netkit: Add option for scrubbing skb meta data
commit83134ef460upstream. Jordan reported that when running Cilium with netkit in per-endpoint-routes mode, network policy misclassifies traffic. In this direct routing mode of Cilium which is used in case of GKE/EKS/AKS, the Pod's BPF program to enforce policy sits on the netkit primary device's egress side. The issue here is that in case of netkit's netkit_prep_forward(), it will clear meta data such as skb->mark and skb->priority before executing the BPF program. Thus, identity data stored in there from earlier BPF programs (e.g. from tcx ingress on the physical device) gets cleared instead of being made available for the primary's program to process. While for traffic egressing the Pod via the peer device this might be desired, this is different for the primary one where compared to tcx egress on the host veth this information would be available. To address this, add a new parameter for the device orchestration to allow control of skb->mark and skb->priority scrubbing, to make the two accessible from BPF (and eventually leave it up to the program to scrub). By default, the current behavior is retained. For netkit peer this also enables the use case where applications could cooperate/signal intent to the BPF program. Note that struct netkit has a 4 byte hole between policy and bundle which is used here, in other words, struct netkit's first cacheline content used in fast-path does not get moved around. Fixes:35dfaad718("netkit, bpf: Add bpf programmable net device") Reported-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/34042 Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241004101335.117711-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
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@@ -1292,6 +1292,19 @@ enum netkit_mode {
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NETKIT_L3,
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};
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/* NETKIT_SCRUB_NONE leaves clearing skb->{mark,priority} up to
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* the BPF program if attached. This also means the latter can
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* consume the two fields if they were populated earlier.
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*
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* NETKIT_SCRUB_DEFAULT zeroes skb->{mark,priority} fields before
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* invoking the attached BPF program when the peer device resides
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* in a different network namespace. This is the default behavior.
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*/
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enum netkit_scrub {
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NETKIT_SCRUB_NONE,
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NETKIT_SCRUB_DEFAULT,
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};
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enum {
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IFLA_NETKIT_UNSPEC,
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IFLA_NETKIT_PEER_INFO,
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@@ -1299,6 +1312,8 @@ enum {
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IFLA_NETKIT_POLICY,
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IFLA_NETKIT_PEER_POLICY,
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IFLA_NETKIT_MODE,
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IFLA_NETKIT_SCRUB,
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IFLA_NETKIT_PEER_SCRUB,
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__IFLA_NETKIT_MAX,
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};
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#define IFLA_NETKIT_MAX (__IFLA_NETKIT_MAX - 1)
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