twx-linux/security
David Gstir 2e8a0f40a3 KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys
DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP.
Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for
hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob
mechanism similar to what CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and
parsing the blob has to happen in software (i.e. the kernel).

The software-based blob format used by DCP trusted keys encrypts
the payload using AES-128-GCM with a freshly generated random key and nonce.
The random key itself is AES-128-ECB encrypted using the DCP unique
or OTP key.

The DCP trusted key blob format is:
/*
 * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
 *
 * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1
 * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
 *            @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
 *            AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
 * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
 * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
 * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
 *           GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it.
 *
 * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len +
 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
 */
struct dcp_blob_fmt {
	__u8 fmt_version;
	__u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
	__u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
	__le32 payload_len;
	__u8 payload[];
} __packed;

By default the unique key is used. It is also possible to use the
OTP key. While the unique key should be unique it is not documented how
this key is derived. Therefore selection the OTP key is supported as
well via the use_otp_key module parameter.

Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2024-05-09 18:29:03 +03:00
..
apparmor lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls 2024-03-14 11:31:26 -04:00
bpf lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static 2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
integrity lsm/stable-6.9 PR 20240312 2024-03-12 20:03:34 -07:00
keys KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys 2024-05-09 18:29:03 +03:00
landlock landlock: Use f_cred in security_file_open() hook 2024-03-08 18:22:16 +01:00
loadpin lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static 2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
lockdown LSM: Identify modules by more than name 2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
safesetid lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static 2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
selinux selinux: avoid dereference of garbage after mount failure 2024-04-01 23:32:35 -04:00
smack lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls 2024-03-14 11:31:26 -04:00
tomoyo tomoyo: fix UAF write bug in tomoyo_write_control() 2024-03-01 11:14:00 -08:00
yama lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static 2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
commoncap.c lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static 2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
device_cgroup.c device_cgroup: Fix kernel-doc warnings in device_cgroup 2023-06-21 09:30:49 -04:00
inode.c security: convert to new timestamp accessors 2023-10-18 14:08:31 +02:00
Kconfig fortify: drop Clang version check for 12.0.1 or newer 2024-02-22 15:38:54 -08:00
Kconfig.hardening hardening: Move BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION to hardening options 2023-08-15 14:57:25 -07:00
lsm_audit.c
lsm_syscalls.c lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls 2024-03-14 11:31:26 -04:00
Makefile LSM: syscalls for current process attributes 2023-11-12 22:54:42 -05:00
min_addr.c
security.c security: Place security_path_post_mknod() where the original IMA call was 2024-04-03 10:21:32 -07:00