Compare commits

...

47 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mark Brown c2ee9f594d KVM: selftests: Fix build on on non-x86 architectures
Commit 9a400068a1 ("KVM: selftests: x86: Avoid using SSE/AVX
instructions") unconditionally added -march=x86-64-v2 to the CFLAGS used
to build the KVM selftests which does not work on non-x86 architectures:

  cc1: error: unknown value ‘x86-64-v2’ for ‘-march’

Fix this by making the addition of this x86 specific command line flag
conditional on building for x86.

Fixes: 9a400068a1 ("KVM: selftests: x86: Avoid using SSE/AVX instructions")
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-21 15:49:33 -07:00
Linus Torvalds a360f311f5 9p: fix slab cache name creation for real
This was attempted by using the dev_name in the slab cache name, but as
Omar Sandoval pointed out, that can be an arbitrary string, eg something
like "/dev/root".  Which in turn trips verify_dirent_name(), which fails
if a filename contains a slash.

So just make it use a sequence counter, and make it an atomic_t to avoid
any possible races or locking issues.

Reported-and-tested-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZxafcO8KWMlXaeWE@telecaster.dhcp.thefacebook.com/
Fixes: 79efebae4a ("9p: Avoid creating multiple slab caches with the same name")
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Cc: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@leemhuis.info>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-21 15:41:29 -07:00
Linus Torvalds d129377639 Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM64:

   - Fix the guest view of the ID registers, making the relevant fields
     writable from userspace (affecting ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 and
     ID_AA64PFR1_EL1)

   - Correcly expose S1PIE to guests, fixing a regression introduced in
     6.12-rc1 with the S1POE support

   - Fix the recycling of stage-2 shadow MMUs by tracking the context
     (are we allowed to block or not) as well as the recycling state

   - Address a couple of issues with the vgic when userspace
     misconfigures the emulation, resulting in various splats. Headaches
     courtesy of our Syzkaller friends

   - Stop wasting space in the HYP idmap, as we are dangerously close to
     the 4kB limit, and this has already exploded in -next

   - Fix another race in vgic_init()

   - Fix a UBSAN error when faking the cache topology with MTE enabled

  RISCV:

   - RISCV: KVM: use raw_spinlock for critical section in imsic

  x86:

   - A bandaid for lack of XCR0 setup in selftests, which causes trouble
     if the compiler is configured to have x86-64-v3 (with AVX) as the
     default ISA. Proper XCR0 setup will come in the next merge window.

   - Fix an issue where KVM would not ignore low bits of the nested CR3
     and potentially leak up to 31 bytes out of the guest memory's
     bounds

   - Fix case in which an out-of-date cached value for the segments
     could by returned by KVM_GET_SREGS.

   - More cleanups for KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL

   - Override MTRR state for KVM confidential guests, making it WB by
     default as is already the case for Hyper-V guests.

  Generic:

   - Remove a couple of unused functions"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (27 commits)
  RISCV: KVM: use raw_spinlock for critical section in imsic
  KVM: selftests: Fix out-of-bounds reads in CPUID test's array lookups
  KVM: selftests: x86: Avoid using SSE/AVX instructions
  KVM: nSVM: Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory
  KVM: VMX: reset the segment cache after segment init in vmx_vcpu_reset()
  KVM: x86: Clean up documentation for KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL
  KVM: x86/mmu: Add lockdep assert to enforce safe usage of kvm_unmap_gfn_range()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only SPs that shadow gPTEs when deleting memslot
  x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX
  KVM: Remove unused kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic
  KVM: Remove unused kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn
  KVM: arm64: Ensure vgic_ready() is ordered against MMIO registration
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Don't check for vgic_ready() when setting NR_IRQS
  KVM: arm64: Fix shift-out-of-bounds bug
  KVM: arm64: Shave a few bytes from the EL2 idmap code
  KVM: arm64: Don't eagerly teardown the vgic on init error
  KVM: arm64: Expose S1PIE to guests
  KVM: arm64: nv: Clarify safety of allowing TLBI unmaps to reschedule
  KVM: arm64: nv: Punt stage-2 recycling to a vCPU request
  KVM: arm64: nv: Do not block when unmapping stage-2 if disallowed
  ...
2024-10-21 11:22:04 -07:00
Linus Torvalds c1bc09d7bf Merge tag 'probes-fixes-v6.12-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull uprobe fix from Masami Hiramatsu:

 - uprobe: avoid out-of-bounds memory access of fetching args

   Uprobe trace events can cause out-of-bounds memory access when
   fetching user-space data which is bigger than one page, because it
   does not check the local CPU buffer size when reading the data. This
   checks the read data size and cut it down to the local CPU buffer
   size.

* tag 'probes-fixes-v6.12-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
  uprobe: avoid out-of-bounds memory access of fetching args
2024-10-21 11:08:05 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 7166c32651 Merge tag 'vfs-6.12-rc5.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Christian Brauner:
 "afs:
   - Fix a lock recursion in afs_wake_up_async_call() on ->notify_lock

 netfs:
   - Drop the references to a folio immediately after the folio has been
     extracted to prevent races with future I/O collection

   - Fix a documenation build error

   - Downgrade the i_rwsem for buffered writes to fix a cifs reported
     performance regression when switching to netfslib

  vfs:
   - Explicitly return -E2BIG from openat2() if the specified size is
     unexpectedly large. This aligns openat2() with other extensible
     struct based system calls

   - When copying a mount namespace ensure that we only try to remove
     the new copy from the mount namespace rbtree if it has already been
     added to it

  nilfs:
   - Clear the buffer delay flag when clearing the buffer state clags
     when a buffer head is discarded to prevent a kernel OOPs

  ocfs2:
   - Fix an unitialized value warning in ocfs2_setattr()

  proc:
   - Fix a kernel doc warning"

* tag 'vfs-6.12-rc5.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  proc: Fix W=1 build kernel-doc warning
  afs: Fix lock recursion
  fs: Fix uninitialized value issue in from_kuid and from_kgid
  fs: don't try and remove empty rbtree node
  netfs: Downgrade i_rwsem for a buffered write
  nilfs2: fix kernel bug due to missing clearing of buffer delay flag
  openat2: explicitly return -E2BIG for (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
  netfs: fix documentation build error
  netfs: In readahead, put the folio refs as soon extracted
2024-10-21 10:48:24 -07:00
Linus Torvalds a777c32ca4 Merge tag 'v6.12-p4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu:
 "Fix a regression in mpi that broke RSA"

* tag 'v6.12-p4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
  crypto: lib/mpi - Fix an "Uninitialized scalar variable" issue
2024-10-21 09:59:43 -07:00
Qiao Ma 373b9338c9 uprobe: avoid out-of-bounds memory access of fetching args
Uprobe needs to fetch args into a percpu buffer, and then copy to ring
buffer to avoid non-atomic context problem.

Sometimes user-space strings, arrays can be very large, but the size of
percpu buffer is only page size. And store_trace_args() won't check
whether these data exceeds a single page or not, caused out-of-bounds
memory access.

It could be reproduced by following steps:
1. build kernel with CONFIG_KASAN enabled
2. save follow program as test.c

```
\#include <stdio.h>
\#include <stdlib.h>
\#include <string.h>

// If string length large than MAX_STRING_SIZE, the fetch_store_strlen()
// will return 0, cause __get_data_size() return shorter size, and
// store_trace_args() will not trigger out-of-bounds access.
// So make string length less than 4096.
\#define STRLEN 4093

void generate_string(char *str, int n)
{
    int i;
    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
    {
        char c = i % 26 + 'a';
        str[i] = c;
    }
    str[n-1] = '\0';
}

void print_string(char *str)
{
    printf("%s\n", str);
}

int main()
{
    char tmp[STRLEN];

    generate_string(tmp, STRLEN);
    print_string(tmp);

    return 0;
}
```
3. compile program
`gcc -o test test.c`

4. get the offset of `print_string()`
```
objdump -t test | grep -w print_string
0000000000401199 g     F .text  000000000000001b              print_string
```

5. configure uprobe with offset 0x1199
```
off=0x1199

cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/
echo "p /root/test:${off} arg1=+0(%di):ustring arg2=\$comm arg3=+0(%di):ustring"
 > uprobe_events
echo 1 > events/uprobes/enable
echo 1 > tracing_on
```

6. run `test`, and kasan will report error.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812311c004 by task test/499CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 499 Comm: test Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #18
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.16.0-4.al8 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310
 kasan_report+0x10f/0x120
 ? strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
 strncpy_from_user+0x1d6/0x1f0
 ? rmqueue.constprop.0+0x70d/0x2ad0
 process_fetch_insn+0xb26/0x1470
 ? __pfx_process_fetch_insn+0x10/0x10
 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pte_offset_map+0x1f/0x2d0
 ? unwind_next_frame+0xc5f/0x1f80
 ? arch_stack_walk+0x68/0xf0
 ? is_bpf_text_address+0x23/0x30
 ? kernel_text_address.part.0+0xbb/0xd0
 ? __kernel_text_address+0x66/0xb0
 ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0xa0
 ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
 ? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0xf0
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8b/0xf0
 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
 ? depot_alloc_stack+0x4c/0x1f0
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x30
 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x35d/0x4f0
 ? kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x50
 ? kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
 ? mutex_lock+0x91/0xe0
 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 prepare_uprobe_buffer.part.0+0x2cd/0x500
 uprobe_dispatcher+0x2c3/0x6a0
 ? __pfx_uprobe_dispatcher+0x10/0x10
 ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4d/0x90
 handler_chain+0xdd/0x3e0
 handle_swbp+0x26e/0x3d0
 ? __pfx_handle_swbp+0x10/0x10
 ? uprobe_pre_sstep_notifier+0x151/0x1b0
 irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xe2/0x1b0
 asm_exc_int3+0x39/0x40
RIP: 0033:0x401199
Code: 01 c2 0f b6 45 fb 88 02 83 45 fc 01 8b 45 fc 3b 45 e4 7c b7 8b 45 e4 48 98 48 8d 50 ff 48 8b 45 e8 48 01 d0 ce
RSP: 002b:00007ffdf00576a8 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 00007ffdf00576b0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000ff2
RDX: 0000000000000ffc RSI: 0000000000000ffd RDI: 00007ffdf00576b0
RBP: 00007ffdf00586b0 R08: 00007feb2f9c0d20 R09: 00007feb2f9c0d20
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000401040
R13: 00007ffdf0058780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

This commit enforces the buffer's maxlen less than a page-size to avoid
store_trace_args() out-of-memory access.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241015060148.1108331-1-mqaio@linux.alibaba.com/

Fixes: dcad1a204f ("tracing/uprobes: Fetch args before reserving a ring buffer")
Signed-off-by: Qiao Ma <mqaio@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
2024-10-21 13:15:28 +09:00
Paolo Bonzini e9001a382f Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #3

- Stop wasting space in the HYP idmap, as we are dangerously close
  to the 4kB limit, and this has already exploded in -next

- Fix another race in vgic_init()

- Fix a UBSAN error when faking the cache topology with MTE
  enabled
2024-10-20 12:10:59 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini ddd5c58201 Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #2

- Fix the guest view of the ID registers, making the relevant fields
  writable from userspace (affecting ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 and ID_AA64PFR1_EL1)

- Correcly expose S1PIE to guests, fixing a regression introduced
  in 6.12-rc1 with the S1POE support

- Fix the recycling of stage-2 shadow MMUs by tracking the context
  (are we allowed to block or not) as well as the recycling state

- Address a couple of issues with the vgic when userspace misconfigures
  the emulation, resulting in various splats. Headaches courtesy
  of our Syzkaller friends
2024-10-20 12:10:56 -04:00
Cyan Yang 3ec4350d4e RISCV: KVM: use raw_spinlock for critical section in imsic
For the external interrupt updating procedure in imsic, there was a
spinlock to protect it already. But since it should not be preempted in
any cases, we should turn to use raw_spinlock to prevent any preemption
in case PREEMPT_RT was enabled.

Signed-off-by: Cyan Yang <cyan.yang@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Yong-Xuan Wang <yongxuan.wang@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Message-ID: <20240919160126.44487-1-cyan.yang@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 12:10:44 -04:00
Sean Christopherson 773cca1834 KVM: selftests: Fix out-of-bounds reads in CPUID test's array lookups
When looking for a "mangled", i.e. dynamic, CPUID entry, terminate the
walk based on the number of array _entries_, not the size in bytes of
the array.  Iterating based on the total size of the array can result in
false passes, e.g. if the random data beyond the array happens to match
a CPUID entry's function and index.

Fixes: fb18d053b7 ("selftest: kvm: x86: test KVM_GET_CPUID2 and guest visible CPUIDs against KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20241003234337.273364-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 12:10:44 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov 9a400068a1 KVM: selftests: x86: Avoid using SSE/AVX instructions
Some distros switched gcc to '-march=x86-64-v3' by default and while it's
hard to find a CPU which doesn't support it today, many KVM selftests fail
with

  ==== Test Assertion Failure ====
    lib/x86_64/processor.c:570: Unhandled exception in guest
    pid=72747 tid=72747 errno=4 - Interrupted system call
    Unhandled exception '0x6' at guest RIP '0x4104f7'

The failure is easy to reproduce elsewhere with

   $ make clean && CFLAGS='-march=x86-64-v3' make -j && ./x86_64/kvm_pv_test

The root cause of the problem seems to be that with '-march=x86-64-v3' GCC
uses AVX* instructions (VMOVQ in the example above) and without prior
XSETBV() in the guest this results in #UD. It is certainly possible to add
it there, e.g. the following saves the day as well:

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240920154422.2890096-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 12:10:27 -04:00
Sean Christopherson f559b2e9c5 KVM: nSVM: Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory
Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory for nested SVM, as bits
4:0 of CR3 are ignored when PAE paging is used, and thus VMRUN doesn't
enforce 32-byte alignment of nCR3.

In the absolute worst case scenario, failure to ignore bits 4:0 can result
in an out-of-bounds read, e.g. if the target page is at the end of a
memslot, and the VMM isn't using guard pages.

Per the APM:

  The CR3 register points to the base address of the page-directory-pointer
  table. The page-directory-pointer table is aligned on a 32-byte boundary,
  with the low 5 address bits 4:0 assumed to be 0.

And the SDM's much more explicit:

  4:0    Ignored

Note, KVM gets this right when loading PDPTRs, it's only the nSVM flow
that is broken.

Fixes: e4e517b4be ("KVM: MMU: Do not unconditionally read PDPTE from guest memory")
Reported-by: Kirk Swidowski <swidowski@google.com>
Cc: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Cc: 3pvd <3pvd@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241009140838.1036226-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:31:06 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky 731285fbb6 KVM: VMX: reset the segment cache after segment init in vmx_vcpu_reset()
Reset the segment cache after segment initialization in vmx_vcpu_reset()
to harden KVM against caching stale/uninitialized data.  Without the
recent fix to bypass the cache in kvm_arch_vcpu_put(), the following
scenario is possible:

 - vCPU is just created, and the vCPU thread is preempted before
   SS.AR_BYTES is written in vmx_vcpu_reset().

 - When scheduling out the vCPU task, kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() =>
   vmx_get_cpl() reads and caches '0' for SS.AR_BYTES.

 - vmx_vcpu_reset() => seg_setup() configures SS.AR_BYTES, but doesn't
   invoke vmx_segment_cache_clear() to invalidate the cache.

As a result, KVM retains a stale value in the cache, which can be read,
e.g. via KVM_GET_SREGS.  Usually this is not a problem because the VMX
segment cache is reset on each VM-Exit, but if the userspace VMM (e.g KVM
selftests) reads and writes system registers just after the vCPU was
created, _without_ modifying SS.AR_BYTES, userspace will write back the
stale '0' value and ultimately will trigger a VM-Entry failure due to
incorrect SS segment type.

Invalidating the cache after writing the VMCS doesn't address the general
issue of cache accesses from IRQ context being unsafe, but it does prevent
KVM from clobbering the VMCS, i.e. mitigates the harm done _if_ KVM has a
bug that results in an unsafe cache access.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Fixes: 2fb92db1ec ("KVM: VMX: Cache vmcs segment fields")
[sean: rework changelog to account for previous patch]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241009175002.1118178-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:31:06 -04:00
Sean Christopherson 5a27984244 KVM: x86: Clean up documentation for KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL
Massage the documentation for KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL to call out that
it applies to moved memslots as well as deleted memslots, to avoid KVM's
"fast zap" terminology (which has no meaning for userspace), and to reword
the documented targeted zap behavior to specifically say that KVM _may_
zap a subset of all SPTEs.  As evidenced by the fix to zap non-leafs SPTEs
with gPTEs, formally documenting KVM's exact internal behavior is risky
and unnecessary.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241009192345.1148353-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:31:05 -04:00
Sean Christopherson 28cf497881 KVM: x86/mmu: Add lockdep assert to enforce safe usage of kvm_unmap_gfn_range()
Add a lockdep assertion in kvm_unmap_gfn_range() to ensure that either
mmu_invalidate_in_progress is elevated, or that the range is being zapped
due to memslot removal (loosely detected by slots_lock being held).
Zapping SPTEs without mmu_invalidate_{in_progress,seq} protection is unsafe
as KVM's page fault path snapshots state before acquiring mmu_lock, and
thus can create SPTEs with stale information if vCPUs aren't forced to
retry faults (due to seeing an in-progress or past MMU invalidation).

Memslot removal is a special case, as the memslot is retrieved outside of
mmu_invalidate_seq, i.e. doesn't use the "standard" protections, and
instead relies on SRCU synchronization to ensure any in-flight page faults
are fully resolved before zapping SPTEs.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241009192345.1148353-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:31:05 -04:00
Sean Christopherson 58a20a9435 KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only SPs that shadow gPTEs when deleting memslot
When performing a targeted zap on memslot removal, zap only MMU pages that
shadow guest PTEs, as zapping all SPs that "match" the gfn is inexact and
unnecessary.  Furthermore, for_each_gfn_valid_sp() arguably shouldn't
exist, because it doesn't do what most people would it expect it to do.
The "round gfn for level" adjustment that is done for direct SPs (no gPTE)
means that the exact gfn comparison will not get a match, even when a SP
does "cover" a gfn, or was even created specifically for a gfn.

For memslot deletion specifically, KVM's behavior will vary significantly
based on the size and alignment of a memslot, and in weird ways.  E.g. for
a 4KiB memslot, KVM will zap more SPs if the slot is 1GiB aligned than if
it's only 4KiB aligned.  And as described below, zapping SPs in the
aligned case overzaps for direct MMUs, as odds are good the upper-level
SPs are serving other memslots.

To iterate over all potentially-relevant gfns, KVM would need to make a
pass over the hash table for each level, with the gfn used for lookup
rounded for said level.  And then check that the SP is of the correct
level, too, e.g. to avoid over-zapping.

But even then, KVM would massively overzap, as processing every level is
all but guaranteed to zap SPs that serve other memslots, especially if the
memslot being removed is relatively small.  KVM could mitigate that issue
by processing only levels that can be possible guest huge pages, i.e. are
less likely to be re-used for other memslot, but while somewhat logical,
that's quite arbitrary and would be a bit of a mess to implement.

So, zap only SPs with gPTEs, as the resulting behavior is easy to describe,
is predictable, and is explicitly minimal, i.e. KVM only zaps SPs that
absolutely must be zapped.

Cc: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20241009192345.1148353-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:08:17 -04:00
Kirill A. Shutemov 8e690b817e x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX
AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX have limited access to MTRR: either it is not
advertised in CPUID or it cannot be programmed (on TDX, due to #VE on
CR0.CD clear).

This results in guests using uncached mappings where it shouldn't and
pmd/pud_set_huge() failures due to non-uniform memory type reported by
mtrr_type_lookup().

Override MTRR state, making it WB by default as the kernel does for
Hyper-V guests.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Message-ID: <20241015095818.357915-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:07:02 -04:00
Dr. David Alan Gilbert bc07eea2f3 KVM: Remove unused kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic
The last use of kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic was removed by commit
1bbc60d0c7 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Remove MMU auditing")

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org>
Message-ID: <20241001141354.18009-3-linux@treblig.org>
[Adjust Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:05:51 -04:00
Dr. David Alan Gilbert 88a387cf9e KVM: Remove unused kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn
The last use of kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn was removed by commit
b1624f99aa ("KVM: Remove kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_page() and kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page()")

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org>
Message-ID: <20241001141354.18009-2-linux@treblig.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-10-20 07:04:52 -04:00
Thorsten Blum 197231da7f proc: Fix W=1 build kernel-doc warning
Building the kernel with W=1 generates the following warning:

  fs/proc/fd.c:81: warning: This comment starts with '/**',
                   but isn't a kernel-doc comment.

Use a normal comment for the helper function proc_fdinfo_permission().

Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241018102705.92237-2-thorsten.blum@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-18 13:02:47 +02:00
David Howells 610a79ffea afs: Fix lock recursion
afs_wake_up_async_call() can incur lock recursion.  The problem is that it
is called from AF_RXRPC whilst holding the ->notify_lock, but it tries to
take a ref on the afs_call struct in order to pass it to a work queue - but
if the afs_call is already queued, we then have an extraneous ref that must
be put... calling afs_put_call() may call back down into AF_RXRPC through
rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call(), however, which might try taking the
->notify_lock again.

This case isn't very common, however, so defer it to a workqueue.  The oops
looks something like:

  BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, krxrpcio/7001/1646
   lock: 0xffff888141399b30, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: krxrpcio/7001/1646, .owner_cpu: 0
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1646 Comm: krxrpcio/7001 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-build3+ #4351
  Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
   do_raw_spin_lock+0x3c/0x90
   rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call+0x83/0xb0
   afs_put_call+0xd7/0x180
   rxrpc_notify_socket+0xa0/0x190
   rxrpc_input_split_jumbo+0x198/0x1d0
   rxrpc_input_data+0x14b/0x1e0
   ? rxrpc_input_call_packet+0xc2/0x1f0
   rxrpc_input_call_event+0xad/0x6b0
   rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn+0x1e1/0x210
   rxrpc_input_packet+0x3f2/0x4d0
   rxrpc_io_thread+0x243/0x410
   ? __pfx_rxrpc_io_thread+0x10/0x10
   kthread+0xcf/0xe0
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   </TASK>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1394602.1729162732@warthog.procyon.org.uk
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-17 15:33:46 +02:00
Alessandro Zanni 15f3434748 fs: Fix uninitialized value issue in from_kuid and from_kgid
ocfs2_setattr() uses attr->ia_mode, attr->ia_uid and attr->ia_gid in
a trace point even though ATTR_MODE, ATTR_UID and ATTR_GID aren't set.

Initialize all fields of newattrs to avoid uninitialized variables, by
checking if ATTR_MODE, ATTR_UID, ATTR_GID are initialized, otherwise 0.

Reported-by: syzbot+6c55f725d1bdc8c52058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6c55f725d1bdc8c52058
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Zanni <alessandro.zanni87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017120553.55331-1-alessandro.zanni87@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-17 15:33:43 +02:00
Christian Brauner 229fd15908 fs: don't try and remove empty rbtree node
When copying a namespace we won't have added the new copy into the
namespace rbtree until after the copy succeeded. Calling free_mnt_ns()
will try to remove the copy from the rbtree which is invalid. Simply
free the namespace skeleton directly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241016-adapter-seilwinde-83c508a7bde1@brauner
Fixes: 1901c92497 ("fs: keep an index of current mount namespaces")
Tested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.11+
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-17 15:33:43 +02:00
David Howells d6a77668a7 netfs: Downgrade i_rwsem for a buffered write
In the I/O locking code borrowed from NFS into netfslib, i_rwsem is held
locked across a buffered write - but this causes a performance regression
in cifs as it excludes buffered reads for the duration (cifs didn't use any
locking for buffered reads).

Mitigate this somewhat by downgrading the i_rwsem to a read lock across the
buffered write.  This at least allows parallel reads to occur whilst
excluding other writes, DIO, truncate and setattr.

Note that this shouldn't be a problem for a buffered write as a read
through an mmap can circumvent i_rwsem anyway.

Also note that we might want to make this change in NFS also.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1317958.1729096113@warthog.procyon.org.uk
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.com>
cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@kernel.org>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-17 15:33:42 +02:00
Oliver Upton 78a0055555 KVM: arm64: Ensure vgic_ready() is ordered against MMIO registration
kvm_vgic_map_resources() prematurely marks the distributor as 'ready',
potentially allowing vCPUs to enter the guest before the distributor's
MMIO registration has been made visible.

Plug the race by marking the distributor as ready only after MMIO
registration is completed. Rely on the implied ordering of
synchronize_srcu() to ensure the MMIO registration is visible before
vgic_dist::ready. This also means that writers to vgic_dist::ready are
now serialized by the slots_lock, which was effectively the case already
as all writers held the slots_lock in addition to the config_lock.

Fixes: 59112e9c39 ("KVM: arm64: vgic: Fix a circular locking issue")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017001947.2707312-3-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-17 09:20:48 +01:00
Oliver Upton 5978d4ec7e KVM: arm64: vgic: Don't check for vgic_ready() when setting NR_IRQS
KVM commits to a particular sizing of SPIs when the vgic is initialized,
which is before the point a vgic becomes ready. On top of that, KVM
supplies a default amount of SPIs should userspace not explicitly
configure this.

As such, the check for vgic_ready() in the handling of
KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_NR_IRQS is completely wrong, and testing if nr_spis
is nonzero is sufficient for preventing userspace from playing games
with us.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017001947.2707312-2-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-17 09:20:48 +01:00
Ilkka Koskinen c6c167afa0 KVM: arm64: Fix shift-out-of-bounds bug
Fix a shift-out-of-bounds bug reported by UBSAN when running
VM with MTE enabled host kernel.

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c:1988:14
shift exponent 33 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 7629 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2 #34
Hardware name: IEI NF5280R7/Mitchell MB, BIOS 00.00. 2024-10-12 09:28:54 10/14/2024
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
 show_stack+0x20/0x38
 dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0x90
 dump_stack+0x18/0x28
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0xf8/0x1e0
 reset_clidr+0x10c/0x1c8
 kvm_reset_sys_regs+0x50/0x1c8
 kvm_reset_vcpu+0xec/0x2b0
 __kvm_vcpu_set_target+0x84/0x158
 kvm_vcpu_set_target+0x138/0x168
 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init+0x40/0x2b0
 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x28c/0x4b8
 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4bc/0x7a8
 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0x100
 invoke_syscall+0x70/0x100
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
 el0_svc+0x3c/0x158
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
 el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198

Fixes: 7af0c2534f ("KVM: arm64: Normalize cache configuration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017025701.67936-1-ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-17 09:20:13 +01:00
Marc Zyngier afa9b48f32 KVM: arm64: Shave a few bytes from the EL2 idmap code
Our idmap is becoming too big, to the point where it doesn't fit in
a 4kB page anymore.

There are some low-hanging fruits though, such as the el2_init_state
horror that is expanded 3 times in the kernel. Let's at least limit
ourselves to two copies, which makes the kernel link again.

At some point, we'll have to have a better way of doing this.

Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009204903.GA3353168@thelio-3990X
2024-10-17 09:17:56 +01:00
Ryusuke Konishi 6ed469df0b nilfs2: fix kernel bug due to missing clearing of buffer delay flag
Syzbot reported that after nilfs2 reads a corrupted file system image
and degrades to read-only, the BUG_ON check for the buffer delay flag
in submit_bh_wbc() may fail, causing a kernel bug.

This is because the buffer delay flag is not cleared when clearing the
buffer state flags to discard a page/folio or a buffer head. So, fix
this.

This became necessary when the use of nilfs2's own page clear routine
was expanded.  This state inconsistency does not occur if the buffer
is written normally by log writing.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241015213300.7114-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: 8c26c4e269 ("nilfs2: fix issue with flush kernel thread after remount in RO mode because of driver's internal error or metadata corruption")
Reported-by: syzbot+985ada84bf055a575c07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=985ada84bf055a575c07
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-16 15:05:32 +02:00
Qianqiang Liu cd843399d7 crypto: lib/mpi - Fix an "Uninitialized scalar variable" issue
The "err" variable may be returned without an initialized value.

Fixes: 8e3a67f2de ("crypto: lib/mpi - Add error checks to extension")
Signed-off-by: Qianqiang Liu <qianqiang.liu@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2024-10-16 13:38:16 +08:00
Marc Zyngier df5fd75ee3 KVM: arm64: Don't eagerly teardown the vgic on init error
As there is very little ordering in the KVM API, userspace can
instanciate a half-baked GIC (missing its memory map, for example)
at almost any time.

This means that, with the right timing, a thread running vcpu-0
can enter the kernel without a GIC configured and get a GIC created
behind its back by another thread. Amusingly, it will pick up
that GIC and start messing with the data structures without the
GIC having been fully initialised.

Similarly, a thread running vcpu-1 can enter the kernel, and try
to init the GIC that was previously created. Since this GIC isn't
properly configured (no memory map), it fails to correctly initialise.

And that's the point where we decide to teardown the GIC, freeing all
its resources. Behind vcpu-0's back. Things stop pretty abruptly,
with a variety of symptoms.  Clearly, this isn't good, we should be
a bit more careful about this.

It is obvious that this guest is not viable, as it is missing some
important part of its configuration. So instead of trying to tear
bits of it down, let's just mark it as *dead*. It means that any
further interaction from userspace will result in -EIO. The memory
will be released on the "normal" path, when userspace gives up.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009183603.3221824-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-11 13:40:25 +01:00
Aleksa Sarai f92f0a1b05 openat2: explicitly return -E2BIG for (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
While we do currently return -EFAULT in this case, it seems prudent to
follow the behaviour of other syscalls like clone3. It seems quite
unlikely that anyone depends on this error code being EFAULT, but we can
always revert this if it turns out to be an issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.6+
Fixes: fddb5d430a ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241010-extensible-structs-check_fields-v3-3-d2833dfe6edd@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-10 12:09:03 +02:00
Mark Brown d4a89e5aee KVM: arm64: Expose S1PIE to guests
Prior to commit 70ed723829 ("KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1")
we just exposed the santised view of ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1 to guests, meaning
that they saw both TCRX and S1PIE if present on the host machine. That
commit added VMM control over the contents of the register and exposed
S1POE but removed S1PIE, meaning that the extension is no longer visible
to guests. Reenable support for S1PIE with VMM control.

Fixes: 70ed723829 ("KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1")
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241005-kvm-arm64-fix-s1pie-v1-1-5901f02de749@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 12:59:23 +01:00
Oliver Upton 79cc6cdb93 KVM: arm64: nv: Clarify safety of allowing TLBI unmaps to reschedule
There's been a decent amount of attention around unmaps of nested MMUs,
and TLBI handling is no exception to this. Add a comment clarifying why
it is safe to reschedule during a TLBI unmap, even without a reference
on the MMU in progress.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007233028.2236133-5-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 10:40:27 +01:00
Oliver Upton c268f204f7 KVM: arm64: nv: Punt stage-2 recycling to a vCPU request
Currently, when a nested MMU is repurposed for some other MMU context,
KVM unmaps everything during vcpu_load() while holding the MMU lock for
write. This is quite a performance bottleneck for large nested VMs, as
all vCPU scheduling will spin until the unmap completes.

Start punting the MMU cleanup to a vCPU request, where it is then
possible to periodically release the MMU lock and CPU in the presence of
contention.

Ensure that no vCPU winds up using a stale MMU by tracking the pending
unmap on the S2 MMU itself and requesting an unmap on every vCPU that
finds it.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007233028.2236133-4-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 10:40:27 +01:00
Oliver Upton 3c164eb946 KVM: arm64: nv: Do not block when unmapping stage-2 if disallowed
Right now the nested code allows unmap operations on a shadow stage-2 to
block unconditionally. This is wrong in a couple places, such as a
non-blocking MMU notifier or on the back of a sched_in() notifier as
part of shadow MMU recycling.

Carry through whether or not blocking is allowed to
kvm_pgtable_stage2_unmap(). This 'fixes' an issue where stage-2 MMU
reclaim would precipitate a stack overflow from a pile of kvm_sched_in()
callbacks, all trying to recycle a stage-2 MMU.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007233028.2236133-3-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 10:40:27 +01:00
Oliver Upton 6ded46b5a4 KVM: arm64: nv: Keep reference on stage-2 MMU when scheduled out
If a vCPU is scheduling out and not in WFI emulation, it is highly
likely it will get scheduled again soon and reuse the MMU it had before.
Dropping the MMU at vcpu_put() can have some unfortunate consequences,
as the MMU could get reclaimed and used in a different context, forcing
another 'cold start' on an otherwise active MMU.

Avoid that altogether by keeping a reference on the MMU if the vCPU is
scheduling out, ensuring that another vCPU cannot reclaim it while the
current vCPU is away. Since there are more MMUs than vCPUs, this does
not affect the guarantee that an unused MMU is available at any time.

Furthermore, this makes the vcpu->arch.hw_mmu ~stable in preemptible
code, at least for where it matters in the stage-2 abort path. Yes, the
MMU can change across WFI emulation, but there isn't even a use case
where this would matter.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007233028.2236133-2-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 10:40:27 +01:00
Oliver Upton ae8f8b3761 KVM: arm64: Unregister redistributor for failed vCPU creation
Alex reports that syzkaller has managed to trigger a use-after-free when
tearing down a VM:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
  Read of size 8 at addr ffffff801c6890d0 by task syz.3.2219/10758

  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 10758 Comm: syz.3.2219 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-dirty #64
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x17c/0x1a8 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:317
   show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:324
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x94/0xc0 lib/dump_stack.c:119
   print_report+0x144/0x7a4 mm/kasan/report.c:377
   kasan_report+0xcc/0x128 mm/kasan/report.c:601
   __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
   kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
   kvm_vm_release+0x4c/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1409
   __fput+0x198/0x71c fs/file_table.c:422
   ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:450
   task_work_run+0x1cc/0x23c kernel/task_work.c:228
   do_notify_resume+0x144/0x1a0 include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50
   el0_svc+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
   el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598

Upon closer inspection, it appears that we do not properly tear down the
MMIO registration for a vCPU that fails creation late in the game, e.g.
a vCPU w/ the same ID already exists in the VM.

It is important to consider the context of commit that introduced this bug
by moving the unregistration out of __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). That
change correctly sought to avoid an srcu v. config_lock inversion by
breaking up the vCPU teardown into two parts, one guarded by the
config_lock.

Fix the use-after-free while avoiding lock inversion by adding a
special-cased unregistration to __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). This is safe
because failed vCPUs are torn down outside of the config_lock.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f616506754 ("KVM: arm64: vgic: Don't hold config_lock while unregistering redistributors")
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007223909.2157336-1-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 10:40:27 +01:00
Marc Zyngier 9b7c3dd596 Merge branch kvm-arm64/idregs-6.12 into kvmarm/fixes
* kvm-arm64/idregs-6.12:
  : .
  : Make some fields of ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 and ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
  : writable from userspace, so that a VMM can influence the
  : set of guest-visible features.
  :
  : - for ID_AA64DFR0_EL1: DoubleLock, WRPs, PMUVer and DebugVer
  :   are writable (courtesy of Shameer Kolothum)
  :
  : - for ID_AA64PFR1_EL1: BT, SSBS, CVS2_frac are writable
  :   (courtesy of Shaoqin Huang)
  : .
  KVM: selftests: aarch64: Add writable test for ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
  KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to change ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
  KVM: arm64: Use kvm_has_feat() to check if FEAT_SSBS is advertised to the guest
  KVM: arm64: Disable fields that KVM doesn't know how to handle in ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
  KVM: arm64: Make the exposed feature bits in AA64DFR0_EL1 writable from userspace

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 10:40:04 +01:00
Jonathan Corbet 368196e501 netfs: fix documentation build error
Commit 86b374d061 ("netfs: Remove fs/netfs/io.c") did what it said on the
tin, but failed to remove the reference to fs/netfs/io.c from the
documentation, leading to this docs build error:

  WARNING: kernel-doc './scripts/kernel-doc -rst -enable-lineno -sphinx-version 7.3.7 ./fs/netfs/io.c' failed with return code 1

Remove the offending kernel-doc line, making the docs build process a
little happier.

Fixes: 86b374d061 ("netfs: Remove fs/netfs/io.c")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/874j5nlu86.fsf@trenco.lwn.net
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-08 10:39:38 +02:00
David Howells 796a404964 netfs: In readahead, put the folio refs as soon extracted
netfslib currently defers dropping the ref on the folios it obtains during
readahead to after it has started I/O on the basis that we can do it whilst
we wait for the I/O to complete, but this runs the risk of the I/O
collection racing with this in future.

Furthermore, Matthew Wilcox strongly suggests that the refs should be
dropped immediately, as readahead_folio() does (netfslib is using
__readahead_batch() which doesn't drop the refs).

Fixes: ee4cdf7ba8 ("netfs: Speed up buffered reading")
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3771538.1728052438@warthog.procyon.org.uk
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-10-07 13:48:22 +02:00
Shaoqin Huang dc9b5d7e0b KVM: selftests: aarch64: Add writable test for ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
Add writable test for the ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 register.

Signed-off-by: Shaoqin Huang <shahuang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723072004.1470688-5-shahuang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-08-25 17:48:44 +01:00
Shaoqin Huang 78c4446b5f KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to change ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
Allow userspace to change the guest-visible value of the register with
different way of handling:

  - Since the RAS and MPAM is not writable in the ID_AA64PFR0_EL1
    register, RAS_frac and MPAM_frac are also not writable in the
    ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 register.

  - The MTE is controlled by a separate UAPI (KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE) with an
    internal flag (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED).
    So it's not writable.

  - For those fields which KVM doesn't know how to handle, they are not
    exposed to the guest (being disabled in the register read accessor),
    those fields value will always be 0.
    Those fields don't have a known behavior now, so don't advertise
    them to the userspace. Thus still not writable.
    Those fields include SME, RNDR_trap, NMI, GCS, THE, DF2, PFAR,
    MTE_frac, MTEX.

  - The BT, SSBS, CSV2_frac don't introduce any new registers which KVM
    doesn't know how to handle, they can be written without ill effect.
    So let them writable.

Besides, we don't do the crosscheck in KVM about the CSV2_frac even if
it depends on the value of CSV2, it should be made sure by the VMM
instead of KVM.

Signed-off-by: Shaoqin Huang <shahuang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723072004.1470688-4-shahuang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-08-25 17:48:44 +01:00
Shaoqin Huang e8d164974c KVM: arm64: Use kvm_has_feat() to check if FEAT_SSBS is advertised to the guest
Currently KVM use cpus_have_final_cap() to check if FEAT_SSBS is
advertised to the guest. But if FEAT_SSBS is writable and isn't
advertised to the guest, this is wrong.

Update it to use kvm_has_feat() to check if FEAT_SSBS is advertised
to the guest, thus the KVM can do the right thing if FEAT_SSBS isn't
advertised to the guest.

Signed-off-by: Shaoqin Huang <shahuang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723072004.1470688-3-shahuang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-08-25 17:48:44 +01:00
Shaoqin Huang ffe68b2d19 KVM: arm64: Disable fields that KVM doesn't know how to handle in ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
For some of the fields in the ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 register, KVM doesn't know
how to handle them right now. So explicitly disable them in the register
accessor, then those fields value will be masked to 0 even if on the
hardware the field value is 1. This is safe because from a UAPI point of
view that read_sanitised_ftr_reg() doesn't yet return a nonzero value
for any of those fields.

This will benifit the migration if the host and VM have different values
when restoring a VM.

Those fields include RNDR_trap, NMI, MTE_frac, GCS, THE, MTEX, DF2, PFAR.

Signed-off-by: Shaoqin Huang <shahuang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723072004.1470688-2-shahuang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-08-25 17:48:43 +01:00
Shameer Kolothum 980c41f554 KVM: arm64: Make the exposed feature bits in AA64DFR0_EL1 writable from userspace
KVM exposes the OS double lock feature bit to Guests but returns
RAZ/WI on Guest OSDLR_EL1 access. This breaks Guest migration between
systems where this feature differ. Add support to make this feature
writable from userspace by setting the mask bit. While at it, set the
mask bits for the exposed WRPs(Number of Watchpoints) as well.
Also update the selftest to cover these fields.

However we still can't make BRPs and CTX_CMPs fields writable, because
as per ARM ARM DDI 0487K.a, section D2.8.3 Breakpoint types and
linking of breakpoints, highest numbered breakpoints(BRPs) must be
context aware breakpoints(CTX_CMPs). KVM does not trap + emulate the
breakpoint registers, and as such cannot support a layout that misaligns
with the underlying hardware.

Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240816132819.34316-1-shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2024-08-22 18:05:37 +01:00
40 changed files with 384 additions and 175 deletions
@@ -592,4 +592,3 @@ API Function Reference
.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/netfs.h
.. kernel-doc:: fs/netfs/buffered_read.c
.. kernel-doc:: fs/netfs/io.c
+9 -7
View File
@@ -8098,13 +8098,15 @@ KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_UD_FAULTS By default, KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT (if
KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT is
disabled.
KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL By default, KVM invalidates all SPTEs in
fast way for memslot deletion when VM type
is KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
When this quirk is disabled or when VM type
is other than KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM, KVM zaps
only leaf SPTEs that are within the range of
the memslot being deleted.
KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL By default, for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM VMs, KVM
invalidates all SPTEs in all memslots and
address spaces when a memslot is deleted or
moved. When this quirk is disabled (or the
VM type isn't KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM), KVM only
ensures the backing memory of the deleted
or moved memslot isn't reachable, i.e KVM
_may_ invalidate only SPTEs related to the
memslot.
=================================== ============================================
7.32 KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID
+1 -1
View File
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ For direct sp, we can easily avoid it since the spte of direct sp is fixed
to gfn. For indirect sp, we disabled fast page fault for simplicity.
A solution for indirect sp could be to pin the gfn, for example via
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic, before the cmpxchg. After the pinning:
gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic, before the cmpxchg. After the pinning:
- We have held the refcount of pfn; that means the pfn can not be freed and
be reused for another gfn.
+1
View File
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ struct kvm_nvhe_init_params {
unsigned long hcr_el2;
unsigned long vttbr;
unsigned long vtcr;
unsigned long tmp;
};
/*
+7
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#define KVM_REQ_RELOAD_PMU KVM_ARCH_REQ(5)
#define KVM_REQ_SUSPEND KVM_ARCH_REQ(6)
#define KVM_REQ_RESYNC_PMU_EL0 KVM_ARCH_REQ(7)
#define KVM_REQ_NESTED_S2_UNMAP KVM_ARCH_REQ(8)
#define KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_CAPS (KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_PROTECT_ENABLE | \
KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET)
@@ -211,6 +212,12 @@ struct kvm_s2_mmu {
*/
bool nested_stage2_enabled;
/*
* true when this MMU needs to be unmapped before being used for a new
* purpose.
*/
bool pending_unmap;
/*
* 0: Nobody is currently using this, check vttbr for validity
* >0: Somebody is actively using this.
+2 -1
View File
@@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ int create_hyp_exec_mappings(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size,
int create_hyp_stack(phys_addr_t phys_addr, unsigned long *haddr);
void __init free_hyp_pgds(void);
void kvm_stage2_unmap_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start, u64 size);
void kvm_stage2_unmap_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start,
u64 size, bool may_block);
void kvm_stage2_flush_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t addr, phys_addr_t end);
void kvm_stage2_wp_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t addr, phys_addr_t end);
+3 -1
View File
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ extern void kvm_s2_mmu_iterate_by_vmid(struct kvm *kvm, u16 vmid,
extern void kvm_vcpu_load_hw_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
extern void kvm_vcpu_put_hw_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
extern void check_nested_vcpu_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
struct kvm_s2_trans {
phys_addr_t output;
unsigned long block_size;
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ extern int kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_s2_trans *trans);
extern int kvm_inject_s2_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 esr_el2);
extern void kvm_nested_s2_wp(struct kvm *kvm);
extern void kvm_nested_s2_unmap(struct kvm *kvm);
extern void kvm_nested_s2_unmap(struct kvm *kvm, bool may_block);
extern void kvm_nested_s2_flush(struct kvm *kvm);
unsigned long compute_tlb_inval_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, u64 val);
+1
View File
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ int main(void)
DEFINE(NVHE_INIT_HCR_EL2, offsetof(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, hcr_el2));
DEFINE(NVHE_INIT_VTTBR, offsetof(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, vttbr));
DEFINE(NVHE_INIT_VTCR, offsetof(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, vtcr));
DEFINE(NVHE_INIT_TMP, offsetof(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, tmp));
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PM
DEFINE(CPU_CTX_SP, offsetof(struct cpu_suspend_ctx, sp));
+5
View File
@@ -997,6 +997,9 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static int check_vcpu_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu)) {
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD, vcpu))
return -EIO;
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SLEEP, vcpu))
kvm_vcpu_sleep(vcpu);
@@ -1031,6 +1034,8 @@ static int check_vcpu_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (kvm_dirty_ring_check_request(vcpu))
return 0;
check_nested_vcpu_requests(vcpu);
}
return 1;
+29 -23
View File
@@ -24,28 +24,25 @@
.align 11
SYM_CODE_START(__kvm_hyp_init)
ventry __invalid // Synchronous EL2t
ventry __invalid // IRQ EL2t
ventry __invalid // FIQ EL2t
ventry __invalid // Error EL2t
ventry . // Synchronous EL2t
ventry . // IRQ EL2t
ventry . // FIQ EL2t
ventry . // Error EL2t
ventry __invalid // Synchronous EL2h
ventry __invalid // IRQ EL2h
ventry __invalid // FIQ EL2h
ventry __invalid // Error EL2h
ventry . // Synchronous EL2h
ventry . // IRQ EL2h
ventry . // FIQ EL2h
ventry . // Error EL2h
ventry __do_hyp_init // Synchronous 64-bit EL1
ventry __invalid // IRQ 64-bit EL1
ventry __invalid // FIQ 64-bit EL1
ventry __invalid // Error 64-bit EL1
ventry . // IRQ 64-bit EL1
ventry . // FIQ 64-bit EL1
ventry . // Error 64-bit EL1
ventry __invalid // Synchronous 32-bit EL1
ventry __invalid // IRQ 32-bit EL1
ventry __invalid // FIQ 32-bit EL1
ventry __invalid // Error 32-bit EL1
__invalid:
b .
ventry . // Synchronous 32-bit EL1
ventry . // IRQ 32-bit EL1
ventry . // FIQ 32-bit EL1
ventry . // Error 32-bit EL1
/*
* Only uses x0..x3 so as to not clobber callee-saved SMCCC registers.
@@ -76,6 +73,13 @@ __do_hyp_init:
eret
SYM_CODE_END(__kvm_hyp_init)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(__kvm_init_el2_state)
/* Initialize EL2 CPU state to sane values. */
init_el2_state // Clobbers x0..x2
finalise_el2_state
ret
SYM_CODE_END(__kvm_init_el2_state)
/*
* Initialize the hypervisor in EL2.
*
@@ -102,9 +106,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(___kvm_hyp_init)
// TPIDR_EL2 is used to preserve x0 across the macro maze...
isb
msr tpidr_el2, x0
init_el2_state
finalise_el2_state
str lr, [x0, #NVHE_INIT_TMP]
bl __kvm_init_el2_state
mrs x0, tpidr_el2
ldr lr, [x0, #NVHE_INIT_TMP]
1:
ldr x1, [x0, #NVHE_INIT_TPIDR_EL2]
@@ -199,9 +206,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(__kvm_hyp_init_cpu)
2: msr SPsel, #1 // We want to use SP_EL{1,2}
/* Initialize EL2 CPU state to sane values. */
init_el2_state // Clobbers x0..x2
finalise_el2_state
bl __kvm_init_el2_state
__init_el2_nvhe_prepare_eret
/* Enable MMU, set vectors and stack. */
+6 -6
View File
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int kvm_smccc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* to the guest, and hide SSBS so that the
* guest stays protected.
*/
if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, IMP))
break;
fallthrough;
case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
* Convert the workaround level into an easy-to-compare number, where higher
* values mean better protection.
*/
static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid)
static int get_kernel_wa_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 regid)
{
switch (regid) {
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid)
* don't have any FW mitigation if SSBS is there at
* all times.
*/
if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, IMP))
return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL;
fallthrough;
case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ int kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK;
val = get_kernel_wa_level(vcpu, reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK;
break;
case KVM_REG_ARM_STD_BMAP:
val = READ_ONCE(smccc_feat->std_bmap);
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
if (val & ~KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < val)
if (get_kernel_wa_level(vcpu, reg->id) < val)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
* We can deal with NOT_AVAIL on NOT_REQUIRED, but not the
* other way around.
*/
if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < wa_level)
if (get_kernel_wa_level(vcpu, reg->id) < wa_level)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
+8 -7
View File
@@ -328,9 +328,10 @@ static void __unmap_stage2_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start, u64
may_block));
}
void kvm_stage2_unmap_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start, u64 size)
void kvm_stage2_unmap_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start,
u64 size, bool may_block)
{
__unmap_stage2_range(mmu, start, size, true);
__unmap_stage2_range(mmu, start, size, may_block);
}
void kvm_stage2_flush_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t addr, phys_addr_t end)
@@ -1015,7 +1016,7 @@ static void stage2_unmap_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP)) {
gpa_t gpa = addr + (vm_start - memslot->userspace_addr);
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(&kvm->arch.mmu, gpa, vm_end - vm_start);
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(&kvm->arch.mmu, gpa, vm_end - vm_start, true);
}
hva = vm_end;
} while (hva < reg_end);
@@ -1042,7 +1043,7 @@ void stage2_unmap_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, bkt, slots)
stage2_unmap_memslot(kvm, memslot);
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(kvm);
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(kvm, true);
write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
@@ -1912,7 +1913,7 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
(range->end - range->start) << PAGE_SHIFT,
range->may_block);
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(kvm);
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(kvm, range->may_block);
return false;
}
@@ -2179,8 +2180,8 @@ void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
phys_addr_t size = slot->npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(&kvm->arch.mmu, gpa, size);
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(kvm);
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(&kvm->arch.mmu, gpa, size, true);
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(kvm, true);
write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
}
+46 -7
View File
@@ -632,9 +632,9 @@ static struct kvm_s2_mmu *get_s2_mmu_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* Set the scene for the next search */
kvm->arch.nested_mmus_next = (i + 1) % kvm->arch.nested_mmus_size;
/* Clear the old state */
/* Make sure we don't forget to do the laundry */
if (kvm_s2_mmu_valid(s2_mmu))
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(s2_mmu, 0, kvm_phys_size(s2_mmu));
s2_mmu->pending_unmap = true;
/*
* The virtual VMID (modulo CnP) will be used as a key when matching
@@ -650,6 +650,16 @@ static struct kvm_s2_mmu *get_s2_mmu_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
out:
atomic_inc(&s2_mmu->refcnt);
/*
* Set the vCPU request to perform an unmap, even if the pending unmap
* originates from another vCPU. This guarantees that the MMU has been
* completely unmapped before any vCPU actually uses it, and allows
* multiple vCPUs to lend a hand with completing the unmap.
*/
if (s2_mmu->pending_unmap)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_NESTED_S2_UNMAP, vcpu);
return s2_mmu;
}
@@ -663,6 +673,13 @@ void kvm_init_nested_s2_mmu(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
void kvm_vcpu_load_hw_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
* The vCPU kept its reference on the MMU after the last put, keep
* rolling with it.
*/
if (vcpu->arch.hw_mmu)
return;
if (is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu)) {
vcpu->arch.hw_mmu = &vcpu->kvm->arch.mmu;
} else {
@@ -674,10 +691,18 @@ void kvm_vcpu_load_hw_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
void kvm_vcpu_put_hw_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_is_nested_s2_mmu(vcpu->kvm, vcpu->arch.hw_mmu)) {
/*
* Keep a reference on the associated stage-2 MMU if the vCPU is
* scheduling out and not in WFI emulation, suggesting it is likely to
* reuse the MMU sometime soon.
*/
if (vcpu->scheduled_out && !vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, IN_WFI))
return;
if (kvm_is_nested_s2_mmu(vcpu->kvm, vcpu->arch.hw_mmu))
atomic_dec(&vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->refcnt);
vcpu->arch.hw_mmu = NULL;
}
vcpu->arch.hw_mmu = NULL;
}
/*
@@ -730,7 +755,7 @@ void kvm_nested_s2_wp(struct kvm *kvm)
}
}
void kvm_nested_s2_unmap(struct kvm *kvm)
void kvm_nested_s2_unmap(struct kvm *kvm, bool may_block)
{
int i;
@@ -740,7 +765,7 @@ void kvm_nested_s2_unmap(struct kvm *kvm)
struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu = &kvm->arch.nested_mmus[i];
if (kvm_s2_mmu_valid(mmu))
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, 0, kvm_phys_size(mmu));
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, 0, kvm_phys_size(mmu), may_block);
}
}
@@ -1184,3 +1209,17 @@ int kvm_init_nv_sysregs(struct kvm *kvm)
return 0;
}
void check_nested_vcpu_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_NESTED_S2_UNMAP, vcpu)) {
struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu;
write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
if (mmu->pending_unmap) {
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, 0, kvm_phys_size(mmu), true);
mmu->pending_unmap = false;
}
write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
}
}
+70 -7
View File
@@ -1527,6 +1527,14 @@ static u64 __kvm_read_sanitised_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SME);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RNDR_trap);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_NMI);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE_frac);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_THE);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTEX);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_DF2);
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_PFAR);
break;
case SYS_ID_AA64PFR2_EL1:
/* We only expose FPMR */
@@ -1550,7 +1558,8 @@ static u64 __kvm_read_sanitised_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
val &= ~ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_CCIDX_MASK;
break;
case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1:
val &= ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_TCRX | ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1POE;
val &= ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_TCRX | ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1POE |
ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1PIE;
break;
case SYS_ID_MMFR4_EL1:
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_MMFR4_EL1_CCIDX);
@@ -1985,7 +1994,7 @@ static u64 reset_clidr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
* one cache line.
*/
if (kvm_has_mte(vcpu->kvm))
clidr |= 2 << CLIDR_TTYPE_SHIFT(loc);
clidr |= 2ULL << CLIDR_TTYPE_SHIFT(loc);
__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg) = clidr;
@@ -2376,7 +2385,19 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_RAS |
ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_AdvSIMD |
ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_FP), },
ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1),
ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ~(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_PFAR |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_DF2 |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTEX |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_THE |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE_frac |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_NMI |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RNDR_trap |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SME |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RES0 |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MPAM_frac |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RAS_frac |
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE)),
ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64PFR2_EL1, ID_AA64PFR2_EL1_FPMR),
ID_UNALLOCATED(4,3),
ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, ~ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1_RES0),
@@ -2390,7 +2411,21 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
.get_user = get_id_reg,
.set_user = set_id_aa64dfr0_el1,
.reset = read_sanitised_id_aa64dfr0_el1,
.val = ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_MASK |
/*
* Prior to FEAT_Debugv8.9, the architecture defines context-aware
* breakpoints (CTX_CMPs) as the highest numbered breakpoints (BRPs).
* KVM does not trap + emulate the breakpoint registers, and as such
* cannot support a layout that misaligns with the underlying hardware.
* While it may be possible to describe a subset that aligns with
* hardware, just prevent changes to BRPs and CTX_CMPs altogether for
* simplicity.
*
* See DDI0487K.a, section D2.8.3 Breakpoint types and linking
* of breakpoints for more details.
*/
.val = ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DoubleLock_MASK |
ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_WRPs_MASK |
ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_MASK |
ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DebugVer_MASK, },
ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64DFR1_EL1),
ID_UNALLOCATED(5,2),
@@ -2433,6 +2468,7 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_NV |
ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_CCIDX)),
ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, (ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_TCRX |
ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1PIE |
ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1_S1POE)),
ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1),
ID_UNALLOCATED(7,5),
@@ -2903,7 +2939,7 @@ static bool handle_alle1is(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
* Drop all shadow S2s, resulting in S1/S2 TLBIs for each of the
* corresponding VMIDs.
*/
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(vcpu->kvm);
kvm_nested_s2_unmap(vcpu->kvm, true);
write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
@@ -2955,7 +2991,30 @@ union tlbi_info {
static void s2_mmu_unmap_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,
const union tlbi_info *info)
{
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, info->range.start, info->range.size);
/*
* The unmap operation is allowed to drop the MMU lock and block, which
* means that @mmu could be used for a different context than the one
* currently being invalidated.
*
* This behavior is still safe, as:
*
* 1) The vCPU(s) that recycled the MMU are responsible for invalidating
* the entire MMU before reusing it, which still honors the intent
* of a TLBI.
*
* 2) Until the guest TLBI instruction is 'retired' (i.e. increment PC
* and ERET to the guest), other vCPUs are allowed to use stale
* translations.
*
* 3) Accidentally unmapping an unrelated MMU context is nonfatal, and
* at worst may cause more aborts for shadow stage-2 fills.
*
* Dropping the MMU lock also implies that shadow stage-2 fills could
* happen behind the back of the TLBI. This is still safe, though, as
* the L1 needs to put its stage-2 in a consistent state before doing
* the TLBI.
*/
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, info->range.start, info->range.size, true);
}
static bool handle_vmalls12e1is(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
@@ -3050,7 +3109,11 @@ static void s2_mmu_unmap_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,
max_size = compute_tlb_inval_range(mmu, info->ipa.addr);
base_addr &= ~(max_size - 1);
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, base_addr, max_size);
/*
* See comment in s2_mmu_unmap_range() for why this is allowed to
* reschedule.
*/
kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, base_addr, max_size, true);
}
static bool handle_ipas2e1is(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
+35 -6
View File
@@ -417,8 +417,28 @@ static void __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kfree(vgic_cpu->private_irqs);
vgic_cpu->private_irqs = NULL;
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.vgic.vgic_model == KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3)
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.vgic.vgic_model == KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3) {
/*
* If this vCPU is being destroyed because of a failed creation
* then unregister the redistributor to avoid leaving behind a
* dangling pointer to the vCPU struct.
*
* vCPUs that have been successfully created (i.e. added to
* kvm->vcpu_array) get unregistered in kvm_vgic_destroy(), as
* this function gets called while holding kvm->arch.config_lock
* in the VM teardown path and would otherwise introduce a lock
* inversion w.r.t. kvm->srcu.
*
* vCPUs that failed creation are torn down outside of the
* kvm->arch.config_lock and do not get unregistered in
* kvm_vgic_destroy(), meaning it is both safe and necessary to
* do so here.
*/
if (kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(vcpu->kvm, vcpu->vcpu_id) != vcpu)
vgic_unregister_redist_iodev(vcpu);
vgic_cpu->rd_iodev.base_addr = VGIC_ADDR_UNDEF;
}
}
void kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -524,22 +544,31 @@ int kvm_vgic_map_resources(struct kvm *kvm)
if (ret)
goto out;
dist->ready = true;
dist_base = dist->vgic_dist_base;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.config_lock);
ret = vgic_register_dist_iodev(kvm, dist_base, type);
if (ret)
if (ret) {
kvm_err("Unable to register VGIC dist MMIO regions\n");
goto out_slots;
}
/*
* kvm_io_bus_register_dev() guarantees all readers see the new MMIO
* registration before returning through synchronize_srcu(), which also
* implies a full memory barrier. As such, marking the distributor as
* 'ready' here is guaranteed to be ordered after all vCPUs having seen
* a completely configured distributor.
*/
dist->ready = true;
goto out_slots;
out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.config_lock);
out_slots:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
if (ret)
kvm_vgic_destroy(kvm);
kvm_vm_dead(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
return ret;
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -236,7 +236,12 @@ static int vgic_set_common_attr(struct kvm_device *dev,
mutex_lock(&dev->kvm->arch.config_lock);
if (vgic_ready(dev->kvm) || dev->kvm->arch.vgic.nr_spis)
/*
* Either userspace has already configured NR_IRQS or
* the vgic has already been initialized and vgic_init()
* supplied a default amount of SPIs.
*/
if (dev->kvm->arch.vgic.nr_spis)
ret = -EBUSY;
else
dev->kvm->arch.vgic.nr_spis =
+4 -4
View File
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ struct imsic {
/* IMSIC SW-file */
struct imsic_mrif *swfile;
phys_addr_t swfile_pa;
spinlock_t swfile_extirq_lock;
raw_spinlock_t swfile_extirq_lock;
};
#define imsic_vs_csr_read(__c) \
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static void imsic_swfile_extirq_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* interruptions between reading topei and updating pending status.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&imsic->swfile_extirq_lock, flags);
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&imsic->swfile_extirq_lock, flags);
if (imsic_mrif_atomic_read(mrif, &mrif->eidelivery) &&
imsic_mrif_topei(mrif, imsic->nr_eix, imsic->nr_msis))
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static void imsic_swfile_extirq_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
else
kvm_riscv_vcpu_unset_interrupt(vcpu, IRQ_VS_EXT);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&imsic->swfile_extirq_lock, flags);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&imsic->swfile_extirq_lock, flags);
}
static void imsic_swfile_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool clear,
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ int kvm_riscv_vcpu_aia_imsic_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
imsic->swfile = page_to_virt(swfile_page);
imsic->swfile_pa = page_to_phys(swfile_page);
spin_lock_init(&imsic->swfile_extirq_lock);
raw_spin_lock_init(&imsic->swfile_extirq_lock);
/* Setup IO device */
kvm_iodevice_init(&imsic->iodev, &imsic_iodoev_ops);
+4
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/apicdef.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
#include <asm/cpuidle_haltpoll.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -980,6 +981,9 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)
}
kvmclock_init();
x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init;
/* Set WB as the default cache mode for SEV-SNP and TDX */
mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
}
#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
+17 -10
View File
@@ -1556,6 +1556,17 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
{
bool flush = false;
/*
* To prevent races with vCPUs faulting in a gfn using stale data,
* zapping a gfn range must be protected by mmu_invalidate_in_progress
* (and mmu_invalidate_seq). The only exception is memslot deletion;
* in that case, SRCU synchronization ensures that SPTEs are zapped
* after all vCPUs have unlocked SRCU, guaranteeing that vCPUs see the
* invalid slot.
*/
lockdep_assert_once(kvm->mmu_invalidate_in_progress ||
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->slots_lock));
if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
flush = __kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(kvm, range->slot,
range->start, range->end,
@@ -1884,14 +1895,10 @@ static bool sp_has_gptes(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
if (is_obsolete_sp((_kvm), (_sp))) { \
} else
#define for_each_gfn_valid_sp(_kvm, _sp, _gfn) \
#define for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(_kvm, _sp, _gfn) \
for_each_valid_sp(_kvm, _sp, \
&(_kvm)->arch.mmu_page_hash[kvm_page_table_hashfn(_gfn)]) \
if ((_sp)->gfn != (_gfn)) {} else
#define for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(_kvm, _sp, _gfn) \
for_each_gfn_valid_sp(_kvm, _sp, _gfn) \
if (!sp_has_gptes(_sp)) {} else
if ((_sp)->gfn != (_gfn) || !sp_has_gptes(_sp)) {} else
static bool kvm_sync_page_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
@@ -7063,15 +7070,15 @@ static void kvm_mmu_zap_memslot_pages_and_flush(struct kvm *kvm,
/*
* Since accounting information is stored in struct kvm_arch_memory_slot,
* shadow pages deletion (e.g. unaccount_shadowed()) requires that all
* gfns with a shadow page have a corresponding memslot. Do so before
* the memslot goes away.
* all MMU pages that are shadowing guest PTEs must be zapped before the
* memslot is deleted, as freeing such pages after the memslot is freed
* will result in use-after-free, e.g. in unaccount_shadowed().
*/
for (i = 0; i < slot->npages; i++) {
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
gfn_t gfn = slot->base_gfn + i;
for_each_gfn_valid_sp(kvm, sp, gfn)
for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(kvm, sp, gfn)
kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list);
if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+5 -1
View File
@@ -63,8 +63,12 @@ static u64 nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index)
u64 pdpte;
int ret;
/*
* Note, nCR3 is "assumed" to be 32-byte aligned, i.e. the CPU ignores
* nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory.
*/
ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(cr3), &pdpte,
offset_in_page(cr3) + index * 8, 8);
(cr3 & GENMASK(11, 5)) + index * 8, 8);
if (ret)
return 0;
return pdpte;
+3 -3
View File
@@ -4888,9 +4888,6 @@ void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000ul);
@@ -4917,6 +4914,9 @@ void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
+2
View File
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ struct afs_call {
wait_queue_head_t waitq; /* processes awaiting completion */
struct work_struct async_work; /* async I/O processor */
struct work_struct work; /* actual work processor */
struct work_struct free_work; /* Deferred free processor */
struct rxrpc_call *rxcall; /* RxRPC call handle */
struct rxrpc_peer *peer; /* Remote endpoint */
struct key *key; /* security for this call */
@@ -1331,6 +1332,7 @@ extern int __net_init afs_open_socket(struct afs_net *);
extern void __net_exit afs_close_socket(struct afs_net *);
extern void afs_charge_preallocation(struct work_struct *);
extern void afs_put_call(struct afs_call *);
void afs_deferred_put_call(struct afs_call *call);
void afs_make_call(struct afs_call *call, gfp_t gfp);
void afs_wait_for_call_to_complete(struct afs_call *call);
extern struct afs_call *afs_alloc_flat_call(struct afs_net *,
+59 -24
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct workqueue_struct *afs_async_calls;
static void afs_deferred_free_worker(struct work_struct *work);
static void afs_wake_up_call_waiter(struct sock *, struct rxrpc_call *, unsigned long);
static void afs_wake_up_async_call(struct sock *, struct rxrpc_call *, unsigned long);
static void afs_process_async_call(struct work_struct *);
@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ static struct afs_call *afs_alloc_call(struct afs_net *net,
call->debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&rxrpc_debug_id);
refcount_set(&call->ref, 1);
INIT_WORK(&call->async_work, afs_process_async_call);
INIT_WORK(&call->free_work, afs_deferred_free_worker);
init_waitqueue_head(&call->waitq);
spin_lock_init(&call->state_lock);
call->iter = &call->def_iter;
@@ -159,6 +161,36 @@ static struct afs_call *afs_alloc_call(struct afs_net *net,
return call;
}
static void afs_free_call(struct afs_call *call)
{
struct afs_net *net = call->net;
int o;
ASSERT(!work_pending(&call->async_work));
rxrpc_kernel_put_peer(call->peer);
if (call->rxcall) {
rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call(net->socket, call->rxcall);
rxrpc_kernel_put_call(net->socket, call->rxcall);
call->rxcall = NULL;
}
if (call->type->destructor)
call->type->destructor(call);
afs_unuse_server_notime(call->net, call->server, afs_server_trace_put_call);
kfree(call->request);
o = atomic_read(&net->nr_outstanding_calls);
trace_afs_call(call->debug_id, afs_call_trace_free, 0, o,
__builtin_return_address(0));
kfree(call);
o = atomic_dec_return(&net->nr_outstanding_calls);
if (o == 0)
wake_up_var(&net->nr_outstanding_calls);
}
/*
* Dispose of a reference on a call.
*/
@@ -173,32 +205,34 @@ void afs_put_call(struct afs_call *call)
o = atomic_read(&net->nr_outstanding_calls);
trace_afs_call(debug_id, afs_call_trace_put, r - 1, o,
__builtin_return_address(0));
if (zero)
afs_free_call(call);
}
if (zero) {
ASSERT(!work_pending(&call->async_work));
ASSERT(call->type->name != NULL);
static void afs_deferred_free_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct afs_call *call = container_of(work, struct afs_call, free_work);
rxrpc_kernel_put_peer(call->peer);
afs_free_call(call);
}
if (call->rxcall) {
rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call(net->socket, call->rxcall);
rxrpc_kernel_put_call(net->socket, call->rxcall);
call->rxcall = NULL;
}
if (call->type->destructor)
call->type->destructor(call);
/*
* Dispose of a reference on a call, deferring the cleanup to a workqueue
* to avoid lock recursion.
*/
void afs_deferred_put_call(struct afs_call *call)
{
struct afs_net *net = call->net;
unsigned int debug_id = call->debug_id;
bool zero;
int r, o;
afs_unuse_server_notime(call->net, call->server, afs_server_trace_put_call);
kfree(call->request);
trace_afs_call(call->debug_id, afs_call_trace_free, 0, o,
__builtin_return_address(0));
kfree(call);
o = atomic_dec_return(&net->nr_outstanding_calls);
if (o == 0)
wake_up_var(&net->nr_outstanding_calls);
}
zero = __refcount_dec_and_test(&call->ref, &r);
o = atomic_read(&net->nr_outstanding_calls);
trace_afs_call(debug_id, afs_call_trace_put, r - 1, o,
__builtin_return_address(0));
if (zero)
schedule_work(&call->free_work);
}
static struct afs_call *afs_get_call(struct afs_call *call,
@@ -640,7 +674,8 @@ static void afs_wake_up_call_waiter(struct sock *sk, struct rxrpc_call *rxcall,
}
/*
* wake up an asynchronous call
* Wake up an asynchronous call. The caller is holding the call notify
* spinlock around this, so we can't call afs_put_call().
*/
static void afs_wake_up_async_call(struct sock *sk, struct rxrpc_call *rxcall,
unsigned long call_user_ID)
@@ -657,7 +692,7 @@ static void afs_wake_up_async_call(struct sock *sk, struct rxrpc_call *rxcall,
__builtin_return_address(0));
if (!queue_work(afs_async_calls, &call->async_work))
afs_put_call(call);
afs_deferred_put_call(call);
}
}
+3 -1
View File
@@ -3944,7 +3944,9 @@ struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(unsigned long flags, struct mnt_namespace *ns,
new = copy_tree(old, old->mnt.mnt_root, copy_flags);
if (IS_ERR(new)) {
namespace_unlock();
free_mnt_ns(new_ns);
ns_free_inum(&new_ns->ns);
dec_mnt_namespaces(new_ns->ucounts);
mnt_ns_release(new_ns);
return ERR_CAST(new);
}
if (user_ns != ns->user_ns) {
+14 -33
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ static int netfs_begin_cache_read(struct netfs_io_request *rreq, struct netfs_in
* Decant the list of folios to read into a rolling buffer.
*/
static size_t netfs_load_buffer_from_ra(struct netfs_io_request *rreq,
struct folio_queue *folioq)
struct folio_queue *folioq,
struct folio_batch *put_batch)
{
unsigned int order, nr;
size_t size = 0;
@@ -82,6 +83,9 @@ static size_t netfs_load_buffer_from_ra(struct netfs_io_request *rreq,
order = folio_order(folio);
folioq->orders[i] = order;
size += PAGE_SIZE << order;
if (!folio_batch_add(put_batch, folio))
folio_batch_release(put_batch);
}
for (int i = nr; i < folioq_nr_slots(folioq); i++)
@@ -120,6 +124,9 @@ static ssize_t netfs_prepare_read_iterator(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq)
* that we will need to release later - but we don't want to do
* that until after we've started the I/O.
*/
struct folio_batch put_batch;
folio_batch_init(&put_batch);
while (rreq->submitted < subreq->start + rsize) {
struct folio_queue *tail = rreq->buffer_tail, *new;
size_t added;
@@ -132,10 +139,11 @@ static ssize_t netfs_prepare_read_iterator(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq)
new->prev = tail;
tail->next = new;
rreq->buffer_tail = new;
added = netfs_load_buffer_from_ra(rreq, new);
added = netfs_load_buffer_from_ra(rreq, new, &put_batch);
rreq->iter.count += added;
rreq->submitted += added;
}
folio_batch_release(&put_batch);
}
subreq->len = rsize;
@@ -348,6 +356,7 @@ static int netfs_wait_for_read(struct netfs_io_request *rreq)
static int netfs_prime_buffer(struct netfs_io_request *rreq)
{
struct folio_queue *folioq;
struct folio_batch put_batch;
size_t added;
folioq = kmalloc(sizeof(*folioq), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -360,39 +369,14 @@ static int netfs_prime_buffer(struct netfs_io_request *rreq)
rreq->submitted = rreq->start;
iov_iter_folio_queue(&rreq->iter, ITER_DEST, folioq, 0, 0, 0);
added = netfs_load_buffer_from_ra(rreq, folioq);
folio_batch_init(&put_batch);
added = netfs_load_buffer_from_ra(rreq, folioq, &put_batch);
folio_batch_release(&put_batch);
rreq->iter.count += added;
rreq->submitted += added;
return 0;
}
/*
* Drop the ref on each folio that we inherited from the VM readahead code. We
* still have the folio locks to pin the page until we complete the I/O.
*
* Note that we can't just release the batch in each queue struct as we use the
* occupancy count in other places.
*/
static void netfs_put_ra_refs(struct folio_queue *folioq)
{
struct folio_batch fbatch;
folio_batch_init(&fbatch);
while (folioq) {
for (unsigned int slot = 0; slot < folioq_count(folioq); slot++) {
struct folio *folio = folioq_folio(folioq, slot);
if (!folio)
continue;
trace_netfs_folio(folio, netfs_folio_trace_read_put);
if (!folio_batch_add(&fbatch, folio))
folio_batch_release(&fbatch);
}
folioq = folioq->next;
}
folio_batch_release(&fbatch);
}
/**
* netfs_readahead - Helper to manage a read request
* @ractl: The description of the readahead request
@@ -436,9 +420,6 @@ void netfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *ractl)
goto cleanup_free;
netfs_read_to_pagecache(rreq);
/* Release the folio refs whilst we're waiting for the I/O. */
netfs_put_ra_refs(rreq->buffer);
netfs_put_request(rreq, true, netfs_rreq_trace_put_return);
return;
+2 -1
View File
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ int netfs_start_io_write(struct inode *inode)
up_write(&inode->i_rwsem);
return -ERESTARTSYS;
}
downgrade_write(&inode->i_rwsem);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(netfs_start_io_write);
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(netfs_start_io_write);
void netfs_end_io_write(struct inode *inode)
__releases(inode->i_rwsem)
{
up_write(&inode->i_rwsem);
up_read(&inode->i_rwsem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(netfs_end_io_write);
+2
View File
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ static void netfs_unlock_read_folio(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq,
folio_unlock(folio);
}
}
folioq_clear(folioq, slot);
}
/*
+4 -2
View File
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ void nilfs_forget_buffer(struct buffer_head *bh)
const unsigned long clear_bits =
(BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) |
BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) |
BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected));
BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) |
BIT(BH_Delay));
lock_buffer(bh);
set_mask_bits(&bh->b_state, clear_bits, 0);
@@ -406,7 +407,8 @@ void nilfs_clear_folio_dirty(struct folio *folio)
const unsigned long clear_bits =
(BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) |
BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) |
BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected));
BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) |
BIT(BH_Delay));
bh = head;
do {
+6 -3
View File
@@ -1129,9 +1129,12 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
trace_ocfs2_setattr(inode, dentry,
(unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
dentry->d_name.len, dentry->d_name.name,
attr->ia_valid, attr->ia_mode,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, attr->ia_uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, attr->ia_gid));
attr->ia_valid,
attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE ? attr->ia_mode : 0,
attr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID ?
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, attr->ia_uid) : 0,
attr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID ?
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, attr->ia_gid) : 0);
/* ensuring we don't even attempt to truncate a symlink */
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
+2
View File
@@ -1457,6 +1457,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(openat2, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename,
if (unlikely(usize < OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(usize > PAGE_SIZE))
return -E2BIG;
err = copy_struct_from_user(&tmp, sizeof(tmp), how, usize);
if (err)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
return single_open(file, seq_show, inode);
}
/**
/*
* Shared /proc/pid/fdinfo and /proc/pid/fdinfo/fd permission helper to ensure
* that the current task has PTRACE_MODE_READ in addition to the normal
* POSIX-like checks.
-2
View File
@@ -1313,8 +1313,6 @@ void mark_page_dirty(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn);
struct kvm_memslots *kvm_vcpu_memslots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
struct kvm_memory_slot *kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
kvm_pfn_t kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
kvm_pfn_t kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
int kvm_vcpu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, struct kvm_host_map *map);
void kvm_vcpu_unmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_host_map *map, bool dirty);
unsigned long kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
-1
View File
@@ -172,7 +172,6 @@
EM(netfs_folio_trace_read, "read") \
EM(netfs_folio_trace_read_done, "read-done") \
EM(netfs_folio_trace_read_gaps, "read-gaps") \
EM(netfs_folio_trace_read_put, "read-put") \
EM(netfs_folio_trace_read_unlock, "read-unlock") \
EM(netfs_folio_trace_redirtied, "redirtied") \
EM(netfs_folio_trace_store, "store") \
+6 -3
View File
@@ -875,6 +875,7 @@ struct uprobe_cpu_buffer {
};
static struct uprobe_cpu_buffer __percpu *uprobe_cpu_buffer;
static int uprobe_buffer_refcnt;
#define MAX_UCB_BUFFER_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
static int uprobe_buffer_init(void)
{
@@ -979,6 +980,11 @@ static struct uprobe_cpu_buffer *prepare_uprobe_buffer(struct trace_uprobe *tu,
ucb = uprobe_buffer_get();
ucb->dsize = tu->tp.size + dsize;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ucb->dsize > MAX_UCB_BUFFER_SIZE)) {
ucb->dsize = MAX_UCB_BUFFER_SIZE;
dsize = MAX_UCB_BUFFER_SIZE - tu->tp.size;
}
store_trace_args(ucb->buf, &tu->tp, regs, NULL, esize, dsize);
*ucbp = ucb;
@@ -998,9 +1004,6 @@ static void __uprobe_trace_func(struct trace_uprobe *tu,
WARN_ON(call != trace_file->event_call);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ucb->dsize > PAGE_SIZE))
return;
if (trace_trigger_soft_disabled(trace_file))
return;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ int mpi_mul(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v)
int usign, vsign, sign_product;
int assign_wp = 0;
mpi_ptr_t tmp_limb = NULL;
int err;
int err = 0;
if (u->nlimbs < v->nlimbs) {
/* Swap U and V. */
+3 -1
View File
@@ -977,6 +977,7 @@ error:
struct p9_client *p9_client_create(const char *dev_name, char *options)
{
int err;
static atomic_t seqno = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
struct p9_client *clnt;
char *client_id;
char *cache_name;
@@ -1036,7 +1037,8 @@ struct p9_client *p9_client_create(const char *dev_name, char *options)
if (err)
goto close_trans;
cache_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "9p-fcall-cache-%s", dev_name);
cache_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL,
"9p-fcall-cache-%u", atomic_inc_return(&seqno));
if (!cache_name) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto close_trans;
+3
View File
@@ -248,6 +248,9 @@ CFLAGS += -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -Wuninitialized -O2 -g -std=gnu99 \
ifeq ($(ARCH),s390)
CFLAGS += -march=z10
endif
ifeq ($(ARCH),x86)
CFLAGS += -march=x86-64-v2
endif
ifeq ($(ARCH),arm64)
tools_dir := $(top_srcdir)/tools
arm64_tools_dir := $(tools_dir)/arch/arm64/tools/
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ struct test_feature_reg {
}
static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64dfr0_el1[] = {
S_REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, DoubleLock, 0),
REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, WRPs, 0),
S_REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, PMUVer, 0),
REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, DebugVer, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DebugVer_IMP),
REG_FTR_END,
@@ -134,6 +136,13 @@ static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0_el1[] = {
REG_FTR_END,
};
static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr1_el1[] = {
REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, CSV2_frac, 0),
REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SSBS_NI),
REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, BT, 0),
REG_FTR_END,
};
static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1[] = {
REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ECV, 0),
REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, EXS, 0),
@@ -200,6 +209,7 @@ static struct test_feature_reg test_regs[] = {
TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar1_el1),
TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar2_el1),
TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64pfr0_el1),
TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64pfr1_el1),
TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1),
TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr1_el1),
TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr2_el1),
@@ -569,9 +579,9 @@ int main(void)
test_cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64dfr0_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_dfr0_el1) +
ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64isar0_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64isar1_el1) +
ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64isar2_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64pfr0_el1) +
ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr1_el1) +
ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr2_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64zfr0_el1) -
ARRAY_SIZE(test_regs) + 2;
ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64pfr1_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1) +
ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr1_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr2_el1) +
ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64zfr0_el1) - ARRAY_SIZE(test_regs) + 2;
ksft_set_plan(test_cnt);
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static bool is_cpuid_mangled(const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entrie)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mangled_cpuids); i++) {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mangled_cpuids); i++) {
if (mangled_cpuids[i].function == entrie->function &&
mangled_cpuids[i].index == entrie->index)
return true;
-12
View File
@@ -3035,24 +3035,12 @@ kvm_pfn_t gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gf
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic);
kvm_pfn_t kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn), gfn);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn_atomic);
kvm_pfn_t gfn_to_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_pfn_memslot(gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn), gfn);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gfn_to_pfn);
kvm_pfn_t kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_pfn_memslot(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn), gfn);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn);
int gfn_to_page_many_atomic(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
struct page **pages, int nr_pages)
{