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51 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Greg Kroah-Hartman 216f33936e Linux 4.16.2 2018-04-12 12:30:01 +02:00
Dirk van der Merwe 87d1acd833 nfp: use full 40 bits of the NSP buffer address
[ Upstream commit 1489bbd10e ]

The NSP default buffer is a piece of NFP memory where additional
command data can be placed.  Its format has been copied from
host buffer, but the PCIe selection bits do not make sense in
this case.  If those get masked out from a NFP address - writes
to random place in the chip memory may be issued and crash the
device.

Even in the general NSP buffer case, it doesn't make sense to have the
PCIe selection bits there anymore. These are unused at the moment, and
when it becomes necessary, the PCIe selection bits should rather be
moved to another register to utilise more bits for the buffer address.

This has never been an issue because the buffer used to be
allocated in memory with less-than-38-bit-long address but that
is about to change.

Fixes: 1a64821c6a ("nfp: add support for service processor access")
Signed-off-by: Dirk van der Merwe <dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:01 +02:00
Cong Wang d0fd3e03df net_sched: fix a missing idr_remove() in u32_delete_key()
[ Upstream commit f12c643209 ]

When we delete a u32 key via u32_delete_key(), we forget to
call idr_remove() to remove its handle from IDR.

Fixes: e7614370d6 ("net_sched: use idr to allocate u32 filter handles")
Reported-by: Marcin Kabiesz <admin@hostcenter.eu>
Tested-by: Marcin Kabiesz <admin@hostcenter.eu>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:01 +02:00
Eric Dumazet 9f13ba19dd vti6: better validate user provided tunnel names
[ Upstream commit 537b361fbc ]

Use valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

Fixes: ed1efb2aef ("ipv6: Add support for IPsec virtual tunnel interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:01 +02:00
Eric Dumazet 961757a423 ip6_tunnel: better validate user provided tunnel names
[ Upstream commit db7a65e3ab ]

Use valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:01 +02:00
Eric Dumazet d210545346 ip6_gre: better validate user provided tunnel names
[ Upstream commit 5f42df013b ]

Use dev_valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

syzbot caught the following bug :

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip6gre_tunnel_locate+0x334/0x860 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:339
Write of size 20 at addr ffff8801afb9f7b8 by task syzkaller851048/4466

CPU: 1 PID: 4466 Comm: syzkaller851048 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x29f lib/dump_stack.c:53
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0xac/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
 strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
 ip6gre_tunnel_locate+0x334/0x860 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:339
 ip6gre_tunnel_ioctl+0x69d/0x12e0 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1195
 dev_ifsioc+0x43e/0xb90 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:334
 dev_ioctl+0x69a/0xcc0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:525
 sock_ioctl+0x47e/0x680 net/socket.c:1015
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x1cf/0x1650 fs/ioctl.c:684
 ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701
 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline]
 SyS_ioctl+0x24/0x30 fs/ioctl.c:706
 do_syscall_64+0x29e/0x9d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Fixes: c12b395a46 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:01 +02:00
Eric Dumazet e7392359da ipv6: sit: better validate user provided tunnel names
[ Upstream commit b95211e066 ]

Use dev_valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

syzbot caught the following bug :

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ipip6_tunnel_locate+0x63b/0xaa0 net/ipv6/sit.c:254
Write of size 33 at addr ffff8801b64076d8 by task syzkaller932654/4453

CPU: 0 PID: 4453 Comm: syzkaller932654 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x29f lib/dump_stack.c:53
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0xac/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
 strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
 ipip6_tunnel_locate+0x63b/0xaa0 net/ipv6/sit.c:254
 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl+0xe71/0x241b net/ipv6/sit.c:1221
 dev_ifsioc+0x43e/0xb90 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:334
 dev_ioctl+0x69a/0xcc0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:525
 sock_ioctl+0x47e/0x680 net/socket.c:1015
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x1cf/0x1650 fs/ioctl.c:684
 ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701
 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline]
 SyS_ioctl+0x24/0x30 fs/ioctl.c:706
 do_syscall_64+0x29e/0x9d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:00 +02:00
Eric Dumazet 3e13d6548c ip_tunnel: better validate user provided tunnel names
[ Upstream commit 9cb726a212 ]

Use dev_valid_name() to make sure user does not provide illegal
device name.

syzbot caught the following bug :

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_tunnel_create+0xca/0x6b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:257
Write of size 20 at addr ffff8801ac79f810 by task syzkaller268107/4482

CPU: 0 PID: 4482 Comm: syzkaller268107 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x29f lib/dump_stack.c:53
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0xac/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
 strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
 __ip_tunnel_create+0xca/0x6b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:257
 ip_tunnel_create net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:352 [inline]
 ip_tunnel_ioctl+0x818/0xd40 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:861
 ipip_tunnel_ioctl+0x1c5/0x420 net/ipv4/ipip.c:350
 dev_ifsioc+0x43e/0xb90 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:334
 dev_ioctl+0x69a/0xcc0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:525
 sock_ioctl+0x47e/0x680 net/socket.c:1015
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x1cf/0x1650 fs/ioctl.c:684
 ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701
 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline]
 SyS_ioctl+0x24/0x30 fs/ioctl.c:706
 do_syscall_64+0x29e/0x9d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Fixes: c544193214 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:00 +02:00
Eric Dumazet 218031d350 net: fool proof dev_valid_name()
[ Upstream commit a9d48205d0 ]

We want to use dev_valid_name() to validate tunnel names,
so better use strnlen(name, IFNAMSIZ) than strlen(name) to make
sure to not upset KASAN.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:00 +02:00
Hangbin Liu 066eacb902 vlan: also check phy_driver ts_info for vlan's real device
[ Upstream commit ec1d8ccb07 ]

Just like function ethtool_get_ts_info(), we should also consider the
phy_driver ts_info call back. For example, driver dp83640.

Fixes: 37dd9255b2 ("vlan: Pass ethtool get_ts_info queries to real device.")
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:00 +02:00
Kai-Heng Feng 22714d6e24 sky2: Increase D3 delay to sky2 stops working after suspend
[ Upstream commit afb1336370 ]

The sky2 ethernet stops working after system resume from suspend:
[ 582.852065] sky2 0000:04:00.0: Refused to change power state, currently in D3

The current 150ms delay is not enough, change it to 200ms can solve the
issue.

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1758507
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:00 +02:00
Eric Dumazet 0f56180a8f sctp: sctp_sockaddr_af must check minimal addr length for AF_INET6
[ Upstream commit 81e9837029 ]

Check must happen before call to ipv6_addr_v4mapped()

syzbot report was :

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_sockaddr_af net/sctp/socket.c:359 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_do_bind+0x60f/0xdc0 net/sctp/socket.c:384
CPU: 0 PID: 3576 Comm: syzkaller968804 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676
 sctp_sockaddr_af net/sctp/socket.c:359 [inline]
 sctp_do_bind+0x60f/0xdc0 net/sctp/socket.c:384
 sctp_bind+0x149/0x190 net/sctp/socket.c:332
 inet6_bind+0x1fd/0x1820 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:293
 SYSC_bind+0x3f2/0x4b0 net/socket.c:1474
 SyS_bind+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:1460
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x43fd49
RSP: 002b:00007ffe99df3d28 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fd49
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401670
R13: 0000000000401700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Local variable description: ----address@SYSC_bind
Variable was created at:
 SYSC_bind+0x6f/0x4b0 net/socket.c:1461
 SyS_bind+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:1460

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:00 +02:00
Eric Dumazet e8fc61bc77 sctp: do not leak kernel memory to user space
[ Upstream commit 6780db244d ]

syzbot produced a nice report [1]

Issue here is that a recvmmsg() managed to leak 8 bytes of kernel memory
to user space, because sin_zero (padding field) was not properly cleared.

[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
CPU: 1 PID: 3586 Comm: syzkaller481044 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x164/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1176
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2211
 __sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
 SYSC_recvmmsg+0x29b/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2394
 SyS_recvmmsg+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:2378
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x4401c9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc56f73098 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401c9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020003ac0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000020003bc0 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000401af0
R13: 0000000000401b80 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Local variable description: ----addr@___sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
 ___sys_recvmsg+0xd5/0x810 net/socket.c:2172
 __sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313

Bytes 8-15 of 16 are uninitialized

==================================================================
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...

CPU: 1 PID: 3586 Comm: syzkaller481044 Tainted: G    B            4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 panic+0x39d/0x940 kernel/panic.c:183
 kmsan_report+0x238/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1083
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x164/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1176
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2211
 __sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
 SYSC_recvmmsg+0x29b/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2394
 SyS_recvmmsg+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:2378
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc:	Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc:	Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:30:00 +02:00
Eric Dumazet 141ce92477 pptp: remove a buggy dst release in pptp_connect()
[ Upstream commit bfacfb457b ]

Once dst has been cached in socket via sk_setup_caps(),
it is illegal to call ip_rt_put() (or dst_release()),
since sk_setup_caps() did not change dst refcount.

We can still dereference it since we hold socket lock.

Caugth by syzbot :

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_dec_return include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:198 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dst_release+0x27/0xa0 net/core/dst.c:185
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8801c54dc040 by task syz-executor4/20088

CPU: 1 PID: 20088 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #376
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1a7/0x27d lib/dump_stack.c:53
 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x23c/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:412
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
 kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:278
 atomic_dec_return include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:198 [inline]
 dst_release+0x27/0xa0 net/core/dst.c:185
 sk_dst_set include/net/sock.h:1812 [inline]
 sk_dst_reset include/net/sock.h:1824 [inline]
 sock_setbindtodevice net/core/sock.c:610 [inline]
 sock_setsockopt+0x431/0x1b20 net/core/sock.c:707
 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1845 [inline]
 SyS_setsockopt+0x2ff/0x360 net/socket.c:1828
 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x4552d9
RSP: 002b:00007f4878126c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f48781276d4 RCX: 00000000004552d9
RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000013
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200010c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000526 R14: 00000000006fac30 R15: 0000000000000000

Allocated by task 20088:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline]
 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:552
 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:489
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3542
 dst_alloc+0x11f/0x1a0 net/core/dst.c:104
 rt_dst_alloc+0xe9/0x540 net/ipv4/route.c:1520
 __mkroute_output net/ipv4/route.c:2265 [inline]
 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0xa49/0x2c60 net/ipv4/route.c:2493
 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x20b/0x370 net/ipv4/route.c:2322
 __ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:126 [inline]
 ip_route_output_flow+0x26/0xa0 net/ipv4/route.c:2577
 ip_route_output_ports include/net/route.h:163 [inline]
 pptp_connect+0xa84/0x1170 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:453
 SYSC_connect+0x213/0x4a0 net/socket.c:1639
 SyS_connect+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:1620
 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Freed by task 20082:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:520
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:527
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3486 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x2a0 mm/slab.c:3744
 dst_destroy+0x266/0x380 net/core/dst.c:140
 dst_destroy_rcu+0x16/0x20 net/core/dst.c:153
 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:178 [inline]
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2675 [inline]
 invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2930 [inline]
 __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897 [inline]
 rcu_process_callbacks+0xd6c/0x17b0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2914
 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c54dc000
 which belongs to the cache ip_dst_cache of size 168
The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of
 168-byte region [ffff8801c54dc000, ffff8801c54dc0a8)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007153700 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801c54dc000 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffff8801c54dc000 0000000000000000 0000000100000010
raw: ffffea0006b34b20 ffffea0006b6c1e0 ffff8801d674a1c0 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:29:59 +02:00
Davide Caratti 6f9d3212c7 net/sched: fix NULL dereference in the error path of tcf_bpf_init()
[ Upstream commit 3239534a79 ]

when tcf_bpf_init_from_ops() fails (e.g. because of program having invalid
number of instructions), tcf_bpf_cfg_cleanup() calls bpf_prog_put(NULL) or
bpf_prog_destroy(NULL). Unless CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is unset, this causes
the following error:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
 PGD 800000007345a067 P4D 800000007345a067 PUD 340e1067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 Modules linked in: act_bpf(E) ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter binfmt_misc ext4 mbcache jbd2 crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec_generic pcbc snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd joydev snd_timer snd virtio_balloon pcspkr soundcore i2c_piix4 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic pata_acpi qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm virtio_blk drm virtio_net virtio_console i2c_core crc32c_intel serio_raw virtio_pci ata_piix libata virtio_ring floppy virtio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: act_bpf]
 CPU: 3 PID: 5654 Comm: tc Tainted: G            E    4.16.0.bpf_test+ #408
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_put+0xc/0xc0
 RSP: 0018:ffff9594003ef728 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9594003ef758 RCX: 0000000000000024
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000044
 R10: 0000000000000220 R11: ffff8a7ab9f17131 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: ffff8a7ab7c3c8e0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8a7ab88f1054
 FS:  00007fcb2f17c740(0000) GS:ffff8a7abfd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000007c888006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
 Call Trace:
  tcf_bpf_cfg_cleanup+0x2f/0x40 [act_bpf]
  tcf_bpf_cleanup+0x4c/0x70 [act_bpf]
  __tcf_idr_release+0x79/0x140
  tcf_bpf_init+0x125/0x330 [act_bpf]
  tcf_action_init_1+0x2cc/0x430
  ? get_page_from_freelist+0x3f0/0x11b0
  tcf_action_init+0xd3/0x1b0
  tc_ctl_action+0x18b/0x240
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x29c/0x310
  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x1b9/0x270
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.29+0x100/0x100
  netlink_rcv_skb+0xd2/0x110
  netlink_unicast+0x17c/0x230
  netlink_sendmsg+0x2cd/0x3c0
  sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x27a/0x290
  ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x80/0x130
  ? page_add_new_anon_rmap+0x73/0xc0
  ? do_anonymous_page+0x2a2/0x560
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0xc75/0xe20
  __sys_sendmsg+0x58/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1a0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
 RIP: 0033:0x7fcb2e58eba0
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc93c496c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc93c497f0 RCX: 00007fcb2e58eba0
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc93c49740 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000000005ac6a646 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007ffc93c49120 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007ffc93c49804 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000066afa0
 Code: 5f 00 48 8b 43 20 48 c7 c7 70 2f 7c b8 c7 40 10 00 00 00 00 5b e9 a5 8b 61 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 <48> 8b 47 20 f0 ff 08 74 05 5b 5d 41 5c c3 41 89 f4 0f 1f 44 00
 RIP: __bpf_prog_put+0xc/0xc0 RSP: ffff9594003ef728
 CR2: 0000000000000020

Fix it in tcf_bpf_cfg_cleanup(), ensuring that bpf_prog_{put,destroy}(f)
is called only when f is not NULL.

Fixes: bbc09e7842 ("net/sched: fix idr leak on the error path of tcf_bpf_init()")
Reported-by: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:29:59 +02:00
Jeff Barnhill 22034921c6 net/ipv6: Increment OUTxxx counters after netfilter hook
[ Upstream commit 71a1c91523 ]

At the end of ip6_forward(), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS and
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS are incremented immediately before the NF_HOOK call
for NFPROTO_IPV6 / NF_INET_FORWARD.  As a result, these counters get
incremented regardless of whether or not the netfilter hook allows the
packet to continue being processed.  This change increments the counters
in ip6_forward_finish() so that it will not happen if the netfilter hook
chooses to terminate the packet, which is similar to how IPv4 works.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Barnhill <0xeffeff@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:29:59 +02:00
Andrew Lunn 505e1b27d9 net: dsa: Discard frames from unused ports
[ Upstream commit fc5f33768c ]

The Marvell switches under some conditions will pass a frame to the
host with the port being the CPU port. Such frames are invalid, and
should be dropped. Not dropping them can result in a crash when
incrementing the receive statistics for an invalid port.

Reported-by: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Fixes: 91da11f870 ("net: Distributed Switch Architecture protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:29:59 +02:00
Miguel Fadon Perlines 1255b1f0df arp: fix arp_filter on l3slave devices
[ Upstream commit 58b35f2768 ]

arp_filter performs an ip_route_output search for arp source address and
checks if output device is the same where the arp request was received,
if it is not, the arp request is not answered.

This route lookup is always done on main route table so l3slave devices
never find the proper route and arp is not answered.

Passing l3mdev_master_ifindex_rcu(dev) return value as oif fixes the
lookup for l3slave devices while maintaining same behavior for non
l3slave devices as this function returns 0 in that case.

Fixes: 613d09b30f ("net: Use VRF device index for lookups on TX")
Signed-off-by: Miguel Fadon Perlines <mfadon@teldat.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:29:59 +02:00
Guenter Roeck ee8dfbe42b sparc64: Oracle DAX driver depends on SPARC64
commit 9c548bb582 upstream.

sparc:allmodconfig fails to build as follows.

ERROR: "mdesc_release" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "sun4v_hvapi_register" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "mdesc_get_property" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "mdesc_node_by_name" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "mdesc_grab" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "sun4v_ccb_info" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "sun4v_ccb_submit" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "sun4v_ccb_kill" [drivers/sbus/char/oradax.ko] undefined!

The symbols are only available with SPARC64 builds, thus the driver
depends on it.

Fixes: dd0273284c ("sparc64: Oracle DAX driver")
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-12 12:29:58 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 11454943b2 Linux 4.16.1 2018-04-08 14:29:52 +02:00
Eric W. Biederman e4423fc2f5 signal: Correct the offset of si_pkey and si_lower in struct siginfo on m68k
commit 8420f71943 upstream.

The change moving addr_lsb into the _sigfault union failed to take
into account that _sigfault._addr_bnd._lower being a pointer forced
the entire union to have pointer alignment.  The fix for
_sigfault._addr_bnd._lower having pointer alignment failed to take
into account that m68k has a pointer alignment less than the size
of a pointer.  So simply making the padding members pointers changed
the location of later members in the structure.

Fix this by directly computing the needed size of the padding members,
and making the padding members char arrays of the needed size.  AKA
if __alignof__(void *) is 1 sizeof(short) otherwise __alignof__(void *).
Which should be exactly the same rules the compiler whould have
used when computing the padding.

I have tested this change by adding BUILD_BUG_ONs to m68k to verify
the offset of every member of struct siginfo, and with those testing
that the offsets of the fields in struct siginfo is the same before
I changed the generic _sigfault member and after the correction
to the _sigfault member.

I have also verified that the x86 with it's own BUILD_BUG_ONs to verify
the offsets of the siginfo members also compiles cleanly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Fixes: 859d880cf5 ("signal: Correct the offset of si_pkey in struct siginfo")
Fixes: b68a68d3dc ("signal: Move addr_lsb into the _sigfault union for clarity")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:52 +02:00
Mikulas Patocka 4f85cbc5b6 Fix slab name "biovec-(1<<(21-12))"
commit bd5c4facf5 upstream.

I'm getting a slab named "biovec-(1<<(21-12))". It is caused by unintended
expansion of the macro BIO_MAX_PAGES. This patch renames it to biovec-max.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:52 +02:00
Mike Frysinger 4f92c1eca3 vt: change SGR 21 to follow the standards
commit 65d9982d7e upstream.

ECMA-48 [1] (aka ISO 6429) has defined SGR 21 as "doubly underlined"
since at least March 1984.  The Linux kernel has treated it as SGR 22
"normal intensity" since it was added in Linux-0.96b in June 1992.
Before that, it was simply ignored.  Other terminal emulators have
either ignored it, or treat it as double underline now.  xterm for
example added support in its 304 release (May 2014) [2] where it was
previously ignoring it.

Changing this behavior shouldn't be an issue:
- It isn't a named capability in ncurses's terminfo database, so no
  script is using libtinfo/libcurses to look this up, or using tput
  to query & output the right sequence.
- Any script assuming SGR 21 will reset intensity in all terminals
  already do not work correctly on non-Linux VTs (including running
  under screen/tmux/etc...).
- If someone has written a script that only runs in the Linux VT, and
  they're using SGR 21 (instead of SGR 22), the output should still
  be readable.

imo it's important to change this as the Linux VT's non-conformance
is sometimes used as an argument for other terminal emulators to not
implement SGR 21 at all, or do so incorrectly.

[1]: https://www.ecma-international.org/publications/standards/Ecma-048.htm
[2]: https://github.com/ThomasDickey/xterm-snapshots/commit/2fd29cb98d214cb536bcafbee00bc73b3f1eeb9d

Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:52 +02:00
Ondrej Zary 5bd122146e Input: i8042 - enable MUX on Sony VAIO VGN-CS series to fix touchpad
commit 04bb1719c4 upstream.

The touch sensor buttons on Sony VAIO VGN-CS series laptops (e.g.
VGN-CS31S) are a separate PS/2 device. As the MUX is disabled for all
VAIO machines by the nomux blacklist, the data from touch sensor
buttons and touchpad are combined. The protocol used by the buttons is
probably similar to the touchpad protocol (both are Synaptics) so both
devices get enabled. The controller combines the data, creating a mess
which results in random button clicks, touchpad stopping working and
lost sync error messages:
psmouse serio1: TouchPad at isa0060/serio1/input0 lost sync at byte 4
psmouse serio1: TouchPad at isa0060/serio1/input0 lost sync at byte 1
psmouse serio1: TouchPad at isa0060/serio1/input0 lost sync at byte 1
psmouse serio1: TouchPad at isa0060/serio1/input0 lost sync at byte 1
psmouse serio1: TouchPad at isa0060/serio1/input0 lost sync at byte 1
psmouse serio1: issuing reconnect request

Add a new i8042_dmi_forcemux_table whitelist with VGN-CS.
With MUX enabled, touch sensor buttons are detected as separate device
(and left disabled as there's currently no driver), fixing all touchpad
problems.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Zary <linux@rainbow-software.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:52 +02:00
Dennis Wassenberg 04191afee3 Input: i8042 - add Lenovo ThinkPad L460 to i8042 reset list
commit b56af54ac7 upstream.

Reset i8042 before probing because of insufficient BIOS initialisation of
the i8042 serial controller. This makes Synaptics touchpad detection
possible. Without resetting the Synaptics touchpad is not detected because
there are always NACK messages from AUX port.

Signed-off-by: Dennis Wassenberg <dennis.wassenberg@secunet.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:52 +02:00
Masaki Ota 7430768b91 Input: ALPS - fix TrackStick detection on Thinkpad L570 and Latitude 7370
commit 567b9b549c upstream.

The primary interface for the touchpad device in Thinkpad L570 is SMBus,
so ALPS overlooked PS2 interface Firmware setting of TrackStick, and
shipped with TrackStick otp bit is disabled.

The address 0xD7 contains device number information, so we can identify
the device by checking this value, but to access it we need to enable
Command mode, and then re-enable the device. Devices shipped in Thinkpad
L570 report either 0x0C or 0x1D as device numbers, if we see them we assume
that the devices are DualPoints.

The same issue exists on Dell Latitude 7370.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196929
Fixes: 646580f793 ("Input: ALPS - fix multi-touch decoding on SS4 plus touchpads")
Signed-off-by: Masaki Ota <masaki.ota@jp.alps.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Ma <aaron.ma@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jaak Ristioja <jaak@ristioja.ee>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:52 +02:00
Gaku Inami c8a297b692 Revert "base: arch_topology: fix section mismatch build warnings"
commit 9de9a44948 upstream.

This reverts commit 452562abb5 ("base: arch_topology: fix section
mismatch build warnings"). It causes the notifier call hangs in some
use-cases.

In some cases with using maxcpus, some of cpus are booted first and
then the remaining cpus are booted. As an example, some users who want
to realize fast boot up often use the following procedure.

  1) Define all CPUs on device tree (CA57x4 + CA53x4)
  2) Add "maxcpus=4" in bootargs
  3) Kernel boot up with CA57x4
  4) After kernel boot up, CA53x4 is booted from user

When kernel init was finished, CPUFREQ_POLICY_NOTIFIER was not still
unregisterd. This means that "__init init_cpu_capacity_callback()"
will be called after kernel init sequence. To avoid this problem,
it needs to remove __init{,data} annotations by reverting this commit.

Also, this commit was needed to fix kernel compile issue below.
However, this issue was also fixed by another patch: commit 82d8ba717c
("arch_topology: Fix section miss match warning due to
free_raw_capacity()") in v4.15 as well.
Whereas commit 452562abb5 added all the missing __init annotations,
commit 82d8ba717c removed it from free_raw_capacity().

WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x548f24): Section mismatch in reference
from the function init_cpu_capacity_callback() to the variable
.init.text:$x
The function init_cpu_capacity_callback() references
the variable __init $x.
This is often because init_cpu_capacity_callback lacks a __init
annotation or the annotation of $x is wrong.

Fixes: 82d8ba717c ("arch_topology: Fix section miss match warning due to free_raw_capacity()")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gaku Inami <gaku.inami.xh@renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Acked-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Frank Mori Hess 73575c06c7 staging: comedi: ni_mio_common: ack ai fifo error interrupts.
commit e1d9fc04c4 upstream.

Ack ai fifo error interrupts in interrupt handler to clear interrupt
after fifo overflow.  It should prevent lock-ups after the ai fifo
overflows.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Frank Mori Hess <fmh6jj@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Gavin Schenk 1ecf69351f siox: fix possible buffer overflow in device_add_store
commit f87deada80 upstream.

Width 20 given in format string is larger than destination
buffer 'type[20]', use %19s to prevent overflowing it.

Fixes: bbecb07fa0 ("siox: new driver framework for eckelmann SIOX")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gavin Schenk <g.schenk@eckelmann.de>
Reviewed-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Liu Bo 8727321063 Btrfs: fix unexpected cow in run_delalloc_nocow
commit 5811375325 upstream.

Fstests generic/475 provides a way to fail metadata reads while
checking if checksum exists for the inode inside run_delalloc_nocow(),
and csum_exist_in_range() interprets error (-EIO) as inode having
checksum and makes its caller enter the cow path.

In case of free space inode, this ends up with a warning in
cow_file_range().

The same problem applies to btrfs_cross_ref_exist() since it may also
read metadata in between.

With this, run_delalloc_nocow() bails out when errors occur at the two
places.

cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> v2.6.28+
Fixes: 17d217fe97 ("Btrfs: fix nodatasum handling in balancing code")
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Hans de Goede 399ba73ff3 Bluetooth: hci_bcm: Add 6 new ACPI HIDs
commit 4063cafa3b upstream.

Add 6 new ACPI HIDs to enable bluetooth on devices using these HIDs,
I've tested the following HIDs / devices:

BCM2E74: Jumper ezPad mini 3
BCM2E83: Acer Iconia Tab8 w1-810
BCM2E90: Meegopad T08
BCM2EAA: Chuwi Vi8 plus (CWI519)

The reporter of Red Hat bugzilla 1554835 has tested:
BCM2E84: Lenovo Yoga2

The reporter of kernel bugzilla 274481 has tested:
BCM2E38: Toshiba Encore

Note the Lenovo Yoga2 and Toshiba Encore also needs the earlier patch to
treat all Interrupt ACPI resources as active low.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=274481
Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1554835
Reported-and-tested-by: Robert R. Howell <rhowell@uwyo.edu>
Reported-and-tested-by: Christian Herzog <daduke@daduke.org>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Eric Biggers c33af576bb crypto: x86/cast5-avx - fix ECB encryption when long sg follows short one
commit 8f461b1e02 upstream.

With ecb-cast5-avx, if a 128+ byte scatterlist element followed a
shorter one, then the algorithm accidentally encrypted/decrypted only 8
bytes instead of the expected 128 bytes.  Fix it by setting the
encryption/decryption 'fn' correctly.

Fixes: c12ab20b16 ("crypto: cast5/avx - avoid using temporary stack buffers")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Leonard Crestez 84e2b81c9b crypto: arm,arm64 - Fix random regeneration of S_shipped
commit 6aaf49b495 upstream.

The decision to rebuild .S_shipped is made based on the relative
timestamps of .S_shipped and .pl files but git makes this essentially
random. This means that the perl script might run anyway (usually at
most once per checkout), defeating the whole purpose of _shipped.

Fix by skipping the rule unless explicit make variables are provided:
REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO or REGENERATE_ARM64_CRYPTO.

This can produce nasty occasional build failures downstream, for example
for toolchains with broken perl. The solution is minimally intrusive to
make it easier to push into stable.

Another report on a similar issue here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/8/1379

Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Maciej S. Szmigiero c01d47c2c7 crypto: ccp - return an actual key size from RSA max_size callback
commit 0a9eb80e64 upstream.

rsa-pkcs1pad uses a value returned from a RSA implementation max_size
callback as a size of an input buffer passed to the RSA implementation for
encrypt and sign operations.

CCP RSA implementation uses a hardware input buffer which size depends only
on the current RSA key length, so it should return this key length in
the max_size callback, too.
This also matches what the kernel software RSA implementation does.

Previously, the value returned from this callback was always the maximum
RSA key size the CCP hardware supports.
This resulted in this huge buffer being passed by rsa-pkcs1pad to CCP even
for smaller key sizes and then in a buffer overflow when ccp_run_rsa_cmd()
tried to copy this large input buffer into a RSA key length-sized hardware
input buffer.

Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Fixes: ceeec0afd6 ("crypto: ccp - Add support for RSA on the CCP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:51 +02:00
Rui Miguel Silva ea75f4729c crypto: caam - Fix null dereference at error path
commit b85149f6f5 upstream.

caam_remove already removes the debugfs entry, so we need to remove the one
immediately before calling caam_remove.

This fix a NULL dereference at error paths is caam_probe fail.

Fixes: 67c2315def ("crypto: caam - add Queue Interface (QI) backend support")

Tested-by: Ryan Harkin <ryan.harkin@linaro.org>
Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Lukas Auer <lukas.auer@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Rui Miguel Silva <rui.silva@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
Herbert Xu c7cb9698e1 crypto: ahash - Fix early termination in hash walk
commit 900a081f69 upstream.

When we have an unaligned SG list entry where there is no leftover
aligned data, the hash walk code will incorrectly return zero as if
the entire SG list has been processed.

This patch fixes it by moving onto the next page instead.

Reported-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
LEROY Christophe 60da13207f crypto: talitos - fix IPsec cipher in length
commit 2b1227301a upstream.

For SEC 2.x+, cipher in length must contain only the ciphertext length.
In case of using hardware ICV checking, the ICV length is provided via
the "extent" field of the descriptor pointer.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.8+
Fixes: 549bd8bc59 ("crypto: talitos - Implement AEAD for SEC1 using HMAC_SNOOP_NO_AFEU")
Reported-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Tested-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
Conor McLoughlin 1637d9655c crypto: testmgr - Fix incorrect values in PKCS#1 test vector
commit 333e18c5cc upstream.

The RSA private key for the first form should have
version, prime1, prime2, exponent1, exponent2, coefficient
values 0.
With non-zero values for prime1,2, exponent 1,2 and coefficient
the Intel QAT driver will assume that values are provided for the
private key second form. This will result in signature verification
failures for modules where QAT device is present and the modules
are signed with rsa,sha256.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Conor McLoughlin <conor.mcloughlin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
Gregory CLEMENT 3819c95fec crypto: inside-secure - fix clock management
commit f962eb46e7 upstream.

In this driver the clock is got but never put when the driver is removed
or if there is an error in the probe.

Using the managed version of clk_get() allows to let the kernel take care
of it.

Fixes: 1b44c5a60c ("crypto: inside-secure - add SafeXcel EIP197 crypto
engine driver")
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
LEROY Christophe 0e2503ef90 crypto: talitos - don't persistently map req_ctx->hw_context and req_ctx->buf
commit ad4cd51fb8 upstream.

Commit 49f9783b0c ("crypto: talitos - do hw_context DMA mapping
outside the requests") introduced a persistent dma mapping of
req_ctx->hw_context
Commit 37b5e8897e ("crypto: talitos - chain in buffered data for ahash
on SEC1") introduced a persistent dma mapping of req_ctx->buf

As there is no destructor for req_ctx (the request context), the
associated dma handlers where set in ctx (the tfm context). This is
wrong as several hash operations can run with the same ctx.

This patch removes this persistent mapping.

Reported-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 49f9783b0c ("crypto: talitos - do hw_context DMA mapping outside the requests")
Fixes: 37b5e8897e ("crypto: talitos - chain in buffered data for ahash on SEC1")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Tested-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
Gary R Hook e573342971 crypto: ccp - Fill the result buffer only on digest, finup, and final ops
commit 0ee991be4c upstream.

Any change to the result buffer should only happen on final, finup
and digest operations. Changes to the buffer for update, import, export,
etc, are not allowed.

Fixes: 66d7b9f6175e ("crypto: testmgr - test misuse of result in ahash")
Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
Herbert Xu c48f60c1a9 crypto: lrw - Free rctx->ext with kzfree
commit 8c9bdab212 upstream.

The buffer rctx->ext contains potentially sensitive data and should
be freed with kzfree.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 700cb3f5fe ("crypto: lrw - Convert to skcipher")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:50 +02:00
Alexander Gerasiov 190c7b3d16 parport_pc: Add support for WCH CH382L PCI-E single parallel port card.
commit 823f792383 upstream.

WCH CH382L is a PCI-E adapter with 1 parallel port. It is similair to CH382
but serial ports are not soldered on board. Detected as
Serial controller: Device 1c00:3050 (rev 10) (prog-if 05 [16850])

Signed-off-by: Alexander Gerasiov <gq@redlab-i.ru>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Oliver Neukum 8b862cf0bf media: usbtv: prevent double free in error case
commit 50e7044535 upstream.

Quoting the original report:

It looks like there is a double-free vulnerability in Linux usbtv driver
on an error path of usbtv_probe function. When audio registration fails,
usbtv_video_free function ends up freeing usbtv data structure, which
gets freed the second time under usbtv_video_fail label.

usbtv_audio_fail:

        usbtv_video_free(usbtv); =>

           v4l2_device_put(&usbtv->v4l2_dev);

              => v4l2_device_put

                  => kref_put

                      => v4l2_device_release

  => usbtv_release (CALLBACK)

                             => kfree(usbtv) (1st time)

usbtv_video_fail:

        usb_set_intfdata(intf, NULL);

        usb_put_dev(usbtv->udev);

        kfree(usbtv); (2nd time)

So, as we have refcounting, use it

Reported-by: Yavuz, Tuba <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Kees Cook 6e86812c68 /dev/mem: Avoid overwriting "err" in read_mem()
commit b5b38200eb upstream.

Successes in probe_kernel_read() would mask failures in copy_to_user()
during read_mem().

Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Fixes: 22ec1a2aea ("/dev/mem: Add bounce buffer for copy-out")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Colin Ian King 8a966cd9f3 mei: remove dev_err message on an unsupported ioctl
commit bb0829a741 upstream.

Currently the driver spams the kernel log on unsupported ioctls which is
unnecessary as the ioctl returns -ENOIOCTLCMD to indicate this anyway.
I suspect this was originally for debugging purposes but it really is not
required so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Joel Stanley 3833927b1f serial: 8250: Add Nuvoton NPCM UART
commit f597fbce38 upstream.

The Nuvoton UART is almost compatible with the 8250 driver when probed
via the 8250_of driver, however it requires some extra configuration
at startup.

Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Johan Hovold a2c10adb04 USB: serial: cp210x: add ELDAT Easywave RX09 id
commit 1f1e82f74c upstream.

Add device id for ELDAT Easywave RX09 tranceiver.

Reported-by: Jan Jansen <nattelip@hotmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Clemens Werther 351f73bc42 USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for Harman FirmwareHubEmulator
commit 6555ad13a0 upstream.

Add device id for Harman FirmwareHubEmulator to make the device
auto-detectable by the driver.

Signed-off-by: Clemens Werther <clemens.werther@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Major Hayden 78ac009f86 USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add RT Systems VX-8 cable
commit 9608e5c0f0 upstream.

This patch adds a device ID for the RT Systems cable used to
program Yaesu VX-8R/VX-8DR handheld radios. It uses the main
FTDI VID instead of the common RT Systems VID.

Signed-off-by: Major Hayden <major@mhtx.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
Omar Sandoval 17ce0c97d1 bitmap: fix memset optimization on big-endian systems
commit 21035965f6 upstream.

Commit 2a98dc028f ("include/linux/bitmap.h: turn bitmap_set and
bitmap_clear into memset when possible") introduced an optimization to
bitmap_{set,clear}() which uses memset() when the start and length are
constants aligned to a byte.

This is wrong on big-endian systems; our bitmaps are arrays of unsigned
long, so bit n is not at byte n / 8 in memory.  This was caught by the
Btrfs selftests, but the bitmap selftests also fail when run on a
big-endian machine.

We can still use memset if the start and length are aligned to an
unsigned long, so do that on big-endian.  The same problem applies to
the memcmp in bitmap_equal(), so fix it there, too.

Fixes: 2a98dc028f ("include/linux/bitmap.h: turn bitmap_set and bitmap_clear into memset when possible")
Fixes: 2c6deb0152 ("bitmap: use memcmp optimisation in more situations")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: "Erhard F." <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08 14:29:49 +02:00
54 changed files with 344 additions and 196 deletions
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Required properties:
- "ti,da830-uart"
- "aspeed,ast2400-vuart"
- "aspeed,ast2500-vuart"
- "nuvoton,npcm750-uart"
- "serial" if the port type is unknown.
- reg : offset and length of the register set for the device.
- interrupts : should contain uart interrupt.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 16
SUBLEVEL = 0
SUBLEVEL = 2
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Fearless Coyote
+2
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ crct10dif-arm-ce-y := crct10dif-ce-core.o crct10dif-ce-glue.o
crc32-arm-ce-y:= crc32-ce-core.o crc32-ce-glue.o
chacha20-neon-y := chacha20-neon-core.o chacha20-neon-glue.o
ifdef REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO
quiet_cmd_perl = PERL $@
cmd_perl = $(PERL) $(<) > $(@)
@@ -62,5 +63,6 @@ $(src)/sha256-core.S_shipped: $(src)/sha256-armv4.pl
$(src)/sha512-core.S_shipped: $(src)/sha512-armv4.pl
$(call cmd,perl)
endif
.PRECIOUS: $(obj)/sha256-core.S $(obj)/sha512-core.S
+2
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ CFLAGS_aes-glue-ce.o := -DUSE_V8_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS
$(obj)/aes-glue-%.o: $(src)/aes-glue.c FORCE
$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
ifdef REGENERATE_ARM64_CRYPTO
quiet_cmd_perlasm = PERLASM $@
cmd_perlasm = $(PERL) $(<) void $(@)
@@ -75,5 +76,6 @@ $(src)/sha256-core.S_shipped: $(src)/sha512-armv8.pl
$(src)/sha512-core.S_shipped: $(src)/sha512-armv8.pl
$(call cmd,perlasm)
endif
.PRECIOUS: $(obj)/sha256-core.S $(obj)/sha512-core.S
+1 -2
View File
@@ -66,8 +66,6 @@ static int ecb_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
void (*fn)(struct cast5_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
int err;
fn = (enc) ? cast5_ecb_enc_16way : cast5_ecb_dec_16way;
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
@@ -79,6 +77,7 @@ static int ecb_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
/* Process multi-block batch */
if (nbytes >= bsize * CAST5_PARALLEL_BLOCKS) {
fn = (enc) ? cast5_ecb_enc_16way : cast5_ecb_dec_16way;
do {
fn(ctx, wdst, wsrc);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@
* break badly! cannot be bigger than what you can fit into an
* unsigned short
*/
#define BV(x) { .nr_vecs = x, .name = "biovec-"__stringify(x) }
#define BV(x, n) { .nr_vecs = x, .name = "biovec-"#n }
static struct biovec_slab bvec_slabs[BVEC_POOL_NR] __read_mostly = {
BV(1), BV(4), BV(16), BV(64), BV(128), BV(BIO_MAX_PAGES),
BV(1, 1), BV(4, 4), BV(16, 16), BV(64, 64), BV(128, 128), BV(BIO_MAX_PAGES, max),
};
#undef BV
+4 -3
View File
@@ -92,13 +92,14 @@ int crypto_hash_walk_done(struct crypto_hash_walk *walk, int err)
if (nbytes && walk->offset & alignmask && !err) {
walk->offset = ALIGN(walk->offset, alignmask + 1);
walk->data += walk->offset;
nbytes = min(nbytes,
((unsigned int)(PAGE_SIZE)) - walk->offset);
walk->entrylen -= nbytes;
return nbytes;
if (nbytes) {
walk->data += walk->offset;
return nbytes;
}
}
if (walk->flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void exit_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
rctx->left = 0;
if (rctx->ext)
kfree(rctx->ext);
kzfree(rctx->ext);
}
static int do_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int err)
+3 -3
View File
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {
static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = {
{
.key =
"\x30\x82\x03\x1f\x02\x01\x10\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xd7\x1e\x77\x82"
"\x30\x82\x03\x1f\x02\x01\x00\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xd7\x1e\x77\x82"
"\x8c\x92\x31\xe7\x69\x02\xa2\xd5\x5c\x78\xde\xa2\x0c\x8f\xfe\x28"
"\x59\x31\xdf\x40\x9c\x60\x61\x06\xb9\x2f\x62\x40\x80\x76\xcb\x67"
"\x4a\xb5\x59\x56\x69\x17\x07\xfa\xf9\x4c\xbd\x6c\x37\x7a\x46\x7d"
@@ -597,8 +597,8 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = {
"\xfe\xf8\x27\x1b\xd6\x55\x60\x5e\x48\xb7\x6d\x9a\xa8\x37\xf9\x7a"
"\xde\x1b\xcd\x5d\x1a\x30\xd4\xe9\x9e\x5b\x3c\x15\xf8\x9c\x1f\xda"
"\xd1\x86\x48\x55\xce\x83\xee\x8e\x51\xc7\xde\x32\x12\x47\x7d\x46"
"\xb8\x35\xdf\x41\x02\x01\x30\x02\x01\x30\x02\x01\x30\x02\x01\x30"
"\x02\x01\x30",
"\xb8\x35\xdf\x41\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00"
"\x02\x01\x00",
.key_len = 804,
/*
* m is SHA256 hash of following message:
+6 -6
View File
@@ -169,11 +169,11 @@ bool __init topology_parse_cpu_capacity(struct device_node *cpu_node, int cpu)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_FREQ
static cpumask_var_t cpus_to_visit __initdata;
static void __init parsing_done_workfn(struct work_struct *work);
static __initdata DECLARE_WORK(parsing_done_work, parsing_done_workfn);
static cpumask_var_t cpus_to_visit;
static void parsing_done_workfn(struct work_struct *work);
static DECLARE_WORK(parsing_done_work, parsing_done_workfn);
static int __init
static int
init_cpu_capacity_callback(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long val,
void *data)
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ init_cpu_capacity_callback(struct notifier_block *nb,
return 0;
}
static struct notifier_block init_cpu_capacity_notifier __initdata = {
static struct notifier_block init_cpu_capacity_notifier = {
.notifier_call = init_cpu_capacity_callback,
};
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int __init register_cpufreq_notifier(void)
}
core_initcall(register_cpufreq_notifier);
static void __init parsing_done_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
static void parsing_done_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
{
cpufreq_unregister_notifier(&init_cpu_capacity_notifier,
CPUFREQ_POLICY_NOTIFIER);
+6
View File
@@ -1080,6 +1080,7 @@ static const struct hci_uart_proto bcm_proto = {
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
static const struct acpi_device_id bcm_acpi_match[] = {
{ "BCM2E1A", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E38", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E39", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E3A", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E3D", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
@@ -1092,12 +1093,17 @@ static const struct acpi_device_id bcm_acpi_match[] = {
{ "BCM2E67", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E71", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E72", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E74", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E7B", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E7C", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E7E", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_first_gpios },
{ "BCM2E83", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_first_gpios },
{ "BCM2E84", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E90", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_last_gpios },
{ "BCM2E95", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_first_gpios },
{ "BCM2E96", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_first_gpios },
{ "BCM2EA4", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_first_gpios },
{ "BCM2EAA", (kernel_ulong_t)&acpi_bcm_int_first_gpios },
{ },
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, bcm_acpi_match);
+3 -3
View File
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
while (count > 0) {
unsigned long remaining;
int allowed;
int allowed, probe;
sz = size_inside_page(p, count);
@@ -160,9 +160,9 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
if (!ptr)
goto failed;
err = probe_kernel_read(bounce, ptr, sz);
probe = probe_kernel_read(bounce, ptr, sz);
unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
if (err)
if (probe)
goto failed;
remaining = copy_to_user(buf, bounce, sz);
-3
View File
@@ -815,9 +815,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return 0;
caam_remove:
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
debugfs_remove_recursive(ctrlpriv->dfs_root);
#endif
caam_remove(pdev);
return ret;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int ccp_aes_cmac_complete(struct crypto_async_request *async_req,
}
/* Update result area if supplied */
if (req->result)
if (req->result && rctx->final)
memcpy(req->result, rctx->iv, digest_size);
e_free:
+3 -4
View File
@@ -60,10 +60,9 @@ static int ccp_rsa_complete(struct crypto_async_request *async_req, int ret)
static unsigned int ccp_rsa_maxsize(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
{
if (ccp_version() > CCP_VERSION(3, 0))
return CCP5_RSA_MAXMOD;
else
return CCP_RSA_MAXMOD;
struct ccp_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
return ctx->u.rsa.n_len;
}
static int ccp_rsa_crypt(struct akcipher_request *req, bool encrypt)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int ccp_sha_complete(struct crypto_async_request *async_req, int ret)
}
/* Update result area if supplied */
if (req->result)
if (req->result && rctx->final)
memcpy(req->result, rctx->ctx, digest_size);
e_free:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ static int safexcel_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return PTR_ERR(priv->base);
}
priv->clk = of_clk_get(dev->of_node, 0);
priv->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(priv->clk)) {
ret = clk_prepare_enable(priv->clk);
if (ret) {
+64 -104
View File
@@ -832,8 +832,6 @@ struct talitos_ctx {
unsigned int keylen;
unsigned int enckeylen;
unsigned int authkeylen;
dma_addr_t dma_buf;
dma_addr_t dma_hw_context;
};
#define HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE
@@ -1130,10 +1128,10 @@ next:
return count;
}
static int talitos_sg_map(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int len, struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct talitos_ptr *ptr,
int sg_count, unsigned int offset, int tbl_off)
static int talitos_sg_map_ext(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int len, struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct talitos_ptr *ptr, int sg_count,
unsigned int offset, int tbl_off, int elen)
{
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
@@ -1142,6 +1140,7 @@ static int talitos_sg_map(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *src,
to_talitos_ptr(ptr, 0, 0, is_sec1);
return 1;
}
to_talitos_ptr_ext_set(ptr, elen, is_sec1);
if (sg_count == 1) {
to_talitos_ptr(ptr, sg_dma_address(src) + offset, len, is_sec1);
return sg_count;
@@ -1150,7 +1149,7 @@ static int talitos_sg_map(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *src,
to_talitos_ptr(ptr, edesc->dma_link_tbl + offset, len, is_sec1);
return sg_count;
}
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl_offset(src, sg_count, offset, len,
sg_count = sg_to_link_tbl_offset(src, sg_count, offset, len + elen,
&edesc->link_tbl[tbl_off]);
if (sg_count == 1) {
/* Only one segment now, so no link tbl needed*/
@@ -1164,6 +1163,15 @@ static int talitos_sg_map(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *src,
return sg_count;
}
static int talitos_sg_map(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int len, struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
struct talitos_ptr *ptr, int sg_count,
unsigned int offset, int tbl_off)
{
return talitos_sg_map_ext(dev, src, len, edesc, ptr, sg_count, offset,
tbl_off, 0);
}
/*
* fill in and submit ipsec_esp descriptor
*/
@@ -1181,7 +1189,7 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
int tbl_off = 0;
int sg_count, ret;
int sg_link_tbl_len;
int elen = 0;
bool sync_needed = false;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
@@ -1223,17 +1231,11 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
* extent is bytes of HMAC postpended to ciphertext,
* typically 12 for ipsec
*/
sg_link_tbl_len = cryptlen;
if (is_ipsec_esp && (desc->hdr & DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_CICV))
elen = authsize;
if (is_ipsec_esp) {
to_talitos_ptr_ext_set(&desc->ptr[4], authsize, is_sec1);
if (desc->hdr & DESC_HDR_MODE1_MDEU_CICV)
sg_link_tbl_len += authsize;
}
ret = talitos_sg_map(dev, areq->src, sg_link_tbl_len, edesc,
&desc->ptr[4], sg_count, areq->assoclen, tbl_off);
ret = talitos_sg_map_ext(dev, areq->src, cryptlen, edesc, &desc->ptr[4],
sg_count, areq->assoclen, tbl_off, elen);
if (ret > 1) {
tbl_off += ret;
@@ -1690,9 +1692,30 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev,
struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc;
struct talitos_desc *desc2 = desc + 1;
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
if (desc->next_desc &&
desc->ptr[5].ptr != desc2->ptr[5].ptr)
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc2->ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, req_ctx->psrc, NULL, 0, 0);
/* When using hashctx-in, must unmap it. */
if (from_talitos_ptr_len(&edesc->desc.ptr[1], is_sec1))
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[1],
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
else if (desc->next_desc)
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc2->ptr[1],
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf)
unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[3],
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (edesc->dma_len)
dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
@@ -1766,8 +1789,10 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
/* hash context in */
if (!req_ctx->first || req_ctx->swinit) {
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[1], ctx->dma_hw_context,
req_ctx->hw_context_size, is_sec1);
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[1],
req_ctx->hw_context_size,
(char *)req_ctx->hw_context,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
req_ctx->swinit = 0;
}
/* Indicate next op is not the first. */
@@ -1793,10 +1818,9 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
* data in
*/
if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf) {
dma_addr_t dma_buf = ctx->dma_buf + req_ctx->buf_idx *
HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE;
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[3], dma_buf, req_ctx->nbuf, is_sec1);
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[3], req_ctx->nbuf,
req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx],
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
} else {
sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc,
&desc->ptr[3], sg_count, offset, 0);
@@ -1812,8 +1836,9 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm),
areq->result, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
else
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[5], ctx->dma_hw_context,
req_ctx->hw_context_size, is_sec1);
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5],
req_ctx->hw_context_size,
req_ctx->hw_context, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
/* last DWORD empty */
@@ -1832,9 +1857,14 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
desc->hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT;
desc->hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_DONE_NOTIFY;
to_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[1], ctx->dma_hw_context,
req_ctx->hw_context_size, is_sec1);
if (desc->ptr[1].ptr)
copy_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[1], &desc->ptr[1],
is_sec1);
else
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc2->ptr[1],
req_ctx->hw_context_size,
req_ctx->hw_context,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
copy_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[2], &desc->ptr[2], is_sec1);
sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc,
&desc2->ptr[3], sg_count, offset, 0);
@@ -1842,8 +1872,10 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
sync_needed = true;
copy_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[5], &desc->ptr[5], is_sec1);
if (req_ctx->last)
to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[5], ctx->dma_hw_context,
req_ctx->hw_context_size, is_sec1);
map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5],
req_ctx->hw_context_size,
req_ctx->hw_context,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
next_desc = dma_map_single(dev, &desc2->hdr1, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
@@ -1881,12 +1913,8 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *ahash_edesc_alloc(struct ahash_request *areq,
static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
unsigned int size;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
/* Initialize the context */
req_ctx->buf_idx = 0;
@@ -1898,18 +1926,6 @@ static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq)
: TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512;
req_ctx->hw_context_size = size;
if (ctx->dma_hw_context)
dma_unmap_single(dev, ctx->dma_hw_context, size,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
ctx->dma_hw_context = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->hw_context, size,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (ctx->dma_buf)
dma_unmap_single(dev, ctx->dma_buf, sizeof(req_ctx->buf),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (is_sec1)
ctx->dma_buf = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->buf,
sizeof(req_ctx->buf),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1920,9 +1936,6 @@ static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq)
static int ahash_init_sha224_swinit(struct ahash_request *areq)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
ahash_init(areq);
req_ctx->swinit = 1;/* prevent h/w initting context with sha256 values*/
@@ -1940,9 +1953,6 @@ static int ahash_init_sha224_swinit(struct ahash_request *areq)
req_ctx->hw_context[8] = 0;
req_ctx->hw_context[9] = 0;
dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, ctx->dma_hw_context,
req_ctx->hw_context_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
return 0;
}
@@ -2046,13 +2056,6 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)
/* request SEC to INIT hash. */
if (req_ctx->first && !req_ctx->swinit)
edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT;
if (is_sec1) {
dma_addr_t dma_buf = ctx->dma_buf + req_ctx->buf_idx *
HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE;
dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, dma_buf,
req_ctx->nbuf, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
/* When the tfm context has a keylen, it's an HMAC.
* A first or last (ie. not middle) descriptor must request HMAC.
@@ -2106,12 +2109,7 @@ static int ahash_export(struct ahash_request *areq, void *out)
{
struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
struct talitos_export_state *export = out;
struct crypto_ahash *ahash = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(ahash);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, ctx->dma_hw_context,
req_ctx->hw_context_size, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
memcpy(export->hw_context, req_ctx->hw_context,
req_ctx->hw_context_size);
memcpy(export->buf, req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx], req_ctx->nbuf);
@@ -2130,31 +2128,14 @@ static int ahash_import(struct ahash_request *areq, const void *in)
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
const struct talitos_export_state *export = in;
unsigned int size;
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
memset(req_ctx, 0, sizeof(*req_ctx));
size = (crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) <= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
? TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_MD5_SHA1_SHA256
: TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512;
req_ctx->hw_context_size = size;
if (ctx->dma_hw_context)
dma_unmap_single(dev, ctx->dma_hw_context, size,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
memcpy(req_ctx->hw_context, export->hw_context, size);
ctx->dma_hw_context = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->hw_context, size,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (ctx->dma_buf)
dma_unmap_single(dev, ctx->dma_buf, sizeof(req_ctx->buf),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
memcpy(req_ctx->buf[0], export->buf, export->nbuf);
if (is_sec1)
ctx->dma_buf = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->buf,
sizeof(req_ctx->buf),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
req_ctx->swinit = export->swinit;
req_ctx->first = export->first;
req_ctx->last = export->last;
@@ -3064,27 +3045,6 @@ static void talitos_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
dma_unmap_single(dev, ctx->dma_key, ctx->keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
static void talitos_cra_exit_ahash(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
unsigned int size;
talitos_cra_exit(tfm);
size = (crypto_ahash_digestsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm)) <=
SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
? TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_MD5_SHA1_SHA256
: TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512;
if (ctx->dma_hw_context)
dma_unmap_single(dev, ctx->dma_hw_context, size,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (ctx->dma_buf)
dma_unmap_single(dev, ctx->dma_buf, HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE * 2,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
/*
* given the alg's descriptor header template, determine whether descriptor
* type and primary/secondary execution units required match the hw
@@ -3183,7 +3143,7 @@ static struct talitos_crypto_alg *talitos_alg_alloc(struct device *dev,
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH:
alg = &t_alg->algt.alg.hash.halg.base;
alg->cra_init = talitos_cra_init_ahash;
alg->cra_exit = talitos_cra_exit_ahash;
alg->cra_exit = talitos_cra_exit;
alg->cra_type = &crypto_ahash_type;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.init = ahash_init;
t_alg->algt.alg.hash.update = ahash_update;
+21 -3
View File
@@ -2544,13 +2544,31 @@ static int alps_update_btn_info_ss4_v2(unsigned char otp[][4],
}
static int alps_update_dual_info_ss4_v2(unsigned char otp[][4],
struct alps_data *priv)
struct alps_data *priv,
struct psmouse *psmouse)
{
bool is_dual = false;
int reg_val = 0;
struct ps2dev *ps2dev = &psmouse->ps2dev;
if (IS_SS4PLUS_DEV(priv->dev_id))
if (IS_SS4PLUS_DEV(priv->dev_id)) {
is_dual = (otp[0][0] >> 4) & 0x01;
if (!is_dual) {
/* For support TrackStick of Thinkpad L/E series */
if (alps_exit_command_mode(psmouse) == 0 &&
alps_enter_command_mode(psmouse) == 0) {
reg_val = alps_command_mode_read_reg(psmouse,
0xD7);
}
alps_exit_command_mode(psmouse);
ps2_command(ps2dev, NULL, PSMOUSE_CMD_ENABLE);
if (reg_val == 0x0C || reg_val == 0x1D)
is_dual = true;
}
}
if (is_dual)
priv->flags |= ALPS_DUALPOINT |
ALPS_DUALPOINT_WITH_PRESSURE;
@@ -2573,7 +2591,7 @@ static int alps_set_defaults_ss4_v2(struct psmouse *psmouse,
alps_update_btn_info_ss4_v2(otp, priv);
alps_update_dual_info_ss4_v2(otp, priv);
alps_update_dual_info_ss4_v2(otp, priv, psmouse);
return 0;
}
+24
View File
@@ -530,6 +530,20 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id __initconst i8042_dmi_nomux_table[] = {
{ }
};
static const struct dmi_system_id i8042_dmi_forcemux_table[] __initconst = {
{
/*
* Sony Vaio VGN-CS series require MUX or the touch sensor
* buttons will disturb touchpad operation
*/
.matches = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Sony Corporation"),
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "VGN-CS"),
},
},
{ }
};
/*
* On some Asus laptops, just running self tests cause problems.
*/
@@ -620,6 +634,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id __initconst i8042_dmi_reset_table[] = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "20046"),
},
},
{
/* Lenovo ThinkPad L460 */
.matches = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkPad L460"),
},
},
{
/* Clevo P650RS, 650RP6, Sager NP8152-S, and others */
.matches = {
@@ -1163,6 +1184,9 @@ static int __init i8042_platform_init(void)
if (dmi_check_system(i8042_dmi_nomux_table))
i8042_nomux = true;
if (dmi_check_system(i8042_dmi_forcemux_table))
i8042_nomux = false;
if (dmi_check_system(i8042_dmi_notimeout_table))
i8042_notimeout = true;
+2
View File
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static int usbtv_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
return 0;
usbtv_audio_fail:
/* we must not free at this point */
usb_get_dev(usbtv->udev);
usbtv_video_free(usbtv);
usbtv_video_fail:
-1
View File
@@ -507,7 +507,6 @@ static long mei_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long data)
break;
default:
dev_err(dev->dev, ": unsupported ioctl %d.\n", cmd);
rets = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5087,7 +5087,7 @@ static int sky2_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
INIT_WORK(&hw->restart_work, sky2_restart);
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, hw);
pdev->d3_delay = 150;
pdev->d3_delay = 200;
return 0;
@@ -71,10 +71,11 @@
/* CPP address to retrieve the data from */
#define NSP_BUFFER 0x10
#define NSP_BUFFER_CPP GENMASK_ULL(63, 40)
#define NSP_BUFFER_PCIE GENMASK_ULL(39, 38)
#define NSP_BUFFER_ADDRESS GENMASK_ULL(37, 0)
#define NSP_BUFFER_ADDRESS GENMASK_ULL(39, 0)
#define NSP_DFLT_BUFFER 0x18
#define NSP_DFLT_BUFFER_CPP GENMASK_ULL(63, 40)
#define NSP_DFLT_BUFFER_ADDRESS GENMASK_ULL(39, 0)
#define NSP_DFLT_BUFFER_CONFIG 0x20
#define NSP_DFLT_BUFFER_SIZE_MB GENMASK_ULL(7, 0)
@@ -427,8 +428,8 @@ __nfp_nsp_command_buf(struct nfp_nsp *nsp, u16 code, u32 option,
if (err < 0)
return err;
cpp_id = FIELD_GET(NSP_BUFFER_CPP, reg) << 8;
cpp_buf = FIELD_GET(NSP_BUFFER_ADDRESS, reg);
cpp_id = FIELD_GET(NSP_DFLT_BUFFER_CPP, reg) << 8;
cpp_buf = FIELD_GET(NSP_DFLT_BUFFER_ADDRESS, reg);
if (in_buf && in_size) {
err = nfp_cpp_write(cpp, cpp_id, cpp_buf, in_buf, in_size);
-1
View File
@@ -464,7 +464,6 @@ static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
po->chan.mtu = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (!po->chan.mtu)
po->chan.mtu = PPP_MRU;
ip_rt_put(rt);
po->chan.mtu -= PPTP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
po->chan.hdrlen = 2 + sizeof(struct pptp_gre_header);
+4
View File
@@ -2646,6 +2646,7 @@ enum parport_pc_pci_cards {
netmos_9901,
netmos_9865,
quatech_sppxp100,
wch_ch382l,
};
@@ -2708,6 +2709,7 @@ static struct parport_pc_pci {
/* netmos_9901 */ { 1, { { 0, -1 }, } },
/* netmos_9865 */ { 1, { { 0, -1 }, } },
/* quatech_sppxp100 */ { 1, { { 0, 1 }, } },
/* wch_ch382l */ { 1, { { 2, -1 }, } },
};
static const struct pci_device_id parport_pc_pci_tbl[] = {
@@ -2797,6 +2799,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id parport_pc_pci_tbl[] = {
/* Quatech SPPXP-100 Parallel port PCI ExpressCard */
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_QUATECH, PCI_DEVICE_ID_QUATECH_SPPXP_100,
PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, quatech_sppxp100 },
/* WCH CH382L PCI-E single parallel port card */
{ 0x1c00, 0x3050, 0x1c00, 0x3050, 0, 0, wch_ch382l },
{ 0, } /* terminate list */
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, parport_pc_pci_tbl);
+2 -1
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ config DISPLAY7SEG
config ORACLE_DAX
tristate "Oracle Data Analytics Accelerator"
default m if SPARC64
depends on SPARC64
default m
help
Driver for Oracle Data Analytics Accelerator, which is
a coprocessor that performs database operations in hardware.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static ssize_t device_add_store(struct device *dev,
size_t inbytes = 0, outbytes = 0;
u8 statustype = 0;
ret = sscanf(buf, "%20s %zu %zu %hhu", type, &inbytes,
ret = sscanf(buf, "%19s %zu %zu %hhu", type, &inbytes,
&outbytes, &statustype);
if (ret != 3 && ret != 4)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1275,6 +1275,8 @@ static void ack_a_interrupt(struct comedi_device *dev, unsigned short a_status)
ack |= NISTC_INTA_ACK_AI_START;
if (a_status & NISTC_AI_STATUS1_STOP)
ack |= NISTC_INTA_ACK_AI_STOP;
if (a_status & NISTC_AI_STATUS1_OVER)
ack |= NISTC_INTA_ACK_AI_ERR;
if (ack)
ni_stc_writew(dev, ack, NISTC_INTA_ACK_REG);
}
+1
View File
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id of_platform_serial_table[] = {
{ .compatible = "mrvl,mmp-uart",
.data = (void *)PORT_XSCALE, },
{ .compatible = "ti,da830-uart", .data = (void *)PORT_DA830, },
{ .compatible = "nuvoton,npcm750-uart", .data = (void *)PORT_NPCM, },
{ /* end of list */ },
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_platform_serial_table);
+33
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@
#define UART_EXAR_SLEEP 0x8b /* Sleep mode */
#define UART_EXAR_DVID 0x8d /* Device identification */
/* Nuvoton NPCM timeout register */
#define UART_NPCM_TOR 7
#define UART_NPCM_TOIE BIT(7) /* Timeout Interrupt Enable */
/*
* Debugging.
*/
@@ -293,6 +297,15 @@ static const struct serial8250_config uart_config[] = {
UART_FCR_CLEAR_RCVR | UART_FCR_CLEAR_XMIT,
.flags = UART_CAP_FIFO,
},
[PORT_NPCM] = {
.name = "Nuvoton 16550",
.fifo_size = 16,
.tx_loadsz = 16,
.fcr = UART_FCR_ENABLE_FIFO | UART_FCR_R_TRIG_10 |
UART_FCR_CLEAR_RCVR | UART_FCR_CLEAR_XMIT,
.rxtrig_bytes = {1, 4, 8, 14},
.flags = UART_CAP_FIFO,
},
};
/* Uart divisor latch read */
@@ -2140,6 +2153,15 @@ int serial8250_do_startup(struct uart_port *port)
UART_DA830_PWREMU_MGMT_FREE);
}
if (port->type == PORT_NPCM) {
/*
* Nuvoton calls the scratch register 'UART_TOR' (timeout
* register). Enable it, and set TIOC (timeout interrupt
* comparator) to be 0x20 for correct operation.
*/
serial_port_out(port, UART_NPCM_TOR, UART_NPCM_TOIE | 0x20);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RSA
/*
* If this is an RSA port, see if we can kick it up to the
@@ -2462,6 +2484,15 @@ static unsigned int xr17v35x_get_divisor(struct uart_8250_port *up,
return quot_16 >> 4;
}
/* Nuvoton NPCM UARTs have a custom divisor calculation */
static unsigned int npcm_get_divisor(struct uart_8250_port *up,
unsigned int baud)
{
struct uart_port *port = &up->port;
return DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(port->uartclk, 16 * baud + 2) - 2;
}
static unsigned int serial8250_get_divisor(struct uart_8250_port *up,
unsigned int baud,
unsigned int *frac)
@@ -2482,6 +2513,8 @@ static unsigned int serial8250_get_divisor(struct uart_8250_port *up,
quot = 0x8002;
else if (up->port.type == PORT_XR17V35X)
quot = xr17v35x_get_divisor(up, baud, frac);
else if (up->port.type == PORT_NPCM)
quot = npcm_get_divisor(up, baud);
else
quot = uart_get_divisor(port, baud);
+5 -1
View File
@@ -1354,6 +1354,11 @@ static void csi_m(struct vc_data *vc)
case 3:
vc->vc_italic = 1;
break;
case 21:
/*
* No console drivers support double underline, so
* convert it to a single underline.
*/
case 4:
vc->vc_underline = 1;
break;
@@ -1389,7 +1394,6 @@ static void csi_m(struct vc_data *vc)
vc->vc_disp_ctrl = 1;
vc->vc_toggle_meta = 1;
break;
case 21:
case 22:
vc->vc_intensity = 1;
break;
+1
View File
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x12B8, 0xEC62) }, /* Link G4+ ECU */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x13AD, 0x9999) }, /* Baltech card reader */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1555, 0x0004) }, /* Owen AC4 USB-RS485 Converter */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x155A, 0x1006) }, /* ELDAT Easywave RX09 */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x166A, 0x0201) }, /* Clipsal 5500PACA C-Bus Pascal Automation Controller */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x166A, 0x0301) }, /* Clipsal 5800PC C-Bus Wireless PC Interface */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x166A, 0x0303) }, /* Clipsal 5500PCU C-Bus USB interface */
+2
View File
@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
.driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_NDI_device_quirk },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELLDUS_VID, TELLDUS_TELLSTICK_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(NOVITUS_VID, NOVITUS_BONO_E_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, RTSYSTEMS_USB_VX8_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(RTSYSTEMS_VID, RTSYSTEMS_USB_S03_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(RTSYSTEMS_VID, RTSYSTEMS_USB_59_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(RTSYSTEMS_VID, RTSYSTEMS_USB_57A_PID) },
@@ -931,6 +932,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_SCIENCESCOPE_LS_LOGBOOK_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_SCIENCESCOPE_HS_LOGBOOK_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_CINTERION_MC55I_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_FHE_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_DOTEC_PID) },
{ USB_DEVICE(QIHARDWARE_VID, MILKYMISTONE_JTAGSERIAL_PID),
.driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_jtag_quirk },
+9
View File
@@ -923,6 +923,9 @@
/*
* RT Systems programming cables for various ham radios
*/
/* This device uses the VID of FTDI */
#define RTSYSTEMS_USB_VX8_PID 0x9e50 /* USB-VX8 USB to 7 pin modular plug for Yaesu VX-8 radio */
#define RTSYSTEMS_VID 0x2100 /* Vendor ID */
#define RTSYSTEMS_USB_S03_PID 0x9001 /* RTS-03 USB to Serial Adapter */
#define RTSYSTEMS_USB_59_PID 0x9e50 /* USB-59 USB to 8 pin plug */
@@ -1441,6 +1444,12 @@
*/
#define FTDI_CINTERION_MC55I_PID 0xA951
/*
* Product: FirmwareHubEmulator
* Manufacturer: Harman Becker Automotive Systems
*/
#define FTDI_FHE_PID 0xA9A0
/*
* Product: Comet Caller ID decoder
* Manufacturer: Crucible Technologies
+32 -5
View File
@@ -1262,6 +1262,8 @@ static noinline int csum_exist_in_range(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
list_del(&sums->list);
kfree(sums);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return 1;
}
@@ -1394,10 +1396,23 @@ next_slot:
goto out_check;
if (btrfs_extent_readonly(fs_info, disk_bytenr))
goto out_check;
if (btrfs_cross_ref_exist(root, ino,
found_key.offset -
extent_offset, disk_bytenr))
ret = btrfs_cross_ref_exist(root, ino,
found_key.offset -
extent_offset, disk_bytenr);
if (ret) {
/*
* ret could be -EIO if the above fails to read
* metadata.
*/
if (ret < 0) {
if (cow_start != (u64)-1)
cur_offset = cow_start;
goto error;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(nolock);
goto out_check;
}
disk_bytenr += extent_offset;
disk_bytenr += cur_offset - found_key.offset;
num_bytes = min(end + 1, extent_end) - cur_offset;
@@ -1415,10 +1430,22 @@ next_slot:
* this ensure that csum for a given extent are
* either valid or do not exist.
*/
if (csum_exist_in_range(fs_info, disk_bytenr,
num_bytes)) {
ret = csum_exist_in_range(fs_info, disk_bytenr,
num_bytes);
if (ret) {
if (!nolock)
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshotting(root);
/*
* ret could be -EIO if the above fails to read
* metadata.
*/
if (ret < 0) {
if (cow_start != (u64)-1)
cur_offset = cow_start;
goto error;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(nolock);
goto out_check;
}
if (!btrfs_inc_nocow_writers(fs_info, disk_bytenr)) {
+17 -5
View File
@@ -302,12 +302,20 @@ static inline void bitmap_complement(unsigned long *dst, const unsigned long *sr
__bitmap_complement(dst, src, nbits);
}
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
#define BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT 8
#else
#define BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
#endif
#define BITMAP_MEM_MASK (BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1)
static inline int bitmap_equal(const unsigned long *src1,
const unsigned long *src2, unsigned int nbits)
{
if (small_const_nbits(nbits))
return !((*src1 ^ *src2) & BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK(nbits));
if (__builtin_constant_p(nbits & 7) && IS_ALIGNED(nbits, 8))
if (__builtin_constant_p(nbits & BITMAP_MEM_MASK) &&
IS_ALIGNED(nbits, BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT))
return !memcmp(src1, src2, nbits / 8);
return __bitmap_equal(src1, src2, nbits);
}
@@ -358,8 +366,10 @@ static __always_inline void bitmap_set(unsigned long *map, unsigned int start,
{
if (__builtin_constant_p(nbits) && nbits == 1)
__set_bit(start, map);
else if (__builtin_constant_p(start & 7) && IS_ALIGNED(start, 8) &&
__builtin_constant_p(nbits & 7) && IS_ALIGNED(nbits, 8))
else if (__builtin_constant_p(start & BITMAP_MEM_MASK) &&
IS_ALIGNED(start, BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT) &&
__builtin_constant_p(nbits & BITMAP_MEM_MASK) &&
IS_ALIGNED(nbits, BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT))
memset((char *)map + start / 8, 0xff, nbits / 8);
else
__bitmap_set(map, start, nbits);
@@ -370,8 +380,10 @@ static __always_inline void bitmap_clear(unsigned long *map, unsigned int start,
{
if (__builtin_constant_p(nbits) && nbits == 1)
__clear_bit(start, map);
else if (__builtin_constant_p(start & 7) && IS_ALIGNED(start, 8) &&
__builtin_constant_p(nbits & 7) && IS_ALIGNED(nbits, 8))
else if (__builtin_constant_p(start & BITMAP_MEM_MASK) &&
IS_ALIGNED(start, BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT) &&
__builtin_constant_p(nbits & BITMAP_MEM_MASK) &&
IS_ALIGNED(nbits, BITMAP_MEM_ALIGNMENT))
memset((char *)map + start / 8, 0, nbits / 8);
else
__bitmap_clear(map, start, nbits);
+4 -2
View File
@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ typedef struct compat_siginfo {
#ifdef __ARCH_SI_TRAPNO
int _trapno; /* TRAP # which caused the signal */
#endif
#define __COMPAT_ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD (__alignof__(compat_uptr_t) < sizeof(short) ? \
sizeof(short) : __alignof__(compat_uptr_t))
union {
/*
* used when si_code=BUS_MCEERR_AR or
@@ -230,13 +232,13 @@ typedef struct compat_siginfo {
short int _addr_lsb; /* Valid LSB of the reported address. */
/* used when si_code=SEGV_BNDERR */
struct {
compat_uptr_t _dummy_bnd;
char _dummy_bnd[__COMPAT_ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
compat_uptr_t _lower;
compat_uptr_t _upper;
} _addr_bnd;
/* used when si_code=SEGV_PKUERR */
struct {
compat_uptr_t _dummy_pkey;
char _dummy_pkey[__COMPAT_ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
};
+5 -2
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
unsigned int _flags; /* see ia64 si_flags */
unsigned long _isr; /* isr */
#endif
#define __ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD (__alignof__(void *) < sizeof(short) ? \
sizeof(short) : __alignof__(void *))
union {
/*
* used when si_code=BUS_MCEERR_AR or
@@ -102,13 +105,13 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
short _addr_lsb; /* LSB of the reported address */
/* used when si_code=SEGV_BNDERR */
struct {
void *_dummy_bnd;
char _dummy_bnd[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
void __user *_lower;
void __user *_upper;
} _addr_bnd;
/* used when si_code=SEGV_PKUERR */
struct {
void *_dummy_pkey;
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
};
+3
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@
#define PORT_SUNZILOG 38
#define PORT_SUNSAB 39
/* Nuvoton UART */
#define PORT_NPCM 40
/* Intel EG20 */
#define PORT_PCH_8LINE 44
#define PORT_PCH_2LINE 45
+5 -1
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/net_tstamp.h>
#include <linux/etherdevice.h>
#include <linux/ethtool.h>
#include <linux/phy.h>
#include <net/arp.h>
#include <net/switchdev.h>
@@ -665,8 +666,11 @@ static int vlan_ethtool_get_ts_info(struct net_device *dev,
{
const struct vlan_dev_priv *vlan = vlan_dev_priv(dev);
const struct ethtool_ops *ops = vlan->real_dev->ethtool_ops;
struct phy_device *phydev = vlan->real_dev->phydev;
if (ops->get_ts_info) {
if (phydev && phydev->drv && phydev->drv->ts_info) {
return phydev->drv->ts_info(phydev, info);
} else if (ops->get_ts_info) {
return ops->get_ts_info(vlan->real_dev, info);
} else {
info->so_timestamping = SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE |
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1027,7 +1027,7 @@ bool dev_valid_name(const char *name)
{
if (*name == '\0')
return false;
if (strlen(name) >= IFNAMSIZ)
if (strnlen(name, IFNAMSIZ) == IFNAMSIZ)
return false;
if (!strcmp(name, ".") || !strcmp(name, ".."))
return false;
+7 -1
View File
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static inline struct net_device *dsa_master_find_slave(struct net_device *dev,
struct dsa_port *cpu_dp = dev->dsa_ptr;
struct dsa_switch_tree *dst = cpu_dp->dst;
struct dsa_switch *ds;
struct dsa_port *slave_port;
if (device < 0 || device >= DSA_MAX_SWITCHES)
return NULL;
@@ -137,7 +138,12 @@ static inline struct net_device *dsa_master_find_slave(struct net_device *dev,
if (port < 0 || port >= ds->num_ports)
return NULL;
return ds->ports[port].slave;
slave_port = &ds->ports[port];
if (unlikely(slave_port->type != DSA_PORT_TYPE_USER))
return NULL;
return slave_port->slave;
}
/* port.c */
+1 -1
View File
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int arp_filter(__be32 sip, __be32 tip, struct net_device *dev)
/*unsigned long now; */
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
rt = ip_route_output(net, sip, tip, 0, 0);
rt = ip_route_output(net, sip, tip, 0, l3mdev_master_ifindex_rcu(dev));
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return 1;
if (rt->dst.dev != dev) {
+7 -6
View File
@@ -253,13 +253,14 @@ static struct net_device *__ip_tunnel_create(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
if (parms->name[0])
strlcpy(name, parms->name, IFNAMSIZ);
else {
if (strlen(ops->kind) > (IFNAMSIZ - 3)) {
err = -E2BIG;
err = -E2BIG;
if (parms->name[0]) {
if (!dev_valid_name(parms->name))
goto failed;
strlcpy(name, parms->name, IFNAMSIZ);
} else {
if (strlen(ops->kind) > (IFNAMSIZ - 3))
goto failed;
}
strlcpy(name, ops->kind, IFNAMSIZ);
strncat(name, "%d", 2);
}
+5 -3
View File
@@ -335,11 +335,13 @@ static struct ip6_tnl *ip6gre_tunnel_locate(struct net *net,
if (t || !create)
return t;
if (parms->name[0])
if (parms->name[0]) {
if (!dev_valid_name(parms->name))
return NULL;
strlcpy(name, parms->name, IFNAMSIZ);
else
} else {
strcpy(name, "ip6gre%d");
}
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*t), name, NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
ip6gre_tunnel_setup);
if (!dev)
+5 -2
View File
@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static int ip6_forward_proxy_check(struct sk_buff *skb)
static inline int ip6_forward_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
__IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS);
__IP6_ADD_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS, skb->len);
return dst_output(net, sk, skb);
}
@@ -569,8 +574,6 @@ int ip6_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
hdr->hop_limit--;
__IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS);
__IP6_ADD_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS, skb->len);
return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_FORWARD,
net, NULL, skb, skb->dev, dst->dev,
ip6_forward_finish);
+7 -4
View File
@@ -297,13 +297,16 @@ static struct ip6_tnl *ip6_tnl_create(struct net *net, struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p)
struct net_device *dev;
struct ip6_tnl *t;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
int err = -ENOMEM;
int err = -E2BIG;
if (p->name[0])
if (p->name[0]) {
if (!dev_valid_name(p->name))
goto failed;
strlcpy(name, p->name, IFNAMSIZ);
else
} else {
sprintf(name, "ip6tnl%%d");
}
err = -ENOMEM;
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*t), name, NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
ip6_tnl_dev_setup);
if (!dev)
+5 -2
View File
@@ -212,10 +212,13 @@ static struct ip6_tnl *vti6_tnl_create(struct net *net, struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
int err;
if (p->name[0])
if (p->name[0]) {
if (!dev_valid_name(p->name))
goto failed;
strlcpy(name, p->name, IFNAMSIZ);
else
} else {
sprintf(name, "ip6_vti%%d");
}
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*t), name, NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, vti6_dev_setup);
if (!dev)
+5 -3
View File
@@ -250,11 +250,13 @@ static struct ip_tunnel *ipip6_tunnel_locate(struct net *net,
if (!create)
goto failed;
if (parms->name[0])
if (parms->name[0]) {
if (!dev_valid_name(parms->name))
goto failed;
strlcpy(name, parms->name, IFNAMSIZ);
else
} else {
strcpy(name, "sit%d");
}
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*t), name, NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
ipip6_tunnel_setup);
if (!dev)
+8 -4
View File
@@ -248,10 +248,14 @@ static int tcf_bpf_init_from_efd(struct nlattr **tb, struct tcf_bpf_cfg *cfg)
static void tcf_bpf_cfg_cleanup(const struct tcf_bpf_cfg *cfg)
{
if (cfg->is_ebpf)
bpf_prog_put(cfg->filter);
else
bpf_prog_destroy(cfg->filter);
struct bpf_prog *filter = cfg->filter;
if (filter) {
if (cfg->is_ebpf)
bpf_prog_put(filter);
else
bpf_prog_destroy(filter);
}
kfree(cfg->bpf_ops);
kfree(cfg->bpf_name);
+1
View File
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ static int u32_delete_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *key)
RCU_INIT_POINTER(*kp, key->next);
tcf_unbind_filter(tp, &key->res);
idr_remove(&ht->handle_idr, key->handle);
tcf_exts_get_net(&key->exts);
call_rcu(&key->rcu, u32_delete_key_freepf_rcu);
return 0;
+3 -1
View File
@@ -728,8 +728,10 @@ static int sctp_v6_addr_to_user(struct sctp_sock *sp, union sctp_addr *addr)
sctp_v6_map_v4(addr);
}
if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
memset(addr->v4.sin_zero, 0, sizeof(addr->v4.sin_zero));
return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
}
return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
}
+8 -5
View File
@@ -354,11 +354,14 @@ static struct sctp_af *sctp_sockaddr_af(struct sctp_sock *opt,
if (!opt->pf->af_supported(addr->sa.sa_family, opt))
return NULL;
/* V4 mapped address are really of AF_INET family */
if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) &&
!opt->pf->af_supported(AF_INET, opt))
return NULL;
if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
if (len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return NULL;
/* V4 mapped address are really of AF_INET family */
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) &&
!opt->pf->af_supported(AF_INET, opt))
return NULL;
}
/* If we get this far, af is valid. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa.sa_family);