Linux 5.2.7

commit 4c92057661 upstream

Add documentation to the Spectre document about the new swapgs variant of
Spectre v1.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
+   spectre
    l1tf
    mds

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,769 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Spectre Side Channels
+=====================
+
+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
+
+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+    - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
+
+    - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
+
+    - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
+
+    - Higher end ARM processors
+
+    - Apple CPUs
+
+    - Higher end MIPS CPUs
+
+    - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
+
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+   CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1
+   CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2
+   CVE-2019-1125   Spectre v1 swapgs        Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
+
+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
+:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
+---------------------------------------
+
+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
+leak information to the attacker.
+
+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+
+Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
+only about user-controlled array bounds checks.  It can affect any
+conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
+handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic
+in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
+a user GS.
+
+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`.  The indirect
+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
+execution can be measured to infer data values.
+
+.. _poison_btb:
+
+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
+code with the same offset.
+
+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
+the attack revealing useful data.
+
+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget.  An attacker's
+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
+return instructions.  This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
+
+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core.  A malicious
+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
+victim's data.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
+not cover all possible attack vectors.
+
+1. A user process attacking the kernel
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
+   via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
+   be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
+   a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack.  The index or pointer
+   is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
+   for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
+   accessed and leaked.
+
+   For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
+   potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
+   macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the
+   swapgs path for an interrupt or exception.  If they initialize
+   the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively
+   skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation
+   window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value.  This
+   could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.
+
+   For example:
+
+   ::
+
+     if (coming from user space)
+         swapgs
+     mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
+     mov (%reg), %reg1
+
+   When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the
+   swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS
+   value.  So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel
+   value.  If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address
+   in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may
+   become visible via an L1 side channel attack.
+
+   A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
+   speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the
+   rest of the speculative window.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+   target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
+   After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
+   target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
+   execution.
+
+   If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
+   speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
+   gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
+   the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
+
+   The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
+   target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
+   "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
+   indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
+   to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
+   x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
+   (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
+   mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
+   more efficient than retpoline.
+
+   There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
+   Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
+   attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
+   is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
+
+2. A user process attacking another user process
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
+   either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
+   sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
+   multi-threading (SMT) system.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
+   between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
+   as remote procedure calls (RPC).  Those parameters are used in gadget
+   code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
+   the attacked process.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer.  This can
+   influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
+   runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
+   a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
+
+   A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
+   by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
+   for itself.  An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
+   from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
+   indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
+   from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
+   target buffer.  When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
+   indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
+   Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
+   sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer.  In addition,
+   the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
+   branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
+
+   On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
+   This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
+   prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
+   a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
+   left by the previous process will also be cleared.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
+   more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
+
+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
+   kernel.  The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
+   exit paths.
+
+   For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
+   (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
+   speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel.  For places
+   where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
+   are used to stop speculative memory access.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
+   <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
+   the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
+
+   To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
+   for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
+   and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit.  This prevents rogue
+   guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
+
+   To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
+   indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl().  The branch target
+   buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
+
+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
+   other guest.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
+   between guests.  This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
+   or message passing.  Such parameters could be used to derive data
+   pointers to privileged data in guest.  The privileged data could be
+   accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
+   stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
+   speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
+
+   Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
+   CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
+   and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
+
+   If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
+   in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
+   by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
+   prctl().  A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
+   based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
+
+.. _spectre_sys_info:
+
+Spectre system information
+--------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'
+       - The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has
+         protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.
+     * - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'
+       - Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE
+         barriers.
+
+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
+variant 1 are covered.
+
+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
+
+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
+attack between user processes:
+
+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
+   isolation between processes of different users.
+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
+   isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
+
+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
+per process on a case-by-case base.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  - Kernel status:
+
+  ====================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                        The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Vulnerable'                          Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline'  Software-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline'      AMD-specific software mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'           Hardware-focused mitigation
+  ====================================  =================================
+
+  - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
+    used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
+
+  ========== =============================================================
+  'IBRS_FW'  Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
+  ========== =============================================================
+
+  - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
+    processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
+    an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ===================   ========================================================
+  'IBPB: disabled'      IBPB unused
+  'IBPB: always-on'     Use IBPB on all tasks
+  'IBPB: conditional'   Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ===================   ========================================================
+
+  - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
+    between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
+    only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ====================  ========================================================
+  'STIBP: disabled'     STIBP unused
+  'STIBP: forced'       Use STIBP on all tasks
+  'STIBP: conditional'  Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ====================  ========================================================
+
+  - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
+
+  =============   ===========================================
+  'RSB filling'   Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
+  =============   ===========================================
+
+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
+report vulnerability.
+
+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+1. Kernel mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
+   by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
+   basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
+   <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
+   not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+
+   Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
+   check from being mis-speculated.  The barrier is done by the
+   barrier_nospec() macro.
+
+   For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
+   added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed.  These
+   barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and
+   FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
+   jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
+   :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
+   addresses.  Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
+   in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
+   a gadget.
+
+   To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
+   needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
+   -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
+   If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
+   to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
+   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
+   the latest updated microcode.
+
+   On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
+   cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
+
+   On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
+   IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+   The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
+   CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
+   via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
+   before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
+   using the firmware.
+
+   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+   and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
+   attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
+
+2. User program mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
+   clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
+   can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
+   This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
+   target buffer left by malicious software.  Alternatively, the
+   programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
+   sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
+   flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
+
+   Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
+   also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
+   on x86.  All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
+   speculation restricted by default.  Administrators can change
+   that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+   See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
+   more overhead and run slower.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization
+   (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
+   difficult.
+
+3. VM mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
+   mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
+   uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
+   usable disclosure gadgets.  However, this may not cover all variant
+   1 attack vectors.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
+   Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
+   poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests.  It also
+   flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
+   stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
+   or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
+   the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
+   to a new guest on a CPU.
+
+   The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
+   in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
+   its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
+
+   The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
+   they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
+
+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
+kernel command line.
+
+	nospectre_v1
+
+		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+		possible in the system.
+
+	nospectre_v2
+
+		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+		allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+		to spectre_v2=off.
+
+
+        spectre_v2=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+		The default operation protects the kernel from
+		user space attacks.
+
+		on
+			unconditionally enable, implies
+			spectre_v2_user=on
+		off
+			unconditionally disable, implies
+		        spectre_v2_user=off
+		auto
+			kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+		        vulnerable
+
+		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+		mitigation method at run time according to the
+		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+		compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+		against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+		Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+		the user space protections.
+
+		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+		retpoline
+					replace indirect branches
+		retpoline,generic
+					google's original retpoline
+		retpoline,amd
+					AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2=auto.
+
+For user space mitigation:
+
+        spectre_v2_user=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		user space tasks
+
+		on
+			Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+		off
+			Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+		prctl
+			Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+			but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+			per thread. The mitigation control state
+			is inherited on fork.
+
+		prctl,ibpb
+			Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different user
+			space processes.
+
+		seccomp
+			Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+			threads will enable the mitigation unless
+			they explicitly opt out.
+
+		seccomp,ibpb
+			Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different
+			user space processes.
+
+		auto
+			Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+			the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+		Default mitigation:
+		If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
+		In general the kernel by default selects
+		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
+		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
+		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
+		cannot be disabled.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
+   execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
+   be disabled.
+
+2. Protect sensitive programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
+   keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
+   disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+
+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
+   off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
+   buffer.  All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
+   branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
+   changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+3. High security mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
+   at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This will add
+   overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
+   restricted.
+
+   On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
+   to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
+   against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
+   sibling threads.
+
+   Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
+   whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
+   while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
+   program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This "ibpb" option
+   has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
+   on all the time.
+
+References on Spectre
+---------------------
+
+Intel white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref1:
+
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref2:
+
+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref3:
+
+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref4:
+
+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
+
+AMD white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref5:
+
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref6:
+
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+
+ARM white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref7:
+
+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref8:
+
+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
+
+Google white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref9:
+
+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
+
+MIPS white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref10:
+
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+
+Academic papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref11:
+
+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref12:
+
+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref13:
+
+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2587,7 +2587,7 @@
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
 					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
-					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
 					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
@@ -2936,9 +2936,9 @@
 			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
 				     via the sysfs control file.
 
-	nospectre_v1	[PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
-			check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
-			in the system.
+	nospectre_v1	[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+			(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+			possible in the system.
 
 	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
 			the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
@@ -5102,12 +5102,6 @@
 			emulate     [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
 			            emulated reasonably safely.
 
-			native      Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
-			            This is a little bit faster than trapping
-			            and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
-			            better than they would in emulation mode.
-			            It also makes exploits much easier to write.
-
 			none        Vsyscalls don't work at all.  This makes
 			            them quite hard to use for exploits but
 			            might break your system.

Documentation/atomic_t.txt

@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ These helper barriers exist because architectures have varying implicit
 ordering on their SMP atomic primitives. For example our TSO architectures
 provide full ordered atomics and these barriers are no-ops.
 
+NOTE: when the atomic RmW ops are fully ordered, they should also imply a
+compiler barrier.
+
 Thus:
 
   atomic_fetch_add();

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. A Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT with
+an adapter board.
+
+Required properties:
+- compatible: "armadeus,st0700-adapt"
+- power-supply: see panel-common.txt
+
+Optional properties:
+- backlight: see panel-common.txt

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/leds/backlight/lm3630a-backlight.yaml

@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@ properties:
   reg:
     maxItems: 1
 
-  ti,linear-mapping-mode:
-    description: |
-      Enable linear mapping mode. If disabled, then it will use exponential
-      mapping mode in which the ramp up/down appears to have a more uniform
-      transition to the human eye.
-    type: boolean
+  '#address-cells':
+    const: 1
+
+  '#size-cells':
+    const: 0
 
 required:
   - compatible
   - reg
+  - '#address-cells'
+  - '#size-cells'
 
 patternProperties:
   "^led@[01]$":
@@ -48,7 +49,6 @@ patternProperties:
           in this property. The two current sinks can be controlled
           independently with both banks, or bank A can be configured to control
           both sinks with the led-sources property.
-        maxItems: 1
         minimum: 0
         maximum: 1
 
@@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ patternProperties:
         minimum: 0
         maximum: 255
 
+      ti,linear-mapping-mode:
+        description: |
+          Enable linear mapping mode. If disabled, then it will use exponential
+          mapping mode in which the ramp up/down appears to have a more uniform
+          transition to the human eye.
+        type: boolean
+
     required:
       - reg
 

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Required properties:
 
 Optional properties:
 - interrupts: interrupt line number for the SMI error/done interrupt
-- clocks: phandle for up to three required clocks for the MDIO instance
+- clocks: phandle for up to four required clocks for the MDIO instance
 
 The child nodes of the MDIO driver are the individual PHY devices
 connected to this MDIO bus. They must have a "reg" property given the

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/usb251xb.txt

@@ -64,10 +64,8 @@ Optional properties :
  - power-on-time-ms : Specifies the time it takes from the time the host
 	initiates the power-on sequence to a port until the port has adequate
 	power. The value is given in ms in a 0 - 510 range (default is 100ms).
- - swap-dx-lanes : Specifies the downstream ports which will swap the
-	differential-pair (D+/D-), default is not-swapped.
- - swap-us-lanes : Selects the upstream port differential-pair (D+/D-)
-	swapping (boolean, default is not-swapped)
+ - swap-dx-lanes : Specifies the ports which will swap the differential-pair
+	(D+/D-), default is not-swapped.
 
 Examples:
 	usb2512b@2c {

Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt.c

@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ void calc_runnable_avg_yN_inv(void)
 	int i;
 	unsigned int x;
 
-	printf("static const u32 runnable_avg_yN_inv[] = {");
+	/* To silence -Wunused-but-set-variable warnings. */
+	printf("static const u32 runnable_avg_yN_inv[] __maybe_unused = {");
 	for (i = 0; i < HALFLIFE; i++) {
 		x = ((1UL<<32)-1)*pow(y, i);
 

Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst

@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
 available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
 misfeature will fail.
 
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
 

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 2
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 7
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Bobtail Squid
 
@@ -467,6 +467,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE  := -DMODULE
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE := -T $(srctree)/scripts/module-common.lds
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS :=
 GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS :=
+CLANG_FLAGS :=
 
 export ARCH SRCARCH CONFIG_SHELL HOSTCC KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS CROSS_COMPILE AS LD CC
 export CPP AR NM STRIP OBJCOPY OBJDUMP PAHOLE KBUILD_HOSTLDFLAGS KBUILD_HOSTLDLIBS
@@ -519,7 +520,7 @@ endif
 
 ifneq ($(shell $(CC) --version 2>&1 | head -n 1 | grep clang),)
 ifneq ($(CROSS_COMPILE),)
-CLANG_FLAGS	:= --target=$(notdir $(CROSS_COMPILE:%-=%))
+CLANG_FLAGS	+= --target=$(notdir $(CROSS_COMPILE:%-=%))
 GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR := $(dir $(shell which $(CROSS_COMPILE)elfedit))
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= --prefix=$(GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR)
 GCC_TOOLCHAIN	:= $(realpath $(GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR)/..)
@@ -528,6 +529,7 @@ ifneq ($(GCC_TOOLCHAIN),)
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= --gcc-toolchain=$(GCC_TOOLCHAIN)
 endif
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= -no-integrated-as
+CLANG_FLAGS	+= -Werror=unknown-warning-option
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(CLANG_FLAGS)
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= $(CLANG_FLAGS)
 export CLANG_FLAGS

arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c

@@ -181,11 +181,6 @@ static void *__init unw_hdr_alloc_early(unsigned long sz)
 	return memblock_alloc_from(sz, sizeof(unsigned int), MAX_DMA_ADDRESS);
 }
 
-static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz)
-{
-	return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
-}
-
 static void init_unwind_table(struct unwind_table *table, const char *name,
 			      const void *core_start, unsigned long core_size,
 			      const void *init_start, unsigned long init_size,
@@ -366,6 +361,10 @@ ret_err:
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz)
+{
+	return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
 
 static struct unwind_table *last_table;
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/gemini-dlink-dir-685.dts

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
 		gpio-sck = <&gpio1 5 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		gpio-miso = <&gpio1 8 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		gpio-mosi = <&gpio1 7 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
-		cs-gpios = <&gpio0 20 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		cs-gpios = <&gpio0 20 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 		num-chipselects = <1>;
 
 		panel: display@0 {

arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-mickey.dts

@@ -128,10 +128,6 @@
 	};
 };
 
-&emmc {
-	/delete-property/mmc-hs200-1_8v;
-};
-
 &i2c2 {
 	status = "disabled";
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-minnie.dts

@@ -90,10 +90,6 @@
 	pwm-off-delay-ms = <200>;
 };
 
-&emmc {
-	/delete-property/mmc-hs200-1_8v;
-};
-
 &gpio_keys {
 	pinctrl-0 = <&pwr_key_l &ap_lid_int_l &volum_down_l &volum_up_l>;
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi

@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@
 			     <GIC_PPI 11 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
 			     <GIC_PPI 10 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
 		clock-frequency = <24000000>;
+		arm,no-tick-in-suspend;
 	};
 
 	timer: timer@ff810000 {

arch/arm/mach-exynos/Kconfig

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ config SOC_EXYNOS5420
 	bool "SAMSUNG EXYNOS5420"
 	default y
 	depends on ARCH_EXYNOS5
-	select MCPM if SMP
+	select EXYNOS_MCPM if SMP
 	select ARM_CCI400_PORT_CTRL
 	select ARM_CPU_SUSPEND
 
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ config SOC_EXYNOS5800
 	default y
 	depends on SOC_EXYNOS5420
 
+config EXYNOS_MCPM
+	bool
+	select MCPM
+
 config EXYNOS_CPU_SUSPEND
 	bool
 	select ARM_CPU_SUSPEND

arch/arm/mach-exynos/Makefile

@@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ plus_sec := $(call as-instr,.arch_extension sec,+sec)
 AFLAGS_exynos-smc.o		:=-Wa,-march=armv7-a$(plus_sec)
 AFLAGS_sleep.o			:=-Wa,-march=armv7-a$(plus_sec)
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_MCPM)		+= mcpm-exynos.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EXYNOS_MCPM)	+= mcpm-exynos.o
 CFLAGS_mcpm-exynos.o		+= -march=armv7-a

arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c

@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static int exynos5420_cpu_suspend(unsigned long arg)
 	unsigned int cluster = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 1);
 	unsigned int cpu = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 0);
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MCPM)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXYNOS_MCPM)) {
 		mcpm_set_entry_vector(cpu, cluster, exynos_cpu_resume);
 		mcpm_cpu_suspend();
 	}
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static void exynos5420_pm_prepare(void)
 	exynos_pm_enter_sleep_mode();
 
 	/* ensure at least INFORM0 has the resume address */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MCPM))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXYNOS_MCPM))
 		pmu_raw_writel(__pa_symbol(mcpm_entry_point), S5P_INFORM0);
 
 	tmp = pmu_raw_readl(EXYNOS_L2_OPTION(0));
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ static void exynos5420_prepare_pm_resume(void)
 	mpidr = read_cpuid_mpidr();
 	cluster = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mpidr, 1);
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MCPM))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXYNOS_MCPM))
 		WARN_ON(mcpm_cpu_powered_up());
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HW_PERF_EVENTS) && cluster != 0) {

arch/arm/mach-rpc/dma.c

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static irqreturn_t iomd_dma_handle(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	} while (1);
 
 	idma->state = ~DMA_ST_AB;
-	disable_irq(irq);
+	disable_irq_nosync(irq);
 
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ static void iomd_enable_dma(unsigned int chan, dma_t *dma)
 				DMA_FROM_DEVICE : DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		}
 
+		idma->dma_addr = idma->dma.sg->dma_address;
+		idma->dma_len = idma->dma.sg->length;
+
 		iomd_writeb(DMA_CR_C, dma_base + CR);
 		idma->state = DMA_ST_AB;
 	}

arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -260,7 +260,8 @@ config GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY
 	def_bool y
 
 config ZONE_DMA32
-	def_bool y
+	bool "Support DMA32 zone" if EXPERT
+	default y
 
 config HAVE_GENERIC_GUP
 	def_bool y

arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-8040-mcbin.dtsi

@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@
 	num-lanes = <4>;
 	num-viewport = <8>;
 	reset-gpios = <&cp0_gpio2 20 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+	ranges = <0x81000000 0x0 0xf9010000 0x0 0xf9010000 0x0 0x10000
+		  0x82000000 0x0 0xc0000000 0x0 0xc0000000 0x0 0x20000000>;
 	status = "okay";
 };
 

arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra210-p2180.dtsi

@@ -328,7 +328,8 @@
 			regulator-max-microvolt = <1320000>;
 			enable-gpios = <&pmic 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 			regulator-ramp-delay = <80>;
-			regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <1000>;
+			regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <2000>;
+			regulator-settling-time-us = <160>;
 		};
 	};
 };

arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra210-p3450-0000.dts

@@ -633,17 +633,16 @@
 		};
 
 		vdd_gpu: regulator@6 {
-			compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+			compatible = "pwm-regulator";
 			reg = <6>;
-
+			pwms = <&pwm 1 4880>;
 			regulator-name = "VDD_GPU";
-			regulator-min-microvolt = <5000000>;
-			regulator-max-microvolt = <5000000>;
-			regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <250>;
-
-			gpio = <&pmic 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
-			enable-active-high;
-
+			regulator-min-microvolt = <710000>;
+			regulator-max-microvolt = <1320000>;
+			regulator-ramp-delay = <80>;
+			regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <2000>;
+			regulator-settling-time-us = <160>;
+			enable-gpios = <&pmic 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 			vin-supply = <&vdd_5v0_sys>;
 		};
 	};

arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra210.dtsi

@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@
 			compatible = "nvidia,tegra210-agic";
 			#interrupt-cells = <3>;
 			interrupt-controller;
-			reg = <0x702f9000 0x2000>,
+			reg = <0x702f9000 0x1000>,
 			      <0x702fa000 0x2000>;
 			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 102 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
 			clocks = <&tegra_car TEGRA210_CLK_APE>;

arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/qcs404-evb.dtsi

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
 		};
 
 		vreg_l3_1p05: l3 {
-			regulator-min-microvolt = <1050000>;
+			regulator-min-microvolt = <1048000>;
 			regulator-max-microvolt = <1160000>;
 		};
 

arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/qcs404.dtsi

@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@
 			compatible = "qcom,gcc-qcs404";
 			reg = <0x01800000 0x80000>;
 			#clock-cells = <1>;
+			#reset-cells = <1>;
 
 			assigned-clocks = <&gcc GCC_APSS_AHB_CLK_SRC>;
 			assigned-clock-rates = <19200000>;

arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-sapphire.dtsi

@@ -565,12 +565,11 @@
 	status = "okay";
 
 	u2phy0_otg: otg-port {
-		phy-supply = <&vcc5v0_typec0>;
 		status = "okay";
 	};
 
 	u2phy0_host: host-port {
-		phy-supply = <&vcc5v0_host>;
+		phy-supply = <&vcc5v0_typec0>;
 		status = "okay";
 	};
 };
@@ -620,7 +619,7 @@
 
 &usbdrd_dwc3_0 {
 	status = "okay";
-	dr_mode = "otg";
+	dr_mode = "host";
 };
 
 &usbdrd3_1 {

arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi

@@ -1706,11 +1706,11 @@
 		reg = <0x0 0xff914000 0x0 0x100>, <0x0 0xff915000 0x0 0x100>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 43 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
 		interrupt-names = "isp0_mmu";
-		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP0_NOC>, <&cru HCLK_ISP0_NOC>;
+		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP0_WRAPPER>, <&cru HCLK_ISP0_WRAPPER>;
 		clock-names = "aclk", "iface";
 		#iommu-cells = <0>;
+		power-domains = <&power RK3399_PD_ISP0>;
 		rockchip,disable-mmu-reset;
-		status = "disabled";
 	};
 
 	isp1_mmu: iommu@ff924000 {
@@ -1718,11 +1718,11 @@
 		reg = <0x0 0xff924000 0x0 0x100>, <0x0 0xff925000 0x0 0x100>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 44 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
 		interrupt-names = "isp1_mmu";
-		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP1_NOC>, <&cru HCLK_ISP1_NOC>;
+		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP1_WRAPPER>, <&cru HCLK_ISP1_WRAPPER>;
 		clock-names = "aclk", "iface";
 		#iommu-cells = <0>;
+		power-domains = <&power RK3399_PD_ISP1>;
 		rockchip,disable-mmu-reset;
-		status = "disabled";
 	};
 
 	hdmi_sound: hdmi-sound {

arch/arm64/crypto/sha1-ce-glue.c

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int sha1_ce_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
 			 unsigned int len, u8 *out)
 {
 	struct sha1_ce_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-	bool finalize = !sctx->sst.count && !(len % SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	bool finalize = !sctx->sst.count && !(len % SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE) && len;
 
 	if (!crypto_simd_usable())
 		return crypto_sha1_finup(desc, data, len, out);

arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static int sha256_ce_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
 			   unsigned int len, u8 *out)
 {
 	struct sha256_ce_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-	bool finalize = !sctx->sst.count && !(len % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	bool finalize = !sctx->sst.count && !(len % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) && len;
 
 	if (!crypto_simd_usable()) {
 		if (len)

arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_gicv3.h

@@ -152,7 +152,9 @@ static inline bool gic_prio_masking_enabled(void)
 
 static inline void gic_pmr_mask_irqs(void)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(GICD_INT_DEF_PRI <= GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(GICD_INT_DEF_PRI < (GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF |
+					 GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(GICD_INT_DEF_PRI >= GIC_PRIO_IRQON);
 	gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF);
 }
 

arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h

@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@
  * RAS Error Synchronization barrier
  */
 	.macro  esb
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN
 	hint    #16
+#else
+	nop
+#endif
 	.endm
 
 /*

arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h

@@ -35,9 +35,10 @@
  */
 
 enum ftr_type {
-	FTR_EXACT,	/* Use a predefined safe value */
-	FTR_LOWER_SAFE,	/* Smaller value is safe */
-	FTR_HIGHER_SAFE,/* Bigger value is safe */
+	FTR_EXACT,			/* Use a predefined safe value */
+	FTR_LOWER_SAFE,			/* Smaller value is safe */
+	FTR_HIGHER_SAFE,		/* Bigger value is safe */
+	FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE,	/* Bigger value is safe, but 0 is biggest */
 };
 
 #define FTR_STRICT	true	/* SANITY check strict matching required */

arch/arm64/include/asm/daifflags.h

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/irqflags.h>
 
+#include <asm/arch_gicv3.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 
 #define DAIF_PROCCTX		0
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@ static inline void local_daif_mask(void)
 		:
 		:
 		: "memory");
+
+	/* Don't really care for a dsb here, we don't intend to enable IRQs */
+	if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
+		gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET);
+
 	trace_hardirqs_off();
 }
 
@@ -32,7 +38,7 @@ static inline unsigned long local_daif_save(void)
 
 	if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking()) {
 		/* If IRQs are masked with PMR, reflect it in the flags */
-		if (read_sysreg_s(SYS_ICC_PMR_EL1) <= GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF)
+		if (read_sysreg_s(SYS_ICC_PMR_EL1) != GIC_PRIO_IRQON)
 			flags |= PSR_I_BIT;
 	}
 
@@ -48,36 +54,44 @@ static inline void local_daif_restore(unsigned long flags)
 	if (!irq_disabled) {
 		trace_hardirqs_on();
 
-		if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
-			arch_local_irq_enable();
-	} else if (!(flags & PSR_A_BIT)) {
-		/*
-		 * If interrupts are disabled but we can take
-		 * asynchronous errors, we can take NMIs
-		 */
 		if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking()) {
-			flags &= ~PSR_I_BIT;
-			/*
-			 * There has been concern that the write to daif
-			 * might be reordered before this write to PMR.
-			 * From the ARM ARM DDI 0487D.a, section D1.7.1
-			 * "Accessing PSTATE fields":
-			 *   Writes to the PSTATE fields have side-effects on
-			 *   various aspects of the PE operation. All of these
-			 *   side-effects are guaranteed:
-			 *     - Not to be visible to earlier instructions in
-			 *       the execution stream.
-			 *     - To be visible to later instructions in the
-			 *       execution stream
-			 *
-			 * Also, writes to PMR are self-synchronizing, so no
-			 * interrupts with a lower priority than PMR is signaled
-			 * to the PE after the write.
-			 *
-			 * So we don't need additional synchronization here.
-			 */
-			arch_local_irq_disable();
+			gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON);
+			dsb(sy);
 		}
+	} else if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking()) {
+		u64 pmr;
+
+		if (!(flags & PSR_A_BIT)) {
+			/*
+			 * If interrupts are disabled but we can take
+			 * asynchronous errors, we can take NMIs
+			 */
+			flags &= ~PSR_I_BIT;
+			pmr = GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF;
+		} else {
+			pmr = GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * There has been concern that the write to daif
+		 * might be reordered before this write to PMR.
+		 * From the ARM ARM DDI 0487D.a, section D1.7.1
+		 * "Accessing PSTATE fields":
+		 *   Writes to the PSTATE fields have side-effects on
+		 *   various aspects of the PE operation. All of these
+		 *   side-effects are guaranteed:
+		 *     - Not to be visible to earlier instructions in
+		 *       the execution stream.
+		 *     - To be visible to later instructions in the
+		 *       execution stream
+		 *
+		 * Also, writes to PMR are self-synchronizing, so no
+		 * interrupts with a lower priority than PMR is signaled
+		 * to the PE after the write.
+		 *
+		 * So we don't need additional synchronization here.
+		 */
+		gic_write_pmr(pmr);
 	}
 
 	write_sysreg(flags, daif);

arch/arm64/include/asm/irqflags.h

@@ -56,43 +56,46 @@ static inline void arch_local_irq_disable(void)
  */
 static inline unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void)
 {
-	unsigned long daif_bits;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	daif_bits = read_sysreg(daif);
-
-	/*
-	 * The asm is logically equivalent to:
-	 *
-	 * if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
-	 *	flags = (daif_bits & PSR_I_BIT) ?
-	 *			GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF :
-	 *			read_sysreg_s(SYS_ICC_PMR_EL1);
-	 * else
-	 *	flags = daif_bits;
-	 */
 	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE(
-			"mov	%0, %1\n"
-			"nop\n"
-			"nop",
-			__mrs_s("%0", SYS_ICC_PMR_EL1)
-			"ands	%1, %1, " __stringify(PSR_I_BIT) "\n"
-			"csel	%0, %0, %2, eq",
-			ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING)
-		: "=&r" (flags), "+r" (daif_bits)
-		: "r" ((unsigned long) GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF)
+		"mrs	%0, daif",
+		__mrs_s("%0", SYS_ICC_PMR_EL1),
+		ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING)
+		: "=&r" (flags)
+		:
 		: "memory");
 
 	return flags;
 }
 
+static inline int arch_irqs_disabled_flags(unsigned long flags)
+{
+	int res;
+
+	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE(
+		"and	%w0, %w1, #" __stringify(PSR_I_BIT),
+		"eor	%w0, %w1, #" __stringify(GIC_PRIO_IRQON),
+		ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING)
+		: "=&r" (res)
+		: "r" ((int) flags)
+		: "memory");
+
+	return res;
+}
+
 static inline unsigned long arch_local_irq_save(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	flags = arch_local_save_flags();
 
-	arch_local_irq_disable();
+	/*
+	 * There are too many states with IRQs disabled, just keep the current
+	 * state if interrupts are already disabled/masked.
+	 */
+	if (!arch_irqs_disabled_flags(flags))
+		arch_local_irq_disable();
 
 	return flags;
 }
@@ -113,21 +116,5 @@ static inline void arch_local_irq_restore(unsigned long flags)
 		: "memory");
 }
 
-static inline int arch_irqs_disabled_flags(unsigned long flags)
-{
-	int res;
-
-	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE(
-			"and	%w0, %w1, #" __stringify(PSR_I_BIT) "\n"
-			"nop",
-			"cmp	%w1, #" __stringify(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF) "\n"
-			"cset	%w0, ls",
-			ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING)
-		: "=&r" (res)
-		: "r" ((int) flags)
-		: "memory");
-
-	return res;
-}
 #endif
 #endif

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h

@@ -597,11 +597,12 @@ static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_enter(void)
 	 * will not signal the CPU of interrupts of lower priority, and the
 	 * only way to get out will be via guest exceptions.
 	 * Naturally, we want to avoid this.
+	 *
+	 * local_daif_mask() already sets GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET, we just need a
+	 * dsb to ensure the redistributor is forwards EL2 IRQs to the CPU.
 	 */
-	if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking()) {
-		gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON);
+	if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
 		dsb(sy);
-	}
 }
 
 static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_exit(void)

arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h

@@ -24,9 +24,15 @@
  * means masking more IRQs (or at least that the same IRQs remain masked).
  *
  * To mask interrupts, we clear the most significant bit of PMR.
+ *
+ * Some code sections either automatically switch back to PSR.I or explicitly
+ * require to not use priority masking. If bit GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET is included
+ * in the  the priority mask, it indicates that PSR.I should be set and
+ * interrupt disabling temporarily does not rely on IRQ priorities.
  */
-#define GIC_PRIO_IRQON		0xf0
-#define GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF		(GIC_PRIO_IRQON & ~0x80)
+#define GIC_PRIO_IRQON			0xc0
+#define GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF			(GIC_PRIO_IRQON & ~0x80)
+#define GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET		(1 << 4)
 
 /* Additional SPSR bits not exposed in the UABI */
 #define PSR_IL_BIT		(1 << 20)

arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c

@@ -152,10 +152,14 @@ static int __init acpi_fadt_sanity_check(void)
 	 */
 	if (table->revision < 5 ||
 	   (table->revision == 5 && fadt->minor_revision < 1)) {
-		pr_err("Unsupported FADT revision %d.%d, should be 5.1+\n",
+		pr_err(FW_BUG "Unsupported FADT revision %d.%d, should be 5.1+\n",
 		       table->revision, fadt->minor_revision);
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+
+		if (!fadt->arm_boot_flags) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		pr_err("FADT has ARM boot flags set, assuming 5.1\n");
 	}
 
 	if (!(fadt->flags & ACPI_FADT_HW_REDUCED)) {

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_ctr[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 31, 1, 1), /* RES1 */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DIC_SHIFT, 1, 1),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_IDC_SHIFT, 1, 1),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, CTR_CWG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, CTR_ERG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, CTR_CWG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, CTR_ERG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT, 4, 1),
 	/*
 	 * Linux can handle differing I-cache policies. Userspace JITs will
@@ -468,6 +468,10 @@ static s64 arm64_ftr_safe_value(const struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp, s64 new,
 	case FTR_LOWER_SAFE:
 		ret = new < cur ? new : cur;
 		break;
+	case FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE:
+		if (!cur || !new)
+			break;
+		/* Fallthrough */
 	case FTR_HIGHER_SAFE:
 		ret = new > cur ? new : cur;
 		break;

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S

@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	/*
 	 * Registers that may be useful after this macro is invoked:
 	 *
+	 * x20 - ICC_PMR_EL1
 	 * x21 - aborted SP
 	 * x22 - aborted PC
 	 * x23 - aborted PSTATE
@@ -424,6 +425,38 @@ tsk	.req	x28		// current thread_info
 	irq_stack_exit
 	.endm
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI
+	/*
+	 * Set res to 0 if irqs were unmasked in interrupted context.
+	 * Otherwise set res to non-0 value.
+	 */
+	.macro	test_irqs_unmasked res:req, pmr:req
+alternative_if ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING
+	sub	\res, \pmr, #GIC_PRIO_IRQON
+alternative_else
+	mov	\res, xzr
+alternative_endif
+	.endm
+#endif
+
+	.macro	gic_prio_kentry_setup, tmp:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI
+	alternative_if ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING
+	mov	\tmp, #(GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET | GIC_PRIO_IRQON)
+	msr_s	SYS_ICC_PMR_EL1, \tmp
+	alternative_else_nop_endif
+#endif
+	.endm
+
+	.macro	gic_prio_irq_setup, pmr:req, tmp:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI
+	alternative_if ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING
+	orr	\tmp, \pmr, #GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET
+	msr_s	SYS_ICC_PMR_EL1, \tmp
+	alternative_else_nop_endif
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 	.text
 
 /*
@@ -602,6 +635,7 @@ el1_dbg:
 	cmp	x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64		// if BRK64
 	cinc	x24, x24, eq			// set bit '0'
 	tbz	x24, #0, el1_inv		// EL1 only
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x3
 	mrs	x0, far_el1
 	mov	x2, sp				// struct pt_regs
 	bl	do_debug_exception
@@ -619,22 +653,20 @@ ENDPROC(el1_sync)
 	.align	6
 el1_irq:
 	kernel_entry 1
+	gic_prio_irq_setup pmr=x20, tmp=x1
 	enable_da_f
-#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI
-alternative_if ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING
-	ldr	x20, [sp, #S_PMR_SAVE]
-alternative_else
-	mov	x20, #GIC_PRIO_IRQON
-alternative_endif
-	cmp	x20, #GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF
-	/* Irqs were disabled, don't trace */
-	b.ls	1f
-#endif
-	bl	trace_hardirqs_off
+	test_irqs_unmasked	res=x0, pmr=x20
+	cbz	x0, 1f
+	bl	asm_nmi_enter
 1:
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
+	bl	trace_hardirqs_off
+#endif
+
 	irq_handler
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT
@@ -651,14 +683,23 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	bl	preempt_schedule_irq		// irq en/disable is done inside
 1:
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI
 	/*
-	 * if IRQs were disabled when we received the interrupt, we have an NMI
-	 * and we are not re-enabling interrupt upon eret. Skip tracing.
+	 * When using IRQ priority masking, we can get spurious interrupts while
+	 * PMR is set to GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF. An NMI might also have occurred in a
+	 * section with interrupts disabled. Skip tracing in those cases.
 	 */
-	cmp	x20, #GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF
-	b.ls	1f
+	test_irqs_unmasked	res=x0, pmr=x20
+	cbz	x0, 1f
+	bl	asm_nmi_exit
+1:
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI
+	test_irqs_unmasked	res=x0, pmr=x20
+	cbnz	x0, 1f
 #endif
 	bl	trace_hardirqs_on
 1:
@@ -776,6 +817,7 @@ el0_ia:
 	 * Instruction abort handling
 	 */
 	mrs	x26, far_el1
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x0
 	enable_da_f
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
 	bl	trace_hardirqs_off
@@ -821,6 +863,7 @@ el0_sp_pc:
 	 * Stack or PC alignment exception handling
 	 */
 	mrs	x26, far_el1
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x0
 	enable_da_f
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
 	bl	trace_hardirqs_off
@@ -855,11 +898,12 @@ el0_dbg:
 	 * Debug exception handling
 	 */
 	tbnz	x24, #0, el0_inv		// EL0 only
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x3
 	mrs	x0, far_el1
 	mov	x1, x25
 	mov	x2, sp
 	bl	do_debug_exception
-	enable_daif
+	enable_da_f
 	ct_user_exit
 	b	ret_to_user
 el0_inv:
@@ -876,7 +920,9 @@ ENDPROC(el0_sync)
 el0_irq:
 	kernel_entry 0
 el0_irq_naked:
+	gic_prio_irq_setup pmr=x20, tmp=x0
 	enable_da_f
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
 	bl	trace_hardirqs_off
 #endif
@@ -898,6 +944,7 @@ ENDPROC(el0_irq)
 el1_error:
 	kernel_entry 1
 	mrs	x1, esr_el1
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x2
 	enable_dbg
 	mov	x0, sp
 	bl	do_serror
@@ -908,10 +955,11 @@ el0_error:
 	kernel_entry 0
 el0_error_naked:
 	mrs	x1, esr_el1
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x2
 	enable_dbg
 	mov	x0, sp
 	bl	do_serror
-	enable_daif
+	enable_da_f
 	ct_user_exit
 	b	ret_to_user
 ENDPROC(el0_error)
@@ -932,6 +980,7 @@ work_pending:
  */
 ret_to_user:
 	disable_daif
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x3
 	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
 	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
 	cbnz	x2, work_pending
@@ -948,6 +997,7 @@ ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
  */
 	.align	6
 el0_svc:
+	gic_prio_kentry_setup tmp=x1
 	mov	x0, sp
 	bl	el0_svc_handler
 	b	ret_to_user

arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c

@@ -536,13 +536,14 @@ int hw_breakpoint_arch_parse(struct perf_event *bp,
 			/* Aligned */
 			break;
 		case 1:
-			/* Allow single byte watchpoint. */
-			if (hw->ctrl.len == ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1)
-				break;
 		case 2:
 			/* Allow halfword watchpoints and breakpoints. */
 			if (hw->ctrl.len == ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_2)
 				break;
+		case 3:
+			/* Allow single byte watchpoint. */
+			if (hw->ctrl.len == ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1)
+				break;
 		default:
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}

arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c

@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/irqchip.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <asm/daifflags.h>
 #include <asm/vmap_stack.h>
 
 unsigned long irq_err_count;
@@ -65,3 +67,18 @@ void __init init_IRQ(void)
 	if (!handle_arch_irq)
 		panic("No interrupt controller found.");
 }
+
+/*
+ * Stubs to make nmi_enter/exit() code callable from ASM
+ */
+asmlinkage void notrace asm_nmi_enter(void)
+{
+	nmi_enter();
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(asm_nmi_enter);
+
+asmlinkage void notrace asm_nmi_exit(void)
+{
+	nmi_exit();
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(asm_nmi_exit);

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static void __cpu_do_idle_irqprio(void)
 	 * be raised.
 	 */
 	pmr = gic_read_pmr();
-	gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON);
+	gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET);
 
 	__cpu_do_idle();
 

arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c

@@ -181,11 +181,13 @@ static void init_gic_priority_masking(void)
 
 	WARN_ON(!(cpuflags & PSR_I_BIT));
 
-	gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF);
-
 	/* We can only unmask PSR.I if we can take aborts */
-	if (!(cpuflags & PSR_A_BIT))
+	if (!(cpuflags & PSR_A_BIT)) {
+		gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF);
 		write_sysreg(cpuflags & ~PSR_I_BIT, daif);
+	} else {
+		gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET);
+	}
 }
 
 /*

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c

@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ int __hyp_text __kvm_vcpu_run_nvhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * Naturally, we want to avoid this.
 	 */
 	if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking()) {
-		gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON);
+		gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET);
 		dsb(sy);
 	}
 

arch/arm64/mm/init.c

@@ -180,8 +180,9 @@ static void __init zone_sizes_init(unsigned long min, unsigned long max)
 {
 	unsigned long max_zone_pfns[MAX_NR_ZONES]  = {0};
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA32))
-		max_zone_pfns[ZONE_DMA32] = PFN_DOWN(max_zone_dma_phys());
+#ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA32
+	max_zone_pfns[ZONE_DMA32] = PFN_DOWN(max_zone_dma_phys());
+#endif
 	max_zone_pfns[ZONE_NORMAL] = max;
 
 	free_area_init_nodes(max_zone_pfns);

arch/mips/jz4740/board-qi_lb60.c

@@ -466,27 +466,27 @@ static unsigned long pin_cfg_bias_disable[] = {
 static struct pinctrl_map pin_map[] __initdata = {
 	/* NAND pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-nand",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "nand", "nand-cs1"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "nand-cs1", "nand"),
 
 	/* fbdev pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP("jz4740-fb", PINCTRL_STATE_DEFAULT,
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "lcd", "lcd-8bit"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "lcd-8bit", "lcd"),
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP("jz4740-fb", PINCTRL_STATE_SLEEP,
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "lcd", "lcd-no-pins"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "lcd-no-pins", "lcd"),
 
 	/* MMC pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "mmc", "mmc-1bit"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "mmc-1bit", "mmc"),
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "mmc", "mmc-4bit"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "mmc-4bit", "mmc"),
 	PIN_MAP_CONFIGS_PIN_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "PD0", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "PD0", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
 	PIN_MAP_CONFIGS_PIN_DEFAULT("jz4740-mmc.0",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "PD2", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "PD2", pin_cfg_bias_disable),
 
 	/* PWM pin configuration */
 	PIN_MAP_MUX_GROUP_DEFAULT("jz4740-pwm",
-			"10010000.jz4740-pinctrl", "pwm4", "pwm4"),
+			"10010000.pin-controller", "pwm4", "pwm4"),
 };
 
 

arch/mips/lantiq/irq.c

@@ -154,8 +154,9 @@ static int ltq_eiu_settype(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
 			if (edge)
 				irq_set_handler(d->hwirq, handle_edge_irq);
 
-			ltq_eiu_w32(ltq_eiu_r32(LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C) |
-				(val << (i * 4)), LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C);
+			ltq_eiu_w32((ltq_eiu_r32(LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C) &
+				    (~(7 << (i * 4)))) | (val << (i * 4)),
+				    LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C);
 		}
 	}
 

arch/nds32/include/asm/syscall.h

@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ struct pt_regs;
  *
  * It's only valid to call this when @task is known to be blocked.
  */
-int syscall_get_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline int
+syscall_get_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	return regs->syscallno;
 }
@@ -47,7 +48,8 @@ int syscall_get_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
  * system call instruction.  This may not be the same as what the
  * register state looked like at system call entry tracing.
  */
-void syscall_rollback(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline void
+syscall_rollback(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	regs->uregs[0] = regs->orig_r0;
 }
@@ -62,7 +64,8 @@ void syscall_rollback(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
  * It's only valid to call this when @task is stopped for tracing on exit
  * from a system call, due to %TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or %TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT.
  */
-long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline long
+syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned long error = regs->uregs[0];
 	return IS_ERR_VALUE(error) ? error : 0;
@@ -79,7 +82,8 @@ long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
  * It's only valid to call this when @task is stopped for tracing on exit
  * from a system call, due to %TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or %TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT.
  */
-long syscall_get_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline long
+syscall_get_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	return regs->uregs[0];
 }
@@ -99,8 +103,9 @@ long syscall_get_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
  * It's only valid to call this when @task is stopped for tracing on exit
  * from a system call, due to %TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or %TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT.
  */
-void syscall_set_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
-			      int error, long val)
+static inline void
+syscall_set_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+			 int error, long val)
 {
 	regs->uregs[0] = (long)error ? error : val;
 }
@@ -118,8 +123,9 @@ void syscall_set_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
  * entry to a system call, due to %TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or %TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT.
  */
 #define SYSCALL_MAX_ARGS 6
-void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
-			   unsigned long *args)
+static inline void
+syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+		      unsigned long *args)
 {
 	args[0] = regs->orig_r0;
 	args++;
@@ -138,8 +144,9 @@ void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
  * It's only valid to call this when @task is stopped for tracing on
  * entry to a system call, due to %TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or %TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT.
  */
-void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
-			   const unsigned long *args)
+static inline void
+syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
+		      const unsigned long *args)
 {
 	regs->orig_r0 = args[0];
 	args++;

arch/parisc/Makefile

@@ -164,5 +164,8 @@ define archhelp
 	@echo  '  zinstall	- Install compressed vmlinuz kernel'
 endef
 
+archclean:
+	$(Q)$(MAKE) $(clean)=$(boot)
+
 archheaders:
 	$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls all

arch/parisc/boot/compressed/Makefile

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
 targets := vmlinux.lds vmlinux vmlinux.bin vmlinux.bin.gz vmlinux.bin.bz2
 targets += vmlinux.bin.xz vmlinux.bin.lzma vmlinux.bin.lzo vmlinux.bin.lz4
 targets += misc.o piggy.o sizes.h head.o real2.o firmware.o
+targets += real2.S firmware.c
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS := -D__KERNEL__ -O2 -DBOOTLOADER
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@ $(obj)/misc.o: $(obj)/sizes.h
 CPPFLAGS_vmlinux.lds += -I$(objtree)/$(obj) -DBOOTLOADER
 $(obj)/vmlinux.lds: $(obj)/sizes.h
 
-$(obj)/vmlinux.bin: vmlinux
+OBJCOPYFLAGS_vmlinux.bin := -R .comment -R .note -S
+$(obj)/vmlinux.bin: vmlinux FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
 
 vmlinux.bin.all-y := $(obj)/vmlinux.bin

arch/parisc/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S

@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ SECTIONS
 		*(.rodata.compressed)
 	}
 
-	/* bootloader code and data starts behind area of extracted kernel */
-	. = (SZ_end - SZparisc_kernel_start + KERNEL_BINARY_TEXT_START);
+	/* bootloader code and data starts at least behind area of extracted kernel */
+	. = MAX(ABSOLUTE(.), (SZ_end - SZparisc_kernel_start + KERNEL_BINARY_TEXT_START));
 
 	/* align on next page boundary */
 	. = ALIGN(4096);

arch/parisc/kernel/kprobes.c

@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ int __kprobes parisc_kprobe_ss_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk();
 	struct kprobe *p = kprobe_running();
 
+	if (!p)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (regs->iaoq[0] != (unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn+4)
 		return 0;
 

arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
 		if ((addr & (sizeof(unsigned long)-1)) ||
 		     addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
 			break;
+		if (addr == PT_IAOQ0 || addr == PT_IAOQ1) {
+			data |= 3; /* ensure userspace privilege */
+		}
 		if ((addr >= PT_GR1 && addr <= PT_GR31) ||
 				addr == PT_IAOQ0 || addr == PT_IAOQ1 ||
 				(addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) ||
@@ -228,16 +231,18 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
 
 static compat_ulong_t translate_usr_offset(compat_ulong_t offset)
 {
-	if (offset < 0)
-		return sizeof(struct pt_regs);
-	else if (offset <= 32*4)	/* gr[0..31] */
-		return offset * 2 + 4;
-	else if (offset <= 32*4+32*8)	/* gr[0..31] + fr[0..31] */
-		return offset + 32*4;
-	else if (offset < sizeof(struct pt_regs)/2 + 32*4)
-		return offset * 2 + 4 - 32*8;
+	compat_ulong_t pos;
+
+	if (offset < 32*4)	/* gr[0..31] */
+		pos = offset * 2 + 4;
+	else if (offset < 32*4+32*8)	/* fr[0] ... fr[31] */
+		pos = (offset - 32*4) + PT_FR0;
+	else if (offset < sizeof(struct pt_regs)/2 + 32*4) /* sr[0] ... ipsw */
+		pos = (offset - 32*4 - 32*8) * 2 + PT_SR0 + 4;
 	else
-		return sizeof(struct pt_regs);
+		pos = sizeof(struct pt_regs);
+
+	return pos;
 }
 
 long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
@@ -281,9 +286,12 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
 			addr = translate_usr_offset(addr);
 			if (addr >= sizeof(struct pt_regs))
 				break;
+			if (addr == PT_IAOQ0+4 || addr == PT_IAOQ1+4) {
+				data |= 3; /* ensure userspace privilege */
+			}
 			if (addr >= PT_FR0 && addr <= PT_FR31 + 4) {
 				/* Special case, fp regs are 64 bits anyway */
-				*(__u64 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;
+				*(__u32 *) ((char *) task_regs(child) + addr) = data;
 				ret = 0;
 			}
 			else if ((addr >= PT_GR1+4 && addr <= PT_GR31+4) ||
@@ -496,7 +504,8 @@ static void set_reg(struct pt_regs *regs, int num, unsigned long val)
 			return;
 	case RI(iaoq[0]):
 	case RI(iaoq[1]):
-			regs->iaoq[num - RI(iaoq[0])] = val;
+			/* set 2 lowest bits to ensure userspace privilege: */
+			regs->iaoq[num - RI(iaoq[0])] = val | 3;
 			return;
 	case RI(sar):	regs->sar = val;
 			return;

arch/powerpc/Kconfig

@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ config PPC
 	select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if PPC32
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
+	select ARCH_HAS_DMA_MMAP_PGPROT
 	select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL

arch/powerpc/boot/xz_config.h

@@ -20,10 +20,30 @@ static inline uint32_t swab32p(void *p)
 
 #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__
 #define get_le32(p) (*((uint32_t *) (p)))
+#define cpu_to_be32(x) swab32(x)
+static inline u32 be32_to_cpup(const u32 *p)
+{
+	return swab32p((u32 *)p);
+}
 #else
 #define get_le32(p) swab32p(p)
+#define cpu_to_be32(x) (x)
+static inline u32 be32_to_cpup(const u32 *p)
+{
+	return *p;
+}
 #endif
 
+static inline uint32_t get_unaligned_be32(const void *p)
+{
+	return be32_to_cpup(p);
+}
+
+static inline void put_unaligned_be32(u32 val, void *p)
+{
+	*((u32 *)p) = cpu_to_be32(val);
+}
+
 #define memeq(a, b, size) (memcmp(a, b, size) == 0)
 #define memzero(buf, size) memset(buf, 0, size)
 

arch/powerpc/include/asm/cacheflush.h

@@ -29,9 +29,12 @@
  * not expect this type of fault. flush_cache_vmap is not exactly the right
  * place to put this, but it seems to work well enough.
  */
-#define flush_cache_vmap(start, end)		do { asm volatile("ptesync" ::: "memory"); } while (0)
+static inline void flush_cache_vmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+	asm volatile("ptesync" ::: "memory");
+}
 #else
-#define flush_cache_vmap(start, end)		do { } while (0)
+static inline void flush_cache_vmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { }
 #endif
 
 #define ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE 1

arch/powerpc/include/asm/pgtable.h

@@ -140,6 +140,20 @@ static inline void pte_frag_set(mm_context_t *ctx, void *p)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
+#define is_ioremap_addr is_ioremap_addr
+static inline bool is_ioremap_addr(const void *x)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)x;
+
+	return addr >= IOREMAP_BASE && addr < IOREMAP_END;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_PGTABLE_H */

arch/powerpc/include/asm/pmc.h

@@ -26,12 +26,11 @@ static inline void ppc_set_pmu_inuse(int inuse)
 	if (firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_LPAR)) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
 		get_lppaca()->pmcregs_in_use = inuse;
-#endif
-	} else {
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
-		get_paca()->pmcregs_in_use = inuse;
 #endif
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
+	get_paca()->pmcregs_in_use = inuse;
+#endif
 #endif
 }
 

arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile

@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ obj-y				:= cputable.o ptrace.o syscalls.o \
 				   signal.o sysfs.o cacheinfo.o time.o \
 				   prom.o traps.o setup-common.o \
 				   udbg.o misc.o io.o misc_$(BITS).o \
-				   of_platform.o prom_parse.o
+				   of_platform.o prom_parse.o \
+				   dma-common.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64)		+= setup_64.o sys_ppc32.o \
 				   signal_64.o ptrace32.o \
 				   paca.o nvram_64.o firmware.o

arch/powerpc/kernel/dma-common.c

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Contains common dma routines for all powerpc platforms.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Shawn Anastasio.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/dma-noncoherent.h>
+
+pgprot_t arch_dma_mmap_pgprot(struct device *dev, pgprot_t prot,
+		unsigned long attrs)
+{
+	if (!dev_is_dma_coherent(dev))
+		return pgprot_noncached(prot);
+	return prot;
+}

arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c

@@ -354,10 +354,19 @@ static inline unsigned long eeh_token_to_phys(unsigned long token)
 	ptep = find_init_mm_pte(token, &hugepage_shift);
 	if (!ptep)
 		return token;
-	WARN_ON(hugepage_shift);
-	pa = pte_pfn(*ptep) << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
-	return pa | (token & (PAGE_SIZE-1));
+	pa = pte_pfn(*ptep);
+
+	/* On radix we can do hugepage mappings for io, so handle that */
+	if (hugepage_shift) {
+		pa <<= hugepage_shift;
+		pa |= token & ((1ul << hugepage_shift) - 1);
+	} else {
+		pa <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+		pa |= token & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	}
+
+	return pa;
 }
 
 /*

arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S

@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ handle_page_fault:
 	addi	r3,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
 	bl	do_page_fault
 	cmpdi	r3,0
-	beq+	12f
+	beq+	ret_from_except_lite
 	bl	save_nvgprs
 	mr	r5,r3
 	addi	r3,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
@@ -1761,7 +1761,12 @@ handle_dabr_fault:
 	ld      r5,_DSISR(r1)
 	addi    r3,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
 	bl      do_break
-12:	b       ret_from_except_lite
+	/*
+	 * do_break() may have changed the NV GPRS while handling a breakpoint.
+	 * If so, we need to restore them with their updated values. Don't use
+	 * ret_from_except_lite here.
+	 */
+	b       ret_from_except
 
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64

arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c

@@ -370,6 +370,11 @@ void hw_breakpoint_pmu_read(struct perf_event *bp)
 bool dawr_force_enable;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dawr_force_enable);
 
+static void set_dawr_cb(void *info)
+{
+	set_dawr(info);
+}
+
 static ssize_t dawr_write_file_bool(struct file *file,
 				    const char __user *user_buf,
 				    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -389,7 +394,7 @@ static ssize_t dawr_write_file_bool(struct file *file,
 
 	/* If we are clearing, make sure all CPUs have the DAWR cleared */
 	if (!dawr_force_enable)
-		smp_call_function((smp_call_func_t)set_dawr, &null_brk, 0);
+		smp_call_function(set_dawr_cb, &null_brk, 0);
 
 	return rc;
 }

arch/powerpc/kernel/irq.c

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ notrace void arch_local_irq_restore(unsigned long mask)
 	irq_happened = get_irq_happened();
 	if (!irq_happened) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG
-		WARN_ON(!(mfmsr() & MSR_EE));
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!(mfmsr() & MSR_EE));
 #endif
 		return;
 	}
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ notrace void arch_local_irq_restore(unsigned long mask)
 	 */
 	if (!(irq_happened & PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS)) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG
-		WARN_ON(!(mfmsr() & MSR_EE));
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!(mfmsr() & MSR_EE));
 #endif
 		__hard_irq_disable();
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ notrace void arch_local_irq_restore(unsigned long mask)
 		 * warn if we are wrong. Only do that when IRQ tracing
 		 * is enabled as mfmsr() can be costly.
 		 */
-		if (WARN_ON(mfmsr() & MSR_EE))
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mfmsr() & MSR_EE))
 			__hard_irq_disable();
 #endif
 	}

arch/powerpc/kernel/pci_of_scan.c

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ unsigned int pci_parse_of_flags(u32 addr0, int bridge)
 	if (addr0 & 0x02000000) {
 		flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY;
 		flags |= (addr0 >> 22) & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64;
+		if (flags & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64)
+			flags |= IORESOURCE_MEM_64;
 		flags |= (addr0 >> 28) & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_1M;
 		if (addr0 & 0x40000000)
 			flags |= IORESOURCE_PREFETCH

arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c

@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static unsigned long __prombss prom_tce_alloc_end;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
 static bool __prombss prom_radix_disable;
+static bool __prombss prom_xive_disable;
 #endif
 
 struct platform_support {
@@ -804,6 +805,12 @@ static void __init early_cmdline_parse(void)
 	}
 	if (prom_radix_disable)
 		prom_debug("Radix disabled from cmdline\n");
+
+	opt = prom_strstr(prom_cmd_line, "xive=off");
+	if (opt) {
+		prom_xive_disable = true;
+		prom_debug("XIVE disabled from cmdline\n");
+	}
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
 }
 
@@ -1212,10 +1219,17 @@ static void __init prom_parse_xive_model(u8 val,
 	switch (val) {
 	case OV5_FEAT(OV5_XIVE_EITHER): /* Either Available */
 		prom_debug("XIVE - either mode supported\n");
-		support->xive = true;
+		support->xive = !prom_xive_disable;
 		break;
 	case OV5_FEAT(OV5_XIVE_EXPLOIT): /* Only Exploitation mode */
 		prom_debug("XIVE - exploitation mode supported\n");
+		if (prom_xive_disable) {
+			/*
+			 * If we __have__ to do XIVE, we're better off ignoring
+			 * the command line rather than not booting.
+			 */
+			prom_printf("WARNING: Ignoring cmdline option xive=off\n");
+		}
 		support->xive = true;
 		break;
 	case OV5_FEAT(OV5_XIVE_LEGACY): /* Only Legacy mode */

arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c

@@ -980,10 +980,9 @@ int rtas_ibm_suspend_me(u64 handle)
 	cpu_hotplug_disable();
 
 	/* Check if we raced with a CPU-Offline Operation */
-	if (unlikely(!cpumask_equal(cpu_present_mask, cpu_online_mask))) {
-		pr_err("%s: Raced against a concurrent CPU-Offline\n",
-		       __func__);
-		atomic_set(&data.error, -EBUSY);
+	if (!cpumask_equal(cpu_present_mask, cpu_online_mask)) {
+		pr_info("%s: Raced against a concurrent CPU-Offline\n", __func__);
+		atomic_set(&data.error, -EAGAIN);
 		goto out_hotplug_enable;
 	}
 

arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c

@@ -1198,6 +1198,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 			goto bad;
 
 		if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr_hi<<32)) {
+			/* Trying to start TM on non TM system */
+			if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
+				goto bad;
 			/* We only recheckpoint on return if we're
 			 * transaction.
 			 */

arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c

@@ -771,6 +771,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr)) {
 		/* We recheckpoint on return. */
 		struct ucontext __user *uc_transact;
+
+		/* Trying to start TM on non TM system */
+		if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
+			goto badframe;
+
 		if (__get_user(uc_transact, &uc->uc_link))
 			goto badframe;
 		if (restore_tm_sigcontexts(current, &uc->uc_mcontext,

arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S

@@ -25,11 +25,19 @@
 #define SL_IBAT2	0x48
 #define SL_DBAT3	0x50
 #define SL_IBAT3	0x58
-#define SL_TB		0x60
-#define SL_R2		0x68
-#define SL_CR		0x6c
-#define SL_LR		0x70
-#define SL_R12		0x74	/* r12 to r31 */
+#define SL_DBAT4	0x60
+#define SL_IBAT4	0x68
+#define SL_DBAT5	0x70
+#define SL_IBAT5	0x78
+#define SL_DBAT6	0x80
+#define SL_IBAT6	0x88
+#define SL_DBAT7	0x90
+#define SL_IBAT7	0x98
+#define SL_TB		0xa0
+#define SL_R2		0xa8
+#define SL_CR		0xac
+#define SL_LR		0xb0
+#define SL_R12		0xb4	/* r12 to r31 */
 #define SL_SIZE		(SL_R12 + 80)
 
 	.section .data
@@ -114,6 +122,41 @@ _GLOBAL(swsusp_arch_suspend)
 	mfibatl	r4,3
 	stw	r4,SL_IBAT3+4(r11)
 
+BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT4U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT4L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT4+4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT5U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT5(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT5L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT5+4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT6U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT6(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT6L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT6+4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT7U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT7(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT7L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT7+4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT4U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT4L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT4+4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT5U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT5(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT5L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT5+4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT6U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT6(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT6L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT6+4(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT7U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT7(r11)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT7L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT7+4(r11)
+END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS)
+
 #if  0
 	/* Backup various CPU config stuffs */
 	bl	__save_cpu_setup
@@ -279,27 +322,41 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
 	mtibatu	3,r4
 	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT3+4(r11)
 	mtibatl	3,r4
-#endif
-
 BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION
-	li	r4,0
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT4U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT4+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT4L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT5(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT5U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT5+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT5L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT6(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT6U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT6+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT6L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT7(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT7U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT7+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT7L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT4U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT4+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT4L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT5(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT5U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT5+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT5L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT6(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT6U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT6+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT6L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT7(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT7U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT7+4(r11)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT7L,r4
 END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS)
+#endif
 
 	/* Flush all TLBs */
 	lis	r4,0x1000

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c

@@ -3569,9 +3569,18 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,
 	mtspr(SPRN_DEC, vcpu->arch.dec_expires - mftb());
 
 	if (kvmhv_on_pseries()) {
+		/*
+		 * We need to save and restore the guest visible part of the
+		 * psscr (i.e. using SPRN_PSSCR_PR) since the hypervisor
+		 * doesn't do this for us. Note only required if pseries since
+		 * this is done in kvmhv_load_hv_regs_and_go() below otherwise.
+		 */
+		unsigned long host_psscr;
 		/* call our hypervisor to load up HV regs and go */
 		struct hv_guest_state hvregs;
 
+		host_psscr = mfspr(SPRN_PSSCR_PR);
+		mtspr(SPRN_PSSCR_PR, vcpu->arch.psscr);
 		kvmhv_save_hv_regs(vcpu, &hvregs);
 		hvregs.lpcr = lpcr;
 		vcpu->arch.regs.msr = vcpu->arch.shregs.msr;
@@ -3590,6 +3599,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = vcpu->arch.regs.msr;
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.dar = mfspr(SPRN_DAR);
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.dsisr = mfspr(SPRN_DSISR);
+		vcpu->arch.psscr = mfspr(SPRN_PSSCR_PR);
+		mtspr(SPRN_PSSCR_PR, host_psscr);
 
 		/* H_CEDE has to be handled now, not later */
 		if (trap == BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_SYSCALL && !vcpu->arch.nested &&
@@ -3603,6 +3614,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,
 
 	vcpu->arch.slb_max = 0;
 	dec = mfspr(SPRN_DEC);
+	if (!(lpcr & LPCR_LD)) /* Sign extend if not using large decrementer */
+		dec = (s32) dec;
 	tb = mftb();
 	vcpu->arch.dec_expires = dec + tb;
 	vcpu->cpu = -1;
@@ -3652,6 +3665,8 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,
 		vcpu->arch.vpa.dirty = 1;
 		save_pmu = lp->pmcregs_in_use;
 	}
+	/* Must save pmu if this guest is capable of running nested guests */
+	save_pmu |= nesting_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
 
 	kvmhv_save_guest_pmu(vcpu, save_pmu);
 
@@ -4122,8 +4137,15 @@ int kvmhv_run_single_vcpu(struct kvm_run *kvm_run,
 
 	preempt_enable();
 
-	/* cancel pending decrementer exception if DEC is now positive */
-	if (get_tb() < vcpu->arch.dec_expires && kvmppc_core_pending_dec(vcpu))
+	/*
+	 * cancel pending decrementer exception if DEC is now positive, or if
+	 * entering a nested guest in which case the decrementer is now owned
+	 * by L2 and the L1 decrementer is provided in hdec_expires
+	 */
+	if (kvmppc_core_pending_dec(vcpu) &&
+			((get_tb() < vcpu->arch.dec_expires) ||
+			 (trap == BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_SYSCALL &&
+			  kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 3) == H_ENTER_NESTED)))
 		kvmppc_core_dequeue_dec(vcpu);
 
 	trace_kvm_guest_exit(vcpu);

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm.c

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		}
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
 		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
-			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
+			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 29);
 		/* L=1 => tresume, L=0 => tsuspend */
 		if (instr & (1 << 21)) {
 			if (MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(msr))
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
 		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
-			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
+			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 29);
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr &= ~MSR_TS_MASK;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
 
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		/* Set CR0 to indicate previous transactional state */
 		vcpu->arch.regs.ccr = (vcpu->arch.regs.ccr & 0x0fffffff) |
-			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 28);
+			(((msr & MSR_TS_MASK) >> MSR_TS_S_LG) << 29);
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = msr | MSR_TS_S;
 		return RESUME_GUEST;
 	}

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive.c

@@ -1986,10 +1986,8 @@ static int kvmppc_xive_create(struct kvm_device *dev, u32 type)
 
 	xive->single_escalation = xive_native_has_single_escalation();
 
-	if (ret) {
-		kfree(xive);
+	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	}
 
 	return 0;
 }

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive_native.c

@@ -1090,9 +1090,9 @@ static int kvmppc_xive_native_create(struct kvm_device *dev, u32 type)
 	xive->ops = &kvmppc_xive_native_ops;
 
 	if (ret)
-		kfree(xive);
+		return ret;
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*

arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_native.c

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static inline void tlbiel_hash_set_isa206(unsigned int set, unsigned int is)
  * tlbiel instruction for hash, set invalidation
  * i.e., r=1 and is=01 or is=10 or is=11
  */
-static inline void tlbiel_hash_set_isa300(unsigned int set, unsigned int is,
+static __always_inline void tlbiel_hash_set_isa300(unsigned int set, unsigned int is,
 					unsigned int pid,
 					unsigned int ric, unsigned int prs)
 {

arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c

@@ -1901,11 +1901,20 @@ void hash__setup_initial_memory_limit(phys_addr_t first_memblock_base,
 	 *
 	 * For guests on platforms before POWER9, we clamp the it limit to 1G
 	 * to avoid some funky things such as RTAS bugs etc...
+	 *
+	 * On POWER9 we limit to 1TB in case the host erroneously told us that
+	 * the RMA was >1TB. Effective address bits 0:23 are treated as zero
+	 * (meaning the access is aliased to zero i.e. addr = addr % 1TB)
+	 * for virtual real mode addressing and so it doesn't make sense to
+	 * have an area larger than 1TB as it can't be addressed.
 	 */
 	if (!early_cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
 		ppc64_rma_size = first_memblock_size;
 		if (!early_cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
 			ppc64_rma_size = min_t(u64, ppc64_rma_size, 0x40000000);
+		else
+			ppc64_rma_size = min_t(u64, ppc64_rma_size,
+					       1UL << SID_SHIFT_1T);
 
 		/* Finally limit subsequent allocations */
 		memblock_set_current_limit(ppc64_rma_size);

arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/radix_tlb.c

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  * tlbiel instruction for radix, set invalidation
  * i.e., r=1 and is=01 or is=10 or is=11
  */
-static inline void tlbiel_radix_set_isa300(unsigned int set, unsigned int is,
+static __always_inline void tlbiel_radix_set_isa300(unsigned int set, unsigned int is,
 					unsigned int pid,
 					unsigned int ric, unsigned int prs)
 {
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ static __always_inline void __tlbie_lpid(unsigned long lpid, unsigned long ric)
 	trace_tlbie(lpid, 0, rb, rs, ric, prs, r);
 }
 
-static inline void __tlbiel_lpid_guest(unsigned long lpid, int set,
-				unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void __tlbiel_lpid_guest(unsigned long lpid, int set,
+						unsigned long ric)
 {
 	unsigned long rb,rs,prs,r;
 
@@ -163,8 +163,8 @@ static inline void __tlbiel_lpid_guest(unsigned long lpid, int set,
 }
 
 
-static inline void __tlbiel_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
-			       unsigned long ap, unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void __tlbiel_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
+					unsigned long ap, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	unsigned long rb,rs,prs,r;
 
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static inline void __tlbiel_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
 	trace_tlbie(0, 1, rb, rs, ric, prs, r);
 }
 
-static inline void __tlbie_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
-			      unsigned long ap, unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void __tlbie_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
+				       unsigned long ap, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	unsigned long rb,rs,prs,r;
 
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ static inline void __tlbie_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
 	trace_tlbie(0, 0, rb, rs, ric, prs, r);
 }
 
-static inline void __tlbie_lpid_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long lpid,
-			      unsigned long ap, unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void __tlbie_lpid_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long lpid,
+					    unsigned long ap, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	unsigned long rb,rs,prs,r;
 
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static inline void fixup_tlbie_lpid(unsigned long lpid)
 /*
  * We use 128 set in radix mode and 256 set in hpt mode.
  */
-static inline void _tlbiel_pid(unsigned long pid, unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void _tlbiel_pid(unsigned long pid, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	int set;
 
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static inline void _tlbie_lpid(unsigned long lpid, unsigned long ric)
 	asm volatile("eieio; tlbsync; ptesync": : :"memory");
 }
 
-static inline void _tlbiel_lpid_guest(unsigned long lpid, unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void _tlbiel_lpid_guest(unsigned long lpid, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	int set;
 
@@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ static inline void __tlbiel_va_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
 		__tlbiel_va(addr, pid, ap, RIC_FLUSH_TLB);
 }
 
-static inline void _tlbiel_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
-			      unsigned long psize, unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void _tlbiel_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
+				       unsigned long psize, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	unsigned long ap = mmu_get_ap(psize);
 
@@ -409,8 +409,8 @@ static inline void __tlbie_va_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
 		__tlbie_va(addr, pid, ap, RIC_FLUSH_TLB);
 }
 
-static inline void _tlbie_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
-			      unsigned long psize, unsigned long ric)
+static __always_inline void _tlbie_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
+				      unsigned long psize, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	unsigned long ap = mmu_get_ap(psize);
 
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static inline void _tlbie_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long pid,
 	asm volatile("eieio; tlbsync; ptesync": : :"memory");
 }
 
-static inline void _tlbie_lpid_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long lpid,
+static __always_inline void _tlbie_lpid_va(unsigned long va, unsigned long lpid,
 			      unsigned long psize, unsigned long ric)
 {
 	unsigned long ap = mmu_get_ap(psize);

arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c

@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz
 	} else {
 		pdshift = PUD_SHIFT;
 		pu = pud_alloc(mm, pg, addr);
+		if (!pu)
+			return NULL;
 		if (pshift == PUD_SHIFT)
 			return (pte_t *)pu;
 		else if (pshift > PMD_SHIFT) {
@@ -138,6 +140,8 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz
 		} else {
 			pdshift = PMD_SHIFT;
 			pm = pmd_alloc(mm, pu, addr);
+			if (!pm)
+				return NULL;
 			if (pshift == PMD_SHIFT)
 				/* 16MB hugepage */
 				return (pte_t *)pm;
@@ -154,12 +158,16 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz
 	} else {
 		pdshift = PUD_SHIFT;
 		pu = pud_alloc(mm, pg, addr);
+		if (!pu)
+			return NULL;
 		if (pshift >= PUD_SHIFT) {
 			ptl = pud_lockptr(mm, pu);
 			hpdp = (hugepd_t *)pu;
 		} else {
 			pdshift = PMD_SHIFT;
 			pm = pmd_alloc(mm, pu, addr);
+			if (!pm)
+				return NULL;
 			ptl = pmd_lockptr(mm, pm);
 			hpdp = (hugepd_t *)pm;
 		}

arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static void kasan_populate_pte(pte_t *ptep, pgprot_t prot)
 		__set_pte_at(&init_mm, va, ptep, pfn_pte(PHYS_PFN(pa), prot), 0);
 }
 
-static int kasan_init_shadow_page_tables(unsigned long k_start, unsigned long k_end)
+static int __ref kasan_init_shadow_page_tables(unsigned long k_start, unsigned long k_end)
 {
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 	unsigned long k_cur, k_next;
@@ -35,7 +35,10 @@ static int kasan_init_shadow_page_tables(unsigned long k_start, unsigned long k_
 		if ((void *)pmd_page_vaddr(*pmd) != kasan_early_shadow_pte)
 			continue;
 
-		new = pte_alloc_one_kernel(&init_mm);
+		if (slab_is_available())
+			new = pte_alloc_one_kernel(&init_mm);
+		else
+			new = memblock_alloc(PTE_FRAG_SIZE, PTE_FRAG_SIZE);
 
 		if (!new)
 			return -ENOMEM;

arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable_32.c

@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ void mark_initmem_nx(void)
 	unsigned long numpages = PFN_UP((unsigned long)_einittext) -
 				 PFN_DOWN((unsigned long)_sinittext);
 
-	if (v_block_mapped((unsigned long)_stext) + 1)
+	if (v_block_mapped((unsigned long)_stext + 1))
 		mmu_mark_initmem_nx();
 	else
 		change_page_attr(page, numpages, PAGE_KERNEL);

arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/uic.c

@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static int uic_set_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int flow_type)
 
 	mtdcr(uic->dcrbase + UIC_PR, pr);
 	mtdcr(uic->dcrbase + UIC_TR, tr);
+	mtdcr(uic->dcrbase + UIC_SR, ~mask);
 
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uic->lock, flags);
 

arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/sleep.S

@@ -33,10 +33,18 @@
 #define SL_IBAT2	0x48
 #define SL_DBAT3	0x50
 #define SL_IBAT3	0x58
-#define SL_TB		0x60
-#define SL_R2		0x68
-#define SL_CR		0x6c
-#define SL_R12		0x70	/* r12 to r31 */
+#define SL_DBAT4	0x60
+#define SL_IBAT4	0x68
+#define SL_DBAT5	0x70
+#define SL_IBAT5	0x78
+#define SL_DBAT6	0x80
+#define SL_IBAT6	0x88
+#define SL_DBAT7	0x90
+#define SL_IBAT7	0x98
+#define SL_TB		0xa0
+#define SL_R2		0xa8
+#define SL_CR		0xac
+#define SL_R12		0xb0	/* r12 to r31 */
 #define SL_SIZE		(SL_R12 + 80)
 
 	.section .text
@@ -121,6 +129,41 @@ _GLOBAL(low_sleep_handler)
 	mfibatl	r4,3
 	stw	r4,SL_IBAT3+4(r1)
 
+BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT4U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT4L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT4+4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT5U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT5(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT5L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT5+4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT6U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT6(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT6L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT6+4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT7U
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT7(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_DBAT7L
+	stw	r4,SL_DBAT7+4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT4U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT4L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT4+4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT5U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT5(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT5L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT5+4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT6U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT6(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT6L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT6+4(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT7U
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT7(r1)
+	mfspr	r4,SPRN_IBAT7L
+	stw	r4,SL_IBAT7+4(r1)
+END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS)
+
 	/* Backup various CPU config stuffs */
 	bl	__save_cpu_setup
 
@@ -321,22 +364,37 @@ grackle_wake_up:
 	mtibatl	3,r4
 
 BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION
-	li	r4,0
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT4U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT4+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT4L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT5(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT5U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT5+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT5L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT6(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT6U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT6+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT6L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT7(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT7U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_DBAT7+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_DBAT7L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT4U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT4+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT4L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT5(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT5U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT5+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT5L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT6(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT6U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT6+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT6L,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT7(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT7U,r4
+	lwz	r4,SL_IBAT7+4(r1)
 	mtspr	SPRN_IBAT7L,r4
 END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS)
 

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/idle.c

@@ -758,7 +758,6 @@ static unsigned long power9_idle_stop(unsigned long psscr, bool mmu_on)
 	mtspr(SPRN_PTCR,	sprs.ptcr);
 	mtspr(SPRN_RPR,		sprs.rpr);
 	mtspr(SPRN_TSCR,	sprs.tscr);
-	mtspr(SPRN_LDBAR,	sprs.ldbar);
 
 	if (pls >= pnv_first_tb_loss_level) {
 		/* TB loss */
@@ -790,6 +789,7 @@ core_woken:
 	mtspr(SPRN_MMCR0,	sprs.mmcr0);
 	mtspr(SPRN_MMCR1,	sprs.mmcr1);
 	mtspr(SPRN_MMCR2,	sprs.mmcr2);
+	mtspr(SPRN_LDBAR,	sprs.ldbar);
 
 	mtspr(SPRN_SPRG3,	local_paca->sprg_vdso);
 

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/npu-dma.c

@@ -28,9 +28,22 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(npu_context_lock);
 static struct pci_dev *get_pci_dev(struct device_node *dn)
 {
 	struct pci_dn *pdn = PCI_DN(dn);
+	struct pci_dev *pdev;
 
-	return pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(pci_domain_nr(pdn->phb->bus),
+	pdev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(pci_domain_nr(pdn->phb->bus),
 					   pdn->busno, pdn->devfn);
+
+	/*
+	 * pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot() increased the reference count of
+	 * the PCI device, but callers don't need that actually as the PE
+	 * already holds a reference to the device. Since callers aren't
+	 * aware of the reference count change, call pci_dev_put() now to
+	 * avoid leaks.
+	 */
+	if (pdev)
+		pci_dev_put(pdev);
+
+	return pdev;
 }
 
 /* Given a NPU device get the associated PCI device. */

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda.c

@@ -2456,6 +2456,14 @@ static long pnv_pci_ioda2_setup_default_config(struct pnv_ioda_pe *pe)
 	if (!pnv_iommu_bypass_disabled)
 		pnv_pci_ioda2_set_bypass(pe, true);
 
+	/*
+	 * Set table base for the case of IOMMU DMA use. Usually this is done
+	 * from dma_dev_setup() which is not called when a device is returned
+	 * from VFIO so do it here.
+	 */
+	if (pe->pdev)
+		set_iommu_table_base(&pe->pdev->dev, tbl);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2543,6 +2551,8 @@ static void pnv_ioda2_take_ownership(struct iommu_table_group *table_group)
 	pnv_pci_ioda2_unset_window(&pe->table_group, 0);
 	if (pe->pbus)
 		pnv_ioda_setup_bus_dma(pe, pe->pbus);
+	else if (pe->pdev)
+		set_iommu_table_base(&pe->pdev->dev, NULL);
 	iommu_tce_table_put(tbl);
 }
 

arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-memory.c

@@ -976,6 +976,9 @@ static int pseries_update_drconf_memory(struct of_reconfig_data *pr)
 	if (!memblock_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!pr->old_prop)
+		return 0;
+
 	p = (__be32 *) pr->old_prop->value;
 	if (!p)
 		return -EINVAL;

arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
  */
 
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
@@ -335,11 +336,19 @@ void post_mobility_fixup(void)
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Post-mobility activate-fw failed: %d\n", rc);
 
+	/*
+	 * We don't want CPUs to go online/offline while the device
+	 * tree is being updated.
+	 */
+	cpus_read_lock();
+
 	rc = pseries_devicetree_update(MIGRATION_SCOPE);
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Post-mobility device tree update "
 			"failed: %d\n", rc);
 
+	cpus_read_unlock();
+
 	/* Possibly switch to a new RFI flush type */
 	pseries_setup_rfi_flush();
 

arch/powerpc/sysdev/xive/common.c

@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static int xive_find_target_in_mask(const struct cpumask *mask,
 	 * Now go through the entire mask until we find a valid
 	 * target.
 	 */
-	for (;;) {
+	do {
 		/*
 		 * We re-check online as the fallback case passes us
 		 * an untested affinity mask
@@ -487,12 +487,11 @@ static int xive_find_target_in_mask(const struct cpumask *mask,
 		if (cpu_online(cpu) && xive_try_pick_target(cpu))
 			return cpu;
 		cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, mask);
-		if (cpu == first)
-			break;
 		/* Wrap around */
 		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
 			cpu = cpumask_first(mask);
-	}
+	} while (cpu != first);
+
 	return -1;
 }
 

arch/powerpc/sysdev/xive/spapr.c

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/libfdt.h>
 
 #include <asm/prom.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -659,6 +660,55 @@ static bool xive_get_max_prio(u8 *max_prio)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static const u8 *get_vec5_feature(unsigned int index)
+{
+	unsigned long root, chosen;
+	int size;
+	const u8 *vec5;
+
+	root = of_get_flat_dt_root();
+	chosen = of_get_flat_dt_subnode_by_name(root, "chosen");
+	if (chosen == -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND)
+		return NULL;
+
+	vec5 = of_get_flat_dt_prop(chosen, "ibm,architecture-vec-5", &size);
+	if (!vec5)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (size <= index)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return vec5 + index;
+}
+
+static bool xive_spapr_disabled(void)
+{
+	const u8 *vec5_xive;
+
+	vec5_xive = get_vec5_feature(OV5_INDX(OV5_XIVE_SUPPORT));
+	if (vec5_xive) {
+		u8 val;
+
+		val = *vec5_xive & OV5_FEAT(OV5_XIVE_SUPPORT);
+		switch (val) {
+		case OV5_FEAT(OV5_XIVE_EITHER):
+		case OV5_FEAT(OV5_XIVE_LEGACY):
+			break;
+		case OV5_FEAT(OV5_XIVE_EXPLOIT):
+			/* Hypervisor only supports XIVE */
+			if (xive_cmdline_disabled)
+				pr_warn("WARNING: Ignoring cmdline option xive=off\n");
+			return false;
+		default:
+			pr_warn("%s: Unknown xive support option: 0x%x\n",
+				__func__, val);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return xive_cmdline_disabled;
+}
+
 bool __init xive_spapr_init(void)
 {
 	struct device_node *np;
@@ -671,7 +721,7 @@ bool __init xive_spapr_init(void)
 	const __be32 *reg;
 	int i;
 
-	if (xive_cmdline_disabled)
+	if (xive_spapr_disabled())
 		return false;
 
 	pr_devel("%s()\n", __func__);

arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c

@@ -465,8 +465,10 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 	hard_irq_disable();
 
-	tracing_enabled = tracing_is_on();
-	tracing_off();
+	if (!fromipi) {
+		tracing_enabled = tracing_is_on();
+		tracing_off();
+	}
 
 	bp = in_breakpoint_table(regs->nip, &offset);
 	if (bp != NULL) {

arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h

@@ -59,6 +59,18 @@ static inline int test_facility(unsigned long nr)
 	return __test_facility(nr, &S390_lowcore.stfle_fac_list);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long __stfle_asm(u64 *stfle_fac_list, int size)
+{
+	register unsigned long reg0 asm("0") = size - 1;
+
+	asm volatile(
+		".insn s,0xb2b00000,0(%1)" /* stfle */
+		: "+d" (reg0)
+		: "a" (stfle_fac_list)
+		: "memory", "cc");
+	return reg0;
+}
+
 /**
  * stfle - Store facility list extended
  * @stfle_fac_list: array where facility list can be stored
@@ -75,13 +87,8 @@ static inline void __stfle(u64 *stfle_fac_list, int size)
 	memcpy(stfle_fac_list, &S390_lowcore.stfl_fac_list, 4);
 	if (S390_lowcore.stfl_fac_list & 0x01000000) {
 		/* More facility bits available with stfle */
-		register unsigned long reg0 asm("0") = size - 1;
-
-		asm volatile(".insn s,0xb2b00000,0(%1)" /* stfle */
-			     : "+d" (reg0)
-			     : "a" (stfle_fac_list)
-			     : "memory", "cc");
-		nr = (reg0 + 1) * 8; /* # bytes stored by stfle */
+		nr = __stfle_asm(stfle_fac_list, size);
+		nr = min_t(unsigned long, (nr + 1) * 8, size * 8);
 	}
 	memset((char *) stfle_fac_list + nr, 0, size * 8 - nr);
 }

arch/s390/include/asm/sclp.h

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ struct sclp_info {
 	unsigned char has_gisaf : 1;
 	unsigned char has_diag318 : 1;
 	unsigned char has_sipl : 1;
-	unsigned char has_sipl_g2 : 1;
 	unsigned char has_dirq : 1;
 	unsigned int ibc;
 	unsigned int mtid;

arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c

@@ -286,12 +286,7 @@ static struct kobj_attribute sys_ipl_secure_attr =
 static ssize_t ipl_has_secure_show(struct kobject *kobj,
 				   struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *page)
 {
-	if (MACHINE_IS_LPAR)
-		return sprintf(page, "%i\n", !!sclp.has_sipl);
-	else if (MACHINE_IS_VM)
-		return sprintf(page, "%i\n", !!sclp.has_sipl_g2);
-	else
-		return sprintf(page, "%i\n", 0);
+	return sprintf(page, "%i\n", !!sclp.has_sipl);
 }
 
 static struct kobj_attribute sys_ipl_has_secure_attr =

arch/sh/boards/Kconfig

@@ -8,27 +8,19 @@ config SH_ALPHA_BOARD
 	bool
 
 config SH_DEVICE_TREE
-	bool "Board Described by Device Tree"
+	bool
 	select OF
 	select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
 	select TIMER_OF
 	select COMMON_CLK
 	select GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY
-	help
-	  Select Board Described by Device Tree to build a kernel that
-	  does not hard-code any board-specific knowledge but instead uses
-	  a device tree blob provided by the boot-loader. You must enable
-	  drivers for any hardware you want to use separately. At this
-	  time, only boards based on the open-hardware J-Core processors
-	  have sufficient driver coverage to use this option; do not
-	  select it if you are using original SuperH hardware.
 
 config SH_JCORE_SOC
 	bool "J-Core SoC"
-	depends on SH_DEVICE_TREE && (CPU_SH2 || CPU_J2)
+	select SH_DEVICE_TREE
 	select CLKSRC_JCORE_PIT
 	select JCORE_AIC
-	default y if CPU_J2
+	depends on CPU_J2
 	help
 	  Select this option to include drivers core components of the
 	  J-Core SoC, including interrupt controllers and timers.

arch/sh/include/asm/io.h

@@ -369,7 +369,11 @@ static inline int iounmap_fixed(void __iomem *addr) { return -EINVAL; }
 
 #define ioremap_nocache	ioremap
 #define ioremap_uc	ioremap
-#define iounmap		__iounmap
+
+static inline void iounmap(void __iomem *addr)
+{
+	__iounmap(addr);
+}
 
 /*
  * Convert a physical pointer to a virtual kernel pointer for /dev/mem

arch/um/include/asm/mmu_context.h

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static inline void activate_mm(struct mm_struct *old, struct mm_struct *new)
 	 * when the new ->mm is used for the first time.
 	 */
 	__switch_mm(&new->context.id);
-	down_write(&new->mmap_sem);
+	down_write_nested(&new->mmap_sem, 1);
 	uml_setup_stubs(new);
 	up_write(&new->mmap_sem);
 }

arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include "pgtable.h"
 #include "../string.h"
 #include "../voffset.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
 
 /*
  * WARNING!!

arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/boot.h>
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
-#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
 
 #define BOOT_CTYPE_H
 #include <linux/acpi.h>