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[PATCH] SCTP: Validate the parameter length in HB-ACK chunk (CVE-2006-1857)

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If SCTP receives a badly formatted HB-ACK chunk, it is possible
that we may access invalid memory and potentially have a buffer
overflow.  We should really make sure that the chunk format is
what we expect, before attempting to touch the data.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
This commit is contained in:
Vladislav Yasevich
2006-05-19 14:25:53 -07:00
committed by Chris Wright
parent 0eca2317be
commit 1a9807fd86
1 changed files with 6 additions and 0 deletions
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net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+6
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@@ -1030,6 +1030,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
commands);
hbinfo = (sctp_sender_hb_info_t *) chunk->skb->data;
/* Make sure that the length of the parameter is what we expect */
if (ntohs(hbinfo->param_hdr.length) !=
sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)) {
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
from_addr = hbinfo->daddr;
link = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &from_addr);