seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with
ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of
ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's
use it!
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net
This commit is contained in:
parent
cf23705244
commit
fb14528e44
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
|
||||
#include <linux/filter.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/pid.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/security.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/capability.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
|
||||
@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
|
||||
* behavior of privileged children.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
|
||||
security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
|
||||
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
|
||||
!ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||||
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user