commit bcb44433bb upstream.
Storage devices which report supporting discard commands like
WRITE_SAME_16 with unmap, but reject discard commands sent to the
storage device. This is a clear storage firmware bug but it doesn't
change the fact that should a program cause discards to be sent to a
multipath device layered on this buggy storage, all paths can end up
failed at the same time from the discards, causing possible I/O loss.
The first discard to a path will fail with Illegal Request, Invalid
field in cdb, e.g.:
kernel: sd 8:0:8:19: [sdfn] tag#0 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
kernel: sd 8:0:8:19: [sdfn] tag#0 Sense Key : Illegal Request [current]
kernel: sd 8:0:8:19: [sdfn] tag#0 Add. Sense: Invalid field in cdb
kernel: sd 8:0:8:19: [sdfn] tag#0 CDB: Write same(16) 93 08 00 00 00 00 00 a0 08 00 00 00 80 00 00 00
kernel: blk_update_request: critical target error, dev sdfn, sector 10487808
The SCSI layer converts this to the BLK_STS_TARGET error number, the sd
device disables its support for discard on this path, and because of the
BLK_STS_TARGET error multipath fails the discard without failing any
path or retrying down a different path. But subsequent discards can
cause path failures. Any discards sent to the path which already failed
a discard ends up failing with EIO from blk_cloned_rq_check_limits with
an "over max size limit" error since the discard limit was set to 0 by
the sd driver for the path. As the error is EIO, this now fails the
path and multipath tries to send the discard down the next path. This
cycle continues as discards are sent until all paths fail.
Fix this by training DM core to disable DISCARD if the underlying
storage already did so.
Also, fix branching in dm_done() and clone_endio() to reflect the
mutually exclussive nature of the IO operations in question.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: backported to 4.19: Adjust for context changes in
drivers/md/dm-core.h]
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bd293d071f upstream.
When thin-volume is built on loop device, if available memory is low,
the following deadlock can be triggered:
One process P1 allocates memory with GFP_FS flag, direct alloc fails,
memory reclaim invokes memory shrinker in dm_bufio, dm_bufio_shrink_scan()
runs, mutex dm_bufio_client->lock is acquired, then P1 waits for dm_buffer
IO to complete in __try_evict_buffer().
But this IO may never complete if issued to an underlying loop device
that forwards it using direct-IO, which allocates memory using
GFP_KERNEL (see: do_blockdev_direct_IO()). If allocation fails, memory
reclaim will invoke memory shrinker in dm_bufio, dm_bufio_shrink_scan()
will be invoked, and since the mutex is already held by P1 the loop
thread will hang, and IO will never complete. Resulting in ABBA
deadlock.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3b8cafdd54 upstream.
dm-zoned uses the zone flag DMZ_ACTIVE to indicate that a zone of the
backend device is being actively read or written and so cannot be
reclaimed. This flag is set as long as the zone atomic reference
counter is not 0. When this atomic is decremented and reaches 0 (e.g.
on BIO completion), the active flag is cleared and set again whenever
the zone is reused and BIO issued with the atomic counter incremented.
These 2 operations (atomic inc/dec and flag set/clear) are however not
always executed atomically under the target metadata mutex lock and
this causes the warning:
WARN_ON(!test_bit(DMZ_ACTIVE, &zone->flags));
in dmz_deactivate_zone() to be displayed. This problem is regularly
triggered with xfstests generic/209, generic/300, generic/451 and
xfs/077 with XFS being used as the file system on the dm-zoned target
device. Similarly, xfstests ext4/303, ext4/304, generic/209 and
generic/300 trigger the warning with ext4 use.
This problem can be easily fixed by simply removing the DMZ_ACTIVE flag
and managing the "ACTIVE" state by directly looking at the reference
counter value. To do so, the functions dmz_activate_zone() and
dmz_deactivate_zone() are changed to inline functions respectively
calling atomic_inc() and atomic_dec(), while the dmz_is_active() macro
is changed to an inline function calling atomic_read().
Fixes: 3b1a94c88b ("dm zoned: drive-managed zoned block device target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Masato Suzuki <masato.suzuki@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d9771f5ec4 upstream.
commit d5d885fd51 ("md: introduce new personality funciton start()")
splits the init job to two parts. The first part run() does the jobs that
do not require the md threads. The second part start() does the jobs that
require the md threads.
Now it just does run() in adding new journal device. It needs to do the
second part start() too.
Fixes: d5d885fd51 ("md: introduce new personality funciton start()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.9+
Reported-by: Michal Soltys <soltys@ziu.info>
Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f54d801dda upstream.
Commit 9baf30972b ("bcache: fix for gc and write-back race") added a
new work queue dc->writeback_write_wq, but forgot to destroy it in the
error condition when creating dc->writeback_thread failed.
This patch destroys dc->writeback_write_wq if kthread_create() returns
error pointer to dc->writeback_thread, then a memory leak is avoided.
Fixes: 9baf30972b ("bcache: fix for gc and write-back race")
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5461999848 upstream.
In bch_cached_dev_files[] from driver/md/bcache/sysfs.c, sysfs_errors is
incorrectly inserted in. The correct entry should be sysfs_io_errors.
This patch fixes the problem and now I/O errors of cached device can be
read from /sys/block/bcache<N>/bcache/io_errors.
Fixes: c7b7bd0740 ("bcache: add io_disable to struct cached_dev")
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 578df99b1b upstream.
When md raid device (e.g. raid456) is used as backing device, read-ahead
requests on a degrading and recovering md raid device might be failured
immediately by md raid code, but indeed this md raid array can still be
read or write for normal I/O requests. Therefore such failed read-ahead
request are not real hardware failure. Further more, after degrading and
recovering accomplished, read-ahead requests will be handled by md raid
array again.
For such condition, I/O failures of read-ahead requests don't indicate
real health status (because normal I/O still be served), they should not
be counted into I/O error counter dc->io_errors.
Since there is no simple way to detect whether the backing divice is a
md raid device, this patch simply ignores I/O failures for read-ahead
bios on backing device, to avoid bogus backing device failure on a
degrading md raid array.
Suggested-and-tested-by: Thorsten Knabe <linux@thorsten-knabe.de>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 249a5f6da5 upstream.
This reverts commit c4dc2497d5.
This patch enlarges a race between normal btree flush code path and
flush_btree_write(), which causes deadlock when journal space is
exhausted. Reverts this patch makes the race window from 128 btree
nodes to only 1 btree nodes.
Fixes: c4dc2497d5 ("bcache: fix high CPU occupancy during journal")
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 695277f16b upstream.
This reverts commit 6147305c73.
Although this patch helps the failed bcache device to stop faster when
too many I/O errors detected on corresponding cached device, setting
CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE bit to cache set c->flags was not a good idea. This
operation will disable all I/Os on cache set, which means other attached
bcache devices won't work neither.
Without this patch, the failed bcache device can also be stopped
eventually if internal I/O accomplished (e.g. writeback). Therefore here
I revert it.
Fixes: 6147305c73 ("bcache: set CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE in bch_cached_dev_error()")
Reported-by: Yong Li <mr.liyong@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7e865eba00 ]
When enable lockdep and reboot system with a writeback mode bcache
device, the following potential deadlock warning is reported by lockdep
engine.
[ 101.536569][ T401] kworker/2:2/401 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 101.538575][ T401] 00000000bbf6e6c7 ((wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4c0
[ 101.542054][ T401]
[ 101.542054][ T401] but task is already holding lock:
[ 101.544587][ T401] 00000000f5f305b3 ((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x21e/0x640
[ 101.548386][ T401]
[ 101.548386][ T401] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 101.548386][ T401]
[ 101.551874][ T401]
[ 101.551874][ T401] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 101.555000][ T401]
[ 101.555000][ T401] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2){+.+.}:
[ 101.557860][ T401] process_one_work+0x277/0x640
[ 101.559661][ T401] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0
[ 101.561340][ T401] kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 101.562963][ T401] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 101.564718][ T401]
[ 101.564718][ T401] -> #0 ((wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq){+.+.}:
[ 101.567701][ T401] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1c0
[ 101.569651][ T401] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4c0
[ 101.571494][ T401] drain_workqueue+0xa9/0x180
[ 101.573234][ T401] destroy_workqueue+0x17/0x250
[ 101.575109][ T401] cached_dev_free+0x44/0x120 [bcache]
[ 101.577304][ T401] process_one_work+0x2a4/0x640
[ 101.579357][ T401] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0
[ 101.581055][ T401] kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 101.582709][ T401] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 101.584592][ T401]
[ 101.584592][ T401] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 101.584592][ T401]
[ 101.588355][ T401] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 101.588355][ T401]
[ 101.590974][ T401] CPU0 CPU1
[ 101.592889][ T401] ---- ----
[ 101.594743][ T401] lock((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2);
[ 101.596785][ T401] lock((wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq);
[ 101.600072][ T401] lock((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2);
[ 101.602971][ T401] lock((wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq);
[ 101.605255][ T401]
[ 101.605255][ T401] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 101.605255][ T401]
[ 101.608310][ T401] 2 locks held by kworker/2:2/401:
[ 101.610208][ T401] #0: 00000000cf2c7d17 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x21e/0x640
[ 101.613709][ T401] #1: 00000000f5f305b3 ((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x21e/0x640
[ 101.617480][ T401]
[ 101.617480][ T401] stack backtrace:
[ 101.619539][ T401] CPU: 2 PID: 401 Comm: kworker/2:2 Tainted: G W 5.2.0-rc4-lp151.20-default+ #1
[ 101.623225][ T401] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018
[ 101.627210][ T401] Workqueue: events cached_dev_free [bcache]
[ 101.629239][ T401] Call Trace:
[ 101.630360][ T401] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb
[ 101.631777][ T401] print_circular_bug+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 101.633485][ T401] __lock_acquire+0x16cd/0x1850
[ 101.635184][ T401] ? __lock_acquire+0x6a8/0x1850
[ 101.636863][ T401] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1c0
[ 101.638421][ T401] ? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0
[ 101.640015][ T401] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1c0
[ 101.641513][ T401] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4c0
[ 101.643248][ T401] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4c0
[ 101.644832][ T401] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4c0
[ 101.646476][ T401] ? drain_workqueue+0xa9/0x180
[ 101.648303][ T401] drain_workqueue+0xa9/0x180
[ 101.649867][ T401] destroy_workqueue+0x17/0x250
[ 101.651503][ T401] cached_dev_free+0x44/0x120 [bcache]
[ 101.653328][ T401] process_one_work+0x2a4/0x640
[ 101.655029][ T401] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0
[ 101.656693][ T401] ? process_one_work+0x640/0x640
[ 101.658501][ T401] kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 101.660012][ T401] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[ 101.661985][ T401] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 101.691318][ T401] bcache: bcache_device_free() bcache0 stopped
Here is how the above potential deadlock may happen in reboot/shutdown
code path,
1) bcache_reboot() is called firstly in the reboot/shutdown code path,
then in bcache_reboot(), bcache_device_stop() is called.
2) bcache_device_stop() sets BCACHE_DEV_CLOSING on d->falgs, then call
closure_queue(&d->cl) to invoke cached_dev_flush(). And in turn
cached_dev_flush() calls cached_dev_free() via closure_at()
3) In cached_dev_free(), after stopped writebach kthread
dc->writeback_thread, the kwork dc->writeback_write_wq is stopping by
destroy_workqueue().
4) Inside destroy_workqueue(), drain_workqueue() is called. Inside
drain_workqueue(), flush_workqueue() is called. Then wq->lockdep_map
is acquired by lock_map_acquire() in flush_workqueue(). After the
lock acquired the rest part of flush_workqueue() just wait for the
workqueue to complete.
5) Now we look back at writeback thread routine bch_writeback_thread(),
in the main while-loop, write_dirty() is called via continue_at() in
read_dirty_submit(), which is called via continue_at() in while-loop
level called function read_dirty(). Inside write_dirty() it may be
re-called on workqueeu dc->writeback_write_wq via continue_at().
It means when the writeback kthread is stopped in cached_dev_free()
there might be still one kworker queued on dc->writeback_write_wq
to execute write_dirty() again.
6) Now this kworker is scheduled on dc->writeback_write_wq to run by
process_one_work() (which is called by worker_thread()). Before
calling the kwork routine, wq->lockdep_map is acquired.
7) But wq->lockdep_map is acquired already in step 4), so a A-A lock
(lockdep terminology) scenario happens.
Indeed on multiple cores syatem, the above deadlock is very rare to
happen, just as the code comments in process_one_work() says,
2263 * AFAICT there is no possible deadlock scenario between the
2264 * flush_work() and complete() primitives (except for
single-threaded
2265 * workqueues), so hiding them isn't a problem.
But it is still good to fix such lockdep warning, even no one running
bcache on single core system.
The fix is simple. This patch solves the above potential deadlock by,
- Do not destroy workqueue dc->writeback_write_wq in cached_dev_free().
- Flush and destroy dc->writeback_write_wq in writebach kthread routine
bch_writeback_thread(), where after quit the thread main while-loop
and before cached_dev_put() is called.
By this fix, dc->writeback_write_wq will be stopped and destroy before
the writeback kthread stopped, so the chance for a A-A locking on
wq->lockdep_map is disappeared, such A-A deadlock won't happen
any more.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 80265d8dfd ]
When enable lockdep engine, a lockdep warning can be observed when
reboot or shutdown system,
[ 3142.764557][ T1] bcache: bcache_reboot() Stopping all devices:
[ 3142.776265][ T2649]
[ 3142.777159][ T2649] ======================================================
[ 3142.780039][ T2649] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 3142.782869][ T2649] 5.2.0-rc4-lp151.20-default+ #1 Tainted: G W
[ 3142.785684][ T2649] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 3142.788479][ T2649] kworker/3:67/2649 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 3142.790738][ T2649] 00000000aaf02291 ((wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4c0
[ 3142.794678][ T2649]
[ 3142.794678][ T2649] but task is already holding lock:
[ 3142.797402][ T2649] 000000004fcf89c5 (&bch_register_lock){+.+.}, at: cached_dev_free+0x17/0x120 [bcache]
[ 3142.801462][ T2649]
[ 3142.801462][ T2649] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 3142.801462][ T2649]
[ 3142.805277][ T2649]
[ 3142.805277][ T2649] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 3142.808902][ T2649]
[ 3142.808902][ T2649] -> #2 (&bch_register_lock){+.+.}:
[ 3142.812396][ T2649] __mutex_lock+0x7a/0x9d0
[ 3142.814184][ T2649] cached_dev_free+0x17/0x120 [bcache]
[ 3142.816415][ T2649] process_one_work+0x2a4/0x640
[ 3142.818413][ T2649] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0
[ 3142.820276][ T2649] kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 3142.822061][ T2649] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 3142.823965][ T2649]
[ 3142.823965][ T2649] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2){+.+.}:
[ 3142.827244][ T2649] process_one_work+0x277/0x640
[ 3142.829160][ T2649] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0
[ 3142.830958][ T2649] kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 3142.832674][ T2649] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 3142.834915][ T2649]
[ 3142.834915][ T2649] -> #0 ((wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq){+.+.}:
[ 3142.838121][ T2649] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1c0
[ 3142.840025][ T2649] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4c0
[ 3142.842035][ T2649] drain_workqueue+0xa9/0x180
[ 3142.844042][ T2649] destroy_workqueue+0x17/0x250
[ 3142.846142][ T2649] cached_dev_free+0x52/0x120 [bcache]
[ 3142.848530][ T2649] process_one_work+0x2a4/0x640
[ 3142.850663][ T2649] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0
[ 3142.852464][ T2649] kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 3142.854106][ T2649] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 3142.855880][ T2649]
[ 3142.855880][ T2649] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 3142.855880][ T2649]
[ 3142.859663][ T2649] Chain exists of:
[ 3142.859663][ T2649] (wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq --> (work_completion)(&cl->work)#2 --> &bch_register_lock
[ 3142.859663][ T2649]
[ 3142.865424][ T2649] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 3142.865424][ T2649]
[ 3142.868022][ T2649] CPU0 CPU1
[ 3142.869885][ T2649] ---- ----
[ 3142.871751][ T2649] lock(&bch_register_lock);
[ 3142.873379][ T2649] lock((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2);
[ 3142.876399][ T2649] lock(&bch_register_lock);
[ 3142.879727][ T2649] lock((wq_completion)bcache_writeback_wq);
[ 3142.882064][ T2649]
[ 3142.882064][ T2649] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 3142.882064][ T2649]
[ 3142.885060][ T2649] 3 locks held by kworker/3:67/2649:
[ 3142.887245][ T2649] #0: 00000000e774cdd0 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x21e/0x640
[ 3142.890815][ T2649] #1: 00000000f7df89da ((work_completion)(&cl->work)#2){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x21e/0x640
[ 3142.894884][ T2649] #2: 000000004fcf89c5 (&bch_register_lock){+.+.}, at: cached_dev_free+0x17/0x120 [bcache]
[ 3142.898797][ T2649]
[ 3142.898797][ T2649] stack backtrace:
[ 3142.900961][ T2649] CPU: 3 PID: 2649 Comm: kworker/3:67 Tainted: G W 5.2.0-rc4-lp151.20-default+ #1
[ 3142.904789][ T2649] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018
[ 3142.909168][ T2649] Workqueue: events cached_dev_free [bcache]
[ 3142.911422][ T2649] Call Trace:
[ 3142.912656][ T2649] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb
[ 3142.914181][ T2649] print_circular_bug+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 3142.916193][ T2649] __lock_acquire+0x16cd/0x1850
[ 3142.917936][ T2649] ? __lock_acquire+0x6a8/0x1850
[ 3142.919704][ T2649] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1c0
[ 3142.921335][ T2649] ? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0
[ 3142.923052][ T2649] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1c0
[ 3142.924635][ T2649] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4c0
[ 3142.926375][ T2649] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x4c0
[ 3142.928047][ T2649] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x4c0
[ 3142.929824][ T2649] ? drain_workqueue+0xa9/0x180
[ 3142.931686][ T2649] drain_workqueue+0xa9/0x180
[ 3142.933534][ T2649] destroy_workqueue+0x17/0x250
[ 3142.935787][ T2649] cached_dev_free+0x52/0x120 [bcache]
[ 3142.937795][ T2649] process_one_work+0x2a4/0x640
[ 3142.939803][ T2649] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0
[ 3142.941487][ T2649] ? process_one_work+0x640/0x640
[ 3142.943389][ T2649] kthread+0x125/0x140
[ 3142.944894][ T2649] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[ 3142.947744][ T2649] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 3142.970358][ T2649] bcache: bcache_device_free() bcache0 stopped
Here is how the deadlock happens.
1) bcache_reboot() calls bcache_device_stop(), then inside
bcache_device_stop() BCACHE_DEV_CLOSING bit is set on d->flags.
Then closure_queue(&d->cl) is called to invoke cached_dev_flush().
2) In cached_dev_flush(), cached_dev_free() is called by continu_at().
3) In cached_dev_free(), when stopping the writeback kthread of the
cached device by kthread_stop(), dc->writeback_thread will be waken
up to quite the kthread while-loop, then cached_dev_put() is called
in bch_writeback_thread().
4) Calling cached_dev_put() in writeback kthread may drop dc->count to
0, then dc->detach kworker is scheduled, which is initialized as
cached_dev_detach_finish().
5) Inside cached_dev_detach_finish(), the last line of code is to call
closure_put(&dc->disk.cl), which drops the last reference counter of
closrure dc->disk.cl, then the callback cached_dev_flush() gets
called.
Now cached_dev_flush() is called for second time in the code path, the
first time is in step 2). And again bch_register_lock will be acquired
again, and a A-A lock (lockdep terminology) is happening.
The root cause of the above A-A lock is in cached_dev_free(), mutex
bch_register_lock is held before stopping writeback kthread and other
kworkers. Fortunately now we have variable 'bcache_is_reboot', which may
prevent device registration or unregistration during reboot/shutdown
time, so it is unncessary to hold bch_register_lock such early now.
This is how this patch fixes the reboot/shutdown time A-A lock issue:
After moving mutex_lock(&bch_register_lock) to a later location where
before atomic_read(&dc->running) in cached_dev_free(), such A-A lock
problem can be solved without any reboot time registration race.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 383ff2183a ]
When too many I/O errors happen on cache set and CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE
bit is set, bch_journal() may continue to work because the journaling
bkey might be still in write set yet. The caller of bch_journal() may
believe the journal still work but the truth is in-memory journal write
set won't be written into cache device any more. This behavior may
introduce potential inconsistent metadata status.
This patch checks CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE bit at the head of bch_journal(),
if the bit is set, bch_journal() returns NULL immediately to notice
caller to know journal does not work.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e775339e1a ]
If CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE of a cache set flag is set by too many I/O
errors, currently allocator routines can still continue allocate
space which may introduce inconsistent metadata state.
This patch checkes CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE bit in following allocator
routines,
- bch_bucket_alloc()
- __bch_bucket_alloc_set()
Once CACHE_SET_IO_DISABLE is set on cache set, the allocator routines
may reject allocation request earlier to avoid potential inconsistent
metadata.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2eba4e640b ]
DM verity should also use DMERR_LIMIT to limit repeat data block
corruption messages.
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a065192655 ]
For the first call to realloc_argv() in dm_split_args(), old_argv is
NULL and size is zero. Then memcpy is called, with the NULL old_argv
as the source argument and a zero size argument. AFAIK, this is
undefined behavior and generates the following warning when compiled
with UBSAN on ppc64le:
In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h:19,
from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/current.h:16,
from ./include/linux/sched.h:12,
from ./include/linux/kthread.h:6,
from drivers/md/dm-core.h:12,
from drivers/md/dm-table.c:8:
In function 'memcpy',
inlined from 'realloc_argv' at drivers/md/dm-table.c:565:3,
inlined from 'dm_split_args' at drivers/md/dm-table.c:588:9:
./include/linux/string.h:345:9: error: argument 2 null where non-null expected [-Werror=nonnull]
return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/md/dm-table.c: In function 'dm_split_args':
./include/linux/string.h:345:9: note: in a call to built-in function '__builtin_memcpy'
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9642fa73d0 ]
Stopping external metadata arrays during resync/recovery causes
retries, loop of interrupting and starting reconstruction, until it
hit at good moment to stop completely. While these retries
curr_mark_cnt can be small- especially on HDD drives, so subtraction
result can be smaller than 0. However it is casted to uint without
checking. As a result of it the status bar in /proc/mdstat while stopping
is strange (it jumps between 0% and 99%).
The real problem occurs here after commit 72deb455b5 ("block: remove
CONFIG_LBDAF"). Sector_div() macro has been changed, now the
divisor is casted to uint32. For db = -8 the divisior(db/32-1) becomes 0.
Check if db value can be really counted and replace these macro by
div64_u64() inline.
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Tkaczyk <mariusz.tkaczyk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------
This patch is not on mainline and is meant to 4.19 stable *only*.
After the patch description there's a reasoning about that.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Commit cd4a4ae468 ("block: don't use blocking queue entered for
recursive bio submits") introduced the flag BIO_QUEUE_ENTERED in order
split bios bypass the blocking queue entering routine and use the live
non-blocking version. It was a result of an extensive discussion in
a linux-block thread[0], and the purpose of this change was to prevent
a hung task waiting on a reference to drop.
Happens that md raid0 split bios all the time, and more important,
it changes their underlying device to the raid member. After the change
introduced by this flag's usage, we experience various crashes if a raid0
member is removed during a large write. This happens because the bio
reaches the live queue entering function when the queue of the raid0
member is dying.
A simple reproducer of this behavior is presented below:
a) Build kernel v4.19.56-stable with CONFIG_BLK_DEV_THROTTLING=y.
b) Create a raid0 md array with 2 NVMe devices as members, and mount
it with an ext4 filesystem.
c) Run the following oneliner (supposing the raid0 is mounted in /mnt):
(dd of=/mnt/tmp if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=999 &); sleep 0.3;
echo 1 > /sys/block/nvme1n1/device/device/remove
(whereas nvme1n1 is the 2nd array member)
This will trigger the following warning/oops:
------------[ cut here ]------------
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000155
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
RIP: 0010:blk_throtl_bio+0x45/0x970
[...]
Call Trace:
generic_make_request_checks+0x1bf/0x690
generic_make_request+0x64/0x3f0
raid0_make_request+0x184/0x620 [raid0]
? raid0_make_request+0x184/0x620 [raid0]
md_handle_request+0x126/0x1a0
md_make_request+0x7b/0x180
generic_make_request+0x19e/0x3f0
submit_bio+0x73/0x140
[...]
This patch changes raid0 driver to fallback to the "old" blocking queue
entering procedure, by clearing the BIO_QUEUE_ENTERED from raid0 bios.
This prevents the crashes and restores the regular behavior of raid0
arrays when a member is removed during a large write.
[0] lore.kernel.org/linux-block/343bbbf6-64eb-879e-d19e-96aebb037d47@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
----------------------------
Why this is not on mainline?
----------------------------
The patch was originally submitted upstream in linux-raid and
linux-block mailing-lists - it was initially accepted by Song Liu,
but Christoph Hellwig[1] observed that there was a clean-up series
ready to be accepted from Ming Lei[2] that fixed the same issue.
The accepted patches from Ming's series in upstream are: commit
47cdee29ef ("block: move blk_exit_queue into __blk_release_queue") and
commit fe2008640a ("block: don't protect generic_make_request_checks
with blk_queue_enter"). Those patches basically do a clean-up in the
block layer involving:
1) Putting back blk_exit_queue() logic into __blk_release_queue(); that
path was changed in the past and the logic from blk_exit_queue() was
added to blk_cleanup_queue().
2) Removing the guard/protection in generic_make_request_checks() with
blk_queue_enter().
The problem with Ming's series for -stable is that it relies in the
legacy request IO path removal. So it's "backport-able" to v5.0+,
but doing that for early versions (like 4.19) would incur in complex
code changes. Hence, it was suggested by Christoph and Song Liu that
this patch was submitted to stable only; otherwise merging it upstream
would add code to fix a path removed in a subsequent commit.
[1] lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20190521172258.GA32702@infradead.org
[2] lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20190515030310.20393-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: cd4a4ae468 ("block: don't use blocking queue entered for recursive bio submits")
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 211ad4b733 upstream.
Currently, although we submit super bios in order (and super.nr_entries
is incremented by each logged entry), submit_bio() is async so each
super sector may not be written to log device in order and then the
final nr_entries may be smaller than it should be.
This problem can be reproduced by the xfstests generic/455 with ext4:
QA output created by 455
-Silence is golden
+mark 'end' does not exist
Fix this by serializing submission of super sectors to make sure each
is written to the log disk in order.
Fixes: 0e9cebe724 ("dm: add log writes target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1f0ffa6734 upstream.
When people set a writeback percent via sysfs file,
/sys/block/bcache<N>/bcache/writeback_percent
current code directly sets BCACHE_DEV_WB_RUNNING to dc->disk.flags
and schedules kworker dc->writeback_rate_update.
If there is no cache set attached to, the writeback kernel thread is
not running indeed, running dc->writeback_rate_update does not make
sense and may cause NULL pointer deference when reference cache set
pointer inside update_writeback_rate().
This patch checks whether the cache set point (dc->disk.c) is NULL in
sysfs interface handler, and only set BCACHE_DEV_WB_RUNNING and
schedule dc->writeback_rate_update when dc->disk.c is not NULL (it
means the cache device is attached to a cache set).
This problem might be introduced from initial bcache commit, but
commit 3fd47bfe55 ("bcache: stop dc->writeback_rate_update properly")
changes part of the original code piece, so I add 'Fixes: 3fd47bfe55b0'
to indicate from which commit this patch can be applied.
Fixes: 3fd47bfe55 ("bcache: stop dc->writeback_rate_update properly")
Reported-by: Bjørn Forsman <bjorn.forsman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Bjørn Forsman <bjorn.forsman@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 31b90956b1 upstream.
Recently people report bcache code compiled with gcc9 is broken, one of
the buggy behavior I observe is that two adjacent 4KB I/Os should merge
into one but they don't. Finally it turns out to be a stack corruption
caused by macro PRECEDING_KEY().
See how PRECEDING_KEY() is defined in bset.h,
437 #define PRECEDING_KEY(_k) \
438 ({ \
439 struct bkey *_ret = NULL; \
440 \
441 if (KEY_INODE(_k) || KEY_OFFSET(_k)) { \
442 _ret = &KEY(KEY_INODE(_k), KEY_OFFSET(_k), 0); \
443 \
444 if (!_ret->low) \
445 _ret->high--; \
446 _ret->low--; \
447 } \
448 \
449 _ret; \
450 })
At line 442, _ret points to address of a on-stack variable combined by
KEY(), the life range of this on-stack variable is in line 442-446,
once _ret is returned to bch_btree_insert_key(), the returned address
points to an invalid stack address and this address is overwritten in
the following called bch_btree_iter_init(). Then argument 'search' of
bch_btree_iter_init() points to some address inside stackframe of
bch_btree_iter_init(), exact address depends on how the compiler
allocates stack space. Now the stack is corrupted.
Fixes: 0eacac2203 ("bcache: PRECEDING_KEY()")
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rolf Fokkens <rolf@rolffokkens.nl>
Reviewed-by: Pierre JUHEN <pierre.juhen@orange.fr>
Tested-by: Shenghui Wang <shhuiw@foxmail.com>
Tested-by: Pierre JUHEN <pierre.juhen@orange.fr>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Nix <nix@esperi.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 78d4eb8ad9 ]
clang has identified a code path in which it thinks a
variable may be unused:
drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c:333:4: error: variable 'bucket' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false
[-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
fifo_pop(&ca->free_inc, bucket);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/md/bcache/util.h:219:27: note: expanded from macro 'fifo_pop'
#define fifo_pop(fifo, i) fifo_pop_front(fifo, (i))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/md/bcache/util.h:189:6: note: expanded from macro 'fifo_pop_front'
if (_r) { \
^~
drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c:343:46: note: uninitialized use occurs here
allocator_wait(ca, bch_allocator_push(ca, bucket));
^~~~~~
drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c:287:7: note: expanded from macro 'allocator_wait'
if (cond) \
^~~~
drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c:333:4: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always true
fifo_pop(&ca->free_inc, bucket);
^
drivers/md/bcache/util.h:219:27: note: expanded from macro 'fifo_pop'
#define fifo_pop(fifo, i) fifo_pop_front(fifo, (i))
^
drivers/md/bcache/util.h:189:2: note: expanded from macro 'fifo_pop_front'
if (_r) { \
^
drivers/md/bcache/alloc.c:331:15: note: initialize the variable 'bucket' to silence this warning
long bucket;
^
This cannot happen in practice because we only enter the loop
if there is at least one element in the list.
Slightly rearranging the code makes this clearer to both the
reader and the compiler, which avoids the warning.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ce3e4cfb59 ]
Currently run_cache_set() has no return value, if there is failure in
bch_journal_replay(), the caller of run_cache_set() has no idea about
such failure and just continue to execute following code after
run_cache_set(). The internal failure is triggered inside
bch_journal_replay() and being handled in async way. This behavior is
inefficient, while failure handling inside bch_journal_replay(), cache
register code is still running to start the cache set. Registering and
unregistering code running as same time may introduce some rare race
condition, and make the code to be more hard to be understood.
This patch adds return value to run_cache_set(), and returns -EIO if
bch_journal_rreplay() fails. Then caller of run_cache_set() may detect
such failure and stop registering code flow immedidately inside
register_cache_set().
If journal replay fails, run_cache_set() can report error immediately
to register_cache_set(). This patch makes the failure handling for
bch_journal_replay() be in synchronized way, easier to understand and
debug, and avoid poetential race condition for register-and-unregister
in same time.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 631207314d ]
journal replay failed with messages:
Sep 10 19:10:43 ceph kernel: bcache: error on
bb379a64-e44e-4812-b91d-a5599871a3b1: bcache: journal entries
2057493-2057567 missing! (replaying 2057493-2076601), disabling
caching
The reason is in journal_reclaim(), when discard is enabled, we send
discard command and reclaim those journal buckets whose seq is old
than the last_seq_now, but before we write a journal with last_seq_now,
the machine is restarted, so the journal with the last_seq_now is not
written to the journal bucket, and the last_seq_wrote in the newest
journal is old than last_seq_now which we expect to be, so when we doing
replay, journals from last_seq_wrote to last_seq_now are missing.
It's hard to write a journal immediately after journal_reclaim(),
and it harmless if those missed journal are caused by discarding
since those journals are already wrote to btree node. So, if miss
seqs are started from the beginning journal, we treat it as normal,
and only print a message to show the miss journal, and point out
it maybe caused by discarding.
Patch v2 add a judgement condition to ignore the missed journal
only when discard enabled as Coly suggested.
(Coly Li: rebase the patch with other changes in bch_journal_replay())
Signed-off-by: Tang Junhui <tang.junhui.linux@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Dennis Schridde <devurandom@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 68d10e6979 ]
When failure happens inside bch_journal_replay(), calling
cache_set_err_on() and handling the failure in async way is not a good
idea. Because after bch_journal_replay() returns, registering code will
continue to execute following steps, and unregistering code triggered
by cache_set_err_on() is running in same time. First it is unnecessary
to handle failure and unregister cache set in an async way, second there
might be potential race condition to run register and unregister code
for same cache set.
So in this patch, if failure happens in bch_journal_replay(), we don't
call cache_set_err_on(), and just print out the same error message to
kernel message buffer, then return -EIO immediately caller. Then caller
can detect such failure and handle it in synchrnozied way.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 95f18c9d13 ]
In the CACHE_SYNC branch of run_cache_set(), LIST_HEAD(journal) is used
to collect journal_replay(s) and filled by bch_journal_read().
If all goes well, bch_journal_replay() will release the list of
jounal_replay(s) at the end of the branch.
If something goes wrong, code flow will jump to the label "err:" and leave
the list unreleased.
This patch will release the list of journal_replay(s) in the case of
error detected.
v1 -> v2:
* Move the release code to the location after label 'err:' to
simply the change.
Signed-off-by: Shenghui Wang <shhuiw@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit b2176a1dfb upstream.
The problem is that any 'uptodate' vs 'disks' check is not precise
in this path. Put a "WARN_ON(!test_bit(R5_UPTODATE, &dev->flags)" on the
device that might try to kick off writes and then skip the action.
Better to prevent the raid driver from taking unexpected action *and* keep
the system alive vs killing the machine with BUG_ON.
Note: fixed warning reported by kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Nigel Croxon <ncroxon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 940bc47178 upstream.
Commit b592211c33 ("dm mpath: fix attached_handler_name leak and
dangling hw_handler_name pointer") fixed a memory leak for the case
where setup_scsi_dh() returns failure. But setup_scsi_dh may return
success and not "use" attached_handler_name if the
retain_attached_hwhandler flag is not set on the map. As setup_scsi_sh
properly "steals" the pointer by nullifying it, freeing it
unconditionally in parse_path() is safe.
Fixes: b592211c33 ("dm mpath: fix attached_handler_name leak and dangling hw_handler_name pointer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30bba430dd upstream.
When we use separate devices for data and metadata, dm-integrity would
incorrectly calculate the size of the metadata device as if it had
512-byte block size - and it would refuse activation with larger block
size and smaller metadata device.
Fix this so that it takes actual block size into account, which fixes
the following reported issue:
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/450
Fixes: 356d9d52e1 ("dm integrity: allow separate metadata device")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 81bc6d150a upstream.
When the target line contains an invalid device, delay_ctr() will call
delay_dtr() with NULL workqueue. Attempting to destroy the NULL
workqueue causes a crash.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7aedf75ff7 upstream.
The function blkdev_report_zones() returns success even if no zone
information is reported (empty report). Empty zone reports can only
happen if the report start sector passed exceeds the device capacity.
The conditions for this to happen are either a bug in the caller code,
or, a change in the device that forced the low level driver to change
the device capacity to a value that is lower than the report start
sector. This situation includes a failed disk revalidation resulting in
the disk capacity being changed to 0.
If this change happens while dm-zoned is in its initialization phase
executing dmz_init_zones(), this function may enter an infinite loop
and hang the system. To avoid this, add a check to disallow empty zone
reports and bail out early. Also fix the function dmz_update_zone() to
make sure that the report for the requested zone was correctly obtained.
Fixes: 3b1a94c88b ("dm zoned: drive-managed zoned block device target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Shaun Tancheff <shaun@tancheff.com>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e28adc3bf3 upstream.
Add missing dm_bitset_cursor_next() to properly advance the bitset
cursor.
Otherwise, the discarded state of all blocks is set according to the
discarded state of the first block.
Fixes: ae4a46a1f6 ("dm cache metadata: use bitset cursor api to load discard bitset")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4bc034d353 upstream.
This reverts commit 5a409b4f56.
This patch has two problems.
1/ it make multiple calls to submit_bio() from inside a make_request_fn.
The bios thus submitted will be queued on current->bio_list and not
submitted immediately. As the bios are allocated from a mempool,
this can theoretically result in a deadlock - all the pool of requests
could be in various ->bio_list queues and a subsequent mempool_alloc
could block waiting for one of them to be released.
2/ It aims to handle a case when there are many concurrent flush requests.
It handles this by submitting many requests in parallel - all of which
are identical and so most of which do nothing useful.
It would be more efficient to just send one lower-level request, but
allow that to satisfy multiple upper-level requests.
Fixes: 5a409b4f56 ("MD: fix lock contention for flush bios")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Tested-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1bee2addc0 upstream.
In journal_reclaim() ja->cur_idx of each cache will be update to
reclaim available journal buckets. Variable 'int n' is used to count how
many cache is successfully reclaimed, then n is set to c->journal.key
by SET_KEY_PTRS(). Later in journal_write_unlocked(), a for_each_cache()
loop will write the jset data onto each cache.
The problem is, if all jouranl buckets on each cache is full, the
following code in journal_reclaim(),
529 for_each_cache(ca, c, iter) {
530 struct journal_device *ja = &ca->journal;
531 unsigned int next = (ja->cur_idx + 1) % ca->sb.njournal_buckets;
532
533 /* No space available on this device */
534 if (next == ja->discard_idx)
535 continue;
536
537 ja->cur_idx = next;
538 k->ptr[n++] = MAKE_PTR(0,
539 bucket_to_sector(c, ca->sb.d[ja->cur_idx]),
540 ca->sb.nr_this_dev);
541 }
542
543 bkey_init(k);
544 SET_KEY_PTRS(k, n);
If there is no available bucket to reclaim, the if() condition at line
534 will always true, and n remains 0. Then at line 544, SET_KEY_PTRS()
will set KEY_PTRS field of c->journal.key to 0.
Setting KEY_PTRS field of c->journal.key to 0 is wrong. Because in
journal_write_unlocked() the journal data is written in following loop,
649 for (i = 0; i < KEY_PTRS(k); i++) {
650-671 submit journal data to cache device
672 }
If KEY_PTRS field is set to 0 in jouranl_reclaim(), the journal data
won't be written to cache device here. If system crahed or rebooted
before bkeys of the lost journal entries written into btree nodes, data
corruption will be reported during bcache reload after rebooting the
system.
Indeed there is only one cache in a cache set, there is no need to set
KEY_PTRS field in journal_reclaim() at all. But in order to keep the
for_each_cache() logic consistent for now, this patch fixes the above
problem by not setting 0 KEY_PTRS of journal key, if there is no bucket
available to reclaim.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4f4fd7c579 upstream.
Changing state from check_state_check_result to
check_state_compute_result not only is unsafe but also doesn't
appear to serve a valid purpose. A raid6 check should only be
pushing out extra writes if doing repair and a mis-match occurs.
The stripe dev management will already try and do repair writes
for failing sectors.
This patch makes the raid6 check_state_check_result handling
work more like raid5's. If somehow too many failures for a
check, just quit the check operation for the stripe. When any
checks pass, don't try and use check_state_compute_result for
a purpose it isn't needed for and is unsafe for. Just mark the
stripe as in sync for passing its parity checks and let the
stripe dev read/write code and the bad blocks list do their
job handling I/O errors.
Repro steps from Xiao:
These are the steps to reproduce this problem:
1. redefined OPT_MEDIUM_ERR_ADDR to 12000 in scsi_debug.c
2. insmod scsi_debug.ko dev_size_mb=11000 max_luns=1 num_tgts=1
3. mdadm --create /dev/md127 --level=6 --raid-devices=5 /dev/sde1 /dev/sde2 /dev/sde3 /dev/sde5 /dev/sde6
sde is the disk created by scsi_debug
4. echo "2" >/sys/module/scsi_debug/parameters/opts
5. raid-check
It panic:
[ 4854.730899] md: data-check of RAID array md127
[ 4854.857455] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#80 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[ 4854.859246] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#80 Sense Key : Medium Error [current]
[ 4854.860694] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#80 Add. Sense: Unrecovered read error
[ 4854.862207] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#80 CDB: Read(10) 28 00 00 00 2d 88 00 04 00 00
[ 4854.864196] print_req_error: critical medium error, dev sdr, sector 11656 flags 0
[ 4854.867409] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#100 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[ 4854.869469] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#100 Sense Key : Medium Error [current]
[ 4854.871206] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#100 Add. Sense: Unrecovered read error
[ 4854.872858] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#100 CDB: Read(10) 28 00 00 00 2e e0 00 00 08 00
[ 4854.874587] print_req_error: critical medium error, dev sdr, sector 12000 flags 4000
[ 4854.876456] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#101 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[ 4854.878552] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#101 Sense Key : Medium Error [current]
[ 4854.880278] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#101 Add. Sense: Unrecovered read error
[ 4854.881846] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#101 CDB: Read(10) 28 00 00 00 2e e8 00 00 08 00
[ 4854.883691] print_req_error: critical medium error, dev sdr, sector 12008 flags 4000
[ 4854.893927] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#166 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[ 4854.896002] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#166 Sense Key : Medium Error [current]
[ 4854.897561] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#166 Add. Sense: Unrecovered read error
[ 4854.899110] sd 5:0:0:0: [sdr] tag#166 CDB: Read(10) 28 00 00 00 2e e0 00 00 10 00
[ 4854.900989] print_req_error: critical medium error, dev sdr, sector 12000 flags 0
[ 4854.902757] md/raid:md127: read error NOT corrected!! (sector 9952 on sdr1).
[ 4854.904375] md/raid:md127: read error NOT corrected!! (sector 9960 on sdr1).
[ 4854.906201] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 4854.907341] kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:4190!
raid5.c:4190 above is this BUG_ON:
handle_parity_checks6()
...
BUG_ON(s->uptodate < disks - 1); /* We don't need Q to recover */
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.16+
OriginalAuthor: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Cc: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Tested-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Jeffy <djeffery@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nigel Croxon <ncroxon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ed319c6ac upstream.
dm-integrity will deadlock if overlapping I/O is issued to it, the bug
was introduced by commit 724376a04d ("dm integrity: implement fair
range locks"). Users rarely use overlapping I/O so this bug went
undetected until now.
Fix this bug by correcting, likely cut-n-paste, typos in
ranges_overlap() and also remove a flawed ranges_overlap() check in
remove_range_unlocked(). This condition could leave unprocessed bios
hanging on wait_list forever.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Fixes: 724376a04d ("dm integrity: implement fair range locks")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb40c0acdc upstream.
Some devices don't use blk_integrity but still want stable pages
because they do their own checksumming. Examples include rbd and iSCSI
when data digests are negotiated. Stacking DM (and thus LVM) on top of
these devices results in sporadic checksum errors.
Set BDI_CAP_STABLE_WRITES if any underlying device has it set.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 75ae193626 upstream.
The limit was already incorporated to dm-crypt with commit 4e870e948f
("dm crypt: fix error with too large bios"), so we don't need to apply
it globally to all targets. The quantity BIO_MAX_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE is
wrong anyway because the variable ti->max_io_len it is supposed to be in
the units of 512-byte sectors not in bytes.
Reduction of the limit to 1048576 sectors could even cause data
corruption in rare cases - suppose that we have a dm-striped device with
stripe size 768MiB. The target will call dm_set_target_max_io_len with
the value 1572864. The buggy code would reduce it to 1048576. Now, the
dm-core will errorneously split the bios on 1048576-sector boundary
insetad of 1572864-sector boundary and pass these stripe-crossing bios
to the striped target.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+
Fixes: 8f50e35815 ("dm: limit the max bio size as BIO_MAX_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0d74e6a3b6 upstream.
If the string opt_string is small, the function memcmp can access bytes
that are beyond the terminating nul character. In theory, it could cause
segfault, if opt_string were located just below some unmapped memory.
Change from memcmp to strncmp so that we don't read bytes beyond the end
of the string.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 5b5fd3c94e ]
Current code already uses d_strtoul_nonzero() to convert input string
to an unsigned integer, to make sure writeback_rate_p_term_inverse
won't be zero value. But overflow may happen when converting input
string to an unsigned integer value by d_strtoul_nonzero(), then
dc->writeback_rate_p_term_inverse can still be set to 0 even if the
sysfs file input value is not zero, e.g. 4294967296 (a.k.a UINT_MAX+1).
If dc->writeback_rate_p_term_inverse is set to 0, it might cause a
dev-zero error in following code from __update_writeback_rate(),
int64_t proportional_scaled =
div_s64(error, dc->writeback_rate_p_term_inverse);
This patch replaces d_strtoul_nonzero() by sysfs_strtoul_clamp() and
limit the value range in [1, UINT_MAX]. Then the unsigned integer
overflow and dev-zero error can be avoided.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 596b5a5dd1 ]
Currently sysfs_strtoul_clamp() is defined as,
82 #define sysfs_strtoul_clamp(file, var, min, max) \
83 do { \
84 if (attr == &sysfs_ ## file) \
85 return strtoul_safe_clamp(buf, var, min, max) \
86 ?: (ssize_t) size; \
87 } while (0)
The problem is, if bit width of var is less then unsigned long, min and
max may not protect var from integer overflow, because overflow happens
in strtoul_safe_clamp() before checking min and max.
To fix such overflow in sysfs_strtoul_clamp(), to make min and max take
effect, this patch adds an unsigned long variable, and uses it to macro
strtoul_safe_clamp() to convert an unsigned long value in range defined
by [min, max]. Then assign this value to var. By this method, if bit
width of var is less than unsigned long, integer overflow won't happen
before min and max are checking.
Now sysfs_strtoul_clamp() can properly handle smaller data type like
unsigned int, of cause min and max should be defined in range of
unsigned int too.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c3b75a2199 ]
dc->writeback_rate_i_term_inverse can be set via sysfs interface. It is
in type unsigned int, and convert from input string by d_strtoul(). The
problem is d_strtoul() does not check valid range of the input, if
4294967296 is written into sysfs file writeback_rate_i_term_inverse,
an overflow of unsigned integer will happen and value 0 is set to
dc->writeback_rate_i_term_inverse.
In writeback.c:__update_writeback_rate(), there are following lines of
code,
integral_scaled = div_s64(dc->writeback_rate_integral,
dc->writeback_rate_i_term_inverse);
If dc->writeback_rate_i_term_inverse is set to 0 via sysfs interface,
a div-zero error might be triggered in the above code.
Therefore we need to add a range limitation in the sysfs interface,
this is what this patch does, use sysfs_stroul_clamp() to replace
d_strtoul() and restrict the input range in [1, UINT_MAX].
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8c27a3953e ]
People may set sequential_cutoff of a cached device via sysfs file,
but current code does not check input value overflow. E.g. if value
4294967295 (UINT_MAX) is written to file sequential_cutoff, its value
is 4GB, but if 4294967296 (UINT_MAX + 1) is written into, its value
will be 0. This is an unexpected behavior.
This patch replaces d_strtoi_h() by sysfs_strtoul_clamp() to convert
input string to unsigned integer value, and limit its range in
[0, UINT_MAX]. Then the input overflow can be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a91fbda49f ]
Cache set sysfs entry io_error_halflife is used to set c->error_decay.
c->error_decay is in type unsigned int, and it is converted by
strtoul_or_return(), therefore overflow to c->error_decay is possible
for a large input value.
This patch fixes the overflow by using strtoul_safe_clamp() to convert
input string to an unsigned long value in range [0, UINT_MAX], then
divides by 88 and set it to c->error_decay.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 70de2cbda8 ]
Invoking dm_get_device() twice on the same device path with different
modes is dangerous. Because in that case, upgrade_mode() will alloc a
new 'dm_dev' and free the old one, which may be referenced by a previous
caller. Dereferencing the dangling pointer will trigger kernel NULL
pointer dereference.
The following two cases can reproduce this issue. Actually, they are
invalid setups that must be disallowed, e.g.:
1. Creating a thin-pool with read_only mode, and the same device as
both metadata and data.
dmsetup create thinp --table \
"0 41943040 thin-pool /dev/vdb /dev/vdb 128 0 1 read_only"
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
...
Call Trace:
new_read+0xfb/0x110 [dm_bufio]
dm_bm_read_lock+0x43/0x190 [dm_persistent_data]
? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x15c/0x1e0
__create_persistent_data_objects+0x65/0x3e0 [dm_thin_pool]
dm_pool_metadata_open+0x8c/0xf0 [dm_thin_pool]
pool_ctr.cold.79+0x213/0x913 [dm_thin_pool]
? realloc_argv+0x50/0x70 [dm_mod]
dm_table_add_target+0x14e/0x330 [dm_mod]
table_load+0x122/0x2e0 [dm_mod]
? dev_status+0x40/0x40 [dm_mod]
ctl_ioctl+0x1aa/0x3e0 [dm_mod]
dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10 [dm_mod]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x600
? handle_mm_fault+0xda/0x200
? __do_page_fault+0x26c/0x4f0
ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x150
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
2. Creating a external snapshot using the same thin-pool device.
dmsetup create thinp --table \
"0 41943040 thin-pool /dev/vdc /dev/vdb 128 0 2 ignore_discard"
dmsetup message /dev/mapper/thinp 0 "create_thin 0"
dmsetup create snap --table \
"0 204800 thin /dev/mapper/thinp 0 /dev/mapper/thinp"
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
...
Call Trace:
? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2e0
retrieve_status+0xa5/0x1f0 [dm_mod]
? dm_get_live_or_inactive_table.isra.7+0x20/0x20 [dm_mod]
table_status+0x61/0xa0 [dm_mod]
ctl_ioctl+0x1aa/0x3e0 [dm_mod]
dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10 [dm_mod]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x600
ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
? ksys_write+0x4f/0xb0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x150
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Signed-off-by: Jason Cai (Xiang Feng) <jason.cai@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Mike Snitzer