Merge tag 'loongarch-kvm-6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson into HEAD
LoongArch KVM changes for v6.16 1. Don't flush tlb if HW PTW supported. 2. Add LoongArch KVM selftests support.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -8,10 +8,19 @@
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#define _UAPI_CXL_FEATURES_H_
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#ifndef __KERNEL__
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#include <uuid/uuid.h>
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#else
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typedef unsigned char __uapi_uuid_t[16];
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#ifdef __KERNEL__
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#include <linux/uuid.h>
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/*
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* Note, __uapi_uuid_t is 1-byte aligned on modern compilers and 4-byte
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* aligned on others. Ensure that __uapi_uuid_t in a struct is placed at
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* a 4-byte aligned offset, or the structure is packed, to ensure
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* consistent padding.
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*/
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static_assert(sizeof(__uapi_uuid_t) == sizeof(uuid_t));
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#define __uapi_uuid_t uuid_t
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#endif
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/*
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@@ -60,7 +69,7 @@ struct cxl_mbox_get_sup_feats_in {
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* Get Supported Features Supported Feature Entry
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*/
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struct cxl_feat_entry {
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uuid_t uuid;
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__uapi_uuid_t uuid;
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__le16 id;
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__le16 get_feat_size;
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__le16 set_feat_size;
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@@ -110,7 +119,7 @@ struct cxl_mbox_get_sup_feats_out {
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* CXL spec r3.2 section 8.2.9.6.2 Table 8-99
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*/
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struct cxl_mbox_get_feat_in {
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uuid_t uuid;
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__uapi_uuid_t uuid;
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__le16 offset;
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__le16 count;
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__u8 selection;
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@@ -143,7 +152,7 @@ enum cxl_get_feat_selection {
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*/
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struct cxl_mbox_set_feat_in {
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__struct_group(cxl_mbox_set_feat_hdr, hdr, /* no attrs */,
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uuid_t uuid;
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__uapi_uuid_t uuid;
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__le32 flags;
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__le16 offset;
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__u8 version;
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only WITH Linux-syscall-note */
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Intel Corporation
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* Copyright (C) 2020-2025 Intel Corporation
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*/
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#ifndef __UAPI_IVPU_DRM_H__
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@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct drm_ivpu_param {
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* platform type when executing on a simulator or emulator (read-only)
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*
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* %DRM_IVPU_PARAM_CORE_CLOCK_RATE:
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* Current PLL frequency (read-only)
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* Maximum frequency of the NPU data processing unit clock (read-only)
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*
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* %DRM_IVPU_PARAM_NUM_CONTEXTS:
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* Maximum number of simultaneously existing contexts (read-only)
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@@ -4968,6 +4968,9 @@ union bpf_attr {
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* the netns switch takes place from ingress to ingress without
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* going through the CPU's backlog queue.
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*
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* *skb*\ **->mark** and *skb*\ **->tstamp** are not cleared during
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* the netns switch.
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*
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* The *flags* argument is reserved and must be 0. The helper is
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* currently only supported for tc BPF program types at the
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* ingress hook and for veth and netkit target device types. The
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@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ enum ethtool_header_flags {
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ETHTOOL_FLAG_STATS = 4,
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};
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enum {
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ETHTOOL_PHY_UPSTREAM_TYPE_MAC,
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ETHTOOL_PHY_UPSTREAM_TYPE_PHY,
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};
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enum ethtool_tcp_data_split {
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ETHTOOL_TCP_DATA_SPLIT_UNKNOWN,
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ETHTOOL_TCP_DATA_SPLIT_DISABLED,
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@@ -1010,7 +1010,9 @@ struct io_uring_zcrx_ifq_reg {
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__u64 region_ptr; /* struct io_uring_region_desc * */
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struct io_uring_zcrx_offsets offsets;
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__u64 __resv[4];
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__u32 zcrx_id;
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__u32 __resv2;
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__u64 __resv[3];
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};
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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@@ -53,43 +53,70 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
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__u64 scoped;
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};
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/*
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* sys_landlock_create_ruleset() flags:
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/**
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* DOC: landlock_create_ruleset_flags
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*
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* - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION: Get the highest supported Landlock ABI
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* version.
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* - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA: Get a bitmask of fixed issues.
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* **Flags**
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*
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* %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION
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* Get the highest supported Landlock ABI version (starting at 1).
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*
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* %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA
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* Get a bitmask of fixed issues for the current Landlock ABI version.
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*/
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/* clang-format off */
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#define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION (1U << 0)
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#define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA (1U << 1)
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/* clang-format on */
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/*
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* sys_landlock_restrict_self() flags:
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/**
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* DOC: landlock_restrict_self_flags
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*
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* - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF: Do not create any log related to the
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* enforced restrictions. This should only be set by tools launching unknown
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* or untrusted programs (e.g. a sandbox tool, container runtime, system
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* service manager). Because programs sandboxing themselves should fix any
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* denied access, they should not set this flag to be aware of potential
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* issues reported by system's logs (i.e. audit).
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* - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON: Explicitly ask to continue
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* logging denied access requests even after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call.
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* This flag should only be set if all the programs than can legitimately be
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* executed will not try to request a denied access (which could spam audit
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* logs).
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* - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF: Do not create any log related
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* to the enforced restrictions coming from future nested domains created by
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* the caller or its descendants. This should only be set according to a
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* runtime configuration (i.e. not hardcoded) by programs launching other
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* unknown or untrusted programs that may create their own Landlock domains
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* and spam logs. The main use case is for container runtimes to enable users
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* to mute buggy sandboxed programs for a specific container image. Other use
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* cases include sandboxer tools and init systems. Unlike
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* %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF,
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* %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF does not impact the requested
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* restriction (if any) but only the future nested domains.
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* **Flags**
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*
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* By default, denied accesses originating from programs that sandbox themselves
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* are logged via the audit subsystem. Such events typically indicate unexpected
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* behavior, such as bugs or exploitation attempts. However, to avoid excessive
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* logging, access requests denied by a domain not created by the originating
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* program are not logged by default. The rationale is that programs should know
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* their own behavior, but not necessarily the behavior of other programs. This
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* default configuration is suitable for most programs that sandbox themselves.
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* For specific use cases, the following flags allow programs to modify this
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* default logging behavior.
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*
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* The %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF and
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* %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON flags apply to the newly created
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* Landlock domain.
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*
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* %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF
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* Disables logging of denied accesses originating from the thread creating
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* the Landlock domain, as well as its children, as long as they continue
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* running the same executable code (i.e., without an intervening
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* :manpage:`execve(2)` call). This is intended for programs that execute
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* unknown code without invoking :manpage:`execve(2)`, such as script
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* interpreters. Programs that only sandbox themselves should not set this
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* flag, so users can be notified of unauthorized access attempts via system
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* logs.
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*
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* %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON
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* Enables logging of denied accesses after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call,
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* providing visibility into unauthorized access attempts by newly executed
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* programs within the created Landlock domain. This flag is recommended
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* only when all potential executables in the domain are expected to comply
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* with the access restrictions, as excessive audit log entries could make
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* it more difficult to identify critical events.
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*
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* %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
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* Disables logging of denied accesses originating from nested Landlock
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* domains created by the caller or its descendants. This flag should be set
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* according to runtime configuration, not hardcoded, to avoid suppressing
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* important security events. It is useful for container runtimes or
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* sandboxing tools that may launch programs which themselves create
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* Landlock domains and could otherwise generate excessive logs. Unlike
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* ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF``, this flag only affects
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* future nested domains, not the one being created. It can also be used
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* with a @ruleset_fd value of -1 to mute subdomain logs without creating a
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* domain.
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*/
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/* clang-format off */
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#define LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF (1U << 0)
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@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
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/* Set current process as the (exclusive) owner of this file descriptor. This
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* must be called before any other vhost command. Further calls to
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* VHOST_OWNER_SET fail until VHOST_OWNER_RESET is called. */
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* VHOST_SET_OWNER fail until VHOST_RESET_OWNER is called. */
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#define VHOST_SET_OWNER _IO(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x01)
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/* Give up ownership, and reset the device to default values.
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* Allows subsequent call to VHOST_OWNER_SET to succeed. */
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* Allows subsequent call to VHOST_SET_OWNER to succeed. */
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#define VHOST_RESET_OWNER _IO(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x02)
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/* Set up/modify memory layout */
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@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ struct virtio_pci_cfg_cap {
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#define VIRTIO_ADMIN_CMD_LIST_USE 0x1
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/* Admin command group type. */
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#define VIRTIO_ADMIN_GROUP_TYPE_SELF 0x0
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#define VIRTIO_ADMIN_GROUP_TYPE_SRIOV 0x1
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/* Transitional device admin command. */
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