twx-linux/security
Konstantin Meskhidze fff69fb03d
landlock: Support network rules with TCP bind and connect
Add network rules support in the ruleset management helpers and the
landlock_create_ruleset() syscall. Extend user space API to support
network actions:
* Add new network access rights: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP and
  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP.
* Add a new network rule type: LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT tied to struct
  landlock_net_port_attr. The allowed_access field contains the network
  access rights, and the port field contains the port value according to
  the controlled protocol. This field can take up to a 64-bit value
  but the maximum value depends on the related protocol (e.g. 16-bit
  value for TCP). Network port is in host endianness [1].
* Add a new handled_access_net field to struct landlock_ruleset_attr
  that contains network access rights.
* Increment the Landlock ABI version to 4.

Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect() LSM hooks, which enable
to control TCP socket binding and connection to specific ports.

Expand access_masks_t from u16 to u32 to be able to store network access
rights alongside filesystem access rights for rulesets' handled access
rights.

Access rights are not tied to socket file descriptors but checked at
bind() or connect() call time against the caller's Landlock domain. For
the filesystem, a file descriptor is a direct access to a file/data.
However, for network sockets, we cannot identify for which data or peer
a newly created socket will give access to. Indeed, we need to wait for
a connect or bind request to identify the use case for this socket.
Likewise a directory file descriptor may enable to open another file
(i.e. a new data item), but this opening is also restricted by the
caller's domain, not the file descriptor's access rights [2].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/263c1eb3-602f-57fe-8450-3f138581bee7@digikod.net

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026014751.414649-9-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com
[mic: Extend commit message, fix typo in comments, and specify
endianness in the documentation]
Co-developed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2023-10-26 21:07:15 +02:00
..
apparmor lsm/stable-6.6 PR 20230829 2023-08-30 09:07:09 -07:00
bpf selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality 2023-03-20 12:34:23 -04:00
integrity ima: rework CONFIG_IMA dependency block 2023-09-27 11:52:12 -04:00
keys KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage 2023-10-10 11:19:43 -07:00
landlock landlock: Support network rules with TCP bind and connect 2023-10-26 21:07:15 +02:00
loadpin LoadPin: Annotate struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest with __counted_by 2023-08-25 16:07:30 -07:00
lockdown selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality 2023-03-20 12:34:23 -04:00
safesetid SafeSetID: fix UID printed instead of GID 2023-06-20 20:26:00 -04:00
selinux selinux: fix handling of empty opts in selinux_fs_context_submount() 2023-09-12 17:31:08 -04:00
smack Smack updates for v6.6. Two minor fixes. 2023-08-30 09:28:07 -07:00
tomoyo tomoyo: remove unused function declaration 2023-08-13 22:07:15 +09:00
yama sysctl-6.4-rc1 2023-04-27 16:52:33 -07:00
commoncap.c lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget() 2023-08-08 16:48:47 -04:00
device_cgroup.c device_cgroup: Fix kernel-doc warnings in device_cgroup 2023-06-21 09:30:49 -04:00
inode.c security: convert to ctime accessor functions 2023-07-24 10:30:08 +02:00
Kconfig mm/slab: remove HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR 2023-05-24 15:38:17 +02:00
Kconfig.hardening hardening: Move BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION to hardening options 2023-08-15 14:57:25 -07:00
lsm_audit.c lsm: fix a number of misspellings 2023-05-25 17:52:15 -04:00
Makefile
min_addr.c
security.c lsm/stable-6.6 PR 20230829 2023-08-30 09:07:09 -07:00