAME has been preventing boot.

Adjust BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 as well to guard against future uses of the macro
on a code path reachable when running in PV mode under Xen; I have to admit
that I stopped at a certain point trying to figure out whether there are
present ones.

Fixes: 3c88c692c2 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0fad341f-b7f5-f859-d55d-f0084ee7087e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:48 +01:00
Navid Emamdoost abf404dfa5 nbd: prevent memory leak
commit 03bf73c315 upstream.

In nbd_add_socket when krealloc succeeds, if nsock's allocation fail the
reallocted memory is leak. The correct behaviour should be assigning the
reallocted memory to config->socks right after success.

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:47 +01:00
Waiman Long 7b77206ad5 x86/speculation: Fix redundant MDS mitigation message
commit cd5a2aa89e upstream.

Since MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related for processors that are
affected by both vulnerabilities, the followiing confusing messages can
be printed in the kernel log:

  MDS: Vulnerable
  MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers

To avoid the first incorrect message, defer the printing of MDS
mitigation after the TAA mitigation selection has been done. However,
that has the side effect of printing TAA mitigation first before MDS
mitigation.

 [ bp: Check box is affected/mitigations are disabled first before
   printing and massage. ]

Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:47 +01:00
Waiman Long 75cad94d03 x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status
commit 64870ed1b1 upstream.

For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS or
TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal processor
buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both mitigated
or both not. However, if the command line options are inconsistent,
the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the mitigation status
correctly.

For example, with only the "mds=off" option:

  vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
  vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable

The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case. Similarly,
the taa vulnerability file will be wrong with mds mitigation on, but
taa off.

Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
are present.

Update documentation to emphasize the fact that both "mds=off" and
"tsx_async_abort=off" have to be specified together for processors that
are affected by both TAA and MDS to be effective.

 [ bp: Massage and add kernel-parameters.txt change too. ]

Fixes: 1b42f01741 ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191115161445.30809-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:46 +01:00
Alexander Kapshuk c5bc6816fc x86/insn: Fix awk regexp warnings
commit 700c1018b8 upstream.

gawk 5.0.1 generates the following regexp warnings:

  GEN      /home/sasha/torvalds/tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/inat-tables.c
  awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:260: warning: regexp escape sequence `\:' is not a known regexp operator
  awk: ../arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk:350: (FILENAME=../arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt FNR=41) warning: regexp escape sequence `\&' is  not a known regexp operator

Ealier versions of gawk are not known to generate these warnings. The
gawk manual referenced below does not list characters ':' and '&' as
needing escaping, so 'unescape' them. See

  https://www.gnu.org/software/gawk/manual/html_node/Escape-Sequences.html

for more info.

Running diff on the output generated by the script before and after
applying the patch reported no differences.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

[ Caught the respective tools header discrepancy. ]
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kapshuk <alexander.kapshuk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924044659.3785-1-alexander.kapshuk@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:45 +01:00
John Pittman 8ac794da75 md/raid10: prevent access of uninitialized resync_pages offset
commit 45422b704d upstream.

Due to unneeded multiplication in the out_free_pages portion of
r10buf_pool_alloc(), when using a 3-copy raid10 layout, it is
possible to access a resync_pages offset that has not been
initialized.  This access translates into a crash of the system
within resync_free_pages() while passing a bad pointer to
put_page().  Remove the multiplication, preventing access to the
uninitialized area.

Fixes: f025061836 ("md: raid10: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: John Pittman <jpittman@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:45 +01:00
Mike Snitzer 191355a2cf Revert "dm crypt: use WQ_HIGHPRI for the IO and crypt workqueues"
commit f612b2132d upstream.

This reverts commit a1b89132dc.

Revert required hand-patching due to subsequent changes that were
applied since commit a1b89132dc.

Requires: ed0302e830 ("dm crypt: make workqueue names device-specific")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199857
Reported-by: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:44 +01:00
Adam Ford 68c5b8cb26 Revert "Bluetooth: hci_ll: set operational frequency earlier"
commit cef456cd35 upstream.

As nice as it would be to update firmware faster, that patch broke
at least two different boards, an OMAP4+WL1285 based Motorola Droid
4, as reported by Sebasian Reichel and the Logic PD i.MX6Q +
WL1837MOD.

This reverts commit a2e02f38ef.

Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:43 +01:00
Christian Lamparter 457c529fc1 ath10k: restore QCA9880-AR1A (v1) detection
commit f8914a1462 upstream.

This patch restores the old behavior that read
the chip_id on the QCA988x before resetting the
chip. This needs to be done in this order since
the unsupported QCA988x AR1A chips fall off the
bus when resetted. Otherwise the next MMIO Op
after the reset causes a BUS ERROR and panic.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1a7fecb766 ("ath10k: reset chip before reading chip_id in probe")
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:42 +01:00
Bjorn Andersson 2a807b1b4e ath10k: Fix HOST capability QMI incompatibility
commit 7165ef890a upstream.

The introduction of 768ec4c012 ("ath10k: update HOST capability QMI
message") served the purpose of supporting the new and extended HOST
capability QMI message.

But while the new message adds a slew of optional members it changes the
data type of the "daemon_support" member, which means that older
versions of the firmware will fail to decode the incoming request
message.

There is no way to detect this breakage from Linux and there's no way to
recover from sending the wrong message (i.e. we can't just try one
format and then fallback to the other), so a quirk is introduced in
DeviceTree to indicate to the driver that the firmware requires the 8bit
version of this message.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 768ec4c012 ("ath10k: update HOST capability qmi message")
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:41 +01:00
Hui Peng 0126be1409 ath10k: Fix a NULL-ptr-deref bug in ath10k_usb_alloc_urb_from_pipe
commit bfd6e6e6c5 upstream.

The `ar_usb` field of `ath10k_usb_pipe_usb_pipe` objects
are initialized to point to the containing `ath10k_usb` object
according to endpoint descriptors read from the device side, as shown
below in `ath10k_usb_setup_pipe_resources`:

for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
        endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;

        // get the address from endpoint descriptor
        pipe_num = ath10k_usb_get_logical_pipe_num(ar_usb,
                                                endpoint->bEndpointAddress,
                                                &urbcount);
        ......
        // select the pipe object
        pipe = &ar_usb->pipes[pipe_num];

        // initialize the ar_usb field
        pipe->ar_usb = ar_usb;
}

The driver assumes that the addresses reported in endpoint
descriptors from device side  to be complete. If a device is
malicious and does not report complete addresses, it may trigger
NULL-ptr-deref `ath10k_usb_alloc_urb_from_pipe` and
`ath10k_usb_free_urb_to_pipe`.

This patch fixes the bug by preventing potential NULL-ptr-deref.

Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[groeck: Add driver tag to subject, fix build warning]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:41 +01:00
Denis Efremov 3064134f88 ath9k_hw: fix uninitialized variable data
commit 80e84f3641 upstream.

Currently, data variable in ar9003_hw_thermo_cal_apply() could be
uninitialized if ar9300_otp_read_word() will fail to read the value.
Initialize data variable with 0 to prevent an undefined behavior. This
will be enough to handle error case when ar9300_otp_read_word() fails.

Fixes: 80fe43f2bb ("ath9k_hw: Read and configure thermocal for AR9462")
Cc: Rajkumar Manoharan <rmanohar@qca.qualcomm.com>
Cc: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:40 +01:00
Tomas Bortoli 6b47a3043a Bluetooth: Fix invalid-free in bcsp_close()
commit cf94da6f50 upstream.

Syzbot reported an invalid-free that I introduced fixing a memleak.

bcsp_recv() also frees bcsp->rx_skb but never nullifies its value.
Nullify bcsp->rx_skb every time it is freed.

Signed-off-by: Tomas Bortoli <tomasbortoli@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+a0d209a4676664613e76@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-29 10:09:39 +01:00
120 changed files with 1592 additions and 676 deletions
+5 -2
View File
@@ -265,8 +265,11 @@ time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
============ =============================================================
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full". For processors
that are affected by both TAA (TSX Asynchronous Abort) and MDS,
specifying just "mds=off" without an accompanying "tsx_async_abort=off"
will have no effect as the same mitigation is used for both
vulnerabilities.
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
@@ -174,7 +174,10 @@ the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
============ =============================================================
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full". For
processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
"tsx_async_abort=off" without an accompanying "mds=off" will have no
effect as the same mitigation is used for both vulnerabilities.
The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
@@ -2473,6 +2473,12 @@
SMT on vulnerable CPUs
off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
too.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
mds=full.
@@ -4931,6 +4937,11 @@
vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected
and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ Optional properties:
Definition: Name of external front end module used. Some valid FEM names
for example: "microsemi-lx5586", "sky85703-11"
and "sky85803" etc.
- qcom,snoc-host-cap-8bit-quirk:
Usage: Optional
Value type: <empty>
Definition: Quirk specifying that the firmware expects the 8bit version
of the host capability QMI request
Example (to supply PCI based wifi block details):
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 4
SUBLEVEL = 0
SUBLEVEL = 2
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
@@ -152,9 +152,12 @@ void _kvmppc_save_tm_pr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_msr);
/* Patch sites */
extern s32 patch__call_flush_count_cache;
extern s32 patch__flush_count_cache_return;
extern s32 patch__flush_link_stack_return;
extern s32 patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack;
extern s32 patch__memset_nocache, patch__memcpy_nocache;
extern long flush_count_cache;
extern long kvm_flush_link_stack;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
void kvmppc_save_tm_hv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 msr, bool preserve_nv);
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(unsigned long feature)
// Software required to flush count cache on context switch
#define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE 0x0000000000000400ull
// Software required to flush link stack on context switch
#define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK 0x0000000000001000ull
// Features enabled by default
#define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
+6
View File
@@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ flush_count_cache:
/* Save LR into r9 */
mflr r9
// Flush the link stack
.rept 64
bl .+4
.endr
@@ -546,6 +547,11 @@ flush_count_cache:
.balign 32
/* Restore LR */
1: mtlr r9
// If we're just flushing the link stack, return here
3: nop
patch_site 3b patch__flush_link_stack_return
li r9,0x7fff
mtctr r9
+53 -4
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ enum count_cache_flush_type {
COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW = 0x4,
};
static enum count_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
static bool link_stack_flush_enabled;
bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
static bool no_nospec;
@@ -212,11 +213,19 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, c
if (ccd)
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
if (link_stack_flush_enabled)
seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush");
} else if (count_cache_flush_type != COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush");
if (count_cache_flush_type == COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
if (link_stack_flush_enabled)
seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush");
} else if (btb_flush_enabled) {
seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush");
} else {
@@ -377,18 +386,49 @@ static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)
device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
static void no_count_cache_flush(void)
{
count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
}
static void toggle_count_cache_flush(bool enable)
{
if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) {
if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE) &&
!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK))
enable = false;
if (!enable) {
patch_instruction_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache, PPC_INST_NOP);
count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
patch_instruction_site(&patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack, PPC_INST_NOP);
#endif
pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
link_stack_flush_enabled = false;
no_count_cache_flush();
return;
}
// This enables the branch from _switch to flush_count_cache
patch_branch_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache,
(u64)&flush_count_cache, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
// This enables the branch from guest_exit_cont to kvm_flush_link_stack
patch_branch_site(&patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack,
(u64)&kvm_flush_link_stack, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
#endif
pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
link_stack_flush_enabled = true;
// If we just need to flush the link stack, patch an early return
if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) {
patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_link_stack_return, PPC_INST_BLR);
no_count_cache_flush();
return;
}
if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
pr_info("count-cache-flush: full software flush sequence enabled.\n");
@@ -407,11 +447,20 @@ void setup_count_cache_flush(void)
if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED) ||
security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED))
pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not under software control, can't disable\n");
pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not fully under software control, can't disable\n");
enable = false;
}
/*
* There's no firmware feature flag/hypervisor bit to tell us we need to
* flush the link stack on context switch. So we set it here if we see
* either of the Spectre v2 mitigations that aim to protect userspace.
*/
if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED) ||
security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE))
security_ftr_set(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK);
toggle_count_cache_flush(enable);
}
+30
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
*/
#include <asm/ppc_asm.h>
#include <asm/code-patching-asm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
#include <asm/reg.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
@@ -1487,6 +1488,13 @@ guest_exit_cont: /* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */
1:
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_XICS */
/*
* Possibly flush the link stack here, before we do a blr in
* guest_exit_short_path.
*/
1: nop
patch_site 1b patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack
/* If we came in through the P9 short path, go back out to C now */
lwz r0, STACK_SLOT_SHORT_PATH(r1)
cmpwi r0, 0
@@ -1963,6 +1971,28 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)
mtlr r0
blr
.balign 32
.global kvm_flush_link_stack
kvm_flush_link_stack:
/* Save LR into r0 */
mflr r0
/* Flush the link stack. On Power8 it's up to 32 entries in size. */
.rept 32
bl .+4
.endr
/* And on Power9 it's up to 64. */
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
.rept 32
bl .+4
.endr
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)
/* Restore LR */
mtlr r0
blr
kvmppc_guest_external:
/* External interrupt, first check for host_ipi. If this is
* set, we know the host wants us out so let's do it now
+133 -78
View File
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
.if \no_user_check == 0
/* coming from usermode? */
testl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp)
testl $USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp)
jz .Lend_\@
.endif
/* On user-cr3? */
@@ -205,64 +205,76 @@
#define CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK (1 << 31)
#define CS_FROM_USER_CR3 (1 << 30)
#define CS_FROM_KERNEL (1 << 29)
#define CS_FROM_ESPFIX (1 << 28)
.macro FIXUP_FRAME
/*
* The high bits of the CS dword (__csh) are used for CS_FROM_*.
* Clear them in case hardware didn't do this for us.
*/
andl $0x0000ffff, 3*4(%esp)
andl $0x0000ffff, 4*4(%esp)
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
testl $X86_EFLAGS_VM, 4*4(%esp)
testl $X86_EFLAGS_VM, 5*4(%esp)
jnz .Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@
#endif
testl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, 3*4(%esp)
testl $USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, 4*4(%esp)
jnz .Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@
orl $CS_FROM_KERNEL, 3*4(%esp)
orl $CS_FROM_KERNEL, 4*4(%esp)
/*
* When we're here from kernel mode; the (exception) stack looks like:
*
* 5*4(%esp) - <previous context>
* 4*4(%esp) - flags
* 3*4(%esp) - cs
* 2*4(%esp) - ip
* 1*4(%esp) - orig_eax
* 0*4(%esp) - gs / function
* 6*4(%esp) - <previous context>
* 5*4(%esp) - flags
* 4*4(%esp) - cs
* 3*4(%esp) - ip
* 2*4(%esp) - orig_eax
* 1*4(%esp) - gs / function
* 0*4(%esp) - fs
*
* Lets build a 5 entry IRET frame after that, such that struct pt_regs
* is complete and in particular regs->sp is correct. This gives us
* the original 5 enties as gap:
* the original 6 enties as gap:
*
* 12*4(%esp) - <previous context>
* 11*4(%esp) - gap / flags
* 10*4(%esp) - gap / cs
* 9*4(%esp) - gap / ip
* 8*4(%esp) - gap / orig_eax
* 7*4(%esp) - gap / gs / function
* 6*4(%esp) - ss
* 5*4(%esp) - sp
* 4*4(%esp) - flags
* 3*4(%esp) - cs
* 2*4(%esp) - ip
* 1*4(%esp) - orig_eax
* 0*4(%esp) - gs / function
* 14*4(%esp) - <previous context>
* 13*4(%esp) - gap / flags
* 12*4(%esp) - gap / cs
* 11*4(%esp) - gap / ip
* 10*4(%esp) - gap / orig_eax
* 9*4(%esp) - gap / gs / function
* 8*4(%esp) - gap / fs
* 7*4(%esp) - ss
* 6*4(%esp) - sp
* 5*4(%esp) - flags
* 4*4(%esp) - cs
* 3*4(%esp) - ip
* 2*4(%esp) - orig_eax
* 1*4(%esp) - gs / function
* 0*4(%esp) - fs
*/
pushl %ss # ss
pushl %esp # sp (points at ss)
addl $6*4, (%esp) # point sp back at the previous context
pushl 6*4(%esp) # flags
pushl 6*4(%esp) # cs
pushl 6*4(%esp) # ip
pushl 6*4(%esp) # orig_eax
pushl 6*4(%esp) # gs / function
addl $7*4, (%esp) # point sp back at the previous context
pushl 7*4(%esp) # flags
pushl 7*4(%esp) # cs
pushl 7*4(%esp) # ip
pushl 7*4(%esp) # orig_eax
pushl 7*4(%esp) # gs / function
pushl 7*4(%esp) # fs
.Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@:
.endm
.macro IRET_FRAME
/*
* We're called with %ds, %es, %fs, and %gs from the interrupted
* frame, so we shouldn't use them. Also, we may be in ESPFIX
* mode and therefore have a nonzero SS base and an offset ESP,
* so any attempt to access the stack needs to use SS. (except for
* accesses through %esp, which automatically use SS.)
*/
testl $CS_FROM_KERNEL, 1*4(%esp)
jz .Lfinished_frame_\@
@@ -276,31 +288,40 @@
movl 5*4(%esp), %eax # (modified) regs->sp
movl 4*4(%esp), %ecx # flags
movl %ecx, -4(%eax)
movl %ecx, %ss:-1*4(%eax)
movl 3*4(%esp), %ecx # cs
andl $0x0000ffff, %ecx
movl %ecx, -8(%eax)
movl %ecx, %ss:-2*4(%eax)
movl 2*4(%esp), %ecx # ip
movl %ecx, -12(%eax)
movl %ecx, %ss:-3*4(%eax)
movl 1*4(%esp), %ecx # eax
movl %ecx, -16(%eax)
movl %ecx, %ss:-4*4(%eax)
popl %ecx
lea -16(%eax), %esp
lea -4*4(%eax), %esp
popl %eax
.Lfinished_frame_\@:
.endm
.macro SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=%eax switch_stacks=0 skip_gs=0
.macro SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=%eax switch_stacks=0 skip_gs=0 unwind_espfix=0
cld
.if \skip_gs == 0
PUSH_GS
.endif
FIXUP_FRAME
pushl %fs
pushl %eax
movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %eax
movl %eax, %fs
.if \unwind_espfix > 0
UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
.endif
popl %eax
FIXUP_FRAME
pushl %es
pushl %ds
pushl \pt_regs_ax
@@ -313,8 +334,6 @@
movl $(__USER_DS), %edx
movl %edx, %ds
movl %edx, %es
movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %edx
movl %edx, %fs
.if \skip_gs == 0
SET_KERNEL_GS %edx
.endif
@@ -324,8 +343,8 @@
.endif
.endm
.macro SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg:req
SAVE_ALL
.macro SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg:req unwind_espfix=0
SAVE_ALL unwind_espfix=\unwind_espfix
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3
@@ -357,6 +376,7 @@
2: popl %es
3: popl %fs
POP_GS \pop
IRET_FRAME
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
4: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 1b
@@ -395,7 +415,8 @@
.macro CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
#define GDT_ESPFIX_SS PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page) + (GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS * 8)
#define GDT_ESPFIX_OFFSET (GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS * 8)
#define GDT_ESPFIX_SS PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page) + GDT_ESPFIX_OFFSET
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_BUG_ESPFIX
@@ -1075,7 +1096,6 @@ restore_all:
/* Restore user state */
RESTORE_REGS pop=4 # skip orig_eax/error_code
.Lirq_return:
IRET_FRAME
/*
* ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization
* when returning from IPI handler and when returning from
@@ -1128,30 +1148,43 @@ ENDPROC(entry_INT80_32)
* We can't call C functions using the ESPFIX stack. This code reads
* the high word of the segment base from the GDT and swiches to the
* normal stack and adjusts ESP with the matching offset.
*
* We might be on user CR3 here, so percpu data is not mapped and we can't
* access the GDT through the percpu segment. Instead, use SGDT to find
* the cpu_entry_area alias of the GDT.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
/* fixup the stack */
mov GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 4, %al /* bits 16..23 */
mov GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 7, %ah /* bits 24..31 */
pushl %ecx
subl $2*4, %esp
sgdt (%esp)
movl 2(%esp), %ecx /* GDT address */
/*
* Careful: ECX is a linear pointer, so we need to force base
* zero. %cs is the only known-linear segment we have right now.
*/
mov %cs:GDT_ESPFIX_OFFSET + 4(%ecx), %al /* bits 16..23 */
mov %cs:GDT_ESPFIX_OFFSET + 7(%ecx), %ah /* bits 24..31 */
shl $16, %eax
addl $2*4, %esp
popl %ecx
addl %esp, %eax /* the adjusted stack pointer */
pushl $__KERNEL_DS
pushl %eax
lss (%esp), %esp /* switch to the normal stack segment */
#endif
.endm
.macro UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
/* It's safe to clobber %eax, all other regs need to be preserved */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
movl %ss, %eax
/* see if on espfix stack */
cmpw $__ESPFIX_SS, %ax
jne 27f
movl $__KERNEL_DS, %eax
movl %eax, %ds
movl %eax, %es
jne .Lno_fixup_\@
/* switch to normal stack */
FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK
27:
.Lno_fixup_\@:
#endif
.endm
@@ -1341,11 +1374,6 @@ END(spurious_interrupt_bug)
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
ENTRY(xen_hypervisor_callback)
pushl $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
SAVE_ALL
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
/*
* Check to see if we got the event in the critical
* region in xen_iret_direct, after we've reenabled
@@ -1353,16 +1381,17 @@ ENTRY(xen_hypervisor_callback)
* iret instruction's behaviour where it delivers a
* pending interrupt when enabling interrupts:
*/
movl PT_EIP(%esp), %eax
cmpl $xen_iret_start_crit, %eax
cmpl $xen_iret_start_crit, (%esp)
jb 1f
cmpl $xen_iret_end_crit, %eax
cmpl $xen_iret_end_crit, (%esp)
jae 1f
jmp xen_iret_crit_fixup
ENTRY(xen_do_upcall)
1: mov %esp, %eax
call xen_iret_crit_fixup
1:
pushl $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
SAVE_ALL
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
mov %esp, %eax
call xen_evtchn_do_upcall
#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
call xen_maybe_preempt_hcall
@@ -1449,10 +1478,9 @@ END(page_fault)
common_exception_read_cr2:
/* the function address is in %gs's slot on the stack */
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 skip_gs=1
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 skip_gs=1 unwind_espfix=1
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
/* fixup %gs */
GS_TO_REG %ecx
@@ -1474,9 +1502,8 @@ END(common_exception_read_cr2)
common_exception:
/* the function address is in %gs's slot on the stack */
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 skip_gs=1
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 skip_gs=1 unwind_espfix=1
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
/* fixup %gs */
GS_TO_REG %ecx
@@ -1515,6 +1542,10 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
ASM_CLAC
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
/*
* ESPFIX_SS is only ever set on the return to user path
* after we've switched to the entry stack.
*/
pushl %eax
movl %ss, %eax
cmpw $__ESPFIX_SS, %ax
@@ -1550,6 +1581,11 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
movl %ebx, %esp
.Lnmi_return:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
testl $CS_FROM_ESPFIX, PT_CS(%esp)
jnz .Lnmi_from_espfix
#endif
CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX
RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi pop=4
jmp .Lirq_return
@@ -1557,23 +1593,42 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
.Lnmi_espfix_stack:
/*
* create the pointer to lss back
* Create the pointer to LSS back
*/
pushl %ss
pushl %esp
addl $4, (%esp)
/* copy the iret frame of 12 bytes */
.rept 3
pushl 16(%esp)
.endr
pushl %eax
SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi
/* Copy the (short) IRET frame */
pushl 4*4(%esp) # flags
pushl 4*4(%esp) # cs
pushl 4*4(%esp) # ip
pushl %eax # orig_ax
SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi unwind_espfix=1
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK # %eax == %esp
/* clear CS_FROM_KERNEL, set CS_FROM_ESPFIX */
xorl $(CS_FROM_ESPFIX | CS_FROM_KERNEL), PT_CS(%esp)
xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code
call do_nmi
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
jmp .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack
.Lnmi_from_espfix:
RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi
lss 12+4(%esp), %esp # back to espfix stack
/*
* Because we cleared CS_FROM_KERNEL, IRET_FRAME 'forgot' to
* fix up the gap and long frame:
*
* 3 - original frame (exception)
* 2 - ESPFIX block (above)
* 6 - gap (FIXUP_FRAME)
* 5 - long frame (FIXUP_FRAME)
* 1 - orig_ax
*/
lss (1+5+6)*4(%esp), %esp # back to espfix stack
jmp .Lirq_return
#endif
END(nmi)
+12 -6
View File
@@ -78,8 +78,12 @@ struct cpu_entry_area {
/*
* The GDT is just below entry_stack and thus serves (on x86_64) as
* a a read-only guard page.
* a read-only guard page. On 32-bit the GDT must be writeable, so
* it needs an extra guard page.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
char guard_entry_stack[PAGE_SIZE];
#endif
struct entry_stack_page entry_stack_page;
/*
@@ -94,7 +98,6 @@ struct cpu_entry_area {
*/
struct cea_exception_stacks estacks;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
/*
* Per CPU debug store for Intel performance monitoring. Wastes a
* full page at the moment.
@@ -105,11 +108,13 @@ struct cpu_entry_area {
* Reserve enough fixmap PTEs.
*/
struct debug_store_buffers cpu_debug_buffers;
#endif
};
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE (sizeof(struct cpu_entry_area))
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOT_SIZE (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE * NR_CPUS)
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE (sizeof(struct cpu_entry_area))
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_ARRAY_SIZE (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE * NR_CPUS)
/* Total size includes the readonly IDT mapping page as well: */
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_ARRAY_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE)
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct cpu_entry_area *, cpu_entry_area);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct cea_exception_stacks *, cea_exception_stacks);
@@ -117,13 +122,14 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct cea_exception_stacks *, cea_exception_stacks);
extern void setup_cpu_entry_areas(void);
extern void cea_set_pte(void *cea_vaddr, phys_addr_t pa, pgprot_t flags);
/* Single page reserved for the readonly IDT mapping: */
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT + PAGE_SIZE)
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT_VADDR ((void *)CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT)
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE \
(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOT_SIZE - CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE)
(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_ARRAY_SIZE - CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE)
extern struct cpu_entry_area *get_cpu_entry_area(int cpu);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ static inline void __fpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(struct fpu *fpu)
static inline int fpregs_state_valid(struct fpu *fpu, unsigned int cpu)
{
return fpu == this_cpu_read_stable(fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx) && cpu == fpu->last_cpu;
return fpu == this_cpu_read(fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx) && cpu == fpu->last_cpu;
}
/*
+4 -4
View File
@@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ extern bool __vmalloc_start_set; /* set once high_memory is set */
* Define this here and validate with BUILD_BUG_ON() in pgtable_32.c
* to avoid include recursion hell
*/
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 40)
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 39)
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE \
((FIXADDR_TOT_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1)) \
& PMD_MASK)
/* The +1 is for the readonly IDT page: */
#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE \
((FIXADDR_TOT_START - PAGE_SIZE*(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES+1)) & PMD_MASK)
#define LDT_BASE_ADDR \
((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE - PAGE_SIZE) & PMD_MASK)
+12
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@
*/
#define SEGMENT_RPL_MASK 0x3
/*
* When running on Xen PV, the actual privilege level of the kernel is 1,
* not 0. Testing the Requested Privilege Level in a segment selector to
* determine whether the context is user mode or kernel mode with
* SEGMENT_RPL_MASK is wrong because the PV kernel's privilege level
* matches the 0x3 mask.
*
* Testing with USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK is valid for both native and Xen PV
* kernels because privilege level 2 is never used.
*/
#define USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK 0x2
/* User mode is privilege level 3: */
#define USER_RPL 0x3
+28 -2
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
@@ -108,6 +109,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
/*
* As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
* mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
*/
mds_print_mitigation();
arch_smt_update();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -245,6 +252,12 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
(mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
}
}
static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
return;
pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
}
@@ -304,8 +317,12 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
return;
}
/* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
/*
* TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
* tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
*/
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
goto out;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
@@ -339,6 +356,15 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
/*
* Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
* now enabled for TAA mitigation.
*/
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
mds_select_mitigation();
}
out:
pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
}
+3
View File
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct x86_hw_tss doublefault_tss __cacheline_aligned = {
.ss = __KERNEL_DS,
.ds = __USER_DS,
.fs = __KERNEL_PERCPU,
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
.gs = __KERNEL_STACK_CANARY,
#endif
.__cr3 = __pa_nodebug(swapper_pg_dir),
};
+10
View File
@@ -571,6 +571,16 @@ ENTRY(initial_page_table)
# error "Kernel PMDs should be 1, 2 or 3"
# endif
.align PAGE_SIZE /* needs to be page-sized too */
#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
* PTI needs another page so sync_initial_pagetable() works correctly
* and does not scribble over the data which is placed behind the
* actual initial_page_table. See clone_pgd_range().
*/
.fill 1024, 4, 0
#endif
#endif
.data
+3 -1
View File
@@ -178,7 +178,9 @@ static __init void setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
unsigned long start, end;
BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);
/* The +1 is for the readonly IDT: */
BUILD_BUG_ON((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES+1)*PAGE_SIZE != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE);
BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE & ~PMD_MASK);
start = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE;
+2 -2
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ BEGIN {
lprefix1_expr = "\\((66|!F3)\\)"
lprefix2_expr = "\\(F3\\)"
lprefix3_expr = "\\((F2|!F3|66\\&F2)\\)"
lprefix3_expr = "\\((F2|!F3|66&F2)\\)"
lprefix_expr = "\\((66|F2|F3)\\)"
max_lprefix = 4
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ function convert_operands(count,opnd, i,j,imm,mod)
return add_flags(imm, mod)
}
/^[0-9a-f]+\:/ {
/^[0-9a-f]+:/ {
if (NR == 1)
next
# get index
+25 -50
View File
@@ -126,10 +126,9 @@ hyper_iret:
.globl xen_iret_start_crit, xen_iret_end_crit
/*
* This is called by xen_hypervisor_callback in entry.S when it sees
* This is called by xen_hypervisor_callback in entry_32.S when it sees
* that the EIP at the time of interrupt was between
* xen_iret_start_crit and xen_iret_end_crit. We're passed the EIP in
* %eax so we can do a more refined determination of what to do.
* xen_iret_start_crit and xen_iret_end_crit.
*
* The stack format at this point is:
* ----------------
@@ -138,70 +137,46 @@ hyper_iret:
* eflags } outer exception info
* cs }
* eip }
* ---------------- <- edi (copy dest)
* ----------------
* eax : outer eax if it hasn't been restored
* ----------------
* eflags } nested exception info
* cs } (no ss/esp because we're nested
* eip } from the same ring)
* orig_eax }<- esi (copy src)
* - - - - - - - -
* fs }
* es }
* ds } SAVE_ALL state
* eax }
* : :
* ebx }<- esp
* ----------------
* eflags }
* cs } nested exception info
* eip }
* return address : (into xen_hypervisor_callback)
*
* In order to deliver the nested exception properly, we need to shift
* everything from the return addr up to the error code so it sits
* just under the outer exception info. This means that when we
* handle the exception, we do it in the context of the outer
* exception rather than starting a new one.
* In order to deliver the nested exception properly, we need to discard the
* nested exception frame such that when we handle the exception, we do it
* in the context of the outer exception rather than starting a new one.
*
* The only caveat is that if the outer eax hasn't been restored yet
* (ie, it's still on stack), we need to insert its value into the
* SAVE_ALL state before going on, since it's usermode state which we
* eventually need to restore.
* The only caveat is that if the outer eax hasn't been restored yet (i.e.
* it's still on stack), we need to restore its value here.
*/
ENTRY(xen_iret_crit_fixup)
/*
* Paranoia: Make sure we're really coming from kernel space.
* One could imagine a case where userspace jumps into the
* critical range address, but just before the CPU delivers a
* GP, it decides to deliver an interrupt instead. Unlikely?
* Definitely. Easy to avoid? Yes. The Intel documents
* explicitly say that the reported EIP for a bad jump is the
* jump instruction itself, not the destination, but some
* virtual environments get this wrong.
* PF, it decides to deliver an interrupt instead. Unlikely?
* Definitely. Easy to avoid? Yes.
*/
movl PT_CS(%esp), %ecx
andl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, %ecx
cmpl $USER_RPL, %ecx
je 2f
lea PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp), %esi
lea PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %edi
testb $2, 2*4(%esp) /* nested CS */
jnz 2f
/*
* If eip is before iret_restore_end then stack
* hasn't been restored yet.
*/
cmp $iret_restore_end, %eax
cmpl $iret_restore_end, 1*4(%esp)
jae 1f
movl 0+4(%edi), %eax /* copy EAX (just above top of frame) */
movl %eax, PT_EAX(%esp)
movl 4*4(%esp), %eax /* load outer EAX */
ret $4*4 /* discard nested EIP, CS, and EFLAGS as
* well as the just restored EAX */
lea ESP_OFFSET(%edi), %edi /* move dest up over saved regs */
/* set up the copy */
1: std
mov $PT_EIP / 4, %ecx /* saved regs up to orig_eax */
rep movsl
cld
lea 4(%edi), %esp /* point esp to new frame */
2: jmp xen_do_upcall
1:
ret $3*4 /* discard nested EIP, CS, and EFLAGS */
2:
ret
END(xen_iret_crit_fixup)
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1278,6 +1278,11 @@ struct bus_type platform_bus_type = {
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(platform_bus_type);
static inline int __platform_match(struct device *dev, const void *drv)
{
return platform_match(dev, (struct device_driver *)drv);
}
/**
* platform_find_device_by_driver - Find a platform device with a given
* driver.
@@ -1288,7 +1293,7 @@ struct device *platform_find_device_by_driver(struct device *start,
const struct device_driver *drv)
{
return bus_find_device(&platform_bus_type, start, drv,
(void *)platform_match);
__platform_match);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(platform_find_device_by_driver);
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1032,14 +1032,15 @@ static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg,
sockfd_put(sock);
return -ENOMEM;
}
config->socks = socks;
nsock = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nbd_sock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nsock) {
sockfd_put(sock);
return -ENOMEM;
}
config->socks = socks;
nsock->fallback_index = -1;
nsock->dead = false;
mutex_init(&nsock->tx_lock);
+3
View File
@@ -591,6 +591,7 @@ static int bcsp_recv(struct hci_uart *hu, const void *data, int count)
if (*ptr == 0xc0) {
BT_ERR("Short BCSP packet");
kfree_skb(bcsp->rx_skb);
bcsp->rx_skb = NULL;
bcsp->rx_state = BCSP_W4_PKT_START;
bcsp->rx_count = 0;
} else
@@ -606,6 +607,7 @@ static int bcsp_recv(struct hci_uart *hu, const void *data, int count)
bcsp->rx_skb->data[2])) != bcsp->rx_skb->data[3]) {
BT_ERR("Error in BCSP hdr checksum");
kfree_skb(bcsp->rx_skb);
bcsp->rx_skb = NULL;
bcsp->rx_state = BCSP_W4_PKT_DELIMITER;
bcsp->rx_count = 0;
continue;
@@ -630,6 +632,7 @@ static int bcsp_recv(struct hci_uart *hu, const void *data, int count)
bscp_get_crc(bcsp));
kfree_skb(bcsp->rx_skb);
bcsp->rx_skb = NULL;
bcsp->rx_state = BCSP_W4_PKT_DELIMITER;
bcsp->rx_count = 0;
continue;
+18 -21
View File
@@ -621,13 +621,6 @@ static int ll_setup(struct hci_uart *hu)
serdev_device_set_flow_control(serdev, true);
if (hu->oper_speed)
speed = hu->oper_speed;
else if (hu->proto->oper_speed)
speed = hu->proto->oper_speed;
else
speed = 0;
do {
/* Reset the Bluetooth device */
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(lldev->enable_gpio, 0);
@@ -639,20 +632,6 @@ static int ll_setup(struct hci_uart *hu)
return err;
}
if (speed) {
__le32 speed_le = cpu_to_le32(speed);
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = __hci_cmd_sync(hu->hdev,
HCI_VS_UPDATE_UART_HCI_BAUDRATE,
sizeof(speed_le), &speed_le,
HCI_INIT_TIMEOUT);
if (!IS_ERR(skb)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
serdev_device_set_baudrate(serdev, speed);
}
}
err = download_firmware(lldev);
if (!err)
break;
@@ -677,7 +656,25 @@ static int ll_setup(struct hci_uart *hu)
}
/* Operational speed if any */
if (hu->oper_speed)
speed = hu->oper_speed;
else if (hu->proto->oper_speed)
speed = hu->proto->oper_speed;
else
speed = 0;
if (speed) {
__le32 speed_le = cpu_to_le32(speed);
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = __hci_cmd_sync(hu->hdev, HCI_VS_UPDATE_UART_HCI_BAUDRATE,
sizeof(speed_le), &speed_le,
HCI_INIT_TIMEOUT);
if (!IS_ERR(skb)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
serdev_device_set_baudrate(serdev, speed);
}
}
return 0;
}
+6
View File
@@ -933,6 +933,9 @@ static ssize_t show(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, char *buf)
struct freq_attr *fattr = to_attr(attr);
ssize_t ret;
if (!fattr->show)
return -EIO;
down_read(&policy->rwsem);
ret = fattr->show(policy, buf);
up_read(&policy->rwsem);
@@ -947,6 +950,9 @@ static ssize_t store(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
struct freq_attr *fattr = to_attr(attr);
ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
if (!fattr->store)
return -EIO;
/*
* cpus_read_trylock() is used here to work around a circular lock
* dependency problem with respect to the cpufreq_register_driver().
+1
View File
@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_TALITOS
select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
select HW_RANDOM
depends on FSL_SOC
help
+2 -2
View File
@@ -221,9 +221,9 @@ static void eip197_trc_cache_init(struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv)
/* Step #3: Determine log2 of hash table size */
cs_ht_sz = __fls(asize - cs_rc_max) - 2;
/* Step #4: determine current size of hash table in dwords */
cs_ht_wc = 16<<cs_ht_sz; /* dwords, not admin words */
cs_ht_wc = 16 << cs_ht_sz; /* dwords, not admin words */
/* Step #5: add back excess words and see if we can fit more records */
cs_rc_max = min_t(uint, cs_rc_abs_max, asize - (cs_ht_wc >> 4));
cs_rc_max = min_t(uint, cs_rc_abs_max, asize - (cs_ht_wc >> 2));
/* Clear the cache RAMs */
eip197_trc_cache_clear(priv, cs_rc_max, cs_ht_wc);
+45 -6
View File
@@ -211,6 +211,18 @@ static unsigned hid_lookup_collection(struct hid_parser *parser, unsigned type)
return 0; /* we know nothing about this usage type */
}
/*
* Concatenate usage which defines 16 bits or less with the
* currently defined usage page to form a 32 bit usage
*/
static void complete_usage(struct hid_parser *parser, unsigned int index)
{
parser->local.usage[index] &= 0xFFFF;
parser->local.usage[index] |=
(parser->global.usage_page & 0xFFFF) << 16;
}
/*
* Add a usage to the temporary parser table.
*/
@@ -222,6 +234,14 @@ static int hid_add_usage(struct hid_parser *parser, unsigned usage, u8 size)
return -1;
}
parser->local.usage[parser->local.usage_index] = usage;
/*
* If Usage item only includes usage id, concatenate it with
* currently defined usage page
*/
if (size <= 2)
complete_usage(parser, parser->local.usage_index);
parser->local.usage_size[parser->local.usage_index] = size;
parser->local.collection_index[parser->local.usage_index] =
parser->collection_stack_ptr ?
@@ -543,13 +563,32 @@ static int hid_parser_local(struct hid_parser *parser, struct hid_item *item)
* usage value."
*/
static void hid_concatenate_usage_page(struct hid_parser *parser)
static void hid_concatenate_last_usage_page(struct hid_parser *parser)
{
int i;
unsigned int usage_page;
unsigned int current_page;
for (i = 0; i < parser->local.usage_index; i++)
if (parser->local.usage_size[i] <= 2)
parser->local.usage[i] += parser->global.usage_page << 16;
if (!parser->local.usage_index)
return;
usage_page = parser->global.usage_page;
/*
* Concatenate usage page again only if last declared Usage Page
* has not been already used in previous usages concatenation
*/
for (i = parser->local.usage_index - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (parser->local.usage_size[i] > 2)
/* Ignore extended usages */
continue;
current_page = parser->local.usage[i] >> 16;
if (current_page == usage_page)
break;
complete_usage(parser, i);
}
}
/*
@@ -561,7 +600,7 @@ static int hid_parser_main(struct hid_parser *parser, struct hid_item *item)
__u32 data;
int ret;
hid_concatenate_usage_page(parser);
hid_concatenate_last_usage_page(parser);
data = item_udata(item);
@@ -772,7 +811,7 @@ static int hid_scan_main(struct hid_parser *parser, struct hid_item *item)
__u32 data;
int i;
hid_concatenate_usage_page(parser);
hid_concatenate_last_usage_page(parser);
data = item_udata(item);
+3 -6
View File
@@ -2700,21 +2700,18 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
}
ret = -ENOMEM;
cc->io_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd_io/%s",
WQ_HIGHPRI | WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM,
1, devname);
cc->io_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd_io/%s", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 1, devname);
if (!cc->io_queue) {
ti->error = "Couldn't create kcryptd io queue";
goto bad;
}
if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags))
cc->crypt_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd/%s",
WQ_HIGHPRI | WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM,
cc->crypt_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd/%s", WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM,
1, devname);
else
cc->crypt_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd/%s",
WQ_HIGHPRI | WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND,
WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND,
num_online_cpus(), devname);
if (!cc->crypt_queue) {
ti->error = "Couldn't create kcryptd queue";
+1 -1
View File
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static void * r10buf_pool_alloc(gfp_t gfp_flags, void *data)
out_free_pages:
while (--j >= 0)
resync_free_pages(&rps[j * 2]);
resync_free_pages(&rps[j]);
j = 0;
out_free_bio:
@@ -796,7 +796,11 @@ static int vivid_thread_vid_cap(void *data)
if (kthread_should_stop())
break;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
if (!mutex_trylock(&dev->mutex)) {
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
continue;
}
cur_jiffies = jiffies;
if (dev->cap_seq_resync) {
dev->jiffies_vid_cap = cur_jiffies;
@@ -956,8 +960,6 @@ void vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap(struct vivid_dev *dev, bool *pstreaming)
/* shutdown control thread */
vivid_grab_controls(dev, false);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
kthread_stop(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
dev->kthread_vid_cap = NULL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
}
@@ -143,7 +143,11 @@ static int vivid_thread_vid_out(void *data)
if (kthread_should_stop())
break;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
if (!mutex_trylock(&dev->mutex)) {
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
continue;
}
cur_jiffies = jiffies;
if (dev->out_seq_resync) {
dev->jiffies_vid_out = cur_jiffies;
@@ -301,8 +305,6 @@ void vivid_stop_generating_vid_out(struct vivid_dev *dev, bool *pstreaming)
/* shutdown control thread */
vivid_grab_controls(dev, false);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
kthread_stop(dev->kthread_vid_out);
dev->kthread_vid_out = NULL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
}
+5 -3
View File
@@ -141,7 +141,11 @@ static int vivid_thread_sdr_cap(void *data)
if (kthread_should_stop())
break;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
if (!mutex_trylock(&dev->mutex)) {
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
continue;
}
cur_jiffies = jiffies;
if (dev->sdr_cap_seq_resync) {
dev->jiffies_sdr_cap = cur_jiffies;
@@ -303,10 +307,8 @@ static void sdr_cap_stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
}
/* shutdown control thread */
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
kthread_stop(dev->kthread_sdr_cap);
dev->kthread_sdr_cap = NULL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
}
static void sdr_cap_buf_request_complete(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
@@ -223,9 +223,6 @@ static int vid_cap_start_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq, unsigned count)
if (vb2_is_streaming(&dev->vb_vid_out_q))
dev->can_loop_video = vivid_vid_can_loop(dev);
if (dev->kthread_vid_cap)
return 0;
dev->vid_cap_seq_count = 0;
dprintk(dev, 1, "%s\n", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < VIDEO_MAX_FRAME; i++)
@@ -161,9 +161,6 @@ static int vid_out_start_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq, unsigned count)
if (vb2_is_streaming(&dev->vb_vid_cap_q))
dev->can_loop_video = vivid_vid_can_loop(dev);
if (dev->kthread_vid_out)
return 0;
dev->vid_out_seq_count = 0;
dprintk(dev, 1, "%s\n", __func__);
if (dev->start_streaming_error) {
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1598,8 +1598,7 @@ static void imon_incoming_packet(struct imon_context *ictx,
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ictx->kc_lock, flags);
/* send touchscreen events through input subsystem if touchpad data */
if (ictx->display_type == IMON_DISPLAY_TYPE_VGA && len == 8 &&
buf[7] == 0x86) {
if (ictx->touch && len == 8 && buf[7] == 0x86) {
imon_touch_event(ictx, buf);
return;
+98 -43
View File
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static int mceusb_cmd_datasize(u8 cmd, u8 subcmd)
datasize = 4;
break;
case MCE_CMD_G_REVISION:
datasize = 2;
datasize = 4;
break;
case MCE_RSP_EQWAKESUPPORT:
case MCE_RSP_GETWAKESOURCE:
@@ -600,14 +600,9 @@ static void mceusb_dev_printdata(struct mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf, int buf_len,
char *inout;
u8 cmd, subcmd, *data;
struct device *dev = ir->dev;
int start, skip = 0;
u32 carrier, period;
/* skip meaningless 0xb1 0x60 header bytes on orig receiver */
if (ir->flags.microsoft_gen1 && !out && !offset)
skip = 2;
if (len <= skip)
if (offset < 0 || offset >= buf_len)
return;
dev_dbg(dev, "%cx data[%d]: %*ph (len=%d sz=%d)",
@@ -616,11 +611,32 @@ static void mceusb_dev_printdata(struct mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf, int buf_len,
inout = out ? "Request" : "Got";
start = offset + skip;
cmd = buf[start] & 0xff;
subcmd = buf[start + 1] & 0xff;
data = buf + start + 2;
cmd = buf[offset];
subcmd = (offset + 1 < buf_len) ? buf[offset + 1] : 0;
data = &buf[offset] + 2;
/* Trace meaningless 0xb1 0x60 header bytes on original receiver */
if (ir->flags.microsoft_gen1 && !out && !offset) {
dev_dbg(dev, "MCE gen 1 header");
return;
}
/* Trace IR data header or trailer */
if (cmd != MCE_CMD_PORT_IR &&
(cmd & MCE_PORT_MASK) == MCE_COMMAND_IRDATA) {
if (cmd == MCE_IRDATA_TRAILER)
dev_dbg(dev, "End of raw IR data");
else
dev_dbg(dev, "Raw IR data, %d pulse/space samples",
cmd & MCE_PACKET_LENGTH_MASK);
return;
}
/* Unexpected end of buffer? */
if (offset + len > buf_len)
return;
/* Decode MCE command/response */
switch (cmd) {
case MCE_CMD_NULL:
if (subcmd == MCE_CMD_NULL)
@@ -644,7 +660,7 @@ static void mceusb_dev_printdata(struct mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf, int buf_len,
dev_dbg(dev, "Get hw/sw rev?");
else
dev_dbg(dev, "hw/sw rev %*ph",
4, &buf[start + 2]);
4, &buf[offset + 2]);
break;
case MCE_CMD_RESUME:
dev_dbg(dev, "Device resume requested");
@@ -746,13 +762,6 @@ static void mceusb_dev_printdata(struct mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf, int buf_len,
default:
break;
}
if (cmd == MCE_IRDATA_TRAILER)
dev_dbg(dev, "End of raw IR data");
else if ((cmd != MCE_CMD_PORT_IR) &&
((cmd & MCE_PORT_MASK) == MCE_COMMAND_IRDATA))
dev_dbg(dev, "Raw IR data, %d pulse/space samples",
cmd & MCE_PACKET_LENGTH_MASK);
#endif
}
@@ -1136,32 +1145,62 @@ static int mceusb_set_rx_carrier_report(struct rc_dev *dev, int enable)
}
/*
* Handle PORT_SYS/IR command response received from the MCE device.
*
* Assumes single response with all its data (not truncated)
* in buf_in[]. The response itself determines its total length
* (mceusb_cmd_datasize() + 2) and hence the minimum size of buf_in[].
*
* We don't do anything but print debug spew for many of the command bits
* we receive from the hardware, but some of them are useful information
* we want to store so that we can use them.
*/
static void mceusb_handle_command(struct mceusb_dev *ir, int index)
static void mceusb_handle_command(struct mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf_in)
{
u8 cmd = buf_in[0];
u8 subcmd = buf_in[1];
u8 *hi = &buf_in[2]; /* read only when required */
u8 *lo = &buf_in[3]; /* read only when required */
struct ir_raw_event rawir = {};
u8 hi = ir->buf_in[index + 1] & 0xff;
u8 lo = ir->buf_in[index + 2] & 0xff;
u32 carrier_cycles;
u32 cycles_fix;
switch (ir->buf_in[index]) {
/* the one and only 5-byte return value command */
case MCE_RSP_GETPORTSTATUS:
if ((ir->buf_in[index + 4] & 0xff) == 0x00)
ir->txports_cabled |= 1 << hi;
break;
if (cmd == MCE_CMD_PORT_SYS) {
switch (subcmd) {
/* the one and only 5-byte return value command */
case MCE_RSP_GETPORTSTATUS:
if (buf_in[5] == 0)
ir->txports_cabled |= 1 << *hi;
break;
/* 1-byte return value commands */
case MCE_RSP_EQEMVER:
ir->emver = *hi;
break;
/* No return value commands */
case MCE_RSP_CMD_ILLEGAL:
ir->need_reset = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
}
if (cmd != MCE_CMD_PORT_IR)
return;
switch (subcmd) {
/* 2-byte return value commands */
case MCE_RSP_EQIRTIMEOUT:
ir->rc->timeout = US_TO_NS((hi << 8 | lo) * MCE_TIME_UNIT);
ir->rc->timeout = US_TO_NS((*hi << 8 | *lo) * MCE_TIME_UNIT);
break;
case MCE_RSP_EQIRNUMPORTS:
ir->num_txports = hi;
ir->num_rxports = lo;
ir->num_txports = *hi;
ir->num_rxports = *lo;
break;
case MCE_RSP_EQIRRXCFCNT:
/*
@@ -1174,7 +1213,7 @@ static void mceusb_handle_command(struct mceusb_dev *ir, int index)
*/
if (ir->carrier_report_enabled && ir->learning_active &&
ir->pulse_tunit > 0) {
carrier_cycles = (hi << 8 | lo);
carrier_cycles = (*hi << 8 | *lo);
/*
* Adjust carrier cycle count by adding
* 1 missed count per pulse "on"
@@ -1192,24 +1231,24 @@ static void mceusb_handle_command(struct mceusb_dev *ir, int index)
break;
/* 1-byte return value commands */
case MCE_RSP_EQEMVER:
ir->emver = hi;
break;
case MCE_RSP_EQIRTXPORTS:
ir->tx_mask = hi;
ir->tx_mask = *hi;
break;
case MCE_RSP_EQIRRXPORTEN:
ir->learning_active = ((hi & 0x02) == 0x02);
if (ir->rxports_active != hi) {
ir->learning_active = ((*hi & 0x02) == 0x02);
if (ir->rxports_active != *hi) {
dev_info(ir->dev, "%s-range (0x%x) receiver active",
ir->learning_active ? "short" : "long", hi);
ir->rxports_active = hi;
ir->learning_active ? "short" : "long", *hi);
ir->rxports_active = *hi;
}
break;
/* No return value commands */
case MCE_RSP_CMD_ILLEGAL:
case MCE_RSP_TX_TIMEOUT:
ir->need_reset = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
@@ -1235,7 +1274,8 @@ static void mceusb_process_ir_data(struct mceusb_dev *ir, int buf_len)
ir->rem = mceusb_cmd_datasize(ir->cmd, ir->buf_in[i]);
mceusb_dev_printdata(ir, ir->buf_in, buf_len, i - 1,
ir->rem + 2, false);
mceusb_handle_command(ir, i);
if (i + ir->rem < buf_len)
mceusb_handle_command(ir, &ir->buf_in[i - 1]);
ir->parser_state = CMD_DATA;
break;
case PARSE_IRDATA:
@@ -1264,15 +1304,22 @@ static void mceusb_process_ir_data(struct mceusb_dev *ir, int buf_len)
ir->rem--;
break;
case CMD_HEADER:
/* decode mce packets of the form (84),AA,BB,CC,DD */
/* IR data packets can span USB messages - rem */
ir->cmd = ir->buf_in[i];
if ((ir->cmd == MCE_CMD_PORT_IR) ||
((ir->cmd & MCE_PORT_MASK) !=
MCE_COMMAND_IRDATA)) {
/*
* got PORT_SYS, PORT_IR, or unknown
* command response prefix
*/
ir->parser_state = SUBCMD;
continue;
}
/*
* got IR data prefix (0x80 + num_bytes)
* decode MCE packets of the form {0x83, AA, BB, CC}
* IR data packets can span USB messages
*/
ir->rem = (ir->cmd & MCE_PACKET_LENGTH_MASK);
mceusb_dev_printdata(ir, ir->buf_in, buf_len,
i, ir->rem + 1, false);
@@ -1296,6 +1343,14 @@ static void mceusb_process_ir_data(struct mceusb_dev *ir, int buf_len)
if (ir->parser_state != CMD_HEADER && !ir->rem)
ir->parser_state = CMD_HEADER;
}
/*
* Accept IR data spanning multiple rx buffers.
* Reject MCE command response spanning multiple rx buffers.
*/
if (ir->parser_state != PARSE_IRDATA || !ir->rem)
ir->parser_state = CMD_HEADER;
if (event) {
dev_dbg(ir->dev, "processed IR data");
ir_raw_event_handle(ir->rc);
+3
View File
@@ -538,6 +538,9 @@ static int flexcop_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
struct flexcop_device *fc = NULL;
int ret;
if (intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1)
return -ENODEV;
if ((fc = flexcop_device_kmalloc(sizeof(struct flexcop_usb))) == NULL) {
err("out of memory\n");
return -ENOMEM;
+2 -1
View File
@@ -521,7 +521,8 @@ static int cxusb_rc_query(struct dvb_usb_device *d)
{
u8 ircode[4];
cxusb_ctrl_msg(d, CMD_GET_IR_CODE, NULL, 0, ircode, 4);
if (cxusb_ctrl_msg(d, CMD_GET_IR_CODE, NULL, 0, ircode, 4) < 0)
return 0;
if (ircode[2] || ircode[3])
rc_keydown(d->rc_dev, RC_PROTO_NEC,
+24 -5
View File
@@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ static int usbvision_v4l2_open(struct file *file)
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&usbvision->v4l2_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (usbvision->remove_pending) {
err_code = -ENODEV;
goto unlock;
}
if (usbvision->user) {
err_code = -EBUSY;
} else {
@@ -377,6 +381,7 @@ unlock:
static int usbvision_v4l2_close(struct file *file)
{
struct usb_usbvision *usbvision = video_drvdata(file);
int r;
PDEBUG(DBG_IO, "close");
@@ -391,9 +396,10 @@ static int usbvision_v4l2_close(struct file *file)
usbvision_scratch_free(usbvision);
usbvision->user--;
r = usbvision->remove_pending;
mutex_unlock(&usbvision->v4l2_lock);
if (usbvision->remove_pending) {
if (r) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Final disconnect\n", __func__);
usbvision_release(usbvision);
return 0;
@@ -453,6 +459,9 @@ static int vidioc_querycap(struct file *file, void *priv,
{
struct usb_usbvision *usbvision = video_drvdata(file);
if (!usbvision->dev)
return -ENODEV;
strscpy(vc->driver, "USBVision", sizeof(vc->driver));
strscpy(vc->card,
usbvision_device_data[usbvision->dev_model].model_string,
@@ -1061,6 +1070,11 @@ static int usbvision_radio_open(struct file *file)
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&usbvision->v4l2_lock))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (usbvision->remove_pending) {
err_code = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
err_code = v4l2_fh_open(file);
if (err_code)
goto out;
@@ -1093,21 +1107,24 @@ out:
static int usbvision_radio_close(struct file *file)
{
struct usb_usbvision *usbvision = video_drvdata(file);
int r;
PDEBUG(DBG_IO, "");
mutex_lock(&usbvision->v4l2_lock);
/* Set packet size to 0 */
usbvision->iface_alt = 0;
usb_set_interface(usbvision->dev, usbvision->iface,
usbvision->iface_alt);
if (usbvision->dev)
usb_set_interface(usbvision->dev, usbvision->iface,
usbvision->iface_alt);
usbvision_audio_off(usbvision);
usbvision->radio = 0;
usbvision->user--;
r = usbvision->remove_pending;
mutex_unlock(&usbvision->v4l2_lock);
if (usbvision->remove_pending) {
if (r) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Final disconnect\n", __func__);
v4l2_fh_release(file);
usbvision_release(usbvision);
@@ -1539,6 +1556,7 @@ err_usb:
static void usbvision_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct usb_usbvision *usbvision = to_usbvision(usb_get_intfdata(intf));
int u;
PDEBUG(DBG_PROBE, "");
@@ -1555,13 +1573,14 @@ static void usbvision_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
v4l2_device_disconnect(&usbvision->v4l2_dev);
usbvision_i2c_unregister(usbvision);
usbvision->remove_pending = 1; /* Now all ISO data will be ignored */
u = usbvision->user;
usb_put_dev(usbvision->dev);
usbvision->dev = NULL; /* USB device is no more */
mutex_unlock(&usbvision->v4l2_lock);
if (usbvision->user) {
if (u) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: In use, disconnect pending\n",
__func__);
wake_up_interruptible(&usbvision->wait_frame);
+15 -13
View File
@@ -2151,6 +2151,20 @@ static int uvc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
sizeof(dev->name) - len);
}
/* Initialize the media device. */
#ifdef CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER
dev->mdev.dev = &intf->dev;
strscpy(dev->mdev.model, dev->name, sizeof(dev->mdev.model));
if (udev->serial)
strscpy(dev->mdev.serial, udev->serial,
sizeof(dev->mdev.serial));
usb_make_path(udev, dev->mdev.bus_info, sizeof(dev->mdev.bus_info));
dev->mdev.hw_revision = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.bcdDevice);
media_device_init(&dev->mdev);
dev->vdev.mdev = &dev->mdev;
#endif
/* Parse the Video Class control descriptor. */
if (uvc_parse_control(dev) < 0) {
uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_PROBE, "Unable to parse UVC "
@@ -2171,19 +2185,7 @@ static int uvc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
"linux-uvc-devel mailing list.\n");
}
/* Initialize the media device and register the V4L2 device. */
#ifdef CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER
dev->mdev.dev = &intf->dev;
strscpy(dev->mdev.model, dev->name, sizeof(dev->mdev.model));
if (udev->serial)
strscpy(dev->mdev.serial, udev->serial,
sizeof(dev->mdev.serial));
usb_make_path(udev, dev->mdev.bus_info, sizeof(dev->mdev.bus_info));
dev->mdev.hw_revision = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.bcdDevice);
media_device_init(&dev->mdev);
dev->vdev.mdev = &dev->mdev;
#endif
/* Register the V4L2 device. */
if (v4l2_device_register(&intf->dev, &dev->vdev) < 0)
goto error;
+5 -4
View File
@@ -873,15 +873,16 @@ static const struct device_type mei_cl_device_type = {
/**
* mei_cl_bus_set_name - set device name for me client device
* <controller>-<client device>
* Example: 0000:00:16.0-55213584-9a29-4916-badf-0fb7ed682aeb
*
* @cldev: me client device
*/
static inline void mei_cl_bus_set_name(struct mei_cl_device *cldev)
{
dev_set_name(&cldev->dev, "mei:%s:%pUl:%02X",
cldev->name,
mei_me_cl_uuid(cldev->me_cl),
mei_me_cl_ver(cldev->me_cl));
dev_set_name(&cldev->dev, "%s-%pUl",
dev_name(cldev->bus->dev),
mei_me_cl_uuid(cldev->me_cl));
}
/**
+1
View File
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
#define MEI_DEV_ID_CMP_LP 0x02e0 /* Comet Point LP */
#define MEI_DEV_ID_CMP_LP_3 0x02e4 /* Comet Point LP 3 (iTouch) */
#define MEI_DEV_ID_CMP_V 0xA3BA /* Comet Point Lake V */
#define MEI_DEV_ID_ICP_LP 0x34E0 /* Ice Lake Point LP */
+1
View File
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id mei_me_pci_tbl[] = {
{MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_CMP_LP, MEI_ME_PCH12_CFG)},
{MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_CMP_LP_3, MEI_ME_PCH8_CFG)},
{MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_CMP_V, MEI_ME_PCH12_CFG)},
{MEI_PCI_DEVICE(MEI_DEV_ID_ICP_LP, MEI_ME_PCH12_CFG)},
+5 -5
View File
@@ -594,15 +594,15 @@ static int sja1105_parse_rgmii_delays(struct sja1105_private *priv,
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SJA1105_NUM_PORTS; i++) {
if (ports->role == XMII_MAC)
if (ports[i].role == XMII_MAC)
continue;
if (ports->phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_RXID ||
ports->phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_ID)
if (ports[i].phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_RXID ||
ports[i].phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_ID)
priv->rgmii_rx_delay[i] = true;
if (ports->phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_TXID ||
ports->phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_ID)
if (ports[i].phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_TXID ||
ports[i].phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_ID)
priv->rgmii_tx_delay[i] = true;
if ((priv->rgmii_rx_delay[i] || priv->rgmii_tx_delay[i]) &&
+1
View File
@@ -4392,6 +4392,7 @@ static int macb_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
mdiobus_free(bp->mii_bus);
unregister_netdev(dev);
tasklet_kill(&bp->hresp_err_tasklet);
pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev);
if (!pm_runtime_suspended(&pdev->dev)) {
+2 -1
View File
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static int gve_alloc_queue_page_list(struct gve_priv *priv, u32 id,
}
qpl->id = id;
qpl->num_entries = pages;
qpl->num_entries = 0;
qpl->pages = kvzalloc(pages * sizeof(*qpl->pages), GFP_KERNEL);
/* caller handles clean up */
if (!qpl->pages)
@@ -562,6 +562,7 @@ static int gve_alloc_queue_page_list(struct gve_priv *priv, u32 id,
/* caller handles clean up */
if (err)
return -ENOMEM;
qpl->num_entries++;
}
priv->num_registered_pages += pages;
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1516,6 +1516,7 @@ static void __rtl8169_set_wol(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 wolopts)
rtl_lock_config_regs(tp);
device_set_wakeup_enable(tp_to_dev(tp), wolopts);
tp->dev->wol_enabled = wolopts ? 1 : 0;
}
static int rtl8169_set_wol(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_wolinfo *wol)
@@ -4118,7 +4119,7 @@ static void rtl_hw_jumbo_enable(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_27 ... RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_28:
r8168dp_hw_jumbo_enable(tp);
break;
case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_31 ... RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_34:
case RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_31 ... RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_33:
r8168e_hw_jumbo_enable(tp);
break;
default:
+2 -1
View File
@@ -359,10 +359,11 @@ static void macvlan_broadcast_enqueue(struct macvlan_port *port,
}
spin_unlock(&port->bc_queue.lock);
schedule_work(&port->bc_work);
if (err)
goto free_nskb;
schedule_work(&port->bc_work);
return;
free_nskb:
+4 -2
View File
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ static int mdiobus_register_reset(struct mdio_device *mdiodev)
struct reset_control *reset = NULL;
if (mdiodev->dev.of_node)
reset = devm_reset_control_get_exclusive(&mdiodev->dev,
"phy");
reset = of_reset_control_get_exclusive(mdiodev->dev.of_node,
"phy");
if (IS_ERR(reset)) {
if (PTR_ERR(reset) == -ENOENT || PTR_ERR(reset) == -ENOTSUPP)
reset = NULL;
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ int mdiobus_unregister_device(struct mdio_device *mdiodev)
if (mdiodev->bus->mdio_map[mdiodev->addr] != mdiodev)
return -EINVAL;
reset_control_put(mdiodev->reset_ctrl);
mdiodev->bus->mdio_map[mdiodev->addr] = NULL;
return 0;
+1
View File
@@ -855,6 +855,7 @@ err_free_chan:
sl->tty = NULL;
tty->disc_data = NULL;
clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
sl_free_netdev(sl->dev);
free_netdev(sl->dev);
err_exit:
+25 -11
View File
@@ -3490,7 +3490,7 @@ static int ath10k_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
struct ath10k_pci *ar_pci;
enum ath10k_hw_rev hw_rev;
struct ath10k_bus_params bus_params = {};
bool pci_ps;
bool pci_ps, is_qca988x = false;
int (*pci_soft_reset)(struct ath10k *ar);
int (*pci_hard_reset)(struct ath10k *ar);
u32 (*targ_cpu_to_ce_addr)(struct ath10k *ar, u32 addr);
@@ -3500,6 +3500,7 @@ static int ath10k_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
case QCA988X_2_0_DEVICE_ID:
hw_rev = ATH10K_HW_QCA988X;
pci_ps = false;
is_qca988x = true;
pci_soft_reset = ath10k_pci_warm_reset;
pci_hard_reset = ath10k_pci_qca988x_chip_reset;
targ_cpu_to_ce_addr = ath10k_pci_qca988x_targ_cpu_to_ce_addr;
@@ -3619,25 +3620,34 @@ static int ath10k_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
goto err_deinit_irq;
}
bus_params.dev_type = ATH10K_DEV_TYPE_LL;
bus_params.link_can_suspend = true;
/* Read CHIP_ID before reset to catch QCA9880-AR1A v1 devices that
* fall off the bus during chip_reset. These chips have the same pci
* device id as the QCA9880 BR4A or 2R4E. So that's why the check.
*/
if (is_qca988x) {
bus_params.chip_id =
ath10k_pci_soc_read32(ar, SOC_CHIP_ID_ADDRESS);
if (bus_params.chip_id != 0xffffffff) {
if (!ath10k_pci_chip_is_supported(pdev->device,
bus_params.chip_id))
goto err_unsupported;
}
}
ret = ath10k_pci_chip_reset(ar);
if (ret) {
ath10k_err(ar, "failed to reset chip: %d\n", ret);
goto err_free_irq;
}
bus_params.dev_type = ATH10K_DEV_TYPE_LL;
bus_params.link_can_suspend = true;
bus_params.chip_id = ath10k_pci_soc_read32(ar, SOC_CHIP_ID_ADDRESS);
if (bus_params.chip_id == 0xffffffff) {
ath10k_err(ar, "failed to get chip id\n");
goto err_free_irq;
}
if (bus_params.chip_id == 0xffffffff)
goto err_unsupported;
if (!ath10k_pci_chip_is_supported(pdev->device, bus_params.chip_id)) {
ath10k_err(ar, "device %04x with chip_id %08x isn't supported\n",
pdev->device, bus_params.chip_id);
if (!ath10k_pci_chip_is_supported(pdev->device, bus_params.chip_id))
goto err_free_irq;
}
ret = ath10k_core_register(ar, &bus_params);
if (ret) {
@@ -3647,6 +3657,10 @@ static int ath10k_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
return 0;
err_unsupported:
ath10k_err(ar, "device %04x with chip_id %08x isn't supported\n",
pdev->device, bus_params.chip_id);
err_free_irq:
ath10k_pci_free_irq(ar);
ath10k_pci_rx_retry_sync(ar);
+10 -3
View File
@@ -581,22 +581,29 @@ static int ath10k_qmi_host_cap_send_sync(struct ath10k_qmi *qmi)
{
struct wlfw_host_cap_resp_msg_v01 resp = {};
struct wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01 req = {};
struct qmi_elem_info *req_ei;
struct ath10k *ar = qmi->ar;
struct ath10k_snoc *ar_snoc = ath10k_snoc_priv(ar);
struct qmi_txn txn;
int ret;
req.daemon_support_valid = 1;
req.daemon_support = 0;
ret = qmi_txn_init(&qmi->qmi_hdl, &txn,
wlfw_host_cap_resp_msg_v01_ei, &resp);
ret = qmi_txn_init(&qmi->qmi_hdl, &txn, wlfw_host_cap_resp_msg_v01_ei,
&resp);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (test_bit(ATH10K_SNOC_FLAG_8BIT_HOST_CAP_QUIRK, &ar_snoc->flags))
req_ei = wlfw_host_cap_8bit_req_msg_v01_ei;
else
req_ei = wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01_ei;
ret = qmi_send_request(&qmi->qmi_hdl, NULL, &txn,
QMI_WLFW_HOST_CAP_REQ_V01,
WLFW_HOST_CAP_REQ_MSG_V01_MAX_MSG_LEN,
wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01_ei, &req);
req_ei, &req);
if (ret < 0) {
qmi_txn_cancel(&txn);
ath10k_err(ar, "failed to send host capability request: %d\n", ret);
@@ -1988,6 +1988,28 @@ struct qmi_elem_info wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01_ei[] = {
{}
};
struct qmi_elem_info wlfw_host_cap_8bit_req_msg_v01_ei[] = {
{
.data_type = QMI_OPT_FLAG,
.elem_len = 1,
.elem_size = sizeof(u8),
.array_type = NO_ARRAY,
.tlv_type = 0x10,
.offset = offsetof(struct wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01,
daemon_support_valid),
},
{
.data_type = QMI_UNSIGNED_1_BYTE,
.elem_len = 1,
.elem_size = sizeof(u8),
.array_type = NO_ARRAY,
.tlv_type = 0x10,
.offset = offsetof(struct wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01,
daemon_support),
},
{}
};
struct qmi_elem_info wlfw_host_cap_resp_msg_v01_ei[] = {
{
.data_type = QMI_STRUCT,
@@ -575,6 +575,7 @@ struct wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01 {
#define WLFW_HOST_CAP_REQ_MSG_V01_MAX_MSG_LEN 189
extern struct qmi_elem_info wlfw_host_cap_req_msg_v01_ei[];
extern struct qmi_elem_info wlfw_host_cap_8bit_req_msg_v01_ei[];
struct wlfw_host_cap_resp_msg_v01 {
struct qmi_response_type_v01 resp;
+11
View File
@@ -1261,6 +1261,15 @@ out:
return ret;
}
static void ath10k_snoc_quirks_init(struct ath10k *ar)
{
struct ath10k_snoc *ar_snoc = ath10k_snoc_priv(ar);
struct device *dev = &ar_snoc->dev->dev;
if (of_property_read_bool(dev->of_node, "qcom,snoc-host-cap-8bit-quirk"))
set_bit(ATH10K_SNOC_FLAG_8BIT_HOST_CAP_QUIRK, &ar_snoc->flags);
}
int ath10k_snoc_fw_indication(struct ath10k *ar, u64 type)
{
struct ath10k_snoc *ar_snoc = ath10k_snoc_priv(ar);
@@ -1678,6 +1687,8 @@ static int ath10k_snoc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
ar->ce_priv = &ar_snoc->ce;
msa_size = drv_data->msa_size;
ath10k_snoc_quirks_init(ar);
ret = ath10k_snoc_resource_init(ar);
if (ret) {
ath10k_warn(ar, "failed to initialize resource: %d\n", ret);
+1
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum ath10k_snoc_flags {
ATH10K_SNOC_FLAG_REGISTERED,
ATH10K_SNOC_FLAG_UNREGISTERING,
ATH10K_SNOC_FLAG_RECOVERY,
ATH10K_SNOC_FLAG_8BIT_HOST_CAP_QUIRK,
};
struct ath10k_snoc {
+8
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ ath10k_usb_alloc_urb_from_pipe(struct ath10k_usb_pipe *pipe)
struct ath10k_urb_context *urb_context = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
/* bail if this pipe is not initialized */
if (!pipe->ar_usb)
return NULL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pipe->ar_usb->cs_lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&pipe->urb_list_head)) {
urb_context = list_first_entry(&pipe->urb_list_head,
@@ -55,6 +59,10 @@ static void ath10k_usb_free_urb_to_pipe(struct ath10k_usb_pipe *pipe,
{
unsigned long flags;
/* bail if this pipe is not initialized */
if (!pipe->ar_usb)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pipe->ar_usb->cs_lock, flags);
pipe->urb_cnt++;
@@ -4183,7 +4183,7 @@ static void ar9003_hw_thermometer_apply(struct ath_hw *ah)
static void ar9003_hw_thermo_cal_apply(struct ath_hw *ah)
{
u32 data, ko, kg;
u32 data = 0, ko, kg;
if (!AR_SREV_9462_20_OR_LATER(ah))
return;
+5 -5
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct bios_args {
u32 command;
u32 commandtype;
u32 datasize;
u32 data;
u8 data[128];
};
enum hp_wmi_commandtype {
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static int hp_wmi_perform_query(int query, enum hp_wmi_command command,
.command = command,
.commandtype = query,
.datasize = insize,
.data = 0,
.data = { 0 },
};
struct acpi_buffer input = { sizeof(struct bios_args), &args };
struct acpi_buffer output = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int hp_wmi_perform_query(int query, enum hp_wmi_command command,
if (WARN_ON(insize > sizeof(args.data)))
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&args.data, buffer, insize);
memcpy(&args.data[0], buffer, insize);
wmi_evaluate_method(HPWMI_BIOS_GUID, 0, mid, &input, &output);
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int hp_wmi_rfkill2_refresh(void)
int err, i;
err = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_WIRELESS2_QUERY, HPWMI_READ, &state,
0, sizeof(state));
sizeof(state), sizeof(state));
if (err)
return err;
@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ static int __init hp_wmi_rfkill2_setup(struct platform_device *device)
int err, i;
err = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_WIRELESS2_QUERY, HPWMI_READ, &state,
0, sizeof(state));
sizeof(state), sizeof(state));
if (err)
return err < 0 ? err : -EINVAL;
+14 -7
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
/*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2014 Bernd Porr, mail@berndporr.me.uk
* Copyright (C) 2004-2019 Bernd Porr, mail@berndporr.me.uk
*/
/*
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* Description: University of Stirling USB DAQ & INCITE Technology Limited
* Devices: [ITL] USB-DUX-FAST (usbduxfast)
* Author: Bernd Porr <mail@berndporr.me.uk>
* Updated: 10 Oct 2014
* Updated: 16 Nov 2019
* Status: stable
*/
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
*
*
* Revision history:
* 1.0: Fixed a rounding error in usbduxfast_ai_cmdtest
* 0.9: Dropping the first data packet which seems to be from the last transfer.
* Buffer overflows in the FX2 are handed over to comedi.
* 0.92: Dropping now 4 packets. The quad buffer has to be emptied.
@@ -350,6 +351,7 @@ static int usbduxfast_ai_cmdtest(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_cmd *cmd)
{
int err = 0;
int err2 = 0;
unsigned int steps;
unsigned int arg;
@@ -399,11 +401,16 @@ static int usbduxfast_ai_cmdtest(struct comedi_device *dev,
*/
steps = (cmd->convert_arg * 30) / 1000;
if (cmd->chanlist_len != 1)
err |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_min(&steps,
MIN_SAMPLING_PERIOD);
err |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_max(&steps, MAX_SAMPLING_PERIOD);
arg = (steps * 1000) / 30;
err |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_is(&cmd->convert_arg, arg);
err2 |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_min(&steps,
MIN_SAMPLING_PERIOD);
else
err2 |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_min(&steps, 1);
err2 |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_max(&steps, MAX_SAMPLING_PERIOD);
if (err2) {
err |= err2;
arg = (steps * 1000) / 30;
err |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_is(&cmd->convert_arg, arg);
}
if (cmd->stop_src == TRIG_COUNT)
err |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_min(&cmd->stop_arg, 1);
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1616,14 +1616,15 @@ static void _rtl92e_hard_data_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
memcpy((unsigned char *)(skb->cb), &dev, sizeof(dev));
skb_push(skb, priv->rtllib->tx_headroom);
ret = _rtl92e_tx(dev, skb);
if (ret != 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
if (queue_index != MGNT_QUEUE) {
priv->rtllib->stats.tx_bytes += (skb->len -
priv->rtllib->tx_headroom);
priv->rtllib->stats.tx_packets++;
}
if (ret != 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
static int _rtl92e_hard_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+1 -6
View File
@@ -18,18 +18,13 @@
static const struct sdio_device_id sdio_ids[] =
{
{ SDIO_DEVICE(0x024c, 0x0523), },
{ SDIO_DEVICE(0x024c, 0x0525), },
{ SDIO_DEVICE(0x024c, 0x0623), },
{ SDIO_DEVICE(0x024c, 0x0626), },
{ SDIO_DEVICE(0x024c, 0xb723), },
{ /* end: all zeroes */ },
};
static const struct acpi_device_id acpi_ids[] = {
{"OBDA8723", 0x0000},
{}
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(sdio, sdio_ids);
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, acpi_ids);
static int rtw_drv_init(struct sdio_func *func, const struct sdio_device_id *id);
static void rtw_dev_remove(struct sdio_func *func);
+14 -9
View File
@@ -477,16 +477,21 @@ void *wilc_parse_join_bss_param(struct cfg80211_bss *bss,
memcpy(&param->supp_rates[1], rates_ie + 2, rates_len);
}
supp_rates_ie = cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES, ies->data,
ies->len);
if (supp_rates_ie) {
if (supp_rates_ie[1] > (WILC_MAX_RATES_SUPPORTED - rates_len))
param->supp_rates[0] = WILC_MAX_RATES_SUPPORTED;
else
param->supp_rates[0] += supp_rates_ie[1];
if (rates_len < WILC_MAX_RATES_SUPPORTED) {
supp_rates_ie = cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES,
ies->data, ies->len);
if (supp_rates_ie) {
u8 ext_rates = supp_rates_ie[1];
memcpy(&param->supp_rates[rates_len + 1], supp_rates_ie + 2,
(param->supp_rates[0] - rates_len));
if (ext_rates > (WILC_MAX_RATES_SUPPORTED - rates_len))
param->supp_rates[0] = WILC_MAX_RATES_SUPPORTED;
else
param->supp_rates[0] += ext_rates;
memcpy(&param->supp_rates[rates_len + 1],
supp_rates_ie + 2,
(param->supp_rates[0] - rates_len));
}
}
ht_ie = cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY, ies->data, ies->len);
+42 -12
View File
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int nvm_validate_and_write(struct tb_switch *sw)
static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw)
{
int ret;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Root switch NVM upgrade requires that we disconnect the
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw)
* already).
*/
if (!sw->safe_mode) {
u32 status;
ret = tb_domain_disconnect_all_paths(sw->tb);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -184,7 +186,16 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw)
* everything goes well so getting timeout is expected.
*/
ret = dma_port_flash_update_auth(sw->dma_port);
return ret == -ETIMEDOUT ? 0 : ret;
if (!ret || ret == -ETIMEDOUT)
return 0;
/*
* Any error from update auth operation requires power
* cycling of the host router.
*/
tb_sw_warn(sw, "failed to authenticate NVM, power cycling\n");
if (dma_port_flash_update_auth_status(sw->dma_port, &status) > 0)
nvm_set_auth_status(sw, status);
}
/*
@@ -192,7 +203,7 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_host(struct tb_switch *sw)
* switch.
*/
dma_port_power_cycle(sw->dma_port);
return 0;
return ret;
}
static int nvm_authenticate_device(struct tb_switch *sw)
@@ -200,8 +211,16 @@ static int nvm_authenticate_device(struct tb_switch *sw)
int ret, retries = 10;
ret = dma_port_flash_update_auth(sw->dma_port);
if (ret && ret != -ETIMEDOUT)
switch (ret) {
case 0:
case -ETIMEDOUT:
case -EACCES:
case -EINVAL:
/* Power cycle is required */
break;
default:
return ret;
}
/*
* Poll here for the authentication status. It takes some time
@@ -1246,8 +1265,6 @@ static ssize_t nvm_authenticate_store(struct device *dev,
*/
nvm_authenticate_start(sw);
ret = nvm_authenticate_host(sw);
if (ret)
nvm_authenticate_complete(sw);
} else {
ret = nvm_authenticate_device(sw);
}
@@ -1690,13 +1707,16 @@ static int tb_switch_add_dma_port(struct tb_switch *sw)
int ret;
switch (sw->generation) {
case 3:
break;
case 2:
/* Only root switch can be upgraded */
if (tb_route(sw))
return 0;
/* fallthrough */
case 3:
ret = tb_switch_set_uuid(sw);
if (ret)
return ret;
break;
default:
@@ -1720,6 +1740,19 @@ static int tb_switch_add_dma_port(struct tb_switch *sw)
if (sw->no_nvm_upgrade)
return 0;
/*
* If there is status already set then authentication failed
* when the dma_port_flash_update_auth() returned. Power cycling
* is not needed (it was done already) so only thing we do here
* is to unblock runtime PM of the root port.
*/
nvm_get_auth_status(sw, &status);
if (status) {
if (!tb_route(sw))
nvm_authenticate_complete(sw);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check status of the previous flash authentication. If there
* is one we need to power cycle the switch in any case to make
@@ -1735,9 +1768,6 @@ static int tb_switch_add_dma_port(struct tb_switch *sw)
if (status) {
tb_sw_info(sw, "switch flash authentication failed\n");
ret = tb_switch_set_uuid(sw);
if (ret)
return ret;
nvm_set_auth_status(sw, status);
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ int dwc2_core_reset(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg, bool skip_wait)
greset |= GRSTCTL_CSFTRST;
dwc2_writel(hsotg, greset, GRSTCTL);
if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_clear(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_CSFTRST, 50)) {
if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_clear(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_CSFTRST, 10000)) {
dev_warn(hsotg->dev, "%s: HANG! Soft Reset timeout GRSTCTL GRSTCTL_CSFTRST\n",
__func__);
return -EBUSY;
+7 -1
View File
@@ -164,7 +164,12 @@ static int appledisplay_bl_get_brightness(struct backlight_device *bd)
0,
pdata->msgdata, 2,
ACD_USB_TIMEOUT);
brightness = pdata->msgdata[1];
if (retval < 2) {
if (retval >= 0)
retval = -EMSGSIZE;
} else {
brightness = pdata->msgdata[1];
}
mutex_unlock(&pdata->sysfslock);
if (retval < 0)
@@ -299,6 +304,7 @@ error:
if (pdata) {
if (pdata->urb) {
usb_kill_urb(pdata->urb);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&pdata->work);
if (pdata->urbdata)
usb_free_coherent(pdata->udev, ACD_URB_BUFFER_LEN,
pdata->urbdata, pdata->urb->transfer_dma);
+21 -3
View File
@@ -384,13 +384,17 @@ static int _chaoskey_fill(struct chaoskey *dev)
!dev->reading,
(started ? NAK_TIMEOUT : ALEA_FIRST_TIMEOUT) );
if (result < 0)
if (result < 0) {
usb_kill_urb(dev->urb);
goto out;
}
if (result == 0)
if (result == 0) {
result = -ETIMEDOUT;
else
usb_kill_urb(dev->urb);
} else {
result = dev->valid;
}
out:
/* Let the device go back to sleep eventually */
usb_autopm_put_interface(dev->interface);
@@ -526,7 +530,21 @@ static int chaoskey_suspend(struct usb_interface *interface,
static int chaoskey_resume(struct usb_interface *interface)
{
struct chaoskey *dev;
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
usb_dbg(interface, "resume");
dev = usb_get_intfdata(interface);
/*
* We may have lost power.
* In that case the device that needs a long time
* for the first requests needs an extended timeout
* again
*/
if (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idVendor) == ALEA_VENDOR_ID)
dev->reads_started = false;
return 0;
}
#else
+1
View File
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8341) }, /* Siemens MC35PU GPRS Modem */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8382) }, /* Cygnal Integrated Products, Inc. */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x83A8) }, /* Amber Wireless AMB2560 */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x83AA) }, /* Mark-10 Digital Force Gauge */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x83D8) }, /* DekTec DTA Plus VHF/UHF Booster/Attenuator */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8411) }, /* Kyocera GPS Module */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8418) }, /* IRZ Automation Teleport SG-10 GSM/GPRS Modem */
+3
View File
@@ -1033,6 +1033,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
/* Sienna devices */
{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_SIENNA_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(ECHELON_VID, ECHELON_U20_PID) },
/* U-Blox devices */
{ USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ZED_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ODIN_PID) },
{ } /* Terminating entry */
};
+7
View File
@@ -1558,3 +1558,10 @@
*/
#define UNJO_VID 0x22B7
#define UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID 0x150D
/*
* U-Blox products (http://www.u-blox.com).
*/
#define UBLOX_VID 0x1546
#define UBLOX_C099F9P_ZED_PID 0x0502
#define UBLOX_C099F9P_ODIN_PID 0x0503
-4
View File
@@ -1833,10 +1833,6 @@ static int mos7720_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
product = le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct);
dev = serial->dev;
/* setting configuration feature to one */
usb_control_msg(serial->dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(serial->dev, 0),
(__u8)0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, NULL, 0x00, 5000);
if (product == MOSCHIP_DEVICE_ID_7715) {
struct urb *urb = serial->port[0]->interrupt_in_urb;
+11 -5
View File
@@ -119,11 +119,15 @@
/* This driver also supports
* ATEN UC2324 device using Moschip MCS7840
* ATEN UC2322 device using Moschip MCS7820
* MOXA UPort 2210 device using Moschip MCS7820
*/
#define USB_VENDOR_ID_ATENINTL 0x0557
#define ATENINTL_DEVICE_ID_UC2324 0x2011
#define ATENINTL_DEVICE_ID_UC2322 0x7820
#define USB_VENDOR_ID_MOXA 0x110a
#define MOXA_DEVICE_ID_2210 0x2210
/* Interrupt Routine Defines */
#define SERIAL_IIR_RLS 0x06
@@ -195,6 +199,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_BANDB, BANDB_DEVICE_ID_USOPTL2_4)},
{USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ATENINTL, ATENINTL_DEVICE_ID_UC2324)},
{USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ATENINTL, ATENINTL_DEVICE_ID_UC2322)},
{USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_MOXA, MOXA_DEVICE_ID_2210)},
{} /* terminating entry */
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, id_table);
@@ -2020,6 +2025,7 @@ static int mos7840_probe(struct usb_serial *serial,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
u16 product = le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct);
u16 vid = le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor);
u8 *buf;
int device_type;
@@ -2030,6 +2036,11 @@ static int mos7840_probe(struct usb_serial *serial,
goto out;
}
if (vid == USB_VENDOR_ID_MOXA && product == MOXA_DEVICE_ID_2210) {
device_type = MOSCHIP_DEVICE_ID_7820;
goto out;
}
buf = kzalloc(VENDOR_READ_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2279,11 +2290,6 @@ out:
goto error;
} else
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "ZLP_REG5 Writing success status%d\n", status);
/* setting configuration feature to one */
usb_control_msg(serial->dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(serial->dev, 0),
0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, NULL, 0x00,
MOS_WDR_TIMEOUT);
}
return 0;
error:
+7
View File
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb);
#define DELL_PRODUCT_5804_MINICARD_ATT 0x819b /* Novatel E371 */
#define DELL_PRODUCT_5821E 0x81d7
#define DELL_PRODUCT_5821E_ESIM 0x81e0
#define KYOCERA_VENDOR_ID 0x0c88
#define KYOCERA_PRODUCT_KPC650 0x17da
@@ -1044,6 +1045,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5804_MINICARD_ATT, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
{ USB_DEVICE(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5821E),
.driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(6) },
{ USB_DEVICE(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5821E_ESIM),
.driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(6) },
{ USB_DEVICE(ANYDATA_VENDOR_ID, ANYDATA_PRODUCT_ADU_E100A) }, /* ADU-E100, ADU-310 */
{ USB_DEVICE(ANYDATA_VENDOR_ID, ANYDATA_PRODUCT_ADU_500A) },
{ USB_DEVICE(ANYDATA_VENDOR_ID, ANYDATA_PRODUCT_ADU_620UW) },
@@ -1990,6 +1993,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x13) },
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x14) },
{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x03f0, 0xa31d, 0xff, 0x06, 0x1b) },
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0489, 0xe0b4), /* Foxconn T77W968 */
.driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(6) },
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0489, 0xe0b5), /* Foxconn T77W968 ESIM */
.driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(6) },
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1508, 0x1001), /* Fibocom NL668 */
.driver_info = RSVD(4) | RSVD(5) | RSVD(6) },
{ USB_DEVICE(0x2cb7, 0x0104), /* Fibocom NL678 series */
+1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config USBIP_CORE
tristate "USB/IP support"
depends on NET
select USB_COMMON
select SGL_ALLOC
---help---
This enables pushing USB packets over IP to allow remote
machines direct access to USB devices. It provides the
+32 -18
View File
@@ -470,18 +470,50 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct stub_device *sdev,
if (pipe == -1)
return;
/*
* Smatch reported the error case where use_sg is true and buf_len is 0.
* In this case, It adds SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC and stub_priv will be
* released by stub event handler and connection will be shut down.
*/
priv = stub_priv_alloc(sdev, pdu);
if (!priv)
return;
buf_len = (unsigned long long)pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
if (use_sg && !buf_len) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "sg buffer with zero length\n");
goto err_malloc;
}
/* allocate urb transfer buffer, if needed */
if (buf_len) {
if (use_sg) {
sgl = sgl_alloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL, &nents);
if (!sgl)
goto err_malloc;
/* Check if the server's HCD supports SG */
if (!udev->bus->sg_tablesize) {
/*
* If the server's HCD doesn't support SG, break
* a single SG request into several URBs and map
* each SG list entry to corresponding URB
* buffer. The previously allocated SG list is
* stored in priv->sgl (If the server's HCD
* support SG, SG list is stored only in
* urb->sg) and it is used as an indicator that
* the server split single SG request into
* several URBs. Later, priv->sgl is used by
* stub_complete() and stub_send_ret_submit() to
* reassemble the divied URBs.
*/
support_sg = 0;
num_urbs = nents;
priv->completed_urbs = 0;
pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_flags &=
~URB_DMA_MAP_SG;
}
} else {
buffer = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
@@ -489,24 +521,6 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct stub_device *sdev,
}
}
/* Check if the server's HCD supports SG */
if (use_sg && !udev->bus->sg_tablesize) {
/*
* If the server's HCD doesn't support SG, break a single SG
* request into several URBs and map each SG list entry to
* corresponding URB buffer. The previously allocated SG
* list is stored in priv->sgl (If the server's HCD support SG,
* SG list is stored only in urb->sg) and it is used as an
* indicator that the server split single SG request into
* several URBs. Later, priv->sgl is used by stub_complete() and
* stub_send_ret_submit() to reassemble the divied URBs.
*/
support_sg = 0;
num_urbs = nents;
priv->completed_urbs = 0;
pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_flags &= ~URB_DMA_MAP_SG;
}
/* allocate urb array */
priv->num_urbs = num_urbs;
priv->urbs = kmalloc_array(num_urbs, sizeof(*priv->urbs), GFP_KERNEL);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
/* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
tsk = current;
old_mm = current->mm;
mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
if (old_mm) {
sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
+15
View File
@@ -5912,8 +5912,23 @@ static int __ext4_expand_extra_isize(struct inode *inode,
{
struct ext4_inode *raw_inode;
struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header *header;
unsigned int inode_size = EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb);
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
int error;
/* this was checked at iget time, but double check for good measure */
if ((EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize > inode_size) ||
(ei->i_extra_isize & 3)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad extra_isize %u (inode size %u)",
ei->i_extra_isize,
EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb));
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if ((new_extra_isize < ei->i_extra_isize) ||
(new_extra_isize < 4) ||
(new_extra_isize > inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL; /* Should never happen */
raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(iloc);
header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode);
+12 -9
View File
@@ -3555,12 +3555,15 @@ static void ext4_clamp_want_extra_isize(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
unsigned def_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
sbi->s_want_extra_isize == 0) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (sbi->s_inode_size == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = 0;
return;
}
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize < 4) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = def_extra_isize;
if (ext4_has_feature_extra_isize(sb)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
@@ -3573,10 +3576,10 @@ static void ext4_clamp_want_extra_isize(struct super_block *sb)
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if ((sbi->s_want_extra_isize > sbi->s_inode_size) ||
(EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size)) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = def_extra_isize;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"required extra inode space not available");
}
+22 -1
View File
@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ struct io_ring_ctx {
struct user_struct *user;
struct cred *creds;
struct completion ctx_done;
struct {
@@ -1752,8 +1754,11 @@ static void io_poll_complete_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct io_poll_iocb *poll = &req->poll;
struct poll_table_struct pt = { ._key = poll->events };
struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx;
const struct cred *old_cred;
__poll_t mask = 0;
old_cred = override_creds(ctx->creds);
if (!READ_ONCE(poll->canceled))
mask = vfs_poll(poll->file, &pt) & poll->events;
@@ -1768,7 +1773,7 @@ static void io_poll_complete_work(struct work_struct *work)
if (!mask && !READ_ONCE(poll->canceled)) {
add_wait_queue(poll->head, &poll->wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->completion_lock);
return;
goto out;
}
list_del_init(&req->list);
io_poll_complete(ctx, req, mask);
@@ -1776,6 +1781,8 @@ static void io_poll_complete_work(struct work_struct *work)
io_cqring_ev_posted(ctx);
io_put_req(req);
out:
revert_creds(old_cred);
}
static int io_poll_wake(struct wait_queue_entry *wait, unsigned mode, int sync,
@@ -2147,10 +2154,12 @@ static void io_sq_wq_submit_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx;
struct mm_struct *cur_mm = NULL;
struct async_list *async_list;
const struct cred *old_cred;
LIST_HEAD(req_list);
mm_segment_t old_fs;
int ret;
old_cred = override_creds(ctx->creds);
async_list = io_async_list_from_sqe(ctx, req->submit.sqe);
restart:
do {
@@ -2258,6 +2267,7 @@ out:
unuse_mm(cur_mm);
mmput(cur_mm);
}
revert_creds(old_cred);
}
/*
@@ -2663,6 +2673,7 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data)
{
struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = data;
struct mm_struct *cur_mm = NULL;
const struct cred *old_cred;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
unsigned inflight;
@@ -2672,6 +2683,7 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data)
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(USER_DS);
old_cred = override_creds(ctx->creds);
timeout = inflight = 0;
while (!kthread_should_park()) {
@@ -2782,6 +2794,7 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data)
unuse_mm(cur_mm);
mmput(cur_mm);
}
revert_creds(old_cred);
kthread_parkme();
@@ -3567,6 +3580,8 @@ static void io_ring_ctx_free(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
io_unaccount_mem(ctx->user,
ring_pages(ctx->sq_entries, ctx->cq_entries));
free_uid(ctx->user);
if (ctx->creds)
put_cred(ctx->creds);
kfree(ctx);
}
@@ -3838,6 +3853,12 @@ static int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p)
ctx->account_mem = account_mem;
ctx->user = user;
ctx->creds = prepare_creds();
if (!ctx->creds) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
ret = io_allocate_scq_urings(ctx, p);
if (ret)
goto err;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int jffs2_add_frag_to_fragtree(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct rb_root *r
lastend = this->ofs + this->size;
} else {
dbg_fragtree2("lookup gave no frag\n");
return -EINVAL;
lastend = 0;
}
/* See if we ran off the end of the fragtree */
-2
View File
@@ -410,8 +410,6 @@ struct compat_kexec_segment;
struct compat_mq_attr;
struct compat_msgbuf;
extern void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
#define BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG (8*sizeof(compat_long_t))
#define BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bits) DIV_ROUND_UP(bits, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG)
+27 -13
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_FUTEX_H
#define _LINUX_FUTEX_H
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ktime.h>
#include <uapi/linux/futex.h>
struct inode;
@@ -48,15 +50,35 @@ union futex_key {
#define FUTEX_KEY_INIT (union futex_key) { .both = { .ptr = NULL } }
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
extern void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
enum {
FUTEX_STATE_OK,
FUTEX_STATE_EXITING,
FUTEX_STATE_DEAD,
};
static inline void futex_init_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsk->pi_state_list);
tsk->pi_state_cache = NULL;
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_OK;
mutex_init(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
}
void futex_exit_recursive(struct task_struct *tsk);
void futex_exit_release(struct task_struct *tsk);
void futex_exec_release(struct task_struct *tsk);
long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
u32 __user *uaddr2, u32 val2, u32 val3);
#else
static inline void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
}
static inline void futex_init_task(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
static inline void futex_exit_recursive(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
static inline void futex_exit_release(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
static inline void futex_exec_release(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
static inline long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val,
ktime_t *timeout, u32 __user *uaddr2,
u32 val2, u32 val3)
@@ -65,12 +87,4 @@ static inline long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val,
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_PI
extern void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr);
#else
static inline void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
}
#endif
#endif
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1054,6 +1054,8 @@ struct task_struct {
#endif
struct list_head pi_state_list;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state_cache;
struct mutex futex_exit_mutex;
unsigned int futex_state;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
struct perf_event_context *perf_event_ctxp[perf_nr_task_contexts];
@@ -1442,7 +1444,6 @@ extern struct pid *cad_pid;
*/
#define PF_IDLE 0x00000002 /* I am an IDLE thread */
#define PF_EXITING 0x00000004 /* Getting shut down */
#define PF_EXITPIDONE 0x00000008 /* PI exit done on shut down */
#define PF_VCPU 0x00000010 /* I'm a virtual CPU */
#define PF_WQ_WORKER 0x00000020 /* I'm a workqueue worker */
#define PF_FORKNOEXEC 0x00000040 /* Forked but didn't exec */
+4 -2
View File
@@ -117,8 +117,10 @@ extern struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task);
* succeeds.
*/
extern struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
/* Remove the current tasks stale references to the old mm_struct */
extern void mm_release(struct task_struct *, struct mm_struct *);
/* Remove the current tasks stale references to the old mm_struct on exit() */
extern void exit_mm_release(struct task_struct *, struct mm_struct *);
/* Remove the current tasks stale references to the old mm_struct on exec() */
extern void exec_mm_release(struct task_struct *, struct mm_struct *);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
extern void mm_update_next_owner(struct mm_struct *mm);
+13 -13
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <net/strparser.h>
#define MAX_MSG_FRAGS MAX_SKB_FRAGS
#define NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS (MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 1)
enum __sk_action {
__SK_DROP = 0,
@@ -29,11 +30,13 @@ struct sk_msg_sg {
u32 size;
u32 copybreak;
bool copy[MAX_MSG_FRAGS];
/* The extra element is used for chaining the front and sections when
* the list becomes partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs
* require the chaining.
/* The extra two elements:
* 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes
* partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the
* chaining;
* 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message.
*/
struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 1];
struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];
};
/* UAPI in filter.c depends on struct sk_msg_sg being first element. */
@@ -141,13 +144,13 @@ static inline void sk_msg_apply_bytes(struct sk_psock *psock, u32 bytes)
static inline u32 sk_msg_iter_dist(u32 start, u32 end)
{
return end >= start ? end - start : end + (MAX_MSG_FRAGS - start);
return end >= start ? end - start : end + (NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - start);
}
#define sk_msg_iter_var_prev(var) \
do { \
if (var == 0) \
var = MAX_MSG_FRAGS - 1; \
var = NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - 1; \
else \
var--; \
} while (0)
@@ -155,7 +158,7 @@ static inline u32 sk_msg_iter_dist(u32 start, u32 end)
#define sk_msg_iter_var_next(var) \
do { \
var++; \
if (var == MAX_MSG_FRAGS) \
if (var == NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS) \
var = 0; \
} while (0)
@@ -172,9 +175,9 @@ static inline void sk_msg_clear_meta(struct sk_msg *msg)
static inline void sk_msg_init(struct sk_msg *msg)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(msg->sg.data) - 1 != MAX_MSG_FRAGS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(msg->sg.data) - 1 != NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
memset(msg, 0, sizeof(*msg));
sg_init_marker(msg->sg.data, MAX_MSG_FRAGS);
sg_init_marker(msg->sg.data, NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
}
static inline void sk_msg_xfer(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src,
@@ -195,14 +198,11 @@ static inline void sk_msg_xfer_full(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src)
static inline bool sk_msg_full(const struct sk_msg *msg)
{
return (msg->sg.end == msg->sg.start) && msg->sg.size;
return sk_msg_iter_dist(msg->sg.start, msg->sg.end) == MAX_MSG_FRAGS;
}
static inline u32 sk_msg_elem_used(const struct sk_msg *msg)
{
if (sk_msg_full(msg))
return MAX_MSG_FRAGS;
return sk_msg_iter_dist(msg->sg.start, msg->sg.end);
}
+3
View File
@@ -1239,6 +1239,9 @@ struct sctp_ep_common {
/* What socket does this endpoint belong to? */
struct sock *sk;
/* Cache netns and it won't change once set */
struct net *net;
/* This is where we receive inbound chunks. */
struct sctp_inq inqueue;
+1 -2
View File
@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ struct tls_rec {
struct list_head list;
int tx_ready;
int tx_flags;
int inplace_crypto;
struct sk_msg msg_plaintext;
struct sk_msg msg_encrypted;
@@ -396,7 +395,7 @@ int tls_push_sg(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
int flags);
int tls_push_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
int flags);
bool tls_free_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
void tls_free_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
static inline struct tls_msg *tls_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+2 -28
View File
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct core_state *core_state;
mm_release(current, mm);
exit_mm_release(current, mm);
if (!mm)
return;
sync_mm_rss(mm);
@@ -746,32 +746,12 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
*/
if (unlikely(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
pr_alert("Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!\n");
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses
* this flag just to verify whether the pi state
* cleanup has been done or not. In the worst case it
* loops once more. We pretend that the cleanup was
* done as there is no way to return. Either the
* OWNER_DIED bit is set by now or we push the blocked
* task into the wait for ever nirwana as well.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
futex_exit_recursive(tsk);
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule();
}
exit_signals(tsk); /* sets PF_EXITING */
/*
* Ensure that all new tsk->pi_lock acquisitions must observe
* PF_EXITING. Serializes against futex.c:attach_to_pi_owner().
*/
smp_mb();
/*
* Ensure that we must observe the pi_state in exit_mm() ->
* mm_release() -> exit_pi_state_list().
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
if (unlikely(in_atomic())) {
pr_info("note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
@@ -846,12 +826,6 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
* Make sure we are holding no locks:
*/
debug_check_no_locks_held();
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses this flag
* just to verify whether the pi state cleanup has been done
* or not. In the worst case it loops once more.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
if (tsk->io_context)
exit_io_context(tsk);
+15 -25
View File
@@ -1283,24 +1283,8 @@ static int wait_for_vfork_done(struct task_struct *child,
* restoring the old one. . .
* Eric Biederman 10 January 1998
*/
void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
static void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
/* Get rid of any futexes when releasing the mm */
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
#endif
uprobe_free_utask(tsk);
/* Get rid of any cached register state */
@@ -1333,6 +1317,18 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
complete_vfork_done(tsk);
}
void exit_mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
futex_exit_release(tsk);
mm_release(tsk, mm);
}
void exec_mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
futex_exec_release(tsk);
mm_release(tsk, mm);
}
/**
* dup_mm() - duplicates an existing mm structure
* @tsk: the task_struct with which the new mm will be associated.
@@ -2062,14 +2058,8 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
p->plug = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
p->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
p->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pi_state_list);
p->pi_state_cache = NULL;
#endif
futex_init_task(p);
/*
* sigaltstack should be cleared when sharing the same VM
*/
+281 -43
View File
@@ -325,6 +325,12 @@ static inline bool should_fail_futex(bool fshared)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX */
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
#else
static inline void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr) { }
#endif
static inline void futex_get_mm(union futex_key *key)
{
mmgrab(key->private.mm);
@@ -890,7 +896,7 @@ static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
* Kernel cleans up PI-state, but userspace is likely hosed.
* (Robust-futex cleanup is separate and might save the day for userspace.)
*/
void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
static void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
@@ -960,7 +966,8 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
#else
static inline void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) { }
#endif
/*
@@ -1169,16 +1176,47 @@ out_error:
return ret;
}
/**
* wait_for_owner_exiting - Block until the owner has exited
* @exiting: Pointer to the exiting task
*
* Caller must hold a refcount on @exiting.
*/
static void wait_for_owner_exiting(int ret, struct task_struct *exiting)
{
if (ret != -EBUSY) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting);
return;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EBUSY && !exiting))
return;
mutex_lock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
/*
* No point in doing state checking here. If the waiter got here
* while the task was in exec()->exec_futex_release() then it can
* have any FUTEX_STATE_* value when the waiter has acquired the
* mutex. OK, if running, EXITING or DEAD if it reached exit()
* already. Highly unlikely and not a problem. Just one more round
* through the futex maze.
*/
mutex_unlock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
put_task_struct(exiting);
}
static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
u32 uval2;
/*
* If PF_EXITPIDONE is not yet set, then try again.
* If the futex exit state is not yet FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, tell the
* caller that the alleged owner is busy.
*/
if (tsk && !(tsk->flags & PF_EXITPIDONE))
return -EAGAIN;
if (tsk && tsk->futex_state != FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
return -EBUSY;
/*
* Reread the user space value to handle the following situation:
@@ -1196,8 +1234,9 @@ static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
* *uaddr = 0xC0000000; tsk = get_task(PID);
* } if (!tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) {
* ... attach();
* tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE; } else {
* if (!(tsk->flags & PF_EXITPIDONE))
* tsk->futex_state = } else {
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD; if (tsk->futex_state !=
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
* return -EAGAIN;
* return -ESRCH; <--- FAIL
* }
@@ -1228,7 +1267,8 @@ static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
* it after doing proper sanity checks.
*/
static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key,
struct futex_pi_state **ps)
struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct **exiting)
{
pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
@@ -1253,22 +1293,33 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key,
}
/*
* We need to look at the task state flags to figure out,
* whether the task is exiting. To protect against the do_exit
* change of the task flags, we do this protected by
* p->pi_lock:
* We need to look at the task state to figure out, whether the
* task is exiting. To protect against the change of the task state
* in futex_exit_release(), we do this protected by p->pi_lock:
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
if (unlikely(p->futex_state != FUTEX_STATE_OK)) {
/*
* The task is on the way out. When PF_EXITPIDONE is
* set, we know that the task has finished the
* cleanup:
* The task is on the way out. When the futex state is
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, we know that the task has finished
* the cleanup:
*/
int ret = handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, p);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
put_task_struct(p);
/*
* If the owner task is between FUTEX_STATE_EXITING and
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD then store the task pointer and keep
* the reference on the task struct. The calling code will
* drop all locks, wait for the task to reach
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD and then drop the refcount. This is
* required to prevent a live lock when the current task
* preempted the exiting task between the two states.
*/
if (ret == -EBUSY)
*exiting = p;
else
put_task_struct(p);
return ret;
}
@@ -1307,7 +1358,8 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key,
static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps)
union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct **exiting)
{
struct futex_q *top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, key);
@@ -1322,7 +1374,7 @@ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
* We are the first waiter - try to look up the owner based on
* @uval and attach to it.
*/
return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, uval, key, ps);
return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, uval, key, ps, exiting);
}
static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
@@ -1350,6 +1402,8 @@ static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
* lookup
* @task: the task to perform the atomic lock work for. This will
* be "current" except in the case of requeue pi.
* @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task
* which is in the middle of exiting
* @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0)
*
* Return:
@@ -1358,11 +1412,17 @@ static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
* - <0 - error
*
* The hb->lock and futex_key refs shall be held by the caller.
*
* @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds
* a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it
* after waiting for the exit to complete.
*/
static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
union futex_key *key,
struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct *task, int set_waiters)
struct task_struct *task,
struct task_struct **exiting,
int set_waiters)
{
u32 uval, newval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(task);
struct futex_q *top_waiter;
@@ -1432,7 +1492,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
* attach to the owner. If that fails, no harm done, we only
* set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in the user space variable.
*/
return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, newval, key, ps);
return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, newval, key, ps, exiting);
}
/**
@@ -1850,6 +1910,8 @@ void requeue_pi_wake_futex(struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key,
* @key1: the from futex key
* @key2: the to futex key
* @ps: address to store the pi_state pointer
* @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task
* which is in the middle of exiting
* @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0)
*
* Try and get the lock on behalf of the top waiter if we can do it atomically.
@@ -1857,16 +1919,20 @@ void requeue_pi_wake_futex(struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key,
* then direct futex_lock_pi_atomic() to force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit.
* hb1 and hb2 must be held by the caller.
*
* @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds
* a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it
* after waiting for the exit to complete.
*
* Return:
* - 0 - failed to acquire the lock atomically;
* - >0 - acquired the lock, return value is vpid of the top_waiter
* - <0 - error
*/
static int futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2,
union futex_key *key1, union futex_key *key2,
struct futex_pi_state **ps, int set_waiters)
static int
futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2, union futex_key *key1,
union futex_key *key2, struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct **exiting, int set_waiters)
{
struct futex_q *top_waiter = NULL;
u32 curval;
@@ -1903,7 +1969,7 @@ static int futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex,
*/
vpid = task_pid_vnr(top_waiter->task);
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(pifutex, hb2, key2, ps, top_waiter->task,
set_waiters);
exiting, set_waiters);
if (ret == 1) {
requeue_pi_wake_futex(top_waiter, key2, hb2);
return vpid;
@@ -2032,6 +2098,8 @@ retry_private:
}
if (requeue_pi && (task_count - nr_wake < nr_requeue)) {
struct task_struct *exiting = NULL;
/*
* Attempt to acquire uaddr2 and wake the top waiter. If we
* intend to requeue waiters, force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS
@@ -2039,7 +2107,8 @@ retry_private:
* faults rather in the requeue loop below.
*/
ret = futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(uaddr2, hb1, hb2, &key1,
&key2, &pi_state, nr_requeue);
&key2, &pi_state,
&exiting, nr_requeue);
/*
* At this point the top_waiter has either taken uaddr2 or is
@@ -2066,7 +2135,8 @@ retry_private:
* If that call succeeds then we have pi_state and an
* initial refcount on it.
*/
ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state);
ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2,
&pi_state, &exiting);
}
switch (ret) {
@@ -2084,17 +2154,24 @@ retry_private:
if (!ret)
goto retry;
goto out;
case -EBUSY:
case -EAGAIN:
/*
* Two reasons for this:
* - Owner is exiting and we just wait for the
* - EBUSY: Owner is exiting and we just wait for the
* exit to complete.
* - The user space value changed.
* - EAGAIN: The user space value changed.
*/
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
put_futex_key(&key2);
put_futex_key(&key1);
/*
* Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of
* exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise
* this task might loop forever, aka. live lock.
*/
wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting);
cond_resched();
goto retry;
default:
@@ -2801,6 +2878,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL;
struct task_struct *exiting = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
@@ -2822,7 +2900,8 @@ retry:
retry_private:
hb = queue_lock(&q);
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(uaddr, hb, &q.key, &q.pi_state, current, 0);
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(uaddr, hb, &q.key, &q.pi_state, current,
&exiting, 0);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
/*
* Atomic work succeeded and we got the lock,
@@ -2835,15 +2914,22 @@ retry_private:
goto out_unlock_put_key;
case -EFAULT:
goto uaddr_faulted;
case -EBUSY:
case -EAGAIN:
/*
* Two reasons for this:
* - Task is exiting and we just wait for the
* - EBUSY: Task is exiting and we just wait for the
* exit to complete.
* - The user space value changed.
* - EAGAIN: The user space value changed.
*/
queue_unlock(hb);
put_futex_key(&q.key);
/*
* Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of
* exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise
* this task might loop forever, aka. live lock.
*/
wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting);
cond_resched();
goto retry;
default:
@@ -3452,11 +3538,16 @@ err_unlock:
return ret;
}
/* Constants for the pending_op argument of handle_futex_death */
#define HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING true
#define HANDLE_DEATH_LIST false
/*
* Process a futex-list entry, check whether it's owned by the
* dying task, and do notification if so:
*/
static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr, int pi)
static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr,
bool pi, bool pending_op)
{
u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
int err;
@@ -3469,6 +3560,42 @@ retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -1;
/*
* Special case for regular (non PI) futexes. The unlock path in
* user space has two race scenarios:
*
* 1. The unlock path releases the user space futex value and
* before it can execute the futex() syscall to wake up
* waiters it is killed.
*
* 2. A woken up waiter is killed before it can acquire the
* futex in user space.
*
* In both cases the TID validation below prevents a wakeup of
* potential waiters which can cause these waiters to block
* forever.
*
* In both cases the following conditions are met:
*
* 1) task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
* @pending_op == true
* 2) User space futex value == 0
* 3) Regular futex: @pi == false
*
* If these conditions are met, it is safe to attempt waking up a
* potential waiter without touching the user space futex value and
* trying to set the OWNER_DIED bit. The user space futex value is
* uncontended and the rest of the user space mutex state is
* consistent, so a woken waiter will just take over the
* uncontended futex. Setting the OWNER_DIED bit would create
* inconsistent state and malfunction of the user space owner died
* handling.
*/
if (pending_op && !pi && !uval) {
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
return 0;
}
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
return 0;
@@ -3547,7 +3674,7 @@ static inline int fetch_robust_entry(struct robust_list __user **entry,
*
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
*/
void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
static void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct robust_list_head __user *head = curr->robust_list;
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
@@ -3588,10 +3715,11 @@ void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
* don't process it twice:
*/
if (entry != pending)
if (entry != pending) {
if (handle_futex_death((void __user *)entry + futex_offset,
curr, pi))
curr, pi, HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
return;
}
if (rc)
return;
entry = next_entry;
@@ -3605,9 +3733,118 @@ void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
cond_resched();
}
if (pending)
if (pending) {
handle_futex_death((void __user *)pending + futex_offset,
curr, pip);
curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
}
}
static void futex_cleanup(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
}
/**
* futex_exit_recursive - Set the tasks futex state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD
* @tsk: task to set the state on
*
* Set the futex exit state of the task lockless. The futex waiter code
* observes that state when a task is exiting and loops until the task has
* actually finished the futex cleanup. The worst case for this is that the
* waiter runs through the wait loop until the state becomes visible.
*
* This is called from the recursive fault handling path in do_exit().
*
* This is best effort. Either the futex exit code has run already or
* not. If the OWNER_DIED bit has been set on the futex then the waiter can
* take it over. If not, the problem is pushed back to user space. If the
* futex exit code did not run yet, then an already queued waiter might
* block forever, but there is nothing which can be done about that.
*/
void futex_exit_recursive(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* If the state is FUTEX_STATE_EXITING then futex_exit_mutex is held */
if (tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING)
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_DEAD;
}
static void futex_cleanup_begin(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* Prevent various race issues against a concurrent incoming waiter
* including live locks by forcing the waiter to block on
* tsk->futex_exit_mutex when it observes FUTEX_STATE_EXITING in
* attach_to_pi_owner().
*/
mutex_lock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
/*
* Switch the state to FUTEX_STATE_EXITING under tsk->pi_lock.
*
* This ensures that all subsequent checks of tsk->futex_state in
* attach_to_pi_owner() must observe FUTEX_STATE_EXITING with
* tsk->pi_lock held.
*
* It guarantees also that a pi_state which was queued right before
* the state change under tsk->pi_lock by a concurrent waiter must
* be observed in exit_pi_state_list().
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
}
static void futex_cleanup_end(struct task_struct *tsk, int state)
{
/*
* Lockless store. The only side effect is that an observer might
* take another loop until it becomes visible.
*/
tsk->futex_state = state;
/*
* Drop the exit protection. This unblocks waiters which observed
* FUTEX_STATE_EXITING to reevaluate the state.
*/
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
}
void futex_exec_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* The state handling is done for consistency, but in the case of
* exec() there is no way to prevent futher damage as the PID stays
* the same. But for the unlikely and arguably buggy case that a
* futex is held on exec(), this provides at least as much state
* consistency protection which is possible.
*/
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
futex_cleanup(tsk);
/*
* Reset the state to FUTEX_STATE_OK. The task is alive and about
* exec a new binary.
*/
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_OK);
}
void futex_exit_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
futex_cleanup(tsk);
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_DEAD);
}
long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
@@ -3737,7 +3974,7 @@ static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list __user *entry,
*
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
*/
void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head = curr->compat_robust_list;
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
@@ -3784,7 +4021,8 @@ void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
if (entry != pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi))
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi,
HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
return;
}
if (rc)
@@ -3803,7 +4041,7 @@ void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
if (pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip);
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
}
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -2299,7 +2299,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,
WARN_ON_ONCE(last_sge == first_sge);
shift = last_sge > first_sge ?
last_sge - first_sge - 1 :
MAX_SKB_FRAGS - first_sge + last_sge - 1;
NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - first_sge + last_sge - 1;
if (!shift)
goto out;
@@ -2308,8 +2308,8 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,
do {
u32 move_from;
if (i + shift >= MAX_MSG_FRAGS)
move_from = i + shift - MAX_MSG_FRAGS;
if (i + shift >= NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS)
move_from = i + shift - NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS;
else
move_from = i + shift;
if (move_from == msg->sg.end)
@@ -2323,7 +2323,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,
} while (1);
msg->sg.end = msg->sg.end - shift > msg->sg.end ?
msg->sg.end - shift + MAX_MSG_FRAGS :
msg->sg.end - shift + NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS :
msg->sg.end - shift;
out:
msg->data = sg_virt(&msg->sg.data[first_sge]) + start - offset;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb)
copied = skb->len;
msg->sg.start = 0;
msg->sg.size = copied;
msg->sg.end = num_sge == MAX_MSG_FRAGS ? 0 : num_sge;
msg->sg.end = num_sge;
msg->skb = skb;
sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir);
static int tcp_bpf_send_verdict(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
struct sk_msg *msg, int *copied, int flags)
{
bool cork = false, enospc = msg->sg.start == msg->sg.end;
bool cork = false, enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
struct sock *sk_redir;
u32 tosend, delta = 0;
int ret;
+14 -3
View File
@@ -704,9 +704,13 @@ static size_t ovs_flow_cmd_msg_size(const struct sw_flow_actions *acts,
{
size_t len = NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ovs_header));
/* OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID */
/* OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID, or unmasked flow key as fallback
* see ovs_nla_put_identifier()
*/
if (sfid && ovs_identifier_is_ufid(sfid))
len += nla_total_size(sfid->ufid_len);
else
len += nla_total_size(ovs_key_attr_size());
/* OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY */
if (!sfid || should_fill_key(sfid, ufid_flags))
@@ -882,7 +886,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *ovs_flow_cmd_build_info(const struct sw_flow *flow,
retval = ovs_flow_cmd_fill_info(flow, dp_ifindex, skb,
info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq, 0,
cmd, ufid_flags);
BUG_ON(retval < 0);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval < 0)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
skb = ERR_PTR(retval);
}
return skb;
}
@@ -1346,7 +1353,10 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL,
ufid_flags);
rcu_read_unlock();
BUG_ON(err < 0);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err < 0)) {
kfree_skb(reply);
goto out_free;
}
ovs_notify(&dp_flow_genl_family, reply, info);
} else {
@@ -1354,6 +1364,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
}
}
out_free:
ovs_flow_free(flow, true);
return 0;
unlock:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ void psample_sample_packet(struct psample_group *group, struct sk_buff *skb,
data_len = PSAMPLE_MAX_PACKET_SIZE - meta_len - NLA_HDRLEN
- NLA_ALIGNTO;
nl_skb = genlmsg_new(meta_len + data_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
nl_skb = genlmsg_new(meta_len + nla_total_size(data_len), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!nl_skb))
return;
+2 -1
View File
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ static int mq_dump_class_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl,
struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = mq_queue_get(sch, cl);
sch = dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping;
if (gnet_stats_copy_basic(&sch->running, d, NULL, &sch->bstats) < 0 ||
if (gnet_stats_copy_basic(&sch->running, d, sch->cpu_bstats,
&sch->bstats) < 0 ||
qdisc_qstats_copy(d, sch) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
+2 -2
View File
@@ -557,8 +557,8 @@ static int mqprio_dump_class_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl,
struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = mqprio_queue_get(sch, cl);
sch = dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping;
if (gnet_stats_copy_basic(qdisc_root_sleeping_running(sch),
d, NULL, &sch->bstats) < 0 ||
if (gnet_stats_copy_basic(qdisc_root_sleeping_running(sch), d,
sch->cpu_bstats, &sch->bstats) < 0 ||
qdisc_qstats_copy(d, sch) < 0)
return -1;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int multiq_dump_class_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl,
cl_q = q->queues[cl - 1];
if (gnet_stats_copy_basic(qdisc_root_sleeping_running(sch),
d, NULL, &cl_q->bstats) < 0 ||
d, cl_q->cpu_bstats, &cl_q->bstats) < 0 ||
qdisc_qstats_copy(d, cl_q) < 0)
return -1;

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