smb: client: fix compound alignment with encryption

The encryption layer can't handle the padding iovs, so flatten the
compound request into a single buffer with required padding to prevent
the server from dropping the connection when finding unaligned
compound requests.

Fixes: bc925c1216 ("smb: client: improve compound padding in encryption")
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
This commit is contained in:
Paulo Alcantara
2025-09-06 21:19:29 -03:00
committed by Steve French
parent 76eeb9b8de
commit 90f7c100d2
+25 -3
View File
@@ -2640,13 +2640,35 @@ smb2_set_next_command(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct smb_rqst *rqst)
}
/* SMB headers in a compound are 8 byte aligned. */
if (!IS_ALIGNED(len, 8)) {
num_padding = 8 - (len & 7);
if (IS_ALIGNED(len, 8))
goto out;
num_padding = 8 - (len & 7);
if (smb3_encryption_required(tcon)) {
int i;
/*
* Flatten request into a single buffer with required padding as
* the encryption layer can't handle the padding iovs.
*/
for (i = 1; i < rqst->rq_nvec; i++) {
memcpy(rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base +
rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len,
rqst->rq_iov[i].iov_base,
rqst->rq_iov[i].iov_len);
rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len += rqst->rq_iov[i].iov_len;
}
memset(rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base + rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len,
0, num_padding);
rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_len += num_padding;
rqst->rq_nvec = 1;
} else {
rqst->rq_iov[rqst->rq_nvec].iov_base = smb2_padding;
rqst->rq_iov[rqst->rq_nvec].iov_len = num_padding;
rqst->rq_nvec++;
len += num_padding;
}
len += num_padding;
out:
shdr->NextCommand = cpu_to_le32(len);
}